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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, April 19, 2007: 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 

Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for 
New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development: 

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues: 

Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Issues: 

Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues: 

GAO-07-596T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-596T, testimony before the Subcommittee on Air and 
Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As operations overseas continue, DOD is experiencing a growing demand 
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to 
provide valuable information in support of military operations. While 
the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community 
to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to 
make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. 
Congress has been interested in DODís approach for managing and 
integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. 

This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAOís 
ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to 
improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and 
challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DODís 
approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, 
and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the 
potential for synergies between them. 

GAO Ďs ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials 
at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command 
operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs. 

What GAO Found: 

DODís first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration 
of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration 
Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability 
portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that 
assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work, 
however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future 
requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. 
DODís second initiative to improve the integration of the servicesí ISR 
programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its 
joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test 
case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across 
DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce 
redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified 
challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt 
suggestions from portfolio managers. 

DODís approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to 
optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged 
with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to 
allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support 
operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR 
programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently 
have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible 
for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility 
over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have 
visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other 
units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to 
evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance 
evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate 
the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of 
existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support 
warfighting needs. 

Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the 
development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more 
efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the 
warfighter. We have identified development programs where program 
managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies 
and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly 
stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR 
development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or 
schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-
based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense 
policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the 
warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems 
relevant. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-596T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Davi DíAgostino at (202) 
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 
pickups@gao.gov, or Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 
sullivanm@gao.gov 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss GAO's work for this 
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and 
acquisition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, 
including unmanned aircraft systems. As you know, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities are central to 
ongoing military operations. Effective ISR can provide early warning of 
enemy threats and precision targeting, as well as enable U.S. military 
forces to increase effectiveness, coordination, and lethality. 
Battlefield commanders rank the need for ISR systems and the 
information they produce as high on their priority lists, a fact that 
is reflected in DOD's planned investment in ISR. The demand for ISR 
assets at every level of command is growing, and DOD is making 
investments in a number of ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft 
systems, manned platforms, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial 
systems. Although the United States has significant ISR capabilities, 
their effectiveness has been hampered by gaps in capabilities, growing 
competition for assets, unavailability when needed, and systems that do 
not fully complement one another. The Quadrennial Defense Review 
emphasized the increasingly important role intelligence capabilities-- 
including manned and unmanned airborne and space capabilities--play in 
supporting military operations and acknowledged that the ISR community 
as a whole must move toward a collaborative enterprise to achieve more 
responsive support for civilian decision makers and commanders engaged 
in planning and executing operations within resources likely to be 
constrained by the fiscal challenges of the federal budget. 

Since we testified before this Subcommittee last year on one component 
of DOD's ISR enterprise--unmanned aircraft systems--demand for ISR 
support has continued to grow, and DOD is planning to invest in new 
systems with expanded and new capabilities. Meanwhile, growing out of 
the Quadrennial Defense Review's recommendations, DOD has undertaken a 
number of studies designed to determine future ISR requirements and 
established a new organization to help integrate current assets to 
improve its processes for supporting combat operations. In addition, 
DOD has updated its ISR Integration Roadmap. Today, you asked us to 
discuss our preliminary observations on DOD's management of ISR 
requirements, distribution of current assets, and planned acquisitions 
based on ongoing work we are conducting for this Subcommittee. 
Specifically, we will highlight (1) the status of DOD initiatives aimed 
at improving the management and integration of ISR requirements and 
challenges the department faces in implementing the initiatives, (2) 
DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military 
operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development 
and the potential for synergies between them. We will be continuing our 
work on the management of ISR requirements, the support of ISR assets 
for combat operations, and the acquisition of ISR capabilities and plan 
to issue reports based on this work later this year. 

To understand the status of initiatives within DOD to improve the 
management and integration of ISR requirements, we analyzed DOD's ISR 
Integration Roadmap and updates. We also reviewed documentation on ISR 
requirements generation and validation that we obtained from DOD's 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System as well as 
previous studies related to DOD's management of ISR assets. In 
addition, we discussed DOD's ISR capabilities management initiatives 
and challenges with senior officials from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); the Joint Staff; the Battlespace 
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board; the National Security Space 
Office; the Air Force; the Army; the Navy; the U.S. Strategic Command's 
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance; the U.S. Central Command; the U.S. Special Operations 
Command; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

To assess the effectiveness of DOD's approach to managing current ISR 
assets in support of ongoing combat operations, we interviewed 
officials and reviewed documentation from the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Planning Task Force within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Joint Staff; each of 
the military services; U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air 
Force component commands; the Joint Functional Component Command for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and other 
organizations. We also observed operations, reviewed documentation, and 
interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command to better understand how 
ISR assets are assigned to specific missions. Additionally, we 
discussed the use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations 
with U.S. Central Command officials and system operators who recently 
returned or are currently supporting operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

To assess the status of selected ISR programs and the potential for 
synergies between them, we obtained and analyzed programmatic and 
budget documents for each of the systems we reviewed. We also discussed 
the status of each program with officials at the program office level 
and with officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, we 
discussed the potential for synergies among programs with officials 
from the Joint Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 

We conducted our ongoing work from June 2006 to March 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

DOD has taken some important first steps to formulate a strategy for 
improving the integration of future ISR requirements--the development 
of its ISR Integration Roadmap and the inclusion of ISR systems across 
DOD in a test case for the joint capability portfolio management 
concept. In response to a statutory requirement, DOD developed the ISR 
Integration Roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR 
capabilities. Our preliminary work has shown, however, that while DOD's 
ISR Integration Roadmap sets out some strategic objectives, such as 
attaining global persistent surveillance, it does not clearly (1) 
identify future requirements and how they can be met, (2) identify 
funding priorities and a mechanism to ensure that services' investment 
plans reflect the overall strategy, or (3) set out how DOD will measure 
its progress toward its strategic goals for the ISR enterprise. We 
previously testified on similar weaknesses in other ISR-related 
programs, such as DOD's unmanned aircraft systems, and concluded that 
DOD had insufficient plans to guide its development and investment 
decisions. DOD's second initiative is its application of the joint 
capability portfolio management concept to ISR systems across DOD as a 
test of the concept. Through the capability portfolio management 
concept, DOD seeks to develop and manage ISR capabilities across the 
entire department --rather than by military service or individual 
program--and by doing so, enable interoperability of future 
capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. While implementation of 
the portfolio management concept is in its early stages, our 
preliminary assessment identified challenges. For example, the 
portfolio managers do not currently have the authority to direct 
services' investments in ISR capabilities, and DOD leadership is 
monitoring the portfolio management test cases to determine whether 
such authority is needed. Therefore, the extent to which the services 
will change their investment plans to adopt suggestions from portfolio 
managers to maximize the effectiveness of the overall enterprise is not 
clear. DOD has undertaken some data-driven analyses of the capabilities 
and costs of different systems that could provide portfolio managers a 
basis for making trade-offs among competing investment options. We 
identified some limitations to the analysis that DOD performed. Still, 
if expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this analytical 
approach could inform portfolio managers and decision makers and enable 
DOD to develop and field the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and 
effectively fill gaps and reduce redundancies. 

DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets, including unmanned 
aircraft systems, limits its ability to optimize the use of these 
assets. While the Joint Force Component Command for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), which is charged with 
recommending to the Secretary of Defense how theater-level assets 
should be allocated to support operational requirements of combatant 
commanders, has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting 
theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into 
all ISR assets. JFCC-ISR is working to increase its knowledge of these 
assets so that it can consider all assets in the allocation process. 
Similarly, during ongoing operations, the commander responsible for 
planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations does not 
currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked, 
which could result in duplicative taskings and limit DOD's ability to 
leverage all available ISR assets. In addition, DOD lacks sufficient 
metrics and feedback for evaluating the performance of its ISR assets. 
DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited metrics such as 
the numbers of targets planned versus the number collected against. DOD 
officials acknowledge more needs to be done and there is an ongoing 
effort within DOD to develop improved metrics and identify qualitative 
as well as quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been limited. 
Further, although DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of ISR support in meeting warfighter requirements, DOD 
officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring, 
due mainly to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without 
sufficient visibility over the full range of available ISR assets and 
feedback and metrics for evaluating ISR missions, DOD may not be in the 
best position to validate the true demand for ISR assets, ensure it is 
maximizing the use of existing assets, or acquire new systems that best 
support warfighting needs. 

The services are not required to jointly develop new weapon systems but 
can attain economies and efficiencies when this happens. Short of a 
joint development program, there are still opportunities for similar 
weapon systems being developed by different services to gain synergies 
that can result in providing new capabilities to the warfighter more 
efficiently and affordably. We have identified development programs 
where program managers and services are working together to gain these 
efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more 
costly stovepiped solutions that are redundant. Additionally, of the 12 
airborne ISR programs that we reviewed, most have encountered either 
cost growth or schedule delays. These problems are typically the result 
of not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system 
development as provided for in DOD policy. In some cases, the resultant 
delay in delivering the new capability to the warfighter has led to 
unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant and operational 
until the new capability is finally delivered. 

Background: 

The term "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance," or "ISR," 
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation 
of sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in 
support of current and future military operations. Intelligence data 
can take many forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images or 
electronic signals. This data can come from a variety of sources, 
including surveillance and reconnaissance systems ranging from 
satellites, to manned aircraft like the U-2, unmanned aircraft systems 
like the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator and the Army's Hunter, to 
other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment, to human intelligence 
teams. DOD ISR activities support the missions of the Department of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the 
missions of other government agencies. ISR activities directly support 
current and future operations and military forces rely on the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence in the planning 
and conduct of their operations and activities. 

Many defense organizations play a role in identifying ISR requirements, 
managing current assets, and developing new capabilities. DOD 
established the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to 
coordinate policy and strategic oversight of defense intelligence, 
security, and counterintelligence to meet combatant commander 
requirements. Other defense intelligence agencies, such as the National 
Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have key roles in supporting defense and 
national security missions. 

Combatant commanders may identify their needs for ISR capabilities to 
support their missions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with 
identifying the ISR capabilities required to support his theater of 
operations. Generally, the individual military services or other DOD 
agencies are responsible for managing the acquisition of new DOD ISR 
systems. 

In 2003, DOD altered its unified command plan to give the U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsibility for planning, 
integrating, and coordinating ISR in support of strategic and global 
operations. To execute this responsibility, USSTRATCOM established the 
Joint Functional Component Command-ISR in March 2005 and designated the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as the commander. The Joint 
Functional Component Command-ISR is charged with developing strategies 
for distributing, or allocating, existing ISR assets among combatant 
commanders and ensuring the integration and synchronization of DOD, 
national, and allied ISR capabilities and collection efforts. In the 
case of ongoing operations, the Joint Force Air Component Commander 
generally tasks theater-level ISR assets made available for support of 
the Joint Force Commander's operational objectives. 

Implemented in 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) is DOD's principal process for identifying, assessing, 
and prioritizing proposals to improve existing capabilities and develop 
new capabilities. The JCIDS process is designed to facilitate 
coordination among DOD components in assessing proposals for new 
capabilities to ensure that they enable joint forces to meet the full 
range of military operations and challenges. Under the JCIDS 
collaborative review process, proposals for new intelligence 
capabilities that support DOD or national intelligence requirements 
must be reviewed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which 
consists of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a four- 
star officer designated by each of the military services. Eight 
Functional Capabilities Boards assist the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council in evaluating proposals and making recommendations on 
approval.[Footnote 1] The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities 
Board (BA/FCB) is responsible for reviewing proposals to develop and 
acquire new ISR capabilities. 

Under section 426 of title 10 of the U.S. Code, DOD is required to 
establish an ISR Integration Council to serve as a forum for the 
services and the defense intelligence agencies to discuss their ISR 
integration efforts in order to ensure unity of effort and preclude 
unnecessary duplication of effort. Led by the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Intelligence, the council is statutorily made up of senior 
intelligence officers from each of the armed services and U.S. Special 
Operations Command, the directors of the defense intelligence agencies, 
and the Joint Staff Director for Operations.[Footnote 2] DOD is also 
required under section 426 to develop a comprehensive plan--known as 
the ISR Integration Roadmap--to guide the development and integration 
of DOD ISR capabilities from 2004 through 2018. DOD published the first 
iteration of the ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005 and updated the 
Roadmap in January 2007. The details of the ISR Integration Roadmap are 
classified, but the management issues and initiatives it contains are 
not classified. 

DOD Is Undertaking Important Initiatives, But the Extent to Which These 
Will Guide Future Investments to Achieve Better Integration of ISR 
Assets Is Not Clear: 

Over the past few years, DOD has taken some important steps to enable 
it to take a department-wide view of ISR capabilities. These steps are 
important in DOD's efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future 
ISR requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how 
existing and future assets will fit together to provide needed 
information to support combatant commanders and national decision 
makers. Specifically, DOD has developed and is updating a statutorily 
required ISR Integration Roadmap that charts current and planned 
programs and has begun testing portfolio management principles to 
manage the requirements for future ISR capabilities. However, these two 
initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and have some 
limitations, and it is unclear whether these initiatives will be enough 
to improve integration of DOD ISR assets and guide DOD ISR investment 
decisions. 

ISR Integration Roadmap: 

DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap is a noteworthy step for DOD in examining 
the ISR capabilities that DOD currently has available and planned, 
although the Roadmap does not represent a comprehensive vision for the 
ISR enterprise or define strategy to guide future investments. First 
published in May 2005 in response to a statutory requirement and 
updated in January 2007, DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap comprises a 
catalogue of detailed information on all the ISR assets being used and 
developed across DOD, including ISR capabilities related to collection, 
communication, exploitation, and analysis. DOD's recent update took the 
ISR Integration Roadmap a step farther than its 2005 version because it 
incorporates information from the QDR and the National Intelligence 
Strategy. For example, the updated version includes a list of the ISR- 
related QDR decisions aimed at achieving future joint force 
characteristics and building on progress to date, such as increasing 
investment in unmanned aircraft systems and balancing air-and space- 
borne ISR capabilities. In addition, the recent ISR Integration Roadmap 
included changes in funding and ISR program information driven by the 
fiscal year 2007 President's Budget. 

We believe that, given the vast scope of ISR capabilities, which 
operate in a variety of mediums and encompass a range of intelligence 
disciplines, the ISR Integration Roadmap represents a significant step 
toward providing DOD leadership and the Congress with the information 
needed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current ISR 
capabilities. However, while the Roadmap sets out some strategic 
objectives for the defense ISR enterprise,[Footnote 3] such as 
attaining global persistent surveillance,[Footnote 4] it does not (1) 
identify overall ISR capabilities and how it plans to achieve them, (2) 
identify funding priorities, and (3) establish mechanisms to enforce an 
investment strategy or measure progress. More specifically, the Roadmap 
does not clarify what requirements for future ISR systems are already 
filled, or possibly saturated, identify the critical capability gaps 
that need to be filled by future systems, or identify focus areas for 
future requirements. In addition, the Roadmap does not clearly show how 
the ISR systems--existing and future--will fit together in a vision for 
common architecture to most efficiently meet priority ISR requirements 
or provide a basis for making trade-offs among competing programs. We 
have previously testified on the need for better planning for other ISR-
related development programs. For example, DOD has continued to request 
funding to support the services' plans to develop new unmanned aircraft 
system capabilities in the absence of overall plans to guide 
development and investment decisions. DOD officials acknowledged that 
the ISR Integration Roadmap has limitations and said that these 
limitations will be addressed in future revisions. As the department 
moves forward with its ISR Integration Roadmap, we believe it could 
provide a basis for DOD to determine the mix of future capabilities 
that provides the best value with regard to their place in an 
overarching ISR architecture. 

Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management: 

DOD is undertaking to better manage the requirements for future ISR 
capabilities across DOD by applying a joint capability portfolio 
management concept to ISR assets and planned programs. In September 
2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems 
across DOD together into a capability portfolio as part of a test case 
for the joint capability portfolio management concept. The capability 
portfolio containing these ISR systems is known as the battlespace 
awareness capability portfolio, and it is one of the four test cases 
for exploring this management concept.[Footnote 5] The intent of the 
ISR portfolio management test case is to enable DOD to develop and 
manage ISR capabilities across the entire department--rather than by 
military service or individual program--and by doing so, to improve the 
interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability 
redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the lead office for the 
battlespace awareness capability portfolio management. The ISR 
Integration Council acts as the governance body for the ISR portfolio 
management effort. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence works closely with the Battlespace Awareness Functional 
Capabilities Board,[Footnote 6] which is a Joint Staff organization 
that provides analytic support for the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council's discussions and decisions on ISR capability needs, joint 
concepts, and programmatic issues. 

Battlespace awareness capability managers reviewed and prioritized ISR 
assets to inform budget development for the first time with the fiscal 
year 2008 budget, and the portfolio management concept is still being 
tested. Therefore, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in 
integrating ISR programs to meet future requirements. However, our 
preliminary work has shown that the concept faces implementation 
challenges, among them clarifying the responsibilities and authorities 
of the capability portfolio managers in relation to the services in 
order to make trade-offs among competing service priorities. For 
example, the ISR Integration Council held discussions on service 
resource allocation decisions in an effort to achieve consensus among 
the services, combatant commanders, and other stakeholders. The Council 
proposed recommendations for rebalancing the services' investments in 
their respective ISR portfolios during the fiscal year 2008 budget. 
However, the ISR Integration Council did not have the authority to 
compel services to change their budget plans. According to defense 
officials, there were some disagreements between the ISR Integration 
Council's recommendations and the services on funding levels on ISR 
systems. These issues were elevated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
for final decision. DOD leaders are monitoring the implementation of 
the capability portfolio test cases to determine whether portfolio 
managers should have the authority to direct changes to service plans. 
However, without authority to direct the military services to adopt any 
of its suggestions, it is unclear the extent to which the ISR 
Integration Council can influence service plans. 

The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board is charged with 
reviewing service proposals for new ISR capabilities and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence assists in this effort. The 
documentation the board reviews provides analysis of the capability 
required and includes cost information related to the proposed approach 
for generating the capability. However, it is not clear to what extent 
these proposals are based on a comprehensive analysis that includes 
data on cost/performance evaluations and consideration of national- 
level capabilities. 

Our preliminary work identified an example of the kind of data-driven 
analysis of alternative investment strategies that we believe could be 
useful to battlespace awareness capability portfolio managers for 
analyzing competing ISR programs and developing an investment strategy 
for the future. In 2004, the National Security Space Office[Footnote 7] 
completed a limited architecture analysis of ISR assets using cost and 
performance data. Specifically, the National Security Space Office 
analyzed how much additional ISR capability would be provided by 
various ISR system mixes for given levels of additional investment. The 
intent of the study was to provide insight into the most efficient mix 
of current and planned ISR systems. While the analysis was a useful 
demonstration of an approach to inform decision makers, it had several 
limitations. For example, the analysis did not include all national and 
tactical ISR systems, mainly focusing on space and air. The analysis 
also assumed that the additional infrastructure needed to support 
integration of information from additional ISR systems would be 
available, while the difficult to estimate costs associated with such 
additional infrastructure were not included in the analysis. Further, 
the analysis was limited in that it only considered ISR capabilities 
only for levels of increased investment, not for levels of decreased 
investment; thus, it did not consider what the most efficient mix of 
ISR systems would be if limited resources forced decision makers to 
decrease funding for ISR programs. Moreover, the analysis represented a 
one-time effort and has not been repeated. Still, we believe that, if 
expanded to be more comprehensive and integrated, this type of data- 
driven analysis analytic approach could inform decision makers on the 
implications of various options for providing the most effective mix of 
ISR capabilities that DOD can afford. Without an ongoing and 
comprehensive data-driven analysis of the most efficient solutions, it 
is not clear to us how DOD can be assured that it is developing and 
fielding the ISR capabilities that most efficiently and effectively 
fill gaps and reduce redundancies. 

Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD's Approach for Developing 
ISR Capabilities: 

While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD 
has established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in 
its planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will 
investigate DOD's processes for integrating requirements and developing 
an investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are 
the extents to which: 

* DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap incorporates a framework and investment 
strategy for achieving an overall integrated ISR architecture; 

* DOD's review processes enable it to identify gaps and redundancies in 
ISR requirements; 

* DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR capabilities, to 
include consideration of all available ISR assets and cost/performance 
evaluations; and: 

* DOD provides information on the challenges and risks associated with 
ISR programs for Congress' use in oversight and funding deliberations. 

DOD Lacks Adequate Visibility and Metrics to Optimize ISR Assets: 

Given the substantial investment DOD is making in ISR assets and the 
increasing demand for them, effective management of these assets has 
become critical. Currently, DOD's approach to allocation and tasking do 
not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets. 
Although DOD has established a process for allocating available ISR 
assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater needs, including 
unmanned aircraft systems, it does not have visibility over all ISR 
assets, which would improve its ability to assign assets. Additionally, 
DOD's process for tasking ISR assets does not currently allow for 
visibility at all levels into how ISR assets are being used on a daily 
basis. Furthermore, DOD does not have metrics and feedback for 
systematically measuring the effectiveness of ISR missions. Without 
better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the 
information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets to ensure it 
is maximizing the use of existing assets and to acquire new systems 
that best support warfighting needs. 

DOD's Approach to Allocating and Tasking ISR Does Not Consider All ISR 
Assets: 

DOD uses an annual process for allocating or distributing available ISR 
assets to the combatant commanders to meet theater-level needs, 
including unmanned aircraft systems. That process is managed by 
USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR), which 
is tasked with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 
how best to allocate ISR resources for theater use across the combatant 
commands. Once ISR assets have been allocated, those assets are 
available to the theater commanders to be assigned, or tasked, against 
specific requests for ISR support, in support of ongoing operations. 

JFCC-ISR's ability to fulfill its mission of integrating DOD, national 
and international partner ISR capabilities to support the warfighter 
depends on the extent to which it has awareness and visibility over all 
ISR assets including DOD, national and allied ISR assets. However, 
although the JFCC-ISR has been assigned the mission of integrating 
national and DOD ISR capabilities, it does not currently have 
visibility into all assets that could be brought to bear to support 
combatant commanders' needs. Currently, JFCC-ISR has full visibility 
only of ISR programs available to support theater-level requirements. 
According to JFCC-ISR officals, although they are working to develop 
better visibility over national ISR assets by working with other 
defense and national intelligence agencies, they lack full visibility 
into these ISR assets. According to JFCC-ISR officials, cultural 
barriers to information sharing represent a hurdle to integrating data 
from multiple defense intelligence agencies, and the success of efforts 
to access highly sensitive ISR programs is currently dependent on 
personal relationships rather than an institutionalized process. As 
with national-level ISR assets, JFCC-ISR officials told us they have 
limited visibility over tactical ISR assets, such as the smaller 
unmanned aircraft systems, that are assigned to units in the field. 
Without an approach to its allocation process that allows visibility 
over all ISR capabilities and access to all relevant information, it is 
not clear to us that the JFCC-ISR has the tools it needs in order to 
fulfill its mission, in particular to leverage all available ISR assets 
and to maximize the effectiveness of those assets. 

Greater visibility of assets is also needed during ongoing operations 
to improve DOD's process for tasking, or assigning ISR assets to 
specific missions. Specifically, greater visibility of assets is needed 
at the theater level. The theater combatant commander's Joint Forces 
Air Component Commander is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 
monitoring joint air operations to focus the impact of air capabilities 
and for assuring their effective and efficient use in achieving the 
combatant commander's objectives. However, while the Air Component 
Commander has visibility into how all theater-level ISR assets, like 
the Air Force's Predator, are being used, it does not currently have 
visibility into how ISR assets, embedded in and controlled by tactical 
units, such as the Army's Hunter, are being used on a daily basis. 
Greater visibility is also needed at the tactical level to allow units 
a greater awareness of where other ISR assets, including both theater- 
level and those assets embedded in other units, are operating and what 
they are being used to do. Our preliminary work shows that as a result 
of this lack of visibility, the potential exists for multiple unmanned 
aircraft systems to be tasked to operate in the same area and against 
the same requirement. Also, our work has shown that by leveraging the 
capabilities of different ISR assets using techniques such as cross- 
cueing,[Footnote 8] the Air Component Commander has been able to use 
the different types of capabilities brought by different theater-level 
manned and unmanned assets to maximize the intelligence collected. For 
example, a manned Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and 
Reconnaissance system could be used to sense movement in an area and 
then an unmanned system such as a Predator could be called in to 
collect imagery to confirm suspected activity. With greater visibility 
into the tasking of all ISR assets, including those tactical assets 
controlled by the military services, there is an opportunity for DOD to 
gain greater synergies and maximize the use of its ISR assets and 
determine whether additional perceived demand is well-founded. This 
visibility would also allow tactical units, when appropriate, to 
leverage other assets operating in their area to maximize the 
information captured and avoid duplicative taskings. 

DOD Lacks Metrics and Feedback for Systematically Tracking the 
Effectiveness of Its ISR Missions: 

The growing demand for ISR assets is an indication of their value in 
supporting combat forces, but DOD does not have sufficient metrics for 
evaluating the effectiveness of ISR missions and is not getting 
consistent feedback on whether the warfighters' needs were met. For 
example, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited metrics 
such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected 
against. We recommended in a December 2005 report that DOD ensure its 
performance measurement system measures how effectively unmanned 
aircraft systems perform their missions, identify performance indicator 
information that needs to be collected, and systematically collect 
identified performance information.[Footnote 9] DOD officials 
acknowledged shortcomings of its metrics, and DOD is developing 
qualitative as well as quantitative ISR metrics, but progress has been 
limited. Additionally, although DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of 
how effective ISR support is in meeting the warfighters' requirements, 
DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently 
occurring mainly because of the fast pace of operations in theater. For 
example, while there is real-time communication among unmanned aircraft 
system operators, requesters, and intelligence personnel during an 
operation to ensure that the needed information is captured, there is 
little to no feedback after the operation to determine whether the 
warfighters' needs were met by the ISR mission. Without developing 
metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables it to assess 
the extent to which ISR missions are successful in supporting 
warfighter needs, DOD is not in a position to validate the true demand 
for ISR assets, determine whether it is allocating and tasking its ISR 
assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new systems that best 
support warfighting needs. 

ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and 
Have Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy 
Systems: 

Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current ISR 
assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the 
future, some of DOD's current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from 
collaboration among the services that could save time and money. Among 
the ISR acquisition programs we reviewed, we found specific cases where 
the military services' successful collaboration resulted in savings of 
time and resources. We also found cases where more collaboration is 
needed to provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable 
new systems to close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 12 airborne ISR 
programs that we reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule 
growth. One program experienced significant cost growth and 9 programs 
have experienced schedule delays that range from 3 months to 60 months. 
These problems were caused largely by acquisition strategies that 
failed to capture sufficient knowledge about the product technologies 
and design before committing to the development or demonstration of a 
new system. Resultant delays in the delivery of some new systems have 
required DOD to make investments in legacy systems in order to keep 
them relevant and operational until they can be replaced by new 
systems. 

Opportunities Exist for Greater Collaboration across the Services' ISR 
Programs: 

While the Office of Secretary of Defense has historically endorsed the 
concept of joint acquisitions because of the potential synergies and 
resultant benefits, the military services have not always embraced 
joint acquisitions and often prefer separately managed programs to 
satisfy their individual needs. As a result, opportunities to gain 
efficiencies through common engineering, design, and manufacturing 
efforts are not presented when a new acquisition program begins. 
However, we found the military services sometimes initiate 
collaborative approaches on their own to achieve some of the economies 
and efficiencies of a joint program. In one case, we also found the 
services resisted seeking synergies that could benefit both programs 
and lead to potential savings in development and procurement costs. The 
following three examples illustrate programs that are collaborating, 
have taken initial steps to begin collaborating, and have resisted 
collaborating. The ultimate extent of collaboration as well as outcomes 
of these programs still remains to be seen. 

Successful Collaboration on Fire Scout: 

The Army began developing its Future Combat Systems--a family of 
systems that included a vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aircraft 
system called Fire Scout--in 2000. Program managers from the Army Fire 
Scout contacted their counterparts in the Navy Fire Scout program to 
share information and see if there could be any synergies between the 
two programs. This was done on their own initiative as acquisition 
policy does not require joint or collaborative programs. Army and Navy 
officials met several times to discuss configuration, performance 
requirements, testing, support, and other issues. Initially the 
requirements for the two systems were quite different. The Army's 
unmanned aircraft system had four blades and a larger engine, while 
Navy's system had three rotor blades and a smaller engine. After 
discussions, the Navy decided to switch to the Army's configuration. 
The Army is buying common components, such as the air vehicle and 
flight components, under the Navy contract. 

An Army program management official estimated that the savings to the 
Army in research and development alone would be about $200 million. As 
both programs mature, the official believes additional synergies and 
savings could be realized through contract price breaks on quantities 
and shared test assets, such as air vehicles, support equipment, and 
test components. Jointly acquiring common hardware under one contract 
will also reduce procurement administrative lead time and permit common 
design, tooling, and testing. Finally, future payload development such 
as communications, sensors, and data links could be procured jointly. 

Opportunity to Collaborate on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS): 

The Navy identified a mission need for a broad area maritime and 
littoral ISR capability in 2000. Based on a 2002 analysis of 
alternatives, the Navy decided to pursue a manned platform Multi- 
mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) with an unmanned adjunct, the BAMS. The 
Navy subsequently performed an analysis of alternatives for the BAMS 
program, which identified several potential alternatives; foremost 
among them was the Global Hawk system. As a risk reduction effort, the 
Navy funded the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration program in 2003. 
Working through the existing Air Force contract, the Navy procured two 
Global Hawk unmanned aircraft and associated ground controls and 
equipment. The demonstration program was expected to leverage the 
existing Global Hawk system to develop tactics, training, and 
techniques for maritime mission applications. 

The BAMS program is at a critical juncture. It released a request for 
proposals in February 2007 and plans to proceed with system development 
and demonstration in October 2007. If the Global Hawk (or another 
existing system like the Air Force Reaper) is selected, there are 
opportunities for the Navy to work with the Air Force and take 
advantage of its knowledge on the existing platform. By adopting the 
collaborative techniques used by the Fire Scout officials, the Navy 
could leverage knowledge early in the acquisition process and avoid or 
reduce costs for design, new tooling, and manufacturing, and streamline 
contracting and acquisition processes. 

Collaboration Slow to Happen on Warrior and Predator: 

In contrast to the Fire Scout experience, the Air Force and Army 
repeatedly resisted collaborating on their Predator and Warrior 
unmanned aircraft programs. The Air Force's Predator is a legacy 
program that has been operational since 1995. Its persistent 
surveillance/full motion video capability continues to be a valued 
asset to the warfighter. When the Army began in 2001 to define 
requirements for the Warrior, a system similar to the Predator, it did 
not explore potential synergies and efficiencies with the Air Force 
program. Both the Air Force and the Joint Staff responsible for 
reviewing Warrior's requirements and acquisition documentation raised 
concerns about duplication of an existing capability. Despite these 
concerns, the Army did not perform an analysis of alternatives, citing 
the urgent need of battlefield commanders for this capability.[Footnote 
10] The Army awarded a separate development contract to the same 
contractor producing the Predator. 

Responding to direction from the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
Secretary of Defense, the Army and Air Force agreed to consider 
cooperating on the acquisition of the two systems in January 2006. 
However, the effort has stalled because the services have different 
concepts of operation and requirements. For example, the Army does not 
agree with the Air Force's requirement for rated pilots. The Air Force 
and the Army are currently working to identify program synergies in a 
phased approach. Initially, the Air Force will acquire two of the more 
modern Warrior airframes and test them. Later, the services will 
compare their requirements for ground control stations and automated 
takeoff and landing. Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare 
concepts of operation and training requirements for additional 
synergies. However, so far the Army has coordinated the proposed 
approach through the Vice Chief of Staff level, but the agreement has 
not yet been approved by the Department of Army. The Air Force is still 
working to resolve comments and concerns at lower organizational 
levels. If this stalls, these programs could be more costly and 
redundant. 

Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led 
to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems: 

Nearly all of the 12 airborne ISR programs[Footnote 11] we reviewed 
have experienced changes in cost or schedule. This can be attributed to 
a variety of causes. Many programs began development without a solid 
business case or a realistic acquisition strategy. As a result of the 
schedule delays in some programs, the services will have to make 
investments in legacy systems to keep them in the inventory longer than 
planned. These investments represent opportunity costs that could have 
been used for other needs within DOD. 

Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status of Airborne ISR Programs: 

Programs must build a business case that provides demonstrated evidence 
that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with 
the chosen concept, and (2) the concept can be developed and produced 
within existing resources--technologies, design, funding, and time. 
Establishing a business case calls for a realistic assessment of risks 
and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case 
and invites failure. Once the business case is done, programs must 
develop a realistic acquisition strategy, which requires having 
critical program knowledge at key points in the acquisition. This 
includes knowledge about technology maturity, system design, and 
manufacturing and production processes. DOD's acquisition policy 
endorses this knowledge-based approach to acquisition. This policy 
includes strategies to reduce technology, integration, design, 
manufacturing, and production risks. 

Table 1 summarizes ISR programs that have encountered problems either 
in development or as they prepared to begin the system development and 
demonstration phase of an acquisition program. Results of these 
problems included cost and schedule growth, program restructuring, 
cancellation, and unplanned investments in the legacy systems that were 
being replaced. 

Table 1: Causes and Impacts of Cost and Schedule Growth: 

System: E-10A; 
Problem encountered: Uncertain need and immature technology; 
Impact: Program cancelled. 

System: Aerial Common Sensor; 
Problem encountered: Requirements and design changes; 
Impact: Development stopped; program being restructured; schedule 
delayed 60 months; and increased investments in legacy systems. 

System: Global Hawk; 
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition; immature technology; and 
requirements and design changes; 
Impact: Cost growth (261 percent in development); schedule delayed 21 
months; program restructured; potential increased investments in legacy 
system. 

System: Reaper; 
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition and immature technology; 
Impact: Cost growth (13 percent in development) and schedule delayed 7 
months. 

System: BAMS; 
Problem encountered: Immature technology; 
Impact: Schedule delayed. 

System: MMA; 
Problem encountered: Immature technology; 
Impact: None to date. 

System: Army Fire Scout; 
Problem encountered: Acquisition dependent on another major acquisition 
program (Future Combat Systems); 
Impact: Schedule delayed 22 months. 

System: Navy Fire Scout; 
Problem encountered: Acquisition dependent on another major acquisition 
program (Littoral Combat Ship); 
Impact: Schedule delayed 3 months. 

System: Space Radar; 
Problem encountered: Immature technology and requirements change; 
Impact: Cost growth (18 percent in development); schedule delayed 8 
months; and program restructured. 

System: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program; 
Problem encountered: Acquisition strategy and funding dependent on 
other major acquisition programs (E-10A cancelled and Global Hawk 
continues); 
Impact: Requirements changed and program restructured. 

System: Warrior; 
Problem encountered: Concurrent acquisition strategy and immature 
technology; 
Impact: Cost growth (21 percent in development); schedule delayed 9 
months. 

System: Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (sensor); 
Problem encountered: Immature technology and design; 
Impact: Schedule delayed. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Impact of Delays on Legacy Systems: 

Following are detailed examples of programs that failed to either 
develop a good business case or an executable acquisition strategy and 
that had problems. The outcome was that the services either had to or 
may have to make additional investments in the legacy systems to keep 
them relevant and in the operational inventory until the new system has 
completed development and is fielded. 

Aerial Common Sensor (ACS): 

The Army's termination of the ACS system development and demonstration 
contract could have significant schedule, cost, and performance impacts 
on three legacy systems in the ISR portfolio--the Army's Guardrail 
Common Sensor (GRCS) and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), and the 
Navy's EP-3. The Army and the Navy had planned a phased approach to 
field the ACS and retire the legacy systems from the inventory with a 
minimal investment in maintaining legacy systems. Delays in ACS 
development will now require the Army and Navy to make investments in 
the legacy systems at the same time that they develop new replacement 
systems. In addition, any delay in either the development of new 
systems or modification of legacy systems could result in an ISR 
capability gap on the battlefield. 

* The GRCS and ARL were to be replaced by ACS beginning in fiscal year 
2009. Since the termination of the ACS development contract, the ACS 
program has reverted to a predevelopment stage as the Army restructures 
the program. ACS is scheduled to restart system development and 
demonstration in 2009, 5 years later than the initial development 
decision. Although the Army has not established a new date for initial 
operating capacity, that date is also likely to slip by 5 years to 
fiscal year 2014. The cost to keep GRCS and ARL mission equipment 
viable and the platforms airworthy is estimated to be $767 million 
between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Without these improvements, the 
systems will not remain capable against modern threats which could 
result in a gap in ISR capabilities on the battlefield. In addition, 
the airframes could not continue to fly during this time frame without 
some structural modifications. 

* The Navy had planned to replace its EP-3 with ACS and begin fielding 
the new system in fiscal year 2012. After the Army terminated the ACS 
development contract, the Navy considered staying with the Army in its 
development effort. However, according to Navy officials, the Chief of 
Naval Operations directed the Navy to proceed with a separate 
development effort, also called Aerial Common Sensor. The Navy now 
plans to proceed with system development and demonstration in the 
fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. The Navy has not established a date 
to begin fielding the new system, but that is not likely to take place 
before 2017. This translates into a 5-year slip in retiring the oldest 
EP-3 systems and will make modifications to those systems necessary so 
that they can remain in the field until the Navy achieves full 
operating capacity for its ACS. The Navy plans to invest more than $900 
million between fiscal years 2007 and 2013 to modify the EP-3. 

Global Hawk: 

The Air Force plans to replace the U-2 with the Global Hawk but delays 
in the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need to keep the U- 
2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. In December 2005, the Air 
Force had planned to begin retiring the U-2 in fiscal year 2007 and 
complete the retirement by fiscal year 2012. Although the next 
configuration of the Global Hawk (with limited signals intelligence 
capability) is scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 2009, it will not 
have the same capability as the U-2. The version of the Global Hawk 
that is planned to include a more robust signals intelligence 
capability is scheduled to begin deliveries in 2012. The Air Force is 
now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later in 2013 and 
at a slower rate than the 2005 plan. There are no funds in the budget 
beyond fiscal year 2006 but the Air Force intends to fund projects 
necessary to keep the U-2 capable. 

E-10A: 

The E-10A development program has been cancelled, but some funding will 
be used to support a technology demonstrator program for E-10A 
technologies. The E-10A was planned to provide battlefield awareness 
and command and control through technologies that provide capabilities 
greater than the current Air Force Joint Surveillance, Target 
Acquisition, and Reconnaissance system (Joint STARS). Battlefield 
awareness is essential to military operations according to the Air 
Force, and continued funding for the E-10A technologies, like the Multi-
Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP),[Footnote 12] is 
seen as a means for exploring follow-on avenues for Joint STARS. 
According to an Air Force program official, the Joint STARS radar will 
need to be replaced at some point in the future and a variant of the MP-
RTIP would probably be a candidate. However, before this new radar 
could be integrated on to the Joint STARS, its data processing and 
communications capabilities would need to be upgraded. At this time, 
this type of an effort is not a part of the Joint STARS program of 
record. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 
to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may 
have. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Davi 
D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431, Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619, or 
Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Other individuals making key contributions to this 
statement include Margaret Morgan, Patricia Lentini, Michael Hazard, 
Assistant Directors; Gabrielle Carrington, Susan Tindall, Dayna Foster, 
Frank Cristinzio, LaShawnda Lindsey, Elisha Matvay, Rae Ann Sapp, 
Michael Aiken, and Grace Coleman. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Improved Planning and Acquisition Strategies 
Can Help Address Operational Challenges. GAO-06-610T. Washington, D.C.: 
April 6, 2006. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and Acquisition Planning 
Can Help Address Emerging Challenges. GAO-05-395T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 9, 2005. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Global Hawk Cost Increase Understated in 
Nunn-McCurdy Report. GAO-06-222R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively Promote 
Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49. 
Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Changes in E-10A Acquisition Strategy Needed 
before Development Starts. GAO-05-273. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2005. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Changes in Global Hawk's Acquisition Strategy 
Are Needed to Reduce Program Risks, GAO-05-6. Washington, D.C.: 
November 5, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: Greater Use of Knowledge-Based Concepts Would 
Reduce Risks in Developing New Signals Intelligence Aircraft, GAO-04- 
939 Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts. GAO-04-342. Washington. D.C.: March 
17, 2004. 

Signals Intelligence: DOD Should Consider Joint Replacement of Aging 
Aircraft. GAO-02-401. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2002. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The other Functional Capabilities Boards are Command and Control, 
Focused Logistics, Force Management, Force Protection, Force 
Application, Net-Centric, and Joint Training. 

[2] The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has voluntarily 
expanded membership of the council to include representatives of 
several additional Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense 
offices, a representative of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the 
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. 

[3] The Defense ISR Enterprise consists of the intelligence components 
of DOD operating cohesively to fulfill the Secretary of Defense's 
obligation to meet DOD's intelligence needs and a significant set of 
government-wide intelligence needs (as tasked by the Director of 
National Intelligence.) 

[4] DOD defines persistent surveillance as the integrated management of 
a diverse set of collection and processing capabilities, operated to 
detect and understand the activity of interest with sufficient sensor 
dwell, revisit rate, and required quality to expeditiously assess 
adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an 
adversary, and assess results of U.S./coalition actions. 

[5] Under this concept, a group of military capabilities, such as ISR 
capabilities, is managed as a joint portfolio rather than separately by 
each service. The other test cases are Joint Command and Control, Joint 
Net-Centric Operations, and Joint Logistics. 

[6] The principal members of the Battlespace Awareness Functional 
Capabilities Board are representatives from the services, the combatant 
commands, the Joint Staff, OUSD(AT&L), the Director, PA&E, and 
OASD(NII)/DOD Chief Information Officer. 

[7] The National Security Space Office (NSSO) falls under the office of 
DOD's Executive Agent for Space--the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 
Its mission is to provide unity of effort and strategic focus to 
national security space issues. The mission of the NSSO's ISR 
Functional Integration Office, which conducted this analysis, is to 
create and sustain the nation's integrated ISR architecture to provide 
a basis for informed decision making across the national security 
enterprise. 

[8] Cross-cueing is the collaborative effort of utilizing capabilities 
offered by multiple ISR platforms to fulfill a mission. 

[9] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively 
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, GAO-06-49 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005). 

[10] The Army asserted that its need was urgent and it could not get 
sufficient support from Predator because of the system's limited 
assets. 

[11] These 12 programs are post Milestone A and are in technology 
development or systems development and demonstration. A project enters 
technology development at Milestone A, when the decision maker has 
approved the technology development strategy. The purpose of this phase 
of development is to reduce technology risk and to determine the 
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. 

[12] A smaller, less capable version of the MP-RTIP is also planned for 
the Global Hawk. 

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