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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, November 1, 2007: 

Drug Testing: 

Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT's Drug 
Testing Program: 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director: 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

GAO-08-225T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-225T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Highways and Transit, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals in 
safety-sensitive positions, the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
requires motor carriers to conduct drug testing of their employees. 
These drug tests involve collecting a urine specimen from employees. To 
ensure the integrity of the urine specimen and the collection process, 
DOT regulations provide numerous protocols that outline collection 
procedures and identify controls to prevent employees from defeating a 
drug test. 

Recent media accounts indicate that some sites performing DOT drug test 
collections may not be adhering to the collection protocols. Moreover, 
given the different techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to 
defeat a drug test, it is possible that a commercial truck driver could 
defeat a drug test by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine 
specimen in order to obtain a passing result. GAO was asked to perform 
an undercover operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors 
followed DOT protocols at selected collection sites and (2) 
commercially available products could be used to defeat drug tests. 

To perform this undercover operation, GAO created two fictitious 
trucking companies and produced bogus driverís licenses. GAO 
investigators then posed as truck drivers to test 24 collection sites 
throughout the United States. GAO briefed DOT officials on its results 
and they agreed with the findings. 

What GAO Found: 

DOTís drug testing program is vulnerable to manipulation by drug users, 
especially given the wide availability of products designed to defeat 
drug tests. While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by 
asking GAO undercover investigators to provide identification, 
investigators successfully used bogus driverís licenses to gain access 
to all 24 sitesódemonstrating that a drug user could send someone to 
take a drug test in their place using fake identification. In addition, 
22 of the 24 selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow 
the remaining protocols GAO tested. For example, 75 percent of the 
urine collection sites GAO tested failed to restrict access to items 
that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that 
running water, soap, or air freshener was available in the bathroom 
during the test. The table below provides information about the high 
failure of selected protocols for the 24 collection sites tested. 

Table: Failure Rates for Selected DOT Protocols GAO Tested: 

Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Secure the facility 
from all substances that could be used to adulterate or dilute the 
specimen; 
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 75. 

Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Secure all sources of 
water in the restroom; 
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 67 . 

Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Ask the employee to 
empty his/her pockets and display items to ensure no items are present 
that could be used to adulterate the specimen; 
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 42. 

Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Check the temperature 
of the specimen; 
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 19. 

Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Place a bluing agent 
in the toilet or secure it with tape; 
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 17. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

GAO also found that drug masking products such as adulterants, 
dilutants, and substitutes were widely available on the Internet. After 
purchasing drug masking products from Web sites, GAO investigators used 
adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic 
urine at another four sites without being caught by site 
collectorsódemonstrating that these products could easily be brought 
into a collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a 
collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding 
administration of the test, investigators were still able to substitute 
synthetic urine for their sample. Every drug masking product went 
undetected by the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant GAO used 
would be able to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely 
be able to use the substances GAO tested to obtain a passing result on 
his or her test. According to officials GAO interviewed at the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 
companies that make drug-masking products are aware of government test 
standards and devise products that prevent laboratories from detecting 
them. SAMHSA is required to provide information to laboratories on how 
to test the validity of the urine specimens, publicly providing 
detailed information on lab testing procedures on its Web site. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-225T]. For more information, contact 
Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our undercover operation to 
test Department of Transportation (DOT) drug testing regulations as 
they relate to commercial truck drivers. According to DOT, its 
regulations implement the world's largest drug and alcohol testing 
program covering six DOT operating administrations and over 12.1 
million employees in the United States, including school bus drivers, 
commercial truck drivers transporting hazardous materials, and airline 
pilots. We focused our efforts on the DOT drug testing program for 
commercial truck drivers, which DOT considers to be a safety-sensitive 
transportation position. If an employee in a safety-sensitive 
transportation position were using controlled substances such as 
marijuana, cocaine, or phencydidine (PCP), a clear public safety risk 
would exist. 

To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals 
holding safety-sensitive positions, federal law requires motor carriers 
to drug test their employees.[Footnote 1] Motor carriers in the United 
States are responsible for conducting the drug testing of their 
employees and can use third-party administrators to help them 
coordinate the drug tests. Drug tests involve collecting a urine 
specimen from the employee at a collection site. As long as the 
collection site meets the requirements of DOT's regulations, urine 
collection can be performed at sites across the nation, in addition to 
being performed onsite at an employer's facilities. DOT regulations 
contain numerous control measures intended to ensure the integrity of 
the urine specimen and the collection process during these tests. 
However, a drug using employee may attempt to defeat a drug test using 
techniques commonly known as substitution, dilution, and adulteration. 
To prevent an employee from defeating the drug test, DOT regulations 
mandate that collection sites follow certain protocols, for instance: 

* DOT protocols require collectors to validate that an employee is 
carrying photo identification before the test. This is designed to 
prevent an employee from having somebody else take the test for him or 
her, which is one form of substitution. 

* DOT protocols require collectors at drug testing sites to ensure that 
no clear water source is available in the collection area, among other 
measures, to prevent an employee from using water in the bathroom to 
dilute their urine specimen. 

* DOT protocols specify that employees should not be able to access 
soap, air freshener, or other chemicals to prevent them from using 
these products to adulterate a urine specimen. Other DOT protocols 
designed to prevent adulteration require employees to empty their 
pockets and wash their hands before providing the specimen. 

Recent media accounts indicate that some private sector collection 
sites performing DOT drug test collections may not be adhering to 
established collection protocols. Moreover, given the different 
techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to defeat a drug test, 
it is possible that a commercial truck driver could defeat a drug test 
by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine specimen in order to 
obtain a passing result. You asked us to perform an undercover 
operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors followed DOT 
protocols at selected collection sites and (2) commercially available 
products could be used to defeat drug tests. 

To determine whether urine collectors followed DOT protocols at 
selected publicly advertised urine collection sites, we created two 
fictitious trucking companies. Since our focus was on commercial truck 
drivers, we produced bogus commercial driver's licenses using computer 
software and hardware available to the public. Our investigators then 
posed as commercial truck drivers employed at the fictitious companies. 
We also used the fictitious company names to hire third-party 
administrators (TPA) to help us coordinate the drug tests by 
recommending collection sites and processing the required paperwork. 
Our undercover investigators then reported to urine collection sites 
pretending they had been selected by their company to receive a drug 
test and submitted urine specimens. The specimens were sent to the drug 
testing laboratories by the collection sites, and through our TPA we 
were able to access the laboratory results of our drug tests. We 
selected 24 publicly advertised urine collection sites to test four 
major geographic areas throughout the United States, including 6 urine 
collection sites in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and 6 in 
each of the following three areas--Los Angeles, New York/Northern New 
Jersey, and Dallas/Fort Worth. We chose the Washington, D.C., area 
because of its size and for reasons of convenience and economy, and the 
other three areas due to the large number of truck drivers residing 
within each area.[Footnote 2] At each urine collection site we tested 
16 specific DOT protocols which we determined, based on our research, 
to be the most critical in preventing an employee from defeating a drug 
test. Investigators brought mobile phones with photographic capability 
into the collection sites to photograph any breaches of protocol they 
observed. 

To determine whether commercially available products could be used to 
defeat drug tests, we researched products available to mask drug use by 
conducting Internet searches, reviewing prior GAO reports, and 
interviewing knowledgeable government officials.[Footnote 3] We then 
purchased adulterants and substitute synthetic urine over the Internet 
and used them in an attempt to defeat 8 out of the 24 drug tests. We 
did not test any commercially available dilutants or use dilutants we 
found in the collection area (e.g., tap water). While synthetic urine 
requires complete substitution, adulterants were mixed with the urine 
specimen our investigators provided. It is therefore important to note 
that since our investigators' urine specimens did not contain traces of 
drug use, we cannot report on whether the adulterants we used were able 
to mask drug use--only on whether the laboratories could detect the 
presence of the adulterant. We assumed that a drug user could receive a 
passing result as long as the laboratories did not detect the presence 
of the synthetic urine. It is not possible to generalize the results of 
our undercover testing to apply to all collection sites or to all drug- 
masking products. 

We conducted this investigation from May to September 2007 in 
accordance with standards prescribed by the President's Council on 
Integrity and Efficiency. 

Summary: 

While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by asking our 
undercover investigators to provide identification, we successfully 
used bogus driver's licenses to gain access to all 24 sites-- 
demonstrating that a drug user could send someone to take a drug test 
in their place using fake identification. In addition, 22 of the 24 
selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow the remaining 
protocols we tested. For example, 75 percent of the 24 urine collection 
sites we tested failed to restrict access to items that could be used 
to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that running water, soap, 
or air freshener was available in the bathroom during the test. Table 1 
provides information about the high failure of selected protocols for 
the 24 collection sites tested. 

Table 1: Failure Rates for Selected DOT Protocols GAO Tested: 

Selected DOT collection protocol: Secure the facility from all 
substances that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen; 
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 75. 

Selected DOT collection protocol: Secure all sources of water in the 
restroom; 
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 67. 

Selected DOT collection protocol: Ask the employee to empty his/her 
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be 
used to adulterate the specimen; 
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 42. 

Selected DOT collection protocol: Check the temperature of the 
specimen; 
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 19. 

Selected DOT collection protocol: Place a bluing agent in the toilet or 
secure it with tape; 
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 17. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

We also determined that drug-masking products, such as adulterants, 
dilutants, and substitutes, were widely available on the Internet. 
After purchasing drug-masking products from Web sites, we used 
adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic 
urine at another four sites without being caught by site collectors-- 
demonstrating that these products could easily be brought into a 
collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a 
collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding 
administration of the test, we were still able to substitute synthetic 
urine for our specimen. Every drug-masking product went undetected by 
the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant we used would be able 
to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely be able to use 
the substances we tested to obtain a passing result on his or her test. 
According to officials we interviewed at the Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), companies that make drug- 
masking products are aware of government test standards and devise 
products that prevent laboratories from detecting them. 

We briefed DOT officials on the results of our work and they agreed 
with our findings. We will provide DOT with a referral letter that 
specifies the geographic areas and collection site names for those 
sites that we determined had failures in protocols. 

Background: 

Six operating administrations under DOT have issued regulations 
requiring antidrug programs in the aviation, highway, railroad, mass 
transit, pipeline, and maritime industries. Antidrug programs for 
commercial truck drivers are regulated by the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA), which is the operating administration 
responsible for enforcing FMCSA regulations and establishing who is 
tested and when they are tested.[Footnote 4] FMCSA antidrug regulations 
require that employers of commercial motor carriers, including those 
who are owner-operators, conduct drug testing according to the DOT 
"Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing 
Programs."[Footnote 5] These DOT regulations mandate that motor 
carriers must conduct pre-employment, reasonable suspicion, random, and 
post-accident drug testing on their employees. While these scenarios 
are all different, DOT requires collectors and collection sites to 
follow uniform collection protocols regardless of the reason for the 
test. Collection sites are privately run facilities, where the 
collectors at the sites do not have to be certified by DOT, but must 
meet DOT regulations by completing the required training and following 
DOT protocols. Because collection sites are spread throughout the 
nation, it is easy for an employee in any of the drug testing 
scenarios, from pre-employment to post-accident drug testing, to get to 
a collection site within the given time frame.[Footnote 6] According to 
DOT regulations, collection sites must promote privacy, incorporate the 
scientific and technical guidelines of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), utilize a scientifically recognized testing 
method, and require that specimens be labeled and secured in the 
presence of the tested employee to prevent tampering. To help 
collection sites comply with these regulations, DOT's Office of Drug 
and Alcohol Policy and Compliance issued revised protocols in December 
2006.[Footnote 7] The protocols indicate that the collector has a major 
role in the success of the DOT drug testing program because he or she 
is the one individual in the testing process with which all employees 
have direct, face-to-face contact. The protocols also state that the 
test may lose validity if the collector does not ensure the integrity 
of the specimen and collection process. 

DOT protocols have specific requirements that collection sites must 
meet, including procedures to (1) prevent unauthorized access to the 
urine collection site; (2) prevent the tested employee or anyone else 
from gaining unauthorized access to the collection materials/supplies; 
(3) ensure that the tested employee does not have access to items that 
could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen such as soap, 
disinfectants, cleaning supplies, and water; and (4) ensure that the 
tested employee is under the supervision of a collector or appropriate 
site personnel at all times when permitted into the site. 

To document the collection of the specimen, DOT requires that urine 
collection sites correctly complete the Federal Drug Testing Custody 
and Control Form (CCF) for every collection under the DOT drug testing 
program. This form is also used to document the transfer of the 
specimen to the HHS-approved, private sector laboratories, where the 
urine specimen is sent to be tested for marijuana, cocaine, 
amphetamines, opiates, and phencydidine (PCP) as identified by HHS 
regulations. It is important to note that the laboratories that test 
the specimen are separate entities than the urine collection sites. The 
collection sites must follow DOT protocols and their role is to collect 
the urine specimen, while the laboratories must be certified by HHS and 
their role is to perform the drug testing of the specimen. The 
laboratories are authorized to also conduct validity testing to 
determine if the specimen is consistent with normal human urine, 
whether adulterants or foreign substances are present, or if the 
specimen was diluted or substituted. The HHS organization, Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), administers 
the Federal Workplace Drug Testing Program and revised the guidelines 
in 2004 to require that specimen validity tests be conducted on all 
urine specimens of federal employees due to the increase in the number 
of chemical adulterants that were marketed on the Internet and in 
certain magazines. DOT did not adopt this update in their regulations-
-so currently drug testing laboratories are only authorized, not 
required, to perform validity testing for all DOT required commercial 
motor carrier drug tests. 

As an additional quality control check, DOT requires that a Medical 
Review Officer (MRO) serve as an independent, impartial authority to 
verify the lab results. After the results are verified, the MRO, who is 
a licensed physician, informs the designated company official whether 
the employee passed or failed the drug test. The MRO may also designate 
test results as cancelled in the case of an invalid test. An invalid 
test results when a drug screening lab identifies an unidentified 
adulterant, substitute, or abnormal physical characteristic in the 
specimen that prevents the lab from obtaining a valid test result. In 
the case of a cancelled test, the MRO conducts an interview with the 
employee to determine if there is a legitimate medical reason for the 
result. If the MRO determines there is a legitimate medical reason, no 
further action is required.[Footnote 8] However, if the MRO determines 
there is no legitimate medical reason, the employee is required to take 
another drug test under direct observation--effectively getting another 
opportunity to take the test, but without the privacy afforded 
previously.[Footnote 9] In the case of a positive result, which is 
defined as a failed drug test, a supervisor or company official is 
required to immediately remove the employee from the job. Employees who 
test positive and continue to perform safety-sensitive functions and 
employers who permit them to do so are both subject to criminal and 
civil fines. 

Most Collection Sites Failed to Comply with All DOT Protocols: 

In our tests of the selected 24 urine collection sites in four major 
geographic areas throughout the United States, we determined that 22 of 
the 24 sites showed varying degrees of failure in complying with the 
protocols that we tested. While all urine collection sites followed DOT 
protocols by asking our undercover investigators to provide 
identification, we successfully used bogus driver's licenses to gain 
access to all 24 sites--demonstrating that a drug user could send 
someone else to take a drug test in their place. This fact in and of 
itself shows that in 100 percent of our tests we successfully used a 
form of substitution. However, we did not count these instances as a 
failure of protocol because the collectors are not required to validate 
the identity of the employee--they are only required to ensure that an 
employee presents identification. 

Twenty-two of the 24 tested collection sites failed to comply with many 
of the remaining DOT protocols we tested. In table 2, we provide a 
summary of the results of our testing of the 16 protocols by geographic 
area in the order that we tested them. The table identifies the number 
of protocols with which each site failed to comply. 

Table 2: Results of Testing the 16 Protocols by Geographic Area: 

Geographic area: Washington, D.C; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 0; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 12; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 2. 

Geographic area: Los Angeles; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 8; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 5; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 6; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 3. 

Geographic area: New York/Northern New Jersey; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 6; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 4; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 5; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 3; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 6; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 5. 

Geographic area: Dallas/Fort Worth; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 5; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 2; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 4; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 0; 
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 2. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

For a summary of the protocols we tested and their rationale, see 
figure 1. 

Figure 1: Key Collection Protocols Tested by GAO Undercover 
Investigators: 

This figure is a chart showing key collection protocols tested by GAO 
undercover investigators. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

Note: We selected these protocols from 49 CFR Part 40, "Procedures for 
Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs." 

[End of figure] 

Some of the criteria above relate to preventing the employee from 
having access to items at the collection site, such as water or 
cleaning products, which could be used to adulterate or dilute the 
specimen. These types of products might be detected by drug testing 
laboratories, however, we did not test this. We provide detail on our 
findings of the tested urine collection sites by area in the order of 
our testing below. 

Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area: 

In our testing of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area we determined 
that, in five of the six sites tested, there were varying degrees of 
failure in complying with the 16 protocols. Most of the sites failed 
only two protocols, while site 3 did not fail any of the protocols and 
site 5 performed poorly by failing 12 protocols--75 percent of the 
protocols tested. In the case of site 5, we determined that although 
this collection site failed to comply with most of the protocols, the 
drug screening lab identified errors and cancelled the test due to the 
inappropriate collection process. We provide additional detail below on 
our experiences at three of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area 
collection sites. 

* Washington D.C., Area, Site 3: This collection site did not fail any 
of the protocols that we tested. However, our investigator used 
substitute synthetic urine he brought with him to contaminate the urine 
specimen during the test and the laboratory did not detect the presence 
of the synthetic urine. 

* Washington D.C., Area, Site 4: At this collection site, the 
investigator had access to water which could be used to dilute a 
specimen. In addition, the investigator brought in and used an 
adulterant at this site and the laboratory did not detect the presence 
of the adulterant. 

* Washington D.C., Area, Site 5: This site failed to comply with 12 of 
the 16 protocols that we tested. Although it was not one of the 
protocols we tested at other facilities, one of our investigators 
exhibited a "shy bladder" at this site and could not provide a full 
urine specimen of 45 mL. The collector permitted our investigator to 
provide half of the specimen, leave the facility, and return 
approximately 1 hour later--a violation of DOT protocols, which state 
that the employee should not be allowed to leave the collection site 
and should be monitored during the waiting time. When completing the 
collection process, the collector used half of the specimen from the 
original collection and half from what the investigator provided later. 
The drug screening lab identified this error and cancelled the test due 
to the inappropriate collection process. 

See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the 
results of our testing in the Washington, D.C., metro area. 

Los Angeles Area: 

In our testing of the Los Angeles area we determined that, of the six 
sites tested, there were varying degrees of failure in complying with 
the 16 protocols--including one site that failed 8 of the 16 protocols. 
Other selected sites in the Los Angeles area failed up to 5 and 6 
protocols while the remaining sites failed 3 protocols or less. We 
provide additional detail below on our experiences at four of the Los 
Angeles area collection sites. 

* Los Angeles, Site 1: The investigator was not instructed to wash his 
hands before providing the specimen. This could have allowed a tested 
employee to hide a drug-masking product in his hand when taking the 
test. In addition, there was no bluing agent in the toilet. That means 
a tested employee could have used the clear water in the toilet to 
dilute his or her specimen. The collector did not perform the split 
specimen correctly by only filling one specimen bottle.[Footnote 10] 
The results were still valid despite the incorrect split specimen 
because the lab result was passing for the first specimen bottle, so 
according to DOT protocols a second bottle is not needed to validate a 
passing result. 

* Los Angeles, Site 3: The collector did not tell our investigator that 
the toilet should not be flushed, allowing the employee to potentially 
use the clear un-blued water in the flushed toilet to dilute the 
specimen. In addition, the collector did not instruct the investigator 
to return with the specimen as soon as possible after voiding--the 
temperature of the specimen needs to be taken within 4 minutes in an 
attempt to determine whether the specimen was substituted, diluted, or 
adulterated. Our investigator used synthetic urine in this drug test 
and the laboratory was not able to detect the presence of the synthetic 
urine. 

* Los Angeles, Site 4: The collector at this site asked our 
investigator to empty his pockets. However, he did not have to empty 
all of his pockets--this enabled our investigator to bring an 
adulterant into the collection area by hiding it in his back pocket. 
The laboratory did not detect the presence of the adulterant. 

* Los Angeles, Site 6: The collector failed to instruct our 
investigator to empty his pockets before providing a specimen at this 
site. In addition, our investigator had access to running water in the 
sink--this could potentially be used to dilute the specimen. The 
collector did not perform the split specimen correctly and only filled 
one specimen bottle. The results were still valid despite the incorrect 
split specimen because the lab result was passing for the first 
specimen bottle, so according to DOT protocols a second bottle is not 
needed to validate a passing result. 

See appendix I for site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the results 
of our testing in the Los Angeles area. 

New York/Northern New Jersey Area: 

In our testing of the New York/Northern New Jersey area we determined 
that, of the six sites tested, collection sites failed to comply with a 
large number of the 16 protocols--sites 1 and 5 failed to comply with 
six protocols, sites 3 and 6 failed to comply with five protocols, and 
sites 2 and 4 failed to comply with four and three protocols, 
respectively. We provide additional detail below on our experiences at 
five of the New York/Northern New Jersey area collection sites, 
including photographs of the collection areas taken with mobile phone 
cameras. 

* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 1: In addition to failing to 
comply with five other protocols, this collection site had an 
adulterant (bleach) located on top of the toilet (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Bleach Located in Collection Area in Violation of DOT 
Protocols: 

This figure is a photograph of bleach located in a collection area in 
violation of DOT protocols. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 2: The collector failed to 
instruct our investigator to empty his pockets before providing a 
specimen at this site, making it easy for our investigator to bring an 
adulterant into the collection room. Moreover, the collector did not 
watch our investigator to see whether he washed his hands before 
providing the specimen. The bathroom had liquid soap and liquid 
cleaning products available in the collection area. Our investigator 
used an adulterant he brought with him to contaminate the urine 
specimen during the test. The laboratory did not detect the presence of 
the adulterant. 

* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 4: The collector failed to 
instruct our investigator to empty his pockets before providing a 
specimen at this site, making it easy for our investigator to bring 
synthetic urine into the collection room. In addition, the bathroom had 
water and disinfectant spray available in the collection area. The 
laboratory did not detect the presence of the synthetic urine. 

* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 5: The collector did not supervise 
our investigator in the collection site. While the collector remained 
in one room, he told our investigator to use a bathroom located down an 
adjoining hallway. According to DOT protocols, a tested employee should 
be supervised at all times during the collection process. 

* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 6: Our investigator was 
unsupervised at the collection site, allowing him to identify cleaning 
products outside the collection room that could be used as adulterants, 
pick up a large can of disinfectant, and bring it with him into the 
collection room. Our investigator took pictures of this violation using 
a mobile phone camera. Figure 3 shows the disinfectant spray and other 
adulterants outside the collection room. 

Figure 3: Adulterants Located Outside a Collection Room in Violation of 
DOT Protocols: 

This figure is a photograph of adulterants located outside a collection 
room in violation of DOT protocols. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In figure 4, the investigator has brought the disinfectant with him 
into the collection room and placed it next to his urine specimen on 
the toilet. 

Figure 4: Adulterant Moved into Collection Room: 

This figure is a photograph of an adulterant moved into a collection 
room. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the 
results of our testing in the New York/Northern New Jersey area. 

Dallas/Fort Worth Area: 

In our testing of the Dallas/Fort Worth area we determined that, in 
five of the six sites tested, there were varying degrees of failure in 
complying with the 16 protocols. Many of the sites failed 2 protocols, 
while site 2 failed 5, site 4 failed 4, and site 5 did not fail any of 
the protocols. We provide additional detail below on our experiences at 
five of the Dallas/Fort Worth area collection sites, including 
photographs of the collection areas taken with mobile phone cameras. 

* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 2: Our investigator was able to bring an 
adulterant into the collection site and used it to adulterate his urine 
specimen. While in the collection area, the investigator noticed that 
running water was available--in violation of DOT protocols. See figure 
5. 

Figure 5: Running Water in the Collection Room in Violation of DOT 
Protocols: 

This figure is a photograph of a sink turned on in the collection room 
in violation of DOT protocols. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

After providing his urine specimen to the collector, the investigator 
observed that the collector only filled one specimen bottle rather than 
the two required under DOT's split specimen protocols. The collector 
threw out the remaining specimen. The laboratory did not detect the 
presence of the adulterant. The results were still valid despite the 
incorrect split specimen because the lab result was passing on the 
first specimen bottle, so according to DOT protocols a second bottle is 
not needed to validate a passing result. 

* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 4: The collector failed to instruct our 
investigator to empty his pockets before providing a specimen at this 
site, making it easy for our investigator to bring synthetic urine into 
the collection room. Once he was in the collection room, the collector 
instructed our investigator to leave the door completely open while 
providing the specimen. The collector waited outside the collection 
room and did not directly observe the collection; nevertheless, our 
investigator was able to pour synthetic urine into the provided 
specimen cup. The laboratory did not detect the synthetic urine. 

* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 5: This collection site performed well in 
meeting all of the DOT protocols. This site had a 15-item checklist 
outlining DOT protocols hanging on the wall. Our investigator observed 
the technician using the checklist while conducting the collection of 
the urine specimen. 

* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 6: This collection site allowed the employee 
access to water by not securing the toilet lid in the collection room-
-leaving the employee an opportunity to use the clear un-blued water to 
potentially dilute the specimen. Also in the collection room was an 
automatic spray disinfectant on the wall. A tested employee could have 
used this spray to dilute or adulterate his or her specimen. 

See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the 
results of our testing in the New York/Northern New Jersey area. 

Commercially Available Products Can Defeat Drug Tests at Selected 
Sites: 

We determined that drug-masking products were widely available for 
purchase over the Internet and used this method to purchase adulterants 
and synthetic urine for our tests. As discussed above, we submitted 
specimens containing adulterants at four of the collection sites and at 
another four sites we used synthetic urine without being caught by site 
collectors, demonstrating that these products could easily be brought 
in and used during a test. In every case that investigators used 
adulterants or substitutes during the drug test, the drug-masking 
products went undetected during lab testing, lab validation, and MRO 
review of the labs' results. We also determined that publicly available 
regulations provide details on how drug testing labs test and validate 
urine specimens. Companies that sell drug-masking products can access 
this information and update their products to prevent them from being 
detected by the laboratory. 

Products to Defeat Drug Tests Are Widely Available: 

In performing Internet searches, we found drug-masking products that 
the public can easily obtain and that are marketed as products that can 
be used to pass urine drug tests. A simple Internet search using a 
phrase such as "pass drug test" resulted in over 2 million Web site 
hits. We determined that these types of Web sites contained various 
adulterants and urine substitutes available for purchase, including 
accessories that would allow an employee to conceal the product on 
their body when taking a test. We used these types of Web sites to 
purchase drug-masking products for our testing of selected urine 
collection sites. SAMHSA is aware of these products and revised the 
Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs in 
2004 to require that specimen validity tests be conducted on all urine 
specimens, noting that there was a recent increase in the number of 
chemical adulterants that are marketed on the Internet and in certain 
magazines. DOT did not adopt this update in their regulations--so 
currently drug testing laboratories are only authorized, not required, 
to perform validity testing for all DOT required commercial motor 
carrier drug tests. According to SAMHSA, approximately 400 different 
products are available to defeat urine drug tests. 

Adulterants and Synthetic Urine Used at 8 of 24 Collection Sites: 

We were able to easily bring drug-masking products into a collection 
room at every one of the eight collection sites we tested with these 
products. Even in cases where the collector followed DOT protocol and 
asked our investigator to empty his pockets, our investigators simply 
hid these products in their pockets and elsewhere in their clothing. At 
one Dallas/Fort Worth collection site discussed above, the collector 
instructed our investigator to leave the bathroom door completely open 
when providing the specimen. The collector waited outside the bathroom; 
nevertheless, the investigator was able to pour synthetic urine into 
the specimen cup undetected. Investigators determined that there is 
information on the Internet about concealing drug-masking products. For 
example, one Web site noted that "although most testing sites will 
require you to remove items from your pockets, it is still possible to 
sneak in another specimen." Even a knowledgeable government official 
with SAMHSA stated that, because collection protocols do not allow 
collectors to directly observe urination unless they are suspicious, 
the opportunity to substitute or adulterate a urine specimen exists. 

Adulterants and Substitutes Were Not Detected by Laboratories: 

SAMHSA officials stated that validity tests are intended to produce 
accurate, reliable, and correctly interpreted test results and to 
decrease or eliminate opportunities to defeat drug tests. We found that 
none of the adulterants or synthetic urine we used were identified by 
the laboratories, however, we cannot confirm if the laboratories 
performed validity testing because under DOT regulations they are only 
authorized, not required, to do so. SAMHSA is required to provide 
information to laboratories on how to test the validity of the urine 
specimen and publicly provide detailed information on lab testing 
procedures.[Footnote 11] According to a SAMHSA official with whom we 
spoke, companies that market masking substances periodically offer new 
formulations of their products to avoid detection. In fact, one Web 
site we located appeared to verify this claim by advertising that its 
product was "continuously updated and adjusted to keep up with changing 
technologies." Despite their sophistication and ease of use, there is 
no regulation prohibiting the sale of these products. Under 21 U.S.C. 
Section 863 it may be illegal to sell drug-masking products if the 
products are determined to be "drug paraphernalia." However, we have 
not found any reported federal cases in which an individual has been 
prosecuted for selling drug-masking products under this statute. 

Corrective Action Briefing: 

We briefed DOT on the results of our investigation on October 1, 2007. 
DOT officials agreed with our findings and indicated that they were not 
surprised by the results of our work, stating that they have performed 
similar tests themselves in prior years with similar results. We agreed 
with DOT that we would provide a referral letter that specifies the 
areas and collection site names for those sites that we determined had 
failures in protocols. DOT added that it has already taken steps to 
improve the collection facilities' performance in the drug testing 
program. For example, officials said they have developed posters with 
10 key DOT protocols to be distributed at urine collection sites. These 
posters are intended to help collectors follow the appropriate 
protocols while conducting drug tests under the DOT drug screening 
program.[Footnote 12] DOT officials also stated that the Real ID Act 
could close the vulnerability we identified of using fake drivers' 
licenses to take the drug tests, but that, because implementation of 
this act is years away, there should be an interim solution.[Footnote 
13] Finally, regarding drug-masking products, DOT officials stated that 
they have continually supported legislation to ban the sale and 
marketing of drug-masking products. 

Conclusion: 

Our work shows that a drug user could easily pass a DOT drug test and 
continue to work in his or her safety-sensitive commercial 
transportation job--driving children to school or transporting 
hazardous materials, for example. To fully address the vulnerabilities 
we identified, improvements will need to be made in both the design of 
the entire process and the ability of collection site employees to 
adhere to current protocols. In ongoing work, expected to be complete 
in May 2008, GAO is examining options to deal with these and related 
drug testing issues.[Footnote 14] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have 
at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 
Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this testimony. In addition to the individual named above, the 
individuals who made major contributions to this testimony were John 
Ryan Assistant, Director; Verginie Amirkhanian; Shafee Carnegie; Paul 
Desaulniers; Matthew Harris; Jason Kelly; Jeffrey McDermott; and Andrew 
McIntosh. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Results of Undercover Testing in Four Metropolitan Areas of 
the United States: 

The following four tables present a site-specific breakdown, by 
protocol, of our undercover test results. We provide these tables in 
the order of our testing. Our investigators used a data collection 
instrument to track the compliance of collectors at each site. An 
"unknown" result means that investigators could not determine whether 
the collection site failed to comply with the particular protocol 
because it was not observed. 

Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area: 

Table 3 provides our findings for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area, which is the first area where we tested the 16 key collection 
protocols. 

Table 3: Washington, D.C., Undercover Test Results: 

Protocol: Did the collector require the employee to provide appropriate 
identification?; 
Site 1: [Check]; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her pockets 
and display items to ensure no items are present that could be used to 
defeat the test?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her hands 
under the collector's supervision?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a specimen 
of at least 45 mL?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the 
toilet?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the 
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Protocol: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured with 
tape?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?; 
Site 1: Unknown; 
Site 2: Unknown; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Unknown. 

Protocol: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals 
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Protocol: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen 
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection site?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the employee have access to the collection materials or 
supplies?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Did the employee have access to items that could be used to 
adulterate or dilute the specimen?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or 
appropriate site personnel at all times?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Protocol: Number of protocols failed; 
Site 1: 2; 
Site 2: 2; 
Site 3: 0; 
Site 4: 2; 
Site 5: 12; 
Site 6: 2. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Los Angeles Metropolitan Area: 

Table 4 provides our findings for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, 
which is the second area where we tested the 16 key collection 
protocols. 

Table 4: Los Angeles Undercover Test Results: 

Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide 
appropriate identification?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her 
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be 
used to defeat the test?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her 
hands under the collector's supervision?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a 
specimen of at least 45 mL?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the 
toilet?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the 
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured 
with tape?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals 
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen 
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection 
site?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials 
or supplies?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used 
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or 
appropriate site personnel at all times?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Number of protocols failed; 
Site 1: 8; 
Site 2: 5; 
Site 3: 6; 
Site 4: 2; 
Site 5: 2; 
Site 6: 3. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

New York/Northern New Jersey Metropolitan Area: 

Table 5 provides our findings for the New York/Northern New Jersey 
metropolitan area, which is the third area where we tested the 16 key 
collection protocols. 

Table 5: New York/Northern New Jersey Undercover Test Results: 

Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide 
appropriate identification?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her 
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be 
used to defeat the test?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her 
hands under the collector's supervision?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a 
specimen of at least 45 mL?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the 
toilet?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the 
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured 
with tape?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Unknown; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Unknown; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals 
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?; 
Site 1: Unknown; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen 
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection 
site?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials 
or supplies?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used 
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or 
appropriate site personnel at all times?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Fail; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Number of protocols failed; 
Site 1: 6; 
Site 2: 4; 
Site 3: 5; 
Site 4: 3; 
Site 5: 6; 
Site 6: 5. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Dallas/Fort Worth Metropolitan Area Undercover Testing: 

Table 6 provides our findings for the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan 
area, which is the fourth area where we tested the 16 key collection 
protocols. 

Table 6: Dallas/Fort Worth Undercover Test Results: 

Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide 
appropriate identification?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her 
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be 
used to defeat the test?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her 
hands under the collector's supervision?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a 
specimen of at least 45 mL?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the 
toilet?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the 
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured 
with tape?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?; 
Site 1: Unknown; 
Site 2: Unknown; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Unknown; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals 
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen 
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection 
site?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials 
or supplies?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used 
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?; 
Site 1: Fail; 
Site 2: Fail; 
Site 3: Fail; 
Site 4: Fail; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Fail. 

Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or 
appropriate site personnel at all times?; 
Site 1: Check; 
Site 2: Check; 
Site 3: Check; 
Site 4: Check; 
Site 5: Check; 
Site 6: Check. 

Requirement: Number of protocols failed; 
Site 1: 2; 
Site 2: 5; 
Site 3: 2; 
Site 4: 4; 
Site 5: 0; 
Site 6: 2. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] 49 U.S.C. ß 31306. 

[2] According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 

[3] GAO, Products to Defeat Drug Use Screening Tests Are Widely 
Available, GAO-05-653T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005). 

[4] These regulations apply to those who operate commercial motor 
vehicles in any state and are subject to commercial drivers' license 
requirements under 49 CFR 382, Licencia Federal de Conductor (Mexico) 
requirements, or the requirements of Canadian National Safety Code. 

[5] 49 CFR Part 40. 

[6] Post-accident drug tests must be conducted as soon as practicable, 
but within 32 hours of the crash, while employees required to take a 
random drug test must report immediately once he or she is notified. 

[7] Urine Specimen Collection Guidelines for the U.S. Department of 
Transportation Workplace. 

[8] In the case of pre-employment, return-to-duty, or follow-up tests, 
a negative result is required. 

[9] A directly observed collection procedure is the same as a routine 
collection with the additional requirement that an observer physically 
watch the employee urinate into the collection container. 

[10] DOT regulations require a split specimen, which entails splitting 
the urine specimen into two vials. The collector pours the primary 
specimen of at least 30 mL of urine in the first vial, and then pours 
at least 15 mL in the second vial. The second vial is not tested unless 
there is a positive result and it is needed to confirm the positive 
result. 

[11] Under P.L. 100-71, Section 503 (July 11, 1987). 

[12] 49 CFR Part 40. 

[13] Real ID Act of 2005, P.L. No. 109-13, div. B (May 11, 2005). 

[14] GAO, Preliminary Information on Challenges to Ensure the Integrity 
of Drug Testing Programs, GAO-08-220T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2007). 

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Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov: 
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U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
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