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Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

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The policy of apprehending military deserters during peacetime in an all volunteer force needs reexamining. Military representatives say treating deserters as criminals has a deterring effect. Findings/Conclusions: Most deserters do not become useful soldiers, being unable or unwilling to meet the standards demanded, and most are eventually discharged as unfit. There is no verifiable evidence that soldiers who do not desert are discouraged from doing so because of fear of becoming a military criminal. Such fear may prevent some potential deserters, but many others may consider the possible discharge to be a reward rather than a punishment. The services have the authority to separate deserters in absentia. The number of deserters, meaning individuals who were absent without leave, more than 30 days, declined in FY76. It cost \$58 million to apprehend and process deserters during the last 2 years, not including costs incurred for related courts-martial, confinement, separation, and pay of the deserters. Costs are being incurred to apprehend individuals who surrender voluntarily. Recommendations: The deserters apprehension policy should be reexamined and less costly alternatives to the present practices should be found. Perhaps the apprehension of deserters should be stopped, except where the deserter is wanted in connection with another crime, and the deserter should be discharged in absentia; or perhaps apprehension efforts should not be undertaken until the deserter has been gone long enough to indicate that a voluntary return is not likely. (Author/SS)

00653



*UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE*

**Millions Being Spent To
Apprehend Military Deserters
Most Of Whom Are Discharged As
Unqualified For Retention**

Department of Defense

In 1975 and 1976 the military classified as deserters about 84,000 people who were absent from duty for more than 30 days. It spent almost \$58 million to apprehend and process these individuals only to discharge most of them as unqualified for retention, in many cases shortly after their return.

The Secretary of Defense should reconsider the military's policies of apprehending deserters. In this report GAO suggests two less expensive alternatives.



UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-146890

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report summarizes the cost of apprehending deserters and their success upon return to the military. It suggests two less expensive alternatives to the current policy of apprehending deserters. This report is an outgrowth of a review we are making of unauthorized absence. The contents of this report were discussed with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Our recommendations to you are set forth on page 15. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Government Operations; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. L. Krieger".

H. L. Krieger
Director

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWOL	absence without leave
DOD	Department of Defense
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	General Accounting Office
UA	unauthorized absence

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MILLIONS BEING SPENT TO
APPREHEND MILITARY DESERTERS
MOST OF WHOM ARE DISCHARGED
AS UNQUALIFIED FOR RETENTION
Department of Defense

D I G E S T

The policy of apprehending military deserters during peacetime in an all volunteer force needs reexamining.

Military representatives say treating deserters as criminals has a deterring effect because it discourages some from becoming repeaters and others from first offenses. However, GAO found that:

- Most deserters do not become useful soldiers. They are unable or unwilling to meet the standards demanded of a professional. Most are discharged eventually for this reason. (See p. 9.)
- There is no verifiable evidence that soldiers who do not desert are discouraged from doing so because of fear of becoming a military criminal. Fear of arrest and punishment may discourage some from deserting. Others may view discharge, a penalty frequently used in desertion cases, more as reward than punishment. The services have the authority to separate deserters in absentia.

As used in this report, desertion means that the individual has been absent without leave for more than 30 days. Desertions declined in fiscal year 1976 but numbered over 36,000. It cost \$58 million to apprehend and process deserters during the last 2 years, GAO estimates. This estimate does not include the costs incurred for related courts-martial, confinement, separation, and pay of the deserters. (See p. 5.)

Costs are being incurred to apprehend individuals who surrender voluntarily. Apprehension efforts begin as soon as an individual is classified a deserter. It makes little sense to incur such costs when the "penalty" upon return is fre-

quently discharge and many deserters return voluntarily.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reexamine this policy and find less costly alternatives to present practices. He could consider among others:

- Stopping the apprehension of deserters except when the individual is wanted for some specific reason, such as another crime or security matter, and discharge them in absentia after they have been absent for a stipulated period.
- Not routinely undertaking aggressive apprehension efforts until an individual has been gone long enough to indicate that a voluntary return is improbable.
(See pp. 15 and 16.)

The report is an outgrowth of a current GAO study dealing with unauthorized absence being conducted in the context of how the services discharge their responsibilities in dealing with this crime.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Desertion is one form of unauthorized absence from the military. Articles 85, 86, and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice define unauthorized absence as a crime. (See app. I.) Initially, each unauthorized absence is classified as absence without leave (AWOL). When individuals are AWOL for 30 days, or in certain circumstances less than 30 days, the military administratively classifies them as deserters. Legally, a person is not a deserter until charged with the crime of desertion and found guilty.

Unauthorized absence is a crime unique to the military and can entail severe punishments. During peacetime, AWOL for more than 30 days can be punished with up to 1-year imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. Those found guilty of desertion can be punished with up to 5-years imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. Penalties are even more severe during wartime. They were not changed when enlistment in the services became voluntary in 1973.

Unauthorized absence is a frequent crime. According to military records, unauthorized absences of 24 hours or more occurred 304,204 times in the 24-month period ended June 30, 1976. Included in this figure are 84,335 desertions.

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Number of unauthorized absences</u>	<u>Number of desertions</u>
1975	168,773	47,997
1976	<u>135,431</u>	<u>36,338</u>
Total	<u>304,204</u>	<u>84,335</u>

Why is unauthorized absence a crime? While this was not explained in any military publication, service representatives we talked to generally stated that it was built around the concept of punishment and the purposes were two-fold--to discourage some from becoming repeaters and to keep others from committing first offenses.

One researcher 1/ provided the following rationale:

"When military organizations are established, the first requisite of their functioning at all is that they have personnel. And it is essential to the accomplishment of their mission that those personnel not only be assigned, but that they also actually be where they are supposed to be at the time they are supposed to be there. If each member of a military organization decided for himself where he would be and when, any attempt to carry on any of the organization's functions must invariably breakdown from the ensuing chaos. If each member came and went as he pleased, no one could rely on the performance by anyone else of his duties, and the first essentials of organization could not be carried on. To deter personnel from abandoning their duties, absence therefrom without authority is an offense, for without such a deterrent, the strength of such organizations must inevitably disintegrate and disappear. Hence the law requires every member of a military organization to be where he is supposed to be at the time he is supposed to be there."

This report presents our findings on the cost of apprehending deserters and their success after returning to duty. It is an outgrowth of our ongoing study dealing with unauthorized absence. The study is being conducted in the context of how the services discharge their responsibilities in dealing with this crime. The primary issues the study is addressing are:

- Education of military people concerning AWOL and its seriousness.
- Adequacy and accuracy of statistical and managerial data.
- Cost to the military both in dollars and mission effectiveness.
- Impact on the military career and civilian lives of individuals who go AWOL.
- Demographics of people who go AWOL.
- Counseling of people upon return.

1/Alfred, Alvin, The Law of AWOL, (New York: Oceana, 1957).

--Consistency of punishments imposed.

--Performance after returning to duty.

CHAPTER 2

LENGTH OF ABSENCES

The military does not compile data showing the length of time deserters are absent or whether they voluntarily return or are apprehended. However, the length of time deserters (as classified by the military) are absent is recorded in payroll and personnel records. Our analysis of absences over 30 days (absences during the 12-month period ended March 31, 1975, for Army, Marine Corps, and Navy and June 30, 1975, for the Air Force) showed that over one-half voluntarily returned or were apprehended within 90 days.

Length of Absences

	<u>31 to 60</u>	<u>61 to 90</u>	<u>91 to 180</u>	<u>Over 180</u>	<u>Total</u>
	------(days)-----				
Army	5,706	3,296	4,974	4,545	18,521
Marine Corps	4,551	2,126	3,712	4,007	14,396
Navy	3,185	1,084	1,168	445	<u>a/5,882</u>
Air Force	<u>370</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>232</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>915</u>
Total	<u>13,812</u>	<u>6,701</u>	<u>10,086</u>	<u>9,115</u>	<u>a/39,714</u>
Percent of total	34.8	16.9	25.4	22.9	100.0

a/These figures do not include an estimated 4,300 individuals for whom we could not determine length of absence.

Many deserters voluntarily surrender. Our analysis of 1975 data at one Army installation responsible for the apprehension of deserters in a two-State area showed that over one-half voluntarily surrendered. Of the 911 deserters returning, 487 (54 percent) surrendered either to military or civilian authorities.

CHAPTER 3

COST TO APPREHEND DESERTERS

We estimate that the four services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) spent \$58 million in fiscal years 1975-76 to apprehend and process actions against deserters. In fiscal year 1976, \$27.5 million was spent in contrast to \$30 million in fiscal year 1975. This decrease was due to a decline in the number of desertions. These estimates do not include the costs incurred for related courts-martial, confinement, separation, and pay 1/ of the deserters.

The military does not accumulate cost data relating to the apprehension of deserters. Hence, we requested data necessary to construct cost estimates from the Army, Marine Corps, and FBI. The breakdown for the 1975 estimate is shown below and explained in the following sections.

	<u>Estimate</u>
	(millions)
Local law authorities	\$.4
FBI	5.9
Escort to military facilities:	
Military guard travel	1.4
Military guard salaries	4.2
Processing after return	<u>18.1</u>
 Total	 <u>\$30.0</u>

PAYMENTS TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

State and local law enforcement authorities in an individual's home area are advised that he is wanted when the military administratively declares him a deserter. The Department of Defense (DOD), by Directive 1325.2, authorizes payment to persons or agencies for apprehending, detaining, or delivering absentees and deserters to the military. A reward of \$15 is authorized for apprehending and detaining an individual until military authorities arrive or \$25 for

1/From the date returned to the military until returned to duty or discharged.

apprehending and delivering an individual to the military. Agencies that are prohibited by local laws or regulations from accepting rewards may be reimbursed for actual expenses up to \$25 per case.

Each of the military services routinely records the amount of these payments in a single account. Our analysis showed that 65 percent of those returned at one Army installation for unauthorized absence were deserters. Applying the 65-percent factor to the total payments of \$634,536 recorded for all the services in fiscal year 1975, we estimate that the payments relating to deserters were \$412,448.

COSTS FBI INCURRED

When a deserter has been absent about 60 days, the military is supposed to notify the FBI which then opens a case file on the individual. According to the FBI, a great number of desertion cases are resolved by the military within 60 days. When the individual returns to the military, by whatever means, the case is closed.

In response to our request, the FBI stated that it had closed 34,674 cases in fiscal year 1975 at an estimated cost of 5.9 million.

MILITARY ESCORT COSTS

When the FBI, State, or local law enforcement agencies apprehend deserters, the military sends guards to escort them back or have the individual return unescorted to a designated military facility. Costs for travel and guard salaries were estimated as follows.

Travel costs

Each military service routinely records guard travel costs in a single account. By applying the above 65-percent factor to the total of this amount for fiscal year 1975, we estimated travel costs relating to deserters were \$1.4 million.

Guard salaries and related costs

The Army assigns guards on a full-time basis to escort deserters and other absentees from civilian detainment facilities to military facilities. The other services assign guards part-time. They also allow individuals to return unescorted when the commander believes the individual can be trusted to do so. Guard costs for deserters are not compiled by any of the services.

We requested that the Army provide us with the number and average grade of persons assigned in fiscal year 1975 to apprehend deserters and other absentees. We also requested related operation and maintenance costs. The Army told us that staffing of the 41 activities involved consists of 14 officers with an average grade of O-3, 385 enlisted persons with an average grade of E-5, and 2 GS-4 civilians. The operation and maintenance costs were reported to be \$403,300. Using the Army's schedule, Composite Standard Rates for Costing Military Personnel Services effective January 1, 1975, we estimate salary cost of guards and administrative staff to be \$3.9 million. Total cost for desertion and absentee apprehension, therefore, is about \$4.3 million. We allocated \$2.8 million to desertion based on the 65-percent factor.

A Marine Corps representative said that the 25 activities involved in apprehending deserters in fiscal year 1975 expended an estimated 12 officer-years at an average grade of O-2 and 77 enlisted-years at an average grade of E-4. Using the Marine Corps' schedule, Composite Standard Rates for Costing Military Personnel Services effective January 1, 1975, we estimated salary cost of guards to be \$807,000, or an average of \$48 per deserter apprehended. (An estimate of related operation and maintenance costs was not provided.)

Using the average cost to apprehend Marine Corps deserters, we estimate the cost of the Air Force and Navy guards to be \$548,000 for the 11,407 deserters apprehended. The total cost of military personnel assigned to deserters in the four services is, therefore, estimated to be \$4.2 million.

PROCESSING COSTS AFTER RETURN

When a deserter is returned to the military, several actions are required, including:

- Filling out necessary forms to show a return-to-duty status for the individual.
- Obtaining the individual's personnel file from the service's deserter information point.
- Providing the individual with legal counsel.
- Determining what action should be taken against the individual. Several alternatives are available: no action, nonjudicial punishment, administrative discharge, and court-martial.

The Air Force and Marine Corps return deserters to their assigned unit for processing. The Navy returns a deserter to the confinement facility nearest the location where the individual was apprehended or surrendered. The Army has established special units--called personnel control facilities--to process deserters. Although AWOL people from another location may be processed through a personnel control facility, it is used primarily to process deserters apprehended in its assigned geographical area.

At our request, the Army developed cost data for operating their 12 personnel control facilities and the number of deserters processed at these facilities. The Army's response showed operational costs to be \$11.9 million for processing 21,190 deserters and 5,757 people for AWOL. Using a factor of 79 percent (the percentage of deserters to total individuals processed), we allocated \$9.4 million of the Army's cost to processing deserters.

The average cost to process a deserter varied among the Army commands. The lowest average cost was \$310 per deserter. Applying the \$310 to the 28,125 deserters processed by the other 2 services, we estimate their cost to be \$8.7 million. (This estimate does not include any adjustment for cost that would normally be incurred regardless of the deserters processed.) We estimate the total cost for processing deserters is, therefore, \$18.1 million (\$9.4 plus \$8.7 million).

CHAPTER 4

SUCCESS OF DESERTERS

AFTER RETURNING TO DUTY


Few deserters become successful soldiers. We used the military's judgment to measure success after return. This judgment is shown in the reason recorded for separation.

Our study group of 1,405 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps people absent more than 30 days was randomly selected from those returning during the 12-month period ended March 31, 1975. We reviewed their personnel files during the period February through September 1976 to determine their status. A review of Air Force deserters is still in process. (See ch. 6.)

DOD Directive 1332.14 states that the military has the right and duty to separate those people who clearly demonstrate they are unqualified for retention. To date, as shown below, 1,123 (80 percent) of the 1,405 deserters in our study group were not successful upon their return; the military judged them to be unqualified for retention and they were separated.

- 503 (36 percent) were immediately separated for the good of the service, at their request, in lieu of court-martial.
- 42 (3 percent) were separated by court-martial without returning to duty.
- 175 (12 percent) were returned to duty and later separated by court-martial or in lieu of court-martial for later offenses.
- 403 (29 percent) were returned to duty and later discharged for reasons indicating that they were not successful.

Of the remaining 282 (20 percent), 50 had not been discharged but were again in an unauthorized absence status. Further details of our analyses are shown in the following chart.



a/Includes instances where no action was taken, action may have been taken but was not recorded in personnel records, action was not directly related to the incident (i.e., finalization of administrative or punitive discharge in process at time of the incident), and action may have been delayed pending return from subsequent absence.

ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH DESERTERS

The alternatives available to a commander in dealing with deserters range from no punishment to referral of the case to a general court-martial which has authority to impose the maximum sentence authorized for the offense. A description of these alternatives and the frequency of use for our study group of 1,405 follows.

<u>Alternatives used</u>	<u>Number of times</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>
Separation for the good of the service in lieu of court-martial. It can be approved by the discharge authority when an individual submits a resignation or request for discharge and is involved in conduct triable by court-martial for an offense punishable by a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge.	503	35.8
Nonjudicial punishment. The forms of punishment authorized include admonition or reprimand, reduction in rank, and detention of one-half month's pay per month for 3 months.	253	18.0
Summary court-martial. The most severe punishments authorized are reduction in rank, confinement for 1 month, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for 1 month.	77	5.5
Special court-martial. The most severe punishments authorized are reduction in rank, confinement for 6 months, forfeiture of two-thirds pay for 6 months, and a bad-conduct discharge. However, the punishment imposed cannot exceed the maximum authorized for the offense.	378	26.9
General court-martial. Any punishment authorized for the offense can be imposed, including a dishonorable discharge.	9	.6
Other	<u>185</u>	<u>13.2</u>
Total	<u>1,405</u>	<u>100.0</u>

As shown above, the most frequently used alternative is the administrative discharge for the good of the service, at the individual's request, in lieu of court-martial, and the least used was referral of the case to a general court-martial where the maximum punishment could be imposed.

An unused alternative is separation of a deserter in absentia. DOD Directive 1332.14 states it may be imposed when the discharge authority determines it will serve the national interest. The discharge authority must attempt to notify the deserter of the imminent discharge action and the effective date by registered or certified mail. If the deserter cannot be located or does not respond within a reasonable time, an administrative discharge board can separate the person in absentia.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The military spends millions of dollars annually to apprehend and process deserters. Military representatives said that treating desertion as a crime had a deterrent effect by discouraging some from becoming repeaters and others from first offenses.

The asserted deterrent effect on the deserter seems to serve little purpose because most deserters do not become successful soldiers. A large majority are separated, in many cases shortly after their return, because they are unable or unwilling to meet the standards demanded of professional soldiers in an all volunteer force.

We found no empirical evidence dealing with the deterrent effect on soldiers who do not desert. Subjectively, fear of apprehension, punishment, and accompanying disgrace would seem to discourage some from deserting. Conversely, others may view discharge, a penalty frequently used, more as a reward than a punishment.

Costs are being incurred to apprehend individuals who voluntarily surrender. Such efforts begin as soon as an individual is administratively classified as a deserter, usually after being absent from duty for 30 days. A test at one station showed that 54 percent of such individuals surrendered. It may not be necessary, therefore, to begin apprehension efforts until voluntary surrender is less probable. It makes little sense to incur the cost of apprehending deserters only to separate them, particularly when many avoid apprehension by returning voluntarily.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reexamine DOD's policies and find less costly alternatives to the present practice of apprehending deserters during peacetime in an all volunteer force. He could consider among others:

- Stopping the apprehension of deserters except when the individual is wanted for some specific purpose, such as another crime or security matter, and discharge them in absentia after they have been absent for a stipulated period.

CHAPTER 6

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The objectives of this segment of our overall review of unauthorized absence in the military services were to determine the (1) cost of apprehending deserters and (2) extent that deserters were successful on return to duty. We had discussions with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the headquarters of each service, and various field activities. Cost data was obtained from the FBI and from the accounting records at the headquarters of each service and from information the Army developed. Certain demographic information on military people involved in unauthorized absence was selected from personnel records. Provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice were also considered.

Discussions with representatives of each service revealed that the Army's apprehension effort was best organized for determining apprehension and related costs. We visited the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma to:

1. Obtain a better understanding of the Army operation and costs.
2. Satisfy ourselves on the processes involved in apprehending deserters.
3. Obtain information on the means of apprehension.

The Fort Sill base is one of the 12 Army bases responsible for apprehending deserters and determining what action should be taken against them.

A key factor in our analysis was selecting a representative group of people involved in unauthorized absence from each service. The following service activities provided computer tapes identifying individuals involved in unauthorized absence during the 12-month period ended March 31, 1975, except the Air Force which used the 12-month period ended June 30, 1975.

--U.S. Air Force Military Personnel Center,
Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

--U.S. Army Military Personnel Center,
Alexandria, Virginia.

--U.S. Marine Corps Manpower Management
Information Systems Branch,
Washington, D.C.

--U.S. Navy Finance Center,
Cleveland, Ohio.

From this data, we took a stratified random sample. The sample groups and sizes are shown in appendix II.

We reviewed the personnel files of the individuals included in our sample to obtain the punishment imposed and the type and reason for discharge if separated from the military. The personnel files were reviewed in the sequence selected for sampling. Although we have not reviewed the files of all the individuals in the overall sample, the number reviewed is sufficient to represent the situation in each service for the issues addressed in this report. This work was done at the following locations:

--Military Personnel Records Center (for separated personnel), St. Louis, Missouri.

--U.S. Army:

Enlisted Record and Evaluation Center,
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

Reserve Component Personnel and Administration
Center, St. Louis, Missouri.

--U.S. Navy:

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Enlisted Service and
Record Division, Arlington, Virginia.

--U.S. Marine Corps:

Manpower, Personnel Service Division,
Arlington, Virginia.

Automated Services Center, Reserve Forces
Administration Activities, Kansas City, Missouri.

Our analyses of Air Force deserters are in process and, therefore, not included in this report.

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE AS DEFINED IN LAW

Articles 85, 86, and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 USC 885-887) define unauthorized absence in the military services as a crime. It describes the various forms of unauthorized absence:

"Art. 85. Desertion

- (a) Any member of the armed forces who--
 - (1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently;
 - (2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or
 - (3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States;

is guilty of desertion.

- (b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion.
- (c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.

"Art. 86. Absence without leave

Any member of the armed forces who, without authority--

- (1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time prescribed;
- (2) goes from that place; or
- (3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty at which he is required to be at the time prescribed;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

"Art. 87. Missing movement

Any person subject to this chapter who through neglect or design misses the movement of a ship, aircraft, or unit with which he is required in the course of duty to move shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."

OUR SAMPLE OF UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE (UA)INCIDENTS TERMINATED DURING THE12-MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1975

Length of UA (days)	<u>U.S. ARMY</u>				UAs record- ed in personnel records (note b)
	Total number of UAs in computerized records	Sample size	Adjust- ments (note a)	Adjusted sample size	
Less than 1	-	-	-	-	11
1 to 3	11,291	305	130	175	203
4 to 15	23,535	479	142	338	325
16 to 30	<u>8,597</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>113</u>
Total 30 or less	<u>43,423</u>	<u>914</u>	<u>305</u>	<u>610</u>	<u>652</u>
31 to 60	5,706	142	27	115	111
61 to 90	3,296	137	19	118	113
91 to 180	4,974	142	15	127	128
Over 180	<u>4,545</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>96</u>
Total over 30	<u>18,521</u>	<u>563</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>448</u>
Total	<u>61,944</u>	<u>1,477</u>	<u>378</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,100</u>

U.S. NAVY

<u>Length of UA</u> (days)	Total number of UAs in computerized records	<u>Sample size</u>	<u>Adjustments (note c)</u>	<u>Adjusted sample size</u>	UAs recorded in personnel records (note b)
Less than 1	-	-	-	-	-
1 to 3	12,264	307	98	209	211
4 to 15	14,756	410	111	299	304
16 to 30	<u>6,106</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>113</u>
Total or 30	<u>33,126</u>	<u>859</u>	<u>246</u>	<u>613</u>	<u>628</u>
31 to 60	3,185	145	34	111	169
61 to 90	1,084	135	30	105	121
91 to 180	1,168	146	29	117	140
Over 180	<u>445</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>150</u>
Total over 30	<u>5,882</u>	<u>575</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>456</u>	<u>580</u>
Length of UA not known	<u>6,144</u>	<u>205</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>139</u>	-
Total	<u>45,152</u>	<u>1,639</u>	<u>431</u>	<u>1,208</u>	<u>1,208</u>

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<u>Length of UA</u> (days)	<u>Total number of UAs in computerized records</u>	<u>Sample size</u>	<u>Adjustments (note d)</u>	<u>Adjusted sample size</u>	<u>UAs recorded in personnel records (note b)</u>
Less than 1	-	-	-	-	2
1 to 3	13,730	281	125	156	157
4 to 15	13,660	402	144	258	269
16 to 30	<u>5,259</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>74</u>
Total 30 or less	<u>32,649</u>	<u>824</u>	<u>331</u>	<u>493</u>	<u>503</u>
31 to 60	4,551	130	38	92	93
61 to 90	2,126	125	22	103	94
91 to 180	3,712	132	39	93	84
Over 180	<u>4,007</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>98</u>	<u>106</u>
Total over 30	<u>14,396</u>	<u>531</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>386</u>	<u>377</u>
Total	<u>47,045</u>	<u>1,355</u>	<u>476</u>	<u>879</u>	<u>879</u>

a/Include 258 sample incidents not found in the examination of personnel records, 79 personnel records not at the review location, and 40 incidents combined with non-UA incidents. These incidents were not included in the analyses.

b/The UAs are categorized by the length of absence recorded in the individual personnel records. In some instances, the length of UA differed from that recorded in the computerized records.

c/Includes 230 incidents combined with non-UA incidents for disposition, 98 personnel records not found at the review location, 77 records being reviewed at 9/30/76, and 26 sample incidents not found in the examination of personnel records. These incidents were not included in the analyses.

d/Includes 151 personnel records not found at the review location, 124 UA incidents combined with non-UA incidents for disposition, 117 sample incidents not found in the examination of personnel records, and 84 records being reviewed at 9/30/76. These incidents were not included in the analyses.