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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:15 p.m. EDT: 
Thursday, May 1, 2008: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their 
Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be Addressed: 

Statement of Brian J. Lepore, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

GAO-08-722T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-722T, a testimony before the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese 
communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in 
the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review 
Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in 
Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from 
Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. 

GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S. 
forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses 
(1) DODís planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2) 
potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with 
the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government 
of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. 

This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO 
report on DODís overseas master plans and prior work on issues related 
to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on 
preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DODís planning 
effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup 
on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on 
surrounding communities in the continental United States. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; 
however, many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the 
military population, which units will be stationed there, and what 
military facilities will be constructed. This part of the planning 
process is ongoing, along with the development of a required 
environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in 
2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for fiscal year 2010 
prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its 
facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated 
funding. Officials of the Navyís Joint Guam Program Office told us that 
immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD 
will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 
goal discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other 
DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic 
schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact 
statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of 
Marines and their dependents to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient 
funding from the governments of United States and Japan to support the 
move. 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 
associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DODís challenges 
include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such 
as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also 
challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on 
Guamís community and civilian infrastructure. For example, according to 
DOD and government of Guam officials, Guamís highways may be unable to 
bear the increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its 
electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy 
needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near 
capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and 
environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated 
with the projected increase in U.S. forces and their dependents. 

The government of Guamís efforts to plan to meet infrastructure 
challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities are 
in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated with the 
military buildup contribute to the difficulties Guam officials face in 
developing precise plans. These challenges are somewhat analogous to 
challenges communities around continental U.S. growth bases face. 
Government of Guam officials recognize that the islandís infrastructure 
is inadequate to meet the projected demand; however, funding sources 
are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to whether and to 
what extent the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial 
assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to the military 
buildup. In September 2007, GAO reported that most communities 
experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army 
installations in the continental United States will likely incur costs 
to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure 
improvements, and many of these communities are also seeking federal 
and state assistance. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making recommendations at this time. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
GAO-08-722T. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the planning 
effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities in Guam and to 
describe the associated challenges for the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and the local community in accommodating the expansion of DOD's 
military presence on Guam. To reduce the burden of the U.S. military 
presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing 
presence of U.S. forces in the region, the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy 
Review Initiative[Footnote 1] established a framework for the future of 
U.S. force structure in Japan, including the relocation of American 
military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. As a part of 
this initiative, DOD plans to move 8,000 Marines and their estimated 
9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. At the 
same time, the other military services are also planning to expand 
their operations and military presence on Guam. For example, the Navy 
plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and 
waterfront facilities; the Air Force plans to develop a global 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen 
Air Force Base; and the Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense 
task force on Guam. As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps 
realignment, the total military buildup on Guam is estimated to cost 
over $13 billion and increase Guam's current population of 171,000 by 
an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or 
14.6 percent) to 196,000. The government of Japan is expected to 
contribute about $6.1 billion toward the costs of the Marine Corps 
move, although a portion of these funds could be repaid over time by 
the U.S. government. 

We have issued several reports on DOD's integrated global presence and 
basing strategy[Footnote 2] and its overseas master plans for changing 
U.S. military infrastructure overseas as required by the fiscal year 
2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report.[Footnote 
3] Most recently, in September 2007, we reported on DOD's overseas 
master plans for changing its infrastructure overseas and on the status 
of DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup 
of military forces and facilities on Guam.[Footnote 4] In that report, 
we found that DOD's planning effort for the military buildup on Guam 
was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet 
to be addressed. Additionally, we found that the potential effects of 
the increase in military forces on Guam's infrastructure--in terms of 
population and military facilities--had not been fully addressed. Also, 
in September 2007, we reported how communities in the continental 
United States are planning and funding for infrastructure to support 
significant personnel growth in response to implementing base 
realignment and closure, overseas force rebasing, and force modularity 
actions.[Footnote 5] 

As requested, my testimony today will focus on three principal 
objectives. First, I will address DOD's planning process for the 
military buildup on Guam. Second, I will point out potential challenges 
for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the military 
buildup. Third, I will describe the status of planning efforts by the 
government of Guam to address infrastructure challenges to the local 
community caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities. 

My testimony is based largely on findings of our September 2007 report 
on DOD's overseas master plans and information from a prior report on 
issues related to reducing the effects of the U.S. military presence in 
Okinawa.[Footnote 6] My testimony is also based, in part, on 
preliminary observations from our ongoing review of DOD's overseas 
master plans and its planning effort to address the challenges 
associated with the military buildup on Guam and on two separate 
reports of the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities 
in the continental United States.[Footnote 7] As part of our ongoing 
work, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, U.S. Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine 
Expeditionary Force, and the Navy's Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)-- 
the office established to plan and execute the military buildup on 
Guam--to discuss the planning process for DOD's military realignments 
on Guam and to identify challenges associated with the buildup of 
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. We also met with the 
Governor of Guam and his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff 
from the office of the Guam Delegate to the House of Representatives, 
and various Guam community groups to discuss their planning efforts and 
any challenges they may face related to the military buildup. We expect 
to report the results of our ongoing review to congressional defense 
committees later this year. We conducted this performance audit and our 
prior reports in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; yet, 
many key decisions must still be made, such as the final size of the 
military population, which units will be stationed there, and what 
military facilities will be required. The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy 
Review Initiative established a framework for the future of U.S. force 
structure in Japan and the Marine Corps realignment to Guam. The U.S. 
Pacific Command then developed the Guam Integrated Military Development 
Plan[Footnote 8] to provide an overview of the projected military 
population and infrastructure requirements. However, the exact size and 
makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the housing, operational, 
quality of life, and service support infrastructure required are not 
yet fully known. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along 
with the development of a required environmental impact statement. 
Before JGPO can finalize its master plan for the military buildup on 
Guam, it needs to complete the required environmental impact statement, 
currently expected to be issued in 2010. Prior to that date, DOD will 
submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first 
phase of military construction projects on Guam. Thus, DOD may be 
asking Congress to fund the military construction projects without the 
benefit of a completed environmental impact statement or a final 
decision on the full extent of its facility and funding requirements. 
DOD officials said that the department often requests funding during 
the same period environmental impact statements are being developed for 
large projects, including major base realignments and closures. JGPO 
officials told us that immediately after the environmental impact 
statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of facilities in 
efforts to meet the 2014 goal identified in the Defense Policy Review 
Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe 
that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the 
possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, 
the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents 
from Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from 
the governments of United States and Japan to support the Marine Corps 
move. 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 
associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD's challenges 
include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such 
as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also 
challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on 
Guam's community and infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and 
government of Guam officials, Guam's highways may be unable to bear the 
increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its 
electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy 
needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near 
capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and 
environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated 
with relocation of U.S. forces and their dependents. 

The government of Guam's efforts to plan to meet infrastructure 
challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities on 
Guam are in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated 
with the military buildup further contribute to the difficulties Guam 
officials face in developing precise plans. These challenges are 
somewhat analogous to the challenges communities around continental 
United States growth bases face. Furthermore, government of Guam 
officials stated that Guam will likely require significant funding to 
address the island's inadequate infrastructure capacity; however, 
funding sources are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to 
whether and to what extent the government of Guam will be able to 
obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to 
the military buildup. In September 2007, we reported that most U.S. 
communities surrounding growing Army bases have unique infrastructure 
improvement needs, such as schools, transportation, and other 
infrastructure improvements, and many of these communities are also 
seeking state and federal assistance.[Footnote 9] 

Background: 

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in 
Okinawa and other locations in Japan. The U.S. military occupation of 
Japan ended in 1952, but the United States administered the Ryukyu 
Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972. Efforts to address the Japanese 
population's concerns regarding U.S. military presence in Okinawa began 
more than a decade ago. One chief complaint is that the Okinawa 
prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and that more 
than 70 percent of the land U.S. forces utilize in Japan is on Okinawa. 
Many citizens of Okinawa believe the U.S. presence has hampered 
economic development. The public outcry in Okinawa following the 
September 1995 abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three 
U.S. servicemembers brought to the forefront long-standing concerns 
among the Okinawan people about the effects of the U.S. military 
presence on the island. According to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, at that time, the continued ability of the United States to 
remain in Japan was at risk, and it was important to reduce the effects 
of the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people. To address these 
concerns, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan 
began, and the Security Consultative Committee established the Special 
Action Committee on Okinawa in November 1995. The committee developed 
recommendations on ways to limit the effects of the U.S. military 
presence on Okinawa by closing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and 
relocating forces from that base to another base on Okinawa, and 
recommended numerous other operational changes. On December 2, 1996, 
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Japan 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State, and the Director General of the 
Japan Defense Agency issued the committee's final report. 

In 1998, we reviewed the Special Action Committee's Final Report. 
[Footnote 10] At that time, among other things, we reported that the 
forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortens transit times, 
thereby promoting early arrival in potential regional trouble spots 
such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits. For example, it 
takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from Okinawa, as compared 
with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from 
the continental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1-1/2 days to 
make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as compared with 
about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the 
continental United States. Also, the cost of this presence is shared by 
the government of Japan, which provides land and other infrastructure 
on Okinawa rent free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based 
Marine Corps forces, such as a portion of the costs for utilities and 
local Japanese labor. Most initiatives of the Special Action Committee 
on Okinawa involving training operations, changes to the status of 
forces agreement procedures, and noise reduction were successfully 
implemented. In contrast, initiatives involving land returns have not 
been as successful, with the majority still ongoing. For example, the 
closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was never completed and the 
air station remains open and operational. According to U.S. Forces 
Japan officials, these initiatives may involve multiple construction 
projects to satisfy the requirements of the initiatives as well as 
detailed coordination between the government of Japan and the local 
communities to gain consensus for these projects. 

In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained 
security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance to better address today's rapidly changing global security 
environment. DOD's Defense Policy Review Initiative established a 
framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to 
create the conditions to reduce the burden on Japanese communities and 
create a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by 
relocating units to other areas, including Guam (app. I shows the 
location of Guam). This initiative also includes a significant 
reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa to 
include relocating 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents 
to Guam. More than 10,000 Marines and their dependents will remain 
stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. Another initiative includes 
the closure and replacement of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma at a 
less densely populated location on Okinawa by the 2014 goal as a result 
of local concerns involving safety and noise. DOD officials view the 
success of the Futenma replacement facility as a key objective of the 
initiative that will need to be completed in order for other 
realignment actions to take place. Previously, the United States and 
Japan were unsuccessful in closing and replacing the Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee effort on 
Okinawa. 

Other Global Realignments: 

In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been 
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military 
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. The initiative is 
intended to close bases no longer needed to meet Cold War threats as 
well as bring home U.S. forces while stationing more flexible, 
deployable capabilities in strategic locations around the world. As 
part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas basing 
requirements to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to combat 
conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. 

The Marine Corps realignment from Okinawa to Guam is just one of 
several initiatives to move military forces and equipment and construct 
supporting military facilities on Guam. In addition to the Marine 
Corps' move to Guam, the Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, 
logistic capabilities, and waterfront facilities to support transient 
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing, combat logistics force ships, 
submarines, surface combatants, and high-speed transport ships at Naval 
Base Guam. The Air Force plans to develop a global intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base 
by hosting various types of aircraft, such as fighters, bombers, and 
tankers, and the Global Hawk system, which is a high-altitude, long- 
endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system, on both permanent and 
rotational bases. The Army also plans to place a ballistic missile 
defense task force on Guam with approximately 630 soldiers and 950 
dependents. As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps 
realignment, the active duty military personnel and dependent 
population of more than 14,000 on Guam is expected to increase 
approximately 176 percent to more than 39,000 (app. II shows current 
U.S. military bases on Guam). 

Master Planning Requirements for the Military Buildup on Guam: 

As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began 
to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness 
of the military construction program and the need for a well-developed 
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. 
In July 2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military 
construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in 
the President's budget request until such time as they can be 
incorporated into a master plan for Guam and viewed in that context. 
Further, the committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to 
the appropriation committees a master plan for Guam by December 29, 
2006, and a report accounting for the United States' share of this 
construction program to project-level detail and the year in which each 
project is expected to be funded.[Footnote 11] The Senate report also 
directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of 
its annual review of DOD's overseas master plans.[Footnote 12] As 
discussed in our 2007 report, DOD has not issued a Guam master plan for 
several reasons. First, the required environmental impact statement, 
which will take at least 3 years to complete according to DOD documents 
and officials, was initiated on March 7, 2007.[Footnote 13] According 
to DOD officials, the results of that environmental impact statement 
will influence many of the key decisions on the exact location, size, 
and makeup of the military infrastructure development on Guam. Second, 
exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet 
identified. Third, DOD officials said that additional time is needed to 
fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, 
operational requirements, and Guam's economic and infrastructure 
requirements. 

Organizations and Responsibilities: 

The U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for 
the movement of Marine Corps forces to Guam. In August 2006, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish JGPO to 
facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated with the 
rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including the 
planning for all the other remaining military realignments on Guam. 
Specifically, JGPO was tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts 
among all the DOD components and other stakeholders to consolidate, 
optimize, and integrate the existing DOD infrastructure on Guam. The 
office's responsibilities include integration of operational support 
requirements, development, and program and budget synchronization; 
oversight of the construction; and coordination of government and 
business activities. JGPO is expected to work closely with the local 
Guam government, the government of Japan, other federal agencies, and 
Congress in order to manage this comprehensive effort and to develop a 
master plan. 

The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility over 
the insular areas for all matters that do not fall within the program 
responsibility of other federal departments or agencies. Also, the 
Interior Secretary presides over the Interagency Group on Insular Areas 
and may make recommendations to the President or heads of agencies 
regarding policy or policy implementation actions of the federal 
government affecting insular areas. The Secretary, as the presiding 
officer of this interagency group, established a Working Group on Guam 
Military Expansion to address issues related to the military buildup. 
The working group includes representatives of the Departments of State, 
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, Transportation, 
Housing and Urban Development, Education, and Veterans Affairs as well 
as the Navy, the Small Business Administration, the Office of 
Management and Budget, and others. Five ongoing subgroups were 
established to discuss policy and resource requirements relating to (1) 
labor and workforce issues, (2) Guam civilian infrastructure needs, (3) 
health and human services requirements, (4) the environment, and (5) 
socioeconomic issues. 

DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam, but the 
Planning Process Is Ongoing: 

The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has established the 
framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan, 
including the realignments on Okinawa and Guam. However, no final 
decision on the exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam, 
including their operational, housing, and installation support 
facilities, has been made. The environmental impact statement expected 
in 2010 may affect many key planning decisions. 

Framework for the Military Realignment and Buildup: 

DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that 
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on 
Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the 
U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the 
framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to 
create the conditions to reduce the burden of American military 
presence on local Japanese communities and to create a continuing 
presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including 
Guam. In its Defense of Japan 2006 publication, the Japan Ministry of 
Defense reported that more than 70 percent of U.S. facilities and areas 
are concentrated in Okinawa and regional development has been greatly 
affected by the concentration.[Footnote 14] That publication 
recommended that the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps forces from 
Okinawa to Guam should occur as soon as possible. It further noted that 
based on bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, the government of Japan 
had decided to support the United States in its development of 
necessary facilities and infrastructure, including headquarters 
buildings, barracks, and family housing, to hasten the process of 
moving Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam. 

Subsequently, in July 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam 
Integrated Military Development Plan[Footnote 15] to provide an 
overview of the projected military population and infrastructure 
requirements; however, it provides limited information on the expected 
effects of the military buildup on the local community and off base 
infrastructure. The plan is based upon a notional force structure that 
was used to generate land and facility requirements for basing, 
operations, logistics, training, and quality of life involving the 
Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces in 
Guam. Also, JGPO has completed its first phase of the Guam master 
planning process and developed basic facility requirements with general 
cost estimates and mapping concepts. The second phase of the master 
planning is in progress and will include more detailed infrastructure 
requirements, facility layouts, and cost estimates for fiscal years 
2010 and 2011. JGPO is developing a planning-level Guam joint military 
master plan that will be submitted to congressional staff by September 
15, 2008. However, that plan is not considered a final master plan 
since DOD is awaiting the results of the environmental impact statement 
and record of decision, which are due in 2010. 

Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known: 

The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the 
operational, housing, and installation support facilities required are 
not yet fully known. While the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review 
Initiative identified Marine Corps units for relocation from Okinawa, 
assessments are still under way within DOD to determine the optimal mix 
of units to move to Guam, which may also include Marines from other 
locations, such as Hawaii and the continental United States. 

Approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents of the 
Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine 
Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st 
Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters are 
expected to be included in the move to Guam. The Marine Corps forces 
remaining on Okinawa will consist of approximately 10,000 Marines plus 
their dependents of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. While these broad 
estimates provide a baseline, according to DOD officials we spoke with, 
the Marine Corps is still determining the specific mix of units and 
capabilities needed to meet mission requirements on Guam. In addition, 
Marine Corps officials said that the department was reviewing the mix 
of units moving to Guam in light of the department's plan to increase 
the number of Marines to 202,000 from 180,000.[Footnote 16] 

The number and mix of units is significant because, according to Marine 
Corps officials, the operational, housing, and installation support 
facilities on Guam will depend on the type, size, and number of units 
that will make the move. That determination will define the training 
and facility requirements, such as the number and size of family 
housing units, barracks, and schools and the capacity of the 
installation support facilities needed to support the military 
population and operations. In response to the ongoing assessment by the 
Marine Corps, JGPO officials said that they were initiating a master 
plan that will reflect the building of žflexible: 

Results of the Required Environmental Impact Statement May Affect 
Several Key Decisions: 

Before JGPO can finalize its Guam master plan, it will need to complete 
the required environmental impact statement. According to DOD 
officials, the results of the environmental statement, currently 
expected to be issued in 2010, can affect many of the key decisions on 
the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure 
development. 

On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare 
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),[Footnote 17] as 
implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality 
Regulations,[Footnote 18] and Executive Order 12114. The notice of 
intent in the Federal Register[Footnote 19] states that the 
environmental impact statement will: 

* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with 
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units 
(which comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement 
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine 
Corps units' relocation to include operations, training, and 
infrastructure changes. 

* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic 
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient 
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental 
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront 
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing. 

* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force 
(approximately 630 solders and their estimated 950 dependents) in Guam. 
The environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from 
activities associated with the task force, including operations, 
training, and infrastructure changes. 

JGPO officials recognize that the results of this environmental 
assessment process may affect the development and timing of JGPO's 
master plan for Guam. Under NEPA and the regulations established by the 
Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental impact statement 
must include a purpose and need statement, a description of all 
reasonable project alternatives and their environmental effects 
(including a "no action" alternative), a description of the environment 
of the area to be affected or created by the alternatives being 
considered, and an analysis of the environmental impacts of the 
proposed action and each alternative.[Footnote 20] Further, accurate 
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are 
essential to implementing NEPA. For example, federal agencies such as 
DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, including 
scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in the 
environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft 
environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are 
required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has 
jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the 
comments of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American 
tribes, and any agency that has requested that it receive such 
statements. Until an agency issues a final environmental impact 
statement and record of decision, it generally may not take any action 
concerning the proposal that would either have adverse environmental 
effects or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. 

DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses 
and cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of Guam master 
plan and thus affect the construction schedule of military facilities 
needed to accommodate thousands of Marines and dependents by the 2014 
goal identified in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. DOD will 
submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first 
phase of military construction projects prior to the completion of the 
environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to 
fund the military construction projects without the benefit of a 
completed environmental impact statement or a final decision on the 
full extent of its facility and funding requirements. DOD officials 
said that this practice of requesting funding during the development of 
environmental impact statements is common within the department for 
large projects, such as major base realignments and closures. JGPO 
officials told us that immediately after the environmental impact 
statement and record of decision are completed, the department will 
commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal. 
However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this 
is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the possibility 
that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the 
complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents from Okinawa 
to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United States and 
Japan to support military construction projects. 

Several DOD and Government of Guam Challenges Have Yet to Be Addressed: 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 
associated with the military buildup, including addressing funding and 
operational challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which 
could affect the development and implementation of their planning 
efforts. First, DOD has not identified all funding requirements and may 
encounter difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities 
within the department. Second, DOD officials need to address the 
operational and training limitations on Guam, such as for sea and 
airlift capabilities, and training requirements for thousands of 
Marines. Third, the increase in military personnel and their dependents 
on Guam and the large number of the construction workers needed to 
build military facilities will create challenges for Guam's community 
and civilian infrastructure. 

DOD Faces Funding Challenges: 

The military services' realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over 
$13 billion. Included in this $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine 
Corps buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. However, these 
estimates do not include the estimated costs of all other defense 
organizations that will be needed to support the additional military 
personnel and dependents on Guam. For example, the Defense Logistics 
Agency, which will help support the services' influx of personnel, 
missions, and equipment to Guam, will likely incur additional costs 
that are not included in the current estimate. Also, the costs to move 
and accommodate Marine Corps units from locations other than Okinawa to 
Guam are not included in the estimate. In addition, the costs 
associated with the development of training ranges[Footnote 21] and 
facilities on nearby islands are not included in the current estimate 
for the military buildup. According to JGPO officials, the total costs 
for the military buildup will eventually be identified and integrated 
into JGPO's master plan for Guam. 

Of the $10.3 billion estimate for the Marine Corps buildup, the 
government of Japan is expected to contribute up to $2.8 billion in 
funds without reimbursement for the construction of facilities, such as 
barracks and office buildings. The government of Japan is also expected 
to provide another $3.3 billion in loans and equity investments for 
installation support infrastructure, such as on base power and water 
systems, and military family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is 
expected over time to be recouped by Japan in the form of service 
charges paid by the U.S. government and in rents paid by American 
servicemembers with their overseas housing allowance provided by DOD. 

In addition, according to DOD officials, there are several conditions 
that must be met before the government of Japan contributes to the cost 
of the Marine Corps move. First, the government of Japan has stipulated 
that its funds will not be made available until it has reviewed and 
agreed to specific infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or 
delay of any initiative outlined in the Defense Policy Review 
Initiative may affect the other initiatives, because various planning 
variables need to fall into place in order for the initiatives to move 
forward. For example, DOD officials expect that if the Futenma 
replacement facility in Okinawa (estimated to cost from $4 billion to 
$5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation to Guam may be 
canceled or delayed. Previously, the United States and Japan were 
unsuccessful in closing and replacing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
as a part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa process in 1996. 
[Footnote 22] DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement 
facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be 
completed in order for other realignment actions to take place, 
including the move to Guam. Finally, the government of Japan may 
encounter challenges in funding its share of the Marine Corps move 
considering Japan's other national priorities and its commitments 
associated with funding several other major realignments of U.S. forces 
in Japan under the Defense Policy Review Initiative. 

DOD Faces Operational Challenges: 

Operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility support 
and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have not 
been fully addressed. According to Marine Forces Pacific officials, the 
Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military sealift and 
airlift to reach destinations in Asia that may be farther away than was 
the case when the units were based in Okinawa. For example, in a 
contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to 
deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or other locations to collect the Marines 
and their equipment on Guam and then go to the area where the 
contingency is taking place, potentially risking a delayed arrival at 
certain potential trouble spots. According to Marine Corps officials, 
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam, 
which may include expanding existing staging facilities and systems 
support for both sealift and airlift. The Marine Corps estimated 
additional costs for strategic lift operating from Guam to be nearly 
$88 million annually. 

Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to 
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A 
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges 
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force 
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific 
Command is also in the process of conducting a training study that 
covers both Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
to see what options are available for training in the region. Marine 
Forces Pacific officials stated that live-fire artillery training, 
amphibious landings, and tracked vehicle operations will be challenging 
because of the combination of factors associated with the limited size 
of training areas available and the environmental concerns on the 
Northern Mariana Islands. 

Increase in Military Presence Is Likely to Cause Local Community and 
Infrastructure Challenges: 

The increase in military presence is expected to have significant 
effects on Guam's community and infrastructure, and these challenges 
have not been fully addressed. This undertaking is estimated to 
increase the current Guam population of approximately 171,000 by an 
estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 
percent) to 196,000. The Guam population could also swell further 
because DOD's personnel estimates do not include defense civilians and 
contractors who are also likely to move to Guam to support DOD 
operations. 

DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the military 
buildup will have significant effects on the local community. For 
example: 

* As a result of the military buildup on Guam, construction demands 
will exceed local capacity and the availability of workers, though the 
extent to which the local workers can meet this increase has yet to be 
determined. For example, on the basis of trend data, government of Guam 
officials estimate the current construction capacity to be 
approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated 
construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed by DOD to 
meet the planned 2014 completion date. In addition, Guam currently 
faces a shortage of skilled construction workers. Preliminary analysis 
indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 construction workers will be required 
to support the projected development on Guam. One estimate is that Guam 
may be able to meet only 10 to 15 percent of the labor requirement 
locally, a concern to federal, military, and local officials. Nearby 
countries may have workers willing to come to Guam to take jobs to 
construct needed facilities, but these workers will have to temporarily 
enter the United States on temporary nonagricultural workers visas, 
currently capped at 66,000 per year. JGPO officials said that 
legislation recently passed by both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives that will increase the cap in the short term is a first 
step toward addressing many of their concerns with temporary 
nonagricultural workers visas. 

* The government of Guam has expressed several concerns about the 
potential effects of an influx of foreign workers on Guam's community. 
The Civilian Military Task Force recommended that Guam needs to 
establish a department that would focus on processing foreign workers. 
Further, a government of Guam report stated that the influx of foreign 
workers would put a strain on existing emergency care services, medical 
facilities, and public utilities. 

In addition, DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the 
island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the increased demand due 
to the military buildup. For example: 

* Guam's commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing 
space, crane operations, and container storage locations. The military 
buildup requires a port with double the current capacity, and military 
cargo is expected to increase sixfold during construction of facilities 
required for the buildup. 

* Guam's two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance 
(ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air 
Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance 
must be transported on one of these major roads that run through highly 
populated areas. The current highway system also experiences slippery 
surfaces, potholes, and occasional flooding. Traffic between military 
installations and commercial, business, and residential areas is 
anticipated to increase significantly with the military buildup. 

* Guam's electrical system--the sole power provider on the island--is 
not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and 
voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to 
deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military 
buildup. 

* Guam's water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and 
have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution 
lines. The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent. 

* Guam's solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental 
challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life. 
Currently, the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of 
unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near 
capacity. 

Government of Guam's Planning Efforts Are in Their Initial Stages: 

The government of Guam's planning efforts to address infrastructure 
challenges associated with the buildup of military forces are in the 
initial stages, and several uncertainties further contribute to the 
difficulties the government of Guam faces in developing precise plans 
to address the effects of the military buildup on the local community 
and infrastructure. In addition, funding sources to address 
infrastructure challenges are uncertain. As we have found with some 
communities experiencing civilian and military population growth 
surrounding Army installations in the continental United States, the 
government of Guam will likely ask for assistance to provide civilian 
infrastructure improvements. 

Two recent studies that examine the various effects of the military 
buildup on the local infrastructure and community were developed by the 
government of Guam and KPMG. First, the Governor of Guam commissioned 
the Civilian Military Task Force to develop a plan that would both 
accommodate the military personnel expansion and provide opportunities 
for the Guam community. The task force issued its report in November 
2007, which provided a synopsis of the various funding and resource 
needs.[Footnote 23] Second, the government of Guam contracted KPMG to 
examine the needs and challenges Guam faces in regard to the military 
buildup. The October 2007 report made preliminary assessments on the 
effects of the military buildup on Guam's infrastructure, economy, and 
social services.[Footnote 24] One study estimated that more than $3 
billion will be required for civilian infrastructure and government 
services to address the military buildup.[Footnote 25] 

The uncertainties associated with exact size, makeup, and timing of the 
forces to be moved to Guam make it difficult for the government of Guam 
to develop comprehensive plans to address the effects of the proposed 
military buildup. Guam officials said that without accurate information 
it is difficult to develop an infrastructure program that identifies 
civilian construction projects and financing to support the military 
buildup and to form an administrative structure to oversee and 
coordinate project scheduling and implementation. In our September 2007 
report on communities experiencing civilian and military population 
growth at continental U.S. Army installations, we found that without 
knowing whether Army headquarters-level offices or the local base plans 
have accurate information about the expected growth, communities are 
not well positioned to plan for and provide adequate schools, housing, 
transportation, and other infrastructure. 

As discussed previously, government of Guam officials recognize that 
the island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand 
and will likely require significant funding to address this challenge. 
However, the extent to which the government of Guam will be able to 
obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands from 
the federal government is unclear. Government of Guam officials we met 
with were uncertain as to whether and to what extent federal grant 
programs will be available to address Guam's public infrastructure to 
support the military realignments. On the basis of its initial review, 
KPMG reported that the data it collected from the government of Guam 
suggested that it is likely there will be a significant funding gap 
between the availability of funds and requirements for Guam's 
infrastructure program.[Footnote 26] KPMG further reported that $282 
million in federal funding was provided to Guam in 2006. Without 
additional federal assistance, government of Guam officials believe 
that local infrastructure improvements to accommodate the military 
buildup would take decades to complete. In our September 2007 report on 
U.S. communities experiencing civilian and military population growth 
at Army installations, we found that communities will likely incur 
costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other 
infrastructure improvements.[Footnote 27] Because of limited local 
funding, some of these communities are seeking federal and state 
assistance. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions you or any members of the committee may have at this 
time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this statement, please contact Brian 
J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this testimony. GAO staff members making major 
contributions to this testimony are listed in appendix III. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Location of Guam: 

Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is located 
in the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles southwest of Honolulu, 
Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the Philippines; and 1,560 miles 
southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Location of Guam: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the Pacific Ocean area with specific 
indications of distances from Guam to the following cities: 

From Guam: 
Distance to Manila: 1,600 miles; 
Distance to Taipei: 1,700 miles; 
Distance to Tokyo: 1,560 miles; 
Distance to Honolulu: 3,810 miles. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Military Installations on Guam: 

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), about 29 percent of the 
land on Guam is controlled by DOD (as indicated in white in fig. 2), 52 
percent is privately owned, and 19 percent is under the supervision of 
the government of Guam. 

Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Guam, with the location of the following 
military installations indicated: 

Andersen AFB: 
Northwest Field, Anderson AFB: 
Andersen South: 
NCTS Finegayan: 
South Finegayan Housing: 
Naval Hospital: 
NCTS Barrigada: 
Guam International Airport: 
Apra Harbor Naval Complex: 
Ordnance Annex: 
Apra Heights: 
Tenjo Vista Tank Farm: 
Sasa Valley Tank Farm: 
Nimitz Hill. 

Source: DOD. 

Note: NCTS is the abbreviation for naval computer and 
telecommunications station and AFB is the abbreviation for air force 
base. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant 
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Jamilah Moon 
made major contributions to this testimony. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Overseas Master Plans/Global Posturing: 

Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD 
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military 
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 12, 2007. 

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are 
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture 
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. 

DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R]. Washington, D.C.: 
August 22, 2006. 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing 
U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 27, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs 
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 15, 2004. 

Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 
Military Presence on Okinawa. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 2, 1998. 

Community Growth Bases: 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: 
April 1, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 13, 2007. 

U.S. Insular Areas: 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation Would 
Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition Period. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-466]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 28, 2008. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability 
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-119]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care 
Funding. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-75]. 
Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005. 

Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with 
Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-423]. Washington, D.C.: 
April 11, 2002. 

Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid 
Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants' Impact on U.S. Areas. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-270T]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 6, 2001. 

Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had 
Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-40]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 5, 2001. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OGC-98-5]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 7, 1997. 

Insular Areas Update. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-184R]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 13, 1996. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal 
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-GGD-95-71]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination Among 
U.S. Agencies Are Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-94-62]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 7, 1994. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOD officials refer to the process through which the United States 
and Japan negotiated the initiatives that realign U.S. forces in Japan 
as the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The realignment initiatives 
were the result of Security Consultative Committee meetings in 2005 and 
2006 between U.S. and Japan officials. The Security Consultative 
Committee is made up of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and 
Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense. 
The committee sets overall bilateral policy regarding the security 
relationship between the United States and Japan. The results of these 
meetings established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in 
Japan, including the Marine Corps move from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. 

[2] GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual 
Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global 
Posture Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006). 

[3] GAO, DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive 
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 27, 2005); and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting 
U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive 
Master Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

[4] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, 
but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the 
Military Buildup on Guam, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2007). 

[5] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for 
Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations 
Expecting Substantial Growth, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007). 

[6] GAO, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of 
the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 2, 1998). 

[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and 
Road Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
1, 2008), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1007]. 

[8] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan 
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006). 

[9] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007]. 

[10] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-
66]. 

[11] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

[12] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. 

[13] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to 
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals 
defined in the National Environmental Policy Act are infused into the 
ongoing programs and actions of the federal government. Further, 
regulations for implementing the act established by the Council on 
Environmental Quality specify that to the fullest extent possible, 
agencies shall prepare draft environmental impact statements 
concurrently with and integrated with other environmental impact 
analyses and related surveys and studies required by the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Historic Preservation Act of 
1966, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and other environmental 
review laws and executive orders. See 40 C.F.R. ß 1502.25. 

[14] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2006 (Japan: October 
2006). 

[15] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan. 

[16] The planned increase in the Army's and Marine Corps' forces 
collectively is commonly referred to as Grow the Force. 

[17] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. ß 4321-4347. 

[18] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508. 

[19] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007). 

[20] 40 C.F.R. ß 1502.13-1502.16. 

[21] Adequate training ranges are critical to maintaining military 
readiness. 

[22] The United States and Japan are continuing their effort to close 
and replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as a part of the Defense 
Policy Review Initiative. 

[23] Guam Civilian Military Task Force, Planning for Military Growth: 
November 2007 Needs Assessment (HagŚtŮa, Guam: Nov. 2007). 

[24] KPMG, Conduct Studies Associated with Military Growth and 
Integration Initiatives for the Island of Guam (Oct. 31, 2007). 

[25] According to KPMG, the cost estimates and figures presented in the 
study are incomplete and were not verified or validated by government 
of Guam or KPMG officials. Moreover, KPMG officials concluded that more 
work in terms of testing and analysis needed to be conducted on 
financial data presented in the report. 

[26] See footnote 24. 

[27] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007]. 

[End of section] 

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