

095021

B-168530

4-21-75



# REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

095021

## How Federal Efforts To Coordinate Programs To Mitigate Juvenile Delinquency Proved Ineffective

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES*

GGD-75-76

~~706339~~

095021

APRIL 21, 1975



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-168530

cl / To the President of the Senate and the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report discusses the ineffectiveness of Federal attempts to coordinate juvenile delinquency programs.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; and the Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas A. Atchefs".

Comptroller General  
of the United States

C o n t e n t s

		<u>Page</u>
DIGEST		i
CHAPTER		
1	INTRODUCTION	1
2	DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY EFFORTS	3
	Major legislative developments	3
	Federal programs apparently affecting juvenile delinquency	5
3	DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING SPECIFIC FEDERAL IMPACT OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES	13
	Lack of awareness	13
	Lack of uniform definitions	15
	Possible overstatement of Federal involvement	15
	Evaluation	16
4	FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES	20
	Earlier coordination efforts	20
	The Interdepartmental Council	22
	Federal regional councils	26
5	STATE AND LOCAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES	31
	State level	31
	Local level	40
	Conclusions	49
6	NEW LEGISLATION PROVIDES FOR IMPROVEMENTS	51
7	MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS	54
	National strategy	54
	Comprehensive State plans	55
	Coordination	56
	Funding	56
8	AGENCY COMMENTS	
	Department of Justice	58
	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	59
	Office of Management and Budget	59
	State and local agencies	59
9	SCOPE OF REVIEW	60

APPENDIX

Page

- |    |   |    |
|----|---|----|
| I  | Letter dated April 4, 1975, from the Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Department of Justice   | 61 |
| II | Principal officials of the Department of Justice and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare responsible for administering activities discussed in this report | 66 |

ABBREVIATIONS

- |      |  |
|------|--|
| GAO  | General Accounting Office                    |
| HEW  | Department of Health, Education, and Welfare |
| HUD  | Department of Housing and Urban Development  |
| LEAA | Law Enforcement Assistance Administration    |
| OMB  | Office of Management and Budget              |

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S  
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

HOW FEDERAL EFFORTS TO  
COORDINATE PROGRAMS TO MITIGATE  
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROVED  
INEFFECTIVE

1 Department of Justice 37  
2 Department of Health, Education,  
and Welfare 22

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO made this review to find out what the Federal Government has done to coordinate the many programs--Federal, State, and local--which could affect the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency in the United States.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Juvenile delinquency must be reduced if crime is to be prevented or curbed.

--Total arrests of juveniles under age 18 rose 144 percent between 1960 and 1973 compared to a 17 percent increase in arrests for those 18 and over.

--Juveniles in 1973 accounted for 51 percent of all arrests for property crimes, 23 percent for violent crimes, and 45 percent of arrests for serious crimes.

In September 1974 the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act became law; it is designed to improve the Federal Government's attempts to combat juvenile delinquency.

Before the law, no adequate national program had been developed to focus resources to

prevent and control juvenile delinquency in the United States.

No Federal agency had

--identified significant causes of juvenile delinquency,

--determined what resources were available for combating juvenile crime,

--developed a strategy to address the causes, or

--informed pertinent agencies' officials of Federal efforts to do something about the problem.

The Federal Government apparently relied on the myriad of antipoverty and social welfare programs to make a significant impact on the problem.

To account for the present situation, a summary of recent events is necessary. The most significant Federal acts, with amendments, dealing with the juvenile delinquency problem were:

1961 - The Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act.

1968 - The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act.

1968 - The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.

The responsibility for acting on juvenile delinquency rested chiefly with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). In 1968 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice also received some responsibilities. The Departments of Labor and Housing and Urban Development and the Office of Economic Opportunity also operated programs that affected the problem. (See pp. 3 to 10.)

#### Coordination problems

Coordination among these and other appropriate Federal agencies was difficult because they had no standard definition for selecting specific Federal programs for preventing juvenile delinquency or rehabilitating such delinquents.

In 1971 the Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Federal Juvenile Delinquency Programs--composed of 10 departments and agencies--was created by the Congress. It developed a definition, but it was too broad to be workable. It defined a juvenile as anyone between 1 day and 24 years of age.

The Council also was ineffective. It effected no major Federal legislative or program decisions because it (1) had to

rely on funds and staff provided by its member agencies and (2) lacked clear authority to coordinate their activities. (See pp. 22 to 26.)

Many officials of the Federal agency programs that the Council had identified as affecting juvenile delinquency were unaware that their programs had such a potential. (See pp. 13 and 14.)

Previous estimates of Federal Government expenditures for juvenile delinquency may not be accurate because of the absence of a workable definition of a juvenile delinquency program.

Congressional legislative committees observed that HEW had failed to adequately coordinate Federal efforts because of inadequate administration of the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Control Act of 1968 and that it requested from fiscal years 1968 to 1971 only \$49.2 million of an authorized \$150 million to administer the act.

A major administrative problem resulted from the 1968 acts' overlapping roles for HEW and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

HEW was to help the States prepare and implement comprehensive State juvenile delinquency plans. At the same time, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was to make block grants to the States to address all criminal

justice problems, including juvenile delinquency.

With more funds available, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration became dominant in criminal justice planning. It spent about \$70 million for juvenile delinquency programs in fiscal year 1971 compared with \$8.5 million spent by HEW for that year.

To facilitate coordination, the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney General agreed in 1971 (1) that HEW would concentrate on prevention efforts before a person entered the juvenile justice system and (2) that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration would focus on efforts once a person was in the juvenile justice system. (See pp. 20 to 22.)

In 1972 Federal regional councils were established in the 10 standard regions to develop closer working relationships between Federal grantmaking agencies and State and local governments.

However, the Federal regional councils generally were not very involved in juvenile delinquency projects, according to an official of the Office of Management and Budget, because of inadequate leadership from Washington. (See pp. 26 to 30.)

#### State and local coordination efforts

GAO's review of the efforts

of Colorado and Massachusetts and their largest cities-- Denver and Boston--showed that coordination problems in juvenile delinquency in States and cities were similar to those in the Federal Government.

Neither State had a single agency or organization coordinating the planning and operation of all programs that could affect juvenile delinquency. Neither had a comprehensive strategy to prevent or control juvenile delinquency.

The State and local situation has resulted in part from the Federal Government's fragmented approach to the juvenile delinquency problem. To seek funds, State and local agencies had to respond to the specific Federal categorical grant programs, each with its own objectives, requirements, and restrictions. As a result, State and local agencies had little incentive to coordinate their activities. (See ch. 5.)

#### 1974 legislation--an impetus for improvements

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, if properly implemented, should help prevent and control juvenile delinquency.

The law

--creates an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration;

- provides increased visibility to the problem and a focal point for Federal juvenile delinquency activities;
- improves existing Federal agency coordination and reporting requirements; and
- requires States to make a single agency responsible for planning juvenile delinquency efforts to be funded with Federal moneys. (See pp. 51 to 53.)

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

The 1974 act gives executive agencies a sufficient framework to improve their coordination of juvenile delinquency efforts. Since the act was enacted only shortly after GAO completed its review, it was too early to determine how the agencies were implementing it and, on the basis of such an assessment, to recommend to appropriate officials ways to improve implementation.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The Departments of Justice and HEW; Office of Management and Budget; and appropriate Colorado and Massachusetts State and local agencies generally agreed with GAO's findings and conclusions. (See ch. 8.)

The Department of Justice recognized its responsibilities, under the 1974 act, to define Federal juvenile delinquency programs and better coordinate their activities but noted two

conditions which may impede its efforts. It has interpreted "New Federalism" to mean that it cannot impose substantial guidelines and definitions, other than those required by law, upon State and local operating agencies, but tries to encourage movement in that direction by using funding incentives and training. The Department also noted that its efforts will be affected by the aggressiveness with which the Office of Management and Budget actively encourages coordinated planning through its funding and oversight responsibilities. The Department also outlined actions it had already taken to implement the 1974 act. (See app. I.)

HEW officials expressed concern, based on their previous experiences, about the ability of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to effectively carry out its legislative mandates under the 1974 act unless there is a commitment at the highest levels of the Federal Government to the effort. (See p. 59.)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

When it passed the 1974 act, the Congress clearly expressed its intent to exercise oversight over implementation and administration of the act. Among the issues the Congress should consider in carrying out its oversight are:

--The extent to which the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is implementing two basic parts of the act-- developing comprehensive State juvenile delinquency plans and a national juvenile delinquency strategy--in a timely manner.

--The extent to which the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is able to effectively implement certain

provisions of section 204 of the act, such as (b)(2), (4), and (f), which basically give the Administration authority to coordinate and direct certain juvenile delinquency efforts of other Federal agencies.

--Whether the executive branch will request and allocate funds to adequately implement the act. (See pp. 54 to 57.)

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In proportion to their numbers in the national population, young people are the largest contributors to the crime problem. Reported criminal involvement of young people, as measured by police arrests, is increasing. In 1973, youths under 18 (juveniles) accounted for 51 percent of the total arrests for property crimes, such as burglary and auto theft; 23 percent of violent crimes, such as murder, rape, and robbery; and 45 percent of arrests for all serious crimes. Total arrests of juveniles rose 144 percent between 1960 and 1973; at the same time total arrests for those aged 18 and over rose only 17 percent.

During this same period, violent crimes by juveniles increased 247 percent compared with 109 percent for adults, while property crimes increased 105 percent compared with 99 percent for adults. Total juvenile arrests during the 1960s increased almost 7 times more than total adult arrests, and juvenile arrests for violent crimes increased 2-1/2 times more than adult arrests.

Unreported crime compounds the problem. Studies reveal that perhaps 90 percent of all young people have committed at least one act for which they could have been brought to juvenile court. Also, the estimated national cost of crime by juveniles is about \$16 billion annually--an increase of about 300 percent since 1968.

An estimated 1 million juveniles enter the juvenile justice system each year. Although 50 percent are informally handled by juvenile court intake staffs and released, 40 percent are formally adjudicated and placed on probation or other supervisory release. Ten percent, or approximately 100,000 young people, are incarcerated in juvenile institutions. Recidivism among juveniles is more severe than among adults; estimates vary from 60 to 85 percent for juveniles compared with 40 to 70 percent for adults.

An entire range of "juvenile status offenses," which includes ungovernability, truancy, and running away, also subjects youth to the juvenile court process. If adults committed these offenses, they would incur no legal consequences. At least half of the youth currently in juvenile institutions are estimated to have been incarcerated for committing status offenses.

The severity of the national problem was reflected at the local level in Denver and Boston--the two localities we reviewed. In Denver, 12,946 juveniles were arrested in 1973. This represented an 82-percent increase over 1967 figures. Nonjuvenile arrests increased 62 percent over the same time period. A survey indicated that as much as 73 percent of the respondents between 10 and 18 had engaged in acts for which they would have been arrested if a policeman had been present. If these results are extended to all Denver youth, delinquency is not only increasing--it is permeating the juvenile population.

Boston had 3,786 juvenile arrests in 1973, a 67 percent increase over 1967. Comparative data was not available on adult arrests for the 2 years. Included in the total were 221 arrests for robbery, 499 for breaking and entering, 281 for assault, 943 for larceny, 9 for rape, 23 for prostitution, 823 for auto theft and related offenses, and 6 for homicide.

## CHAPTER 2

### DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL

### JUVENILE DELINQUENCY EFFORTS

The first Federal effort to combat juvenile delinquency--the establishment of the Children's Bureau in 1912--resulted from a growing awareness of the problem in the first decades of the 20th century.

During the 1940s other Federal agencies became involved. Federal activities were still relatively few, however, until the late 1950s, but they increased greatly in the 1960s. The rate of juvenile crime doubled between 1950 and 1960.

### MAJOR LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Before passing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (see ch. 6), the Congress addressed the juvenile delinquency problem through several acts, including the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-274), which gave the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) responsibility for providing categorical grants to communities, institutions, and agencies to plan and initiate innovative demonstration and training programs. Emphasizing prevention as well as control, these programs included subsidized work training for out-of-school, out-of-work youth; school programs for the disadvantaged; university-based training programs; and community-based correctional programs.

The act was extended in 1964 and 1965. As it became clear that the Office of Economic Opportunity was developing a program which used similar concepts, most of the demonstrations were transferred to its antipoverty program. Appropriations under the act during fiscal years 1961-67 were \$47 million.

Because of the continued increase in crime and delinquency, resources for juvenile delinquency programs were increased in 1968 through the enactment of (1) the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3811), administered by the Secretary of HEW, and (2) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3701), which established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the Department of Justice.

Juvenile Delinquency Prevention  
and Control Act of 1968

Under this act, HEW was to provide assistance for a wide range of preventive and rehabilitative services to delinquent and predelinquent youth, with emphasis on new kinds of community-based programs. The legislation was intended to be administered as part of an integrated network of anti-poverty, antislum, and youth programs which were to coordinate all Federal juvenile delinquency efforts and provide national leadership in developing new approaches to the problems of juvenile crime.

Omnibus Crime Control and  
Safe Streets Act of 1968

This act authorized LEAA to administer a block grant-in-aid program to provide financial and technical assistance to States and local units of government to improve and strengthen law enforcement. LEAA originally viewed its role in juvenile delinquency prevention and control as a limited one because the act did not specify the extent to which it was to address the problem and because of HEW's involvement in the area. Although juvenile delinquency was not specifically mentioned, "law enforcement" was defined in LEAA's act to include "all activities pertaining to crime prevention or reduction and enforcement of the criminal law."

The 1971 amendments to the 1968 act specified that LEAA focus greater attention on juvenile delinquency by redefining law enforcement to include "programs relating to the prevention, control, or reduction of juvenile delinquency \* \* \*." They also authorized funding for the "development and operation of community-based delinquent prevention and correctional programs \* \* \* and community service centers for the guidance and supervision of potential repeat youthful offenders."

The amendments also added a new part to the act which pertained to correctional improvements. To qualify for funds, a State must file a comprehensive plan which, among other things

"provides satisfactory emphasis on the development and operation of community-based correctional facilities and programs, including diagnostic services, halfway houses, probation, and other supervisory release programs for pre-adjudication and postadjudication referral of delinquents, youthful offenders, and first offenders, and community-oriented programs for the supervision of parolees \* \* \*."

The Crime Control Act of 1973 (42 U.S.C. 3701), required LEAA to place even greater emphasis on juvenile delinquency. For the first time, the enabling legislation of LEAA specifically referred to juvenile delinquency in its statement of purpose. It also required for the first time that each State include a juvenile delinquency component in its comprehensive State plan as a condition for receiving LEAA funds.

As a result of the 1973 act and congressional concern, LEAA accelerated its national juvenile delinquency effort. Near the beginning of 1974, LEAA established a Juvenile Justice Division within its Office of National Priority Programs to develop new and innovative programs. Juvenile justice and delinquency prevention is now one of LEAA's four top national priorities. Also, LEAA created a Juvenile Delinquency Division within its National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to expand the level of delinquency research and sharpen the focus on delinquency prevention.

#### FEDERAL PROGRAMS APPARENTLY AFFECTING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The major direct Federal efforts to prevent and control juvenile delinquency are concentrated in HEW's Office of Youth Development and in LEAA as a result of specific mandates. However, other Federal agencies apparently are involved. In 1971 the Congress gave all Federal coordinating responsibilities to the Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Federal Juvenile Delinquency Programs. (See p. 22.) In its fiscal year 1973 annual report, the Council identified 11 Federal agencies, including the Office of Youth Development and LEAA, that administered 116 programs which it believed directly or indirectly related to juvenile delinquency or youth development.

Our review concentrated on the activities and programs of the five Federal agencies the Council identified as being most directly involved--the (1) Office of Economic Opportunity, (2) Department of Labor, (3) Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), (4) HEW, and (5) Department of Justice. A description follows of the nature of these agencies' involvement in the juvenile delinquency and youth development area primarily as provided by them to the Council.

#### Indirect efforts

##### Office of Economic Opportunity

The Office's overall mission is to reduce poverty; youth development is secondary. In 1964 neighborhood

community action agencies were established to administer grants for social programs. Later, youth development programs were established to operate in communities through the agencies. In addition, the Office established neighborhood legal centers which provided legal services to low-income people, including juveniles.<sup>1/</sup>

#### Department of Labor

The Department of Labor provides counseling, on-the-job training, vocational training, job placement, and supportive services to youth to increase their employability. The Department funds two programs specifically designed to provide employment assistance to youth--the Neighborhood Youth Corps and Job Corps. Both programs deal with youths aged 14 to 22. The Neighborhood Youth Corps offers paid work experience to enable youths to remain in school, to return to school, or to improve their employability. The Job Corps trains young people to become more responsible, employable, and productive citizens. Its primary emphasis is on preparing for work, acquiring skills, and moving into meaningful jobs.

In December 1973 the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act was passed. This act placed additional emphasis on youth by authorizing funds to provide services to special manpower target groups, including youth and youthful offenders.

#### HUD

Although HUD has not been legislatively mandated any specific juvenile delinquency and youth development role, the enabling legislation of one of its major programs at the time of our review specifically referred to delinquency. Model Cities, a program of Federal financial and technical assistance, is designed to enable local government units to attack the social, economic, and physical problems of decaying urban neighborhoods. Through a locally developed and implemented plan, available efforts and resources are to be coordinated and concentrated into a comprehensive program to demonstrate methods for improving urban life. One of the program's statutory goals is "to reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency."

---

<sup>1/</sup>On January 4, 1975, Public Law 93-644 extended the community action program under the administration of the Community Services Administration, the successor to the Office. It also authorized specific programs for low-income youth. A separate legal services corporation assumed the legal programs mentioned above.

There are 147 units of local government in 45 States that determine the amount of HUD funds that will be allocated to preventing, treating, or controlling juvenile delinquency under their respective programs. The kinds of projects assisted vary according to each city's locally determined needs and include youth service bureaus, group foster homes, police juvenile aid bureaus, teen centers, and public defenders for juveniles.

After our review, the Model Cities legislation expired and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was passed. Communities currently involved in a Model Cities program will be funded through completion of their fifth action year, after which time the funding will be phased out. The new act may be placing less emphasis on juvenile delinquency than did the previous legislation. The new law's statement of purpose does not specifically mention delinquency. In describing the program activities eligible for assistance, the act limits the amount of HUD funds that may be used for public services and facilities, including those concerned with crime prevention, child care, health, drug abuse, education, welfare, and recreation needs. These services may be provided only when not available under other Federal laws or programs.

#### HEW

HEW is the primary Federal agency whose programs are directed to predelinquent youth. The programs generally involve home, school, recreational, and employment aspects of youth development. Some provide special services to youths, including personal counseling, psychiatric and medical assistance, drug treatment, or referral to other social agencies equipped to provide such services. Also, programs of income maintenance, rehabilitation, and medical and social services are provided through State agencies to the aged and aging, children and youth, needy families, and the disabled.

Within HEW, the Office of Education; the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration; the Social and Rehabilitation Service; and the Office of Youth Development carry out these activities. The Office of Youth Development is the only agency specifically mandated to prevent juvenile delinquency.

#### Office of Education

The bulk of the Office of Education's funds are directed toward improving the Nation's public school systems. However, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 includes provisions aimed directly or indirectly at reducing the

dropout rate. If it is assumed that some of the dropouts and potential dropouts may become delinquents, vocational education is providing opportunities for those youth in school and those out of school to come back to school, take short courses in concentrated areas of study, and leave school better prepared for immediate employment. State and local correctional institutions also receive grants for education as part of a total rehabilitation program for delinquent or neglected children and youth.

#### Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration

This Administration conducts programs which affect youth and delinquency in varying degrees and include the study of alcohol and drug problems linked to juvenile crime. The National Institute of Mental Health, through its Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, is the agency specifically involved with juvenile delinquency. Its program is concerned with preventing, controlling, and treating deviant behavior which may be defined either as mental illness or as violations of the criminal law. It recognizes that delinquent and criminal behaviors stem from interaction of biological, psychological, socioeconomic, and other factors. Whether or not a particular pattern of behavior is considered deviant, delinquent, or criminal depends on societal norms, reactions, and an administrative judgment.

Major Institute activities relating to juvenile delinquency are carried out through its support of research and training grants, research fellowships, and community mental health centers. Its research is designed to improve the understanding of the biological, psychological, and social forces that affect behavior. It is also concerned with improving treatment strategies, particularly community-based approaches, for juvenile delinquency and crime problems. The Institute also supports the development and evaluation of educational models aimed at training a variety of personnel dealing with youth and delinquency problems.

#### Direct efforts

##### Office of Youth Development

HEW's Office of Youth Development administers the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act as amended in August 1972. The Office of Youth Development was created April 1, 1973, as part of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Human Development and incorporated the former Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration from the

Social and Rehabilitation Service which had been established to administer the 1968 act, as well as two other HEW offices.

The Office of Youth Development has created what it calls a national strategy for youth development that focuses on social institutions rather than on persons. This differs from most treatment-oriented approaches to delinquency prevention.

#### National strategy

Very generally, the strategy suggests that negative consequences result when youth do not feel good about their own accomplishments and that youth often feel unsuccessful because they have been labeled as losers--people who do not and cannot do things well. Such labeling occurs in the home, school, and community. These labels tend to persist through a variety of settings and affect youth's actual ability to achieve.

As a result of negative labeling and the problems with finding roles in which they find a sense of accomplishment and pride, youth are often estranged and alienated from the mainstream of American life and frequently begin to experiment with activities that lead them further away from healthy, law-abiding lifestyles. Because of this, the national strategy for youth development focuses on preventive efforts earlier in the causal chain than do traditional person-centered treatment programs; that is, it deemphasizes the remedial treatment of persons who have been negatively affected by institutions and stresses the need to change institutional structures and practices identified with such effects.

The design, however, is not to eliminate person-centered treatment. Such treatment and institutional change are parts of a whole, and any serious attempt to change deviancy rates requires an understanding of this concept. The national strategy for youth development recognizes the institutional impact on the creation of deviance and attempts to rectify any imbalances occurring in programs dealing with delinquency prevention. The national strategy has identified (1) limitation or denial of access to acceptable social roles, (2) premature, negative, or inappropriate labeling, and (3) social alienation as variables contributing to delinquent behavior.

To implement the national strategy, the Office of Youth Development is providing categorical grants to State and local grantees to develop coordinated youth-service systems. These systems may consist of a central coordinator and a network of local youth-serving agencies. The coordinator may also provide services. A system's main function is to coordinate and integrate (when appropriate) diverse, autonomous youth-service

agencies. About 100 youth-service systems are now in various phases of development.

The Office generally relies on existing community youth services. According to its Commissioner, the Office "seeks to enhance the capacity of the local community to more effectively support the favorable development of all youth through the interrelated vehicles of coordination and institutional change." The focus is on youth-serving agencies and personnel rather than on the individual youth in need of assistance. A coordinated youth-service system requires the active participation, support, and power of individuals in public and private agencies at the State, county, and local levels. The system, in the final analysis, will provide the services that will better meet the needs of individual youth.

#### Department of Justice

LEAA, as previously mentioned, is the principal Department of Justice agency that deals with juvenile delinquency. Its enabling legislation provides for State criminal justice planning agencies to manage the block grant funds provided the States. Each State planning agency must develop, with advice from local or regional planning units, a State plan indicating how it will try to prevent or reduce crime, including juvenile delinquency.

After LEAA reviews and approves the State plan, it awards the State a block grant to implement it. The amount of funds received is based on population. LEAA can also award certain funds, at its discretion, directly to governmental units or nonprofit organizations to promote national issues.

LEAA-funded projects can be categorized as prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, upgrading resources, drug abuse, and Impact Cities programs. The prevention projects center around community involvement with youth and youth programs and can include community centers, counseling services, crisis intervention centers, education, and public relations activities. Diversion projects include mental health centers, alternative educational systems, temporary foster homes, youth service bureaus, and tutoring services. Rehabilitation projects include residential centers, probation and parole programs, community detention programs, and community-based counseling services.

#### Emphasis of Federal funding of juvenile delinquency activities

The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1968 and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and

Administration of Justice in 1967 have concluded that one of the keys to controlling U.S. crime is to prevent juvenile crime. In developing the 1972 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, the Congress recognized that youth in danger of becoming delinquent must be prevented from coming in contact with the juvenile justice system. The 1971 amendments to the Safe Streets Act specifically included juvenile delinquency prevention programing as an action grant area. However, most Federal funds mandated for juvenile delinquency were spent in areas other than prevention.

LEAA and the Office of Youth Development are the leading Federal agencies whose funds are specifically committed to juvenile delinquency. In fiscal year 1973 the Office obligated about \$10 million to prevent juvenile delinquency. It has focused its efforts on youth who are in danger of becoming delinquent.

Of the \$669.4 million LEAA awarded to the States for fiscal year 1972, LEAA estimated that about \$136 million was allocated for juvenile delinquency as follows:

	(millions)
Rehabilitation	\$ 40.8
Upgrading resources	32.9
Prevention	21.0
Drug abuse	17.7
Diversions	15.7
Impact Cities programs	<u>8.0</u>
Total	<u>\$136.1</u>

As indicated above, rehabilitation projects took the largest share of LEAA's juvenile delinquency funds. These primarily treat and serve youth within the juvenile justice system in institutions and community-based programs.

A fiscal year 1971 study by LEAA found that the types of programs States were funding at that time could be divided into programs (1) within the juvenile justice system, (2) targeted solely for juvenile delinquents and/or potential delinquents, (3) servicing referrals from the juvenile justice system, among others, and (4) seeking to prevent delinquency by attacking the known characteristics of juvenile delinquents. Another LEAA study indicated that approximately 75 percent of the juvenile programs were exclusively devoted to youths within the juvenile justice system. In general, LEAA's prevention projects may be termed recidivism prevention; that is, they aim at preventing further delinquency by reducing recidivism.

LEAA's emphasis appears to be changing. According to the Director of its Division of Juvenile Delinquency, LEAA is attempting to reduce the role of the criminal justice system while strengthening that of service delivery systems. Recently LEAA indicated in a proposed position paper on juvenile delinquency that it is concerned with children and youth who have had no contact with the criminal justice system and will

"\* \* \* take an active role in developing methods and systems designed to help all children and youth achieve their positive potential as the way to reduce the likelihood of their future involvement in the criminal justice system."

The Federal Government has made some specific efforts to combat juvenile delinquency. Numerous programs administered by a variety of Federal agencies may be affecting the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency; however, not all of these programs may be significantly affecting the problem.

## CHAPTER 3

### DIFFICULTIES IN DETERMINING

#### SPECIFIC FEDERAL IMPACT

#### OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES

The extent of Federal impact on juvenile delinquency is difficult to precisely determine because, for the most part, Federal programs which might have had a positive effect have not been administered with that specific intent. Because officials have not been aware of their programs' relationships in this area, no effective strategy has been developed and implemented to coordinate Federal efforts.

#### LACK OF AWARENESS

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, as amended, required all Federal juvenile delinquency programs to be coordinated, but it did not define the term "juvenile delinquency program." No Federal executive agency had developed a definition or criteria to be used to select and designate particular Federal programs as juvenile delinquency programs.

The Interdepartmental Council, through information compiled under contract with the Bureau of the Census, developed a directory of Federal juvenile delinquency and youth development programs, but its definition was so broad that it included all of the possible resources that could conceivably be brought to bear on the problem. In effect, its philosophy was that prevention begins at preschool age. It defined "juvenile" as persons between 1 day and 24 years of age.

In developing the directory of programs, the Council grouped similar youth programs from different agencies to identify all of the programs which covered a particular need and to point out overlaps and gaps. The programs have been put into such categories as general youth improvement, high-risk youth, and delinquent youth. Apparently, all of the programs can affect youth in some way and at various stages of their lives, but their significance to juvenile delinquency, if any, is not known. Little has been done to determine the programs' impact, significance, or relationship to any aspect of the juvenile delinquency problem; to develop any action plans; and to notify the administrators at all levels of government of the action.

Using the directory as a guide, we asked appropriate Federal officials about their programs' relationship to juvenile delinquency. Most were not aware of the directory of programs. They believed that most of the listed programs and/or their programs did not significantly affect juvenile delinquency. Some could not see any relationship.

Many Federal officials we talked to did not administer their programs with intent of affecting the juvenile delinquency problem, unless the programs were specifically established for that purpose. Many of the five agencies' officials were unaware of what their programs' roles in preventing or controlling juvenile delinquency could or should be. For example, Office of Education officials considered their personnel and programs to be youth development related for educational improvement. They told us that, except for the Program for Neglected and Delinquent Children in State-Operated or Supported Institutions, no Office of Education programs were designed or administered specifically to affect or reduce juvenile delinquency. Officials stated, however, that the results of programs could indirectly affect juvenile delinquency prevention by, for example, reducing school dropouts.

Social and Rehabilitation Service officials said their programs are not intended to deal specifically with youth development or with juvenile delinquency but that they could be considered to prevent delinquency or rehabilitate delinquents. This, however, would be an indirect benefit.

The Associate Regional Health Director for Mental Health in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration in Denver estimated that, although about 25 percent of the staff's time was related to youth activities, this effort was not specifically intended to affect juvenile delinquency. Administration officials said all mental health centers should help prevent delinquency, but they are not aware of the extent or type of effect their programs have on the problem.

A HUD headquarters official believed that none of HUD's programs involved any direct efforts or activities to prevent or control juvenile delinquency, although youth development and criminal justice are a necessary component of HUD's assigned goal of helping upgrade urban life. In contrast, a Boston HUD official believed that the Model Cities program significantly affected the juvenile delinquency problem.

We believe that all government officials should be more aware of their role in the remediation of juvenile delinquency. Strategies should be developed to provide guidance and resources to State and local governments.

## LACK OF UNIFORM DEFINITIONS

In implementing programs or projects, generally no attempts were made to classify how a project or program affected juvenile delinquency; that is, whether it focused on prevention, rehabilitation, or diversion. Except in LEAA and the Office of Youth Development, these terms had little impact on Federal officials' decisions in managing programs related to juvenile delinquency. LEAA regional-office officials did not use these terms as a management tool in approving State plans, although LEAA provided this type of information at the national level.

All levels of government lacked uniform definitions for such terms as juvenile, juvenile delinquent, prevention, and diversion. Some agencies had formalized definitions, and some had no definitions at all.

Although the ultimate goal in preventing and controlling juvenile delinquency is to insure that youth's needs are adequately provided for, the availability of generally accepted definitions might help agencies provide services more effectively because program administrators would be more aware of whom they are trying to reach and of their program goals. It would also be useful in developing informational systems so that activities pertaining to juveniles could be uniformly reported.

## POSSIBLE OVERSTATEMENT OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

Ostensibly, a considerable amount of Federal funds is available for youth development and/or juvenile delinquency programs. The Interdepartmental Council has estimated that as much as \$12 billion has been spent on youth development or juvenile delinquency. However, most of this appears to be only tangentially related to delinquency.

There are programs in the Interdepartmental Council's directory that can be considered juvenile delinquency related only by using the very broadest interpretation. For instance, the Office of Education in HEW administered a program to assist low-income and physically handicapped students with academic potential to initiate, continue, or resume their postsecondary education. Because of its definition of "juvenile," this and some of the other programs in the directory affect older youth rather than those normally considered as juveniles. In Denver, HEW's Office of Education in fiscal year 1973 funded 26 programs considered by the Interdepartmental Council to be related to youth and delinquency prevention. Funds for these programs went to 21 separate grantees, 13 of which were either business schools, colleges,

universities, or parochial seminaries. The age of students at these schools was 18 and above, which is beyond the general statutory age of 17 for juveniles. Therefore, these 13 programs appear to have no significant relationship to the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency.

Another indication of the Federal Government's impact on juvenile delinquency is the number of juveniles actually being served by a federally funded program. A nationally defined juvenile delinquency program must be determined to be actually affecting local youth. Many of the programs that could be considered as juvenile delinquency programs at the national level may not exclusively or significantly deal with juveniles. Statistics on the number of juveniles served may not be available.

For example, in fiscal year 1973, the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration provided funds to seven grantees under three Denver mental health programs which the Interdepartmental Council considered to be related to youth development and delinquency prevention. The Director of the Division of Mental Health, Colorado Department of Institutions, said mental health services and Federal funds for services are not generally available unless a youth has been arrested or adjudicated as a delinquent. Information on the number of youth actually treated by the Denver mental health centers was not available.

We contacted five of the seven grantees to determine how their programs were related to youth development or juvenile delinquency. The grants provided services to persons aged 1 day to 85 years. The grantees did not know the extent to which the programs were related to juvenile delinquency prevention, and some grantees did not believe the programs had any relationship to it.

Officials at two major hospitals in Denver said they could not determine the number of youth served or whether the mental health programs had direct or indirect impacts on preventing or controlling juvenile delinquency. A spokesman for another hospital told us that the program he was operating, funded by the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, had no relationship to youth development or juvenile delinquency prevention.

#### EVALUATION

Little is known about (1) which Federal programs affect juvenile delinquency and (2) the impact and its extent. As indicated previously, many Federal administrators do not see their programs' roles in juvenile delinquency. As a result,

they neither administer their programs with the intent to affect specific aspects of the juvenile delinquency problem nor generally emphasize juveniles.

Except at LEAA and the Office of Youth Development, Federal officials in the regional offices said their headquarters offices had not given them any guidance or direction indicating their programs' relationship to juvenile delinquency. Although their programs could have had impacts, the officials were not aware of the extent and type.

The agencies generally did not evaluate their programs to determine their effects on preventing and controlling juvenile delinquency. If those whose programs dealt mainly with youth evaluated their programs at all, they did not do so in terms of their effectiveness and impact on the problem. Other agencies whose programs were geared to the general population usually did not determine the impact on youth or delinquency.

The Boston and Denver LEAA regional offices did not evaluate juvenile delinquency projects but required the State planning agencies to do so. Although Boston officials made an occasional financial audit, they said they did not have the resources to evaluate their projects. Although the State planning agencies evaluated juvenile delinquency projects, the LEAA Chief of Operations said that the evaluations needed improvement. In Denver, final reports on juvenile delinquency projects from the State planning agencies had not been completed and received.

One official said that, in general, evaluation of all Social and Rehabilitation Service programs is weak. Programs are not evaluated to determine whether they affect juvenile delinquency. He said HEW has never evaluated one program designed to develop preventive or protective services which will prevent the neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency of children. However, we are reviewing the program.

The Interdepartmental Council, through its Evaluation Task Force, contracted with the Bureau of the Census to conduct a comprehensive governmentwide study to describe selected Federal juvenile delinquency and youth development programs and evaluations of them. The study was conducted on fiscal year 1971 program and project information.

Although the study did not assess the quality of program evaluations, the results indicated that they varied in quality and quantity from program to program and from agency to agency. The Census staff noted that the approaches of only a few of the 148 evaluations submitted by the agencies were objective

and scientific. The study indicated that the overall program evaluation effort for Federal juvenile delinquency and youth development programs was substantial; however, there was little interagency coordination and participation in evaluation efforts. The study showed that, compared with other Federal agencies' evaluations, LEAA's tended to focus more on programs aimed at incarcerated offenders and at delinquent youth.

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency noted in 1972 hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency that, although millions of dollars from LEAA have been spent to reduce crime and delinquency, no more was known in 1972 than in 1969 about what were the most effective crime reduction programs. The Council's Research Center estimated that an adequate research and evaluation design would represent, at most, 14 percent of the cost of any program. The Census study indicated that the cost of Federal-level program evaluation is typically less than 1 percent of the total program funding.

In discussing the evaluation of juvenile delinquency prevention programs, a report of the Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice points out that a serious need exists for research on both individuals and society--including the family, school, labor market, recreation, courts, and corrections. Potentially hundreds of kinds of programs can be suggested, and hundreds have been operated to prevent delinquent behavior. The overwhelming need is to find out how well they work. Only by evaluating their outcomes, comparing their effectiveness, discarding those that do not work, and giving greater support to the successes, can society begin to make real inroads on the problem.

The report adds that, in measuring the effectiveness of a prevention program, the issues confronting evaluation are not really technical but center on the

- resistance to evaluation by program practitioners and supporters;

- limitation of evaluation to the specific current features of the program, thus making generalizations to other contexts difficult;

- choice of indicators that mark program success;

- piecemeal, relatively haphazard way evaluation has been conducted; and

--conclusions of sound studies being ignored.

Decisions about the future of programs are affected by organizational self-protection, ideological fashion, practitioner defensiveness, and a host of other factors unrelated to program outcomes.

Although we did not evaluate any of the programs or projects of the five agencies reviewed, we recently issued a report on "Difficulties of Assessing Results of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Projects to Reduce Crime" (B-171019, Mar. 19, 1974). Two of the four types of LEAA projects we reviewed--youth service bureaus and group homes for juveniles--pertained to juveniles. Common difficulties involved in trying to assess the impact of the four types of projects were:

--No standards or criteria for success rates had been established.

--Similar projects did not maintain adequate and comparable data.

--Project evaluations used different techniques and different information sources and had different scopes. Moreover, most evaluations did not present data on project effectiveness and, for those that did, the evaluators had no nationally acceptable standards or criteria to use in evaluating project achievement.

Without comparable data, adequate standards and criteria cannot be developed and objective decisions cannot be made. Our report made recommendations for improving LEAA's evaluation efforts.

In its multiagency study, the Census staff encountered similar difficulties in identifying the universe of Federal involvement in juvenile delinquency and youth development programs and projects and the extent to which they had been evaluated. They found that Federal departments and agencies had virtually no standardized collection of information on juvenile delinquency and youth development projects. They encountered differing policies on the location of program and project information. A wide variety of formats--ranging from computer printouts and worksheets to State plans, project files, and grant books--was used to record data. Even when the same data was collected, different definitions were often used. In short, they concluded that anyone seeking standard information on juvenile delinquency or youth development programs and projects throughout the Federal Government faces a virtually insurmountable problem.

## CHAPTER 4

### FEDERAL ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE

### JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES

A national strategy has not been developed to focus the Nation's resources in a concerted effort to prevent and control juvenile delinquency. Officials administering many health, education, social, welfare, and employment programs generally are not aware that their programs may affect juvenile delinquency, either alone or in conjunction with other programs.

No Federal agency has identified the most significant causes of juvenile delinquency, determined the resources available for combating them, developed a plan to implement a strategy to address one or more aspects, or informed the pertinent agencies' officials of efforts to make an impact on the problem. Any accomplishments thus far have been made in isolation and not as part of an ongoing national strategy to prevent and control the problem.

Other than the efforts of LEAA and some HEW agencies, few identifiable attempts are being made to address the problem directly. The Federal Government's major strategy to prevent juvenile delinquency apparently has been to rely on the myriad of antipoverty and social welfare programs to hopefully make a significant impact.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 should make it easier to address these issues because it assigned the responsibility for all Federal efforts to a new Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in LEAA. The Office's objective is to achieve a coordinated and integrated Federal, State, and local juvenile delinquency prevention and control program. (See pp. 51 to 53.)

### EARLIER COORDINATION EFFORTS

As early as 1948, the Federal Government attempted to coordinate its juvenile delinquency programs, but these efforts met with apparently little success. In that year, the Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth was created to coordinate Federal agencies engaged in youth programs. In 1961 the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime was established and charged with coordinating the Federal antidelinquency effort and recommending innovative policies, programs, and legislation. However, it failed to provide the impetus for coordinated planning and funding of Federal programs.

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 made the Secretary of HEW responsible for coordinating all Federal activities in juvenile delinquency, youth development, and related fields and for providing national leadership in developing new approaches to juvenile crime problems. However, the Secretary did not adequately fulfill his responsibilities. The HEW annual report released in March 1971 concluded that there was

"\* \* \* little coherent national planning or established priority structure among major programs dealing with the problems of youth development and delinquency prevention \* \* \*. The present array of programs demonstrates the lack of priorities, emphasis, and direction in the Federal Government's efforts to combat delinquency."

In commenting on HEW's administration during consideration of the 1971 amendments to the 1968 act, House and Senate committees noted that reasons for this failure included (1) HEW's failure to request more than small proportions of the amounts authorized by the Congress and (2) inadequate administration. In fiscal year 1970, for example, \$50 million was authorized; however, only \$15 million was requested and only \$10 million appropriated. In fiscal year 1971, \$75 million was authorized, \$15 million requested, \$15 million appropriated, and about \$8.5 million spent. In contrast, LEAA spent about \$70 million for juvenile delinquency in fiscal year 1971. From 1968 to 1971 HEW requested only \$49.2 million of a total authorized \$150 million. Except for that spent on State comprehensive juvenile delinquency planning, the funds were spread throughout the country in a series of underfunded, and generally unrelated, projects.

One of the major problems in administering the 1968 act was confusion of the roles of HEW and LEAA in juvenile delinquency because the scope of their two acts overlapped somewhat. Under the 1968 act, HEW was to assist States in preparing and implementing comprehensive State juvenile delinquency plans. At the same time, the Safe Streets Act authorized LEAA to make block grants to the States to address all criminal justice problems, including juvenile delinquency. With its vastly larger resources, LEAA soon became dominant in criminal justice planning.

In 1971 the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney General redefined their roles. They agreed that each State should develop a single comprehensive criminal justice plan which would comply with the statutory requirements of both acts. HEW was to concentrate its efforts on prevention and rehabilitation programs administered outside the traditional juvenile

correctional system, while LEAA was to focus its efforts on programs within the system.

In 1971 the Congress agreed to extend for 1 year the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 to allow HEW to (1) refocus its program by funding preventive programs principally for youths who had not entered the juvenile justice system, (2) improve its administration of the act, including eliminating the maze of conditions required of applicants for funds, and (3) coordinate its overall efforts. The Congress found that HEW was not providing the national direction and leadership intended by the legislation. To facilitate coordination of all Federal juvenile delinquency programs, the legislation authorized the establishment of an interdepartmental council.

In 1972 the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, as amended, was extended until June 30, 1974. The new role of HEW's program was to fund preventive programs, involving schools, in local communities which showed the greatest need for assistance. HEW was to develop coordinated youth services systems, whose administration the Congress was to review in assessing HEW's role in juvenile delinquency.

About this time the Federal regional concept was also established to decentralize programs and program administration and also provide a mechanism for coordination among Federal departments at the regional level with national goals and policies to be set in Washington with State and local input.

#### THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COUNCIL

The Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Federal Juvenile Delinquency Programs was established in July 1971 by amendment to the 1968 Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. Membership on the Council, as designated by the President, included representatives from the Departments of HEW, Justice, Labor, HUD, Interior, Transportation, Agriculture; the Office of Economic Opportunity; the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention; and the Office of Management and Budget.

In addition, representatives from District of Columbia City Council, Veterans Administration, ACTION, the White House, National Institute of Mental Health, Office of Child Development, Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Prisons were invited to be ex-officio members. The President designated the Attorney General as Chairman of the Council. The Attorney General in turn named the LEAA Administrator as Chairman-Designate.

As outlined at its first meeting, the Council's goals were to (1) coordinate all Federal juvenile delinquency programs at all levels of government and (2) search for answers that would immediately affect the prevention and reduction of juvenile delinquency and youth crime. To date, the Council has not met its mandate to coordinate all Federal juvenile delinquency programs.

#### Council accomplishments

Except during fiscal year 1972, the first year of its operation, the Council accomplished little other than developing and submitting its annual report to the Congress. In fiscal year 1972, the Council met 12 times, during which it:

- Conducted a juvenile delinquency training session for its members.
- Developed proposed national policy objectives.
- Contracted with the Bureau of Census to identify the universe of Federal juvenile delinquency and youth development programs and the evaluations conducted on them.
- Aided the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, which was to coordinate interagency efforts in LEAA's Impact Cities program by (1) providing leadership in developing a youth component in the program by assisting in the planning of LEAA's portion of the community system in the rehabilitation of youthful offenders, (2) coordinating existing and planned Council member agency-funded programs in each city, including both juvenile delinquency and youth development programs, and (3) identifying program gaps in each community system and developing and implementing strategies to fill the gaps.
- Contracted for (1) a study of the management of Federal juvenile delinquency programs and (2) the development of a directory of all major Federal programs.
- Studied existing coordinating mechanisms that might be used to coordinate the planning, funding, evaluation, and technical assistance functions of all Federal juvenile delinquency efforts.
- Held public hearings on its proposed national policy objectives and coordination mechanisms and strategies.

During fiscal year 1973, the Council failed to fulfill its mandate of meeting at least six times annually; it met only on September 18, 1972, and May 29, 1973. No program activity occurred during that year. The Council did little until January 1974, when LEAA initiated efforts to revitalize it. From February through June 1974, the Council convened six times to fulfill the required meetings for fiscal year 1974. Generally, these meetings focused on the Council's revitalization, but the 1974 act preempted most of these efforts.

#### Reasons for ineffectiveness

The lack of adequate funds and staff and the Council's uncertainty about its authority to coordinate Federal juvenile delinquency efforts impeded its coordination attempts.

#### Funding

The Interdepartmental Council had to rely on resources provided by its member agencies. During its first year of operation, the Council members agreed to the following.

- The five agencies with major involvement in juvenile delinquency (LEAA, Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration, the Department of Labor, HUD, and the Office of Economic Opportunity) would set aside \$100,000 each for approved contracts or programs, and the three departments with less responsibility (Interior, Agriculture, and Transportation) would each set aside \$50,000.
- LEAA would provide space, overhead and operating cost for the core staff, the staff director, legal counsel, and public information and other needed services.

The Council found it difficult to meet its financial responsibilities under this method of funding. Initial confusion concerned what each agency could or could not fund with its contribution to the Council.

Getting funds from member agencies for Council contracts proved to be a major undertaking. For example, the Census Bureau was not reimbursed for work it had done under contract until over a year beyond the due date. Eventually, LEAA had to pay for HUD's share (\$18,000) of the contract cost.

### Staffing

The members agreed that the Council's initial staffing by the five major agencies would consist of one professional person each, and the other three agencies would provide one secretary each. The Department of Justice provided a staff director and three line staff.

As it turned out, the member agencies generally did not appoint people with decisionmaking authority to the Council, which contributed to its failure in achieving its proposed programs. Several officials who worked on the Council stated that, because most of the designated Council members were midlevel executives, they could not speak for their agencies nor commit funds for Council activities.

The Council found it difficult to maintain the continuity of its Chairman, members, and staff. The Council Chairman has continuously been the LEAA Administrator, as designated by the Attorney General. Since inception of the Council in 1971, there have been 5 different Attorney Generals, and 8 of the 10 member agencies have changed their designated representatives from 1 to 3 times. After the first year of operation, the support staff donated by the member agencies dissipated. The agencies continuously resisted Council requests to furnish staff.

### Lack of authority

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, as amended, stated that the Interdepartmental Council's function was to coordinate all Federal juvenile delinquency programs and prepare an annual report on all Federal juvenile delinquency and youth development activities and related fields. But the act did not indicate what authority the Council was to have to coordinate the agencies' activities. Congressional intent was to have the Council meet regularly to review the various agencies' efforts in combating juvenile delinquency and make certain the overall Federal effort was coordinated and efficient.

After its first year of operation, the Council concluded that it had identified a number of major problems and policy issues which required White House guidance. In a February 7, 1973, memorandum to the White House, the Council sought guidance on:

- Proposed national policy objectives and specific agency objectives for both short- and long-term impacts on the juvenile crime problem.
- A proposed restructuring of the Council which would give it authority to implement the proposed objectives, insure the support of its constituent agencies, and provide it with permanent staff and funding support.
- The drafting of major juvenile delinquency legislation.

The White House did not act on this request for guidance.

#### FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

Another mechanism available to the Federal Government for coordination is the Federal regional councils, established in 1972 in the 10 standard regions to develop closer working relationships between Federal grantmaking agencies and State and local governments and to improve coordination of the categorical grant-in-aid system. Each Federal regional council was to be a body within which participating agencies, under general policy formulated by the Under Secretaries Group for Regional Operations, were to jointly conduct their grantmaking activities by:

- Developing short-term regional interagency strategies and mechanisms for program delivery.
- Developing integrated program and funding plans with Governors and local chief executives.
- Encouraging joint and complementary grant applications for related programs.
- Expediting resolution of interagency conflicts and coordination problems.
- Evaluating programs in which two or more member agencies participate.
- Developing long-term regional interagency and inter-governmental strategies for resource allocations to better respond to States' and local communities' needs.
- Supervising regional interagency program coordination mechanisms.

--Developing administrative procedures to facilitate day-to-day interagency and intergovernmental cooperation.

Each council is headed by a chairman designated by the President from among the regional heads of member agencies. A council chairman may invite the regional head or other appropriate representative of a nonmember agency to deliberate when the council considers matters significantly affecting the interests of that agency.

Representatives of the Office of Management and Budget serve as liaisons between it and the councils and participate in council deliberations. They are primarily responsible for carrying out the Office's role as general overseer and monitor of interagency and intergovernmental coordination efforts within the executive branch. They are also expected to support the council system and help make it more effective by assisting the chairmen and councils as necessary and by generally helping to expedite and facilitate solutions to interagency and intergovernmental problems.

The councils provide a structure, subject to improvements as noted in a previous GAO report (see p. 29), which should be considered as a possibility in coordinating juvenile delinquency efforts. However, they have not been used significantly in this area.

#### Low priority

According to Federal Regional Council System Guidelines, the councils are to formulate initiatives responsive to regional needs on the basis of analyses of regional problems and assessment of available resources. Individual agencies in Washington, D.C., may also initiate assignments, but they must first be reviewed and approved by the Under Secretaries Group. Each council is to prepare an annual workplan. During fiscal year 1974 a management-by-objective approach was introduced.

Neither of the two Federal regional councils we visited regarded juvenile delinquency as a high-priority area. The Boston council, which was chaired by LEAA's regional director at the time of our review, had undertaken only one activity relating to youth development and juvenile delinquency. In November 1973 it sponsored a 1-day seminar on juvenile delinquency prevention, treatment, and control. The seminar, with speakers from the Department of Labor, HUD, LEAA, and HEW, was to inform Massachusetts and regional criminal justice program planners of available federally funded programs. Council officials said that the seminar was not a formal

attempt to coordinate juvenile delinquency efforts. According to LEAA's Massachusetts representative, the seminar was held to make LEAA fund recipients aware of each other's activities to avoid duplication.

Council officials in Boston said they would not consider doing work in juvenile delinquency unless mandated by the Office of Management and Budget. However, at the close of our fieldwork, the representative of the Office of Economic Opportunity said he had been appointed head of a Federal regional council task force to coordinate Federal juvenile delinquency programs. The workplan had been revised and included a task to coordinate Federal juvenile delinquency efforts.

The Mountain Plains Federal Regional Council in Denver has also done little in youth development and juvenile delinquency. Its initial workplan for fiscal year 1973, submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in May 1972, provided for a Committee on Crime Control, Delinquency Prevention, and Offender Rehabilitation.

The committee was created on June 17, 1972, to assist the Mountain Plains council in developing policy and program recommendations aimed at improving State and local governments' capability to address the problems of crime control, delinquency prevention, and offender rehabilitation within their jurisdictions. The committee proposed developing an inventory of all federally funded programs concerning crime and delinquency. The committee was continued in the fiscal year 1974 workplan submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in May 1973 and retained the same objective. Additional planned tasks included:

- identifying problems with existing program delivery systems by evaluating the existing level of integration and coordination of complementary Federal programs and resources aimed at crime, delinquency, and offender rehabilitation and
- evaluating the compatibility and coordination between criminal justice and related program planning systems for crime and delinquency.

After review, the Office of Management and Budget requested the Mountain Plains council to revise the fiscal year 1974 workplan to conform to the management-by-objective format. The committee's activities were not included in the revision, and at the time of our review no committee was dealing with youth or delinquency matters. However, a committee on children and youth was then defining its objectives.

Members of the Committee on Crime Control, Delinquency Prevention, and Offender Rehabilitation told us that it was dissolved in December 1973 because the participants and the Mountain Plains council could not adequately define its role, concept, definitions, and common range of activities. Although the committee had made several proposals and recommendations to the Mountain Plains council, the only council crime and delinquency objective met was the preparation of the "Compendium of Federal Programs Relating to Crime Control, Delinquency Prevention, and Offender Rehabilitation." The Mountain Plains council had 500 copies of the compendium printed, but they were never distributed because many of the Federal categorical programs were being phased out and others were to be converted to special revenue sharing.

The other Federal regional councils also did not give juvenile delinquency a high priority. In March 1974 we asked Office of Management and Budget officials to review Federal regional council workplans and current management by objectives dealing with juvenile delinquency. The Deputy Associate Director for Field Activities replied that

"\* \* \* there has been minimal involvement by the Federal Regional Councils in juvenile delinquency projects \* \* \* due to the inadequate Washington leadership, an absence of national goals and standards in the juvenile delinquency area, the overlap between HEW's Youth Development and Juvenile Delinquency Administration, the President's Council on Youth Development, the Domestic Council and finally the lack of leadership by LEAA at the Regional level."

In September 1972 the Under Secretaries Group approved an LEAA proposal to establish Public Safety Task Forces in each Federal regional council to coordinate the interagency aspects of the Impact program, Comprehensive Offender Program Effort, and juvenile delinquency programs. The task forces were to be comprised of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Departments of Labor, HEW, and HUD, with LEAA acting as the lead agency. Other agencies would participate as appropriate. In commenting on this coordination effort, the Deputy Associate Director stated that, although juvenile delinquency was one of the three major programs, the task forces concentrated on the Impact program and the Comprehensive Offender Program Effort. He said that inadequate leadership and followup by LEAA at the Washington and regional levels prevented these programs from getting a good start.

In our "Assessment of Federal Regional Councils" report (B-178319, Jan. 31, 1974), which discussed the overall organi-

zation and activities of four Federal regional councils, we noted that improvements could be made to make them more effective. We reported that coordinating mechanisms the councils were implementing helped State and local governments to coordinate the administration of Federal grant-in-aid programs; however, these were experimental and reached only a limited number of potential recipients. We pointed out in the report that the councils were impeded from being more effective by such factors as

- member agencies' lack of or variations in decentralized decisionmaking authority,
- limits on the authority of council chairmen, and
- division of time and effort by council members, staffs, and task force members between council and agency affairs.

We recommended that the Under Secretaries Group improve the councils' effectiveness by being more assertive and providing definitive direction and firm support, including prescribing planning and reporting standards, providing for councils' participation in the planning stages of mandated projects, and assuming responsibility for determining the appropriateness of uniformly decentralizing grant programs of Federal agencies.

## CHAPTER 5

### STATE AND LOCAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACTIVITIES

State and local circumstances were similar to those at the national level:

--Officials of agencies and organizations that had a mandate in the juvenile delinquency area or worked with delinquent or high-risk youth were most aware that their programs could help prevent and control juvenile delinquency.

--No single agency was responsible for implementing a comprehensive strategy to systematically approach the juvenile delinquency problem and coordinate the efforts of agencies serving youth.

--Very little evaluation had been done to determine the programs' impact on the problem.

This situation was due, in part, to the Federal Government's fragmented way of handling the problem. To help fund their activities, the State and local agencies had to respond to the Federal agencies' specific categorical grant programs, each of which had its own objectives, requirements, and restrictions. They could not look to one Federal agency to obtain information on funding and other Federal juvenile delinquency resources. Thus, the State and local agencies had little incentive to coordinate their activities.

Officials in Colorado and Massachusetts said they believed the Federal Government contributed to the fragmented approach to juvenile delinquency prevention and control. The Assistant Commissioner for Children's Services in the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health:

--Stated that the lack of a nationally accepted strategy for juvenile delinquency has contributed to fragmentation.

--Suggested that the Federal Government establish coordinating mechanisms at the Federal level for juvenile delinquency planning and funding and devise an overall strategy on how to approach the problem.

### STATE LEVEL

As at the Federal level, Colorado's and Massachusetts' planning and coordination of juvenile delinquency and youth development activities were not centralized.

Lack of comprehensive,  
coordinated planning and programing

Preventing and controlling delinquency requires a joint effort of law enforcement and social, welfare, and other agencies. This would suggest the desirability of a formal coordinating mechanism to integrate, through planning, all of the relevant programing. Colorado and Massachusetts had little planning across functional lines of effort; health and welfare activities, for instance, were normally not planned and carried out in conjunction with law enforcement activities and vice versa. They need not be in all cases, but when programs of both types of agencies are supposed to affect similar problems, coordination is necessary, especially to prevent duplication.

Colorado

Colorado had four State agencies specifically responsible for addressing juvenile delinquency. HEW had approved and funded three of them, each of whose objectives included identifying and coordinating existing resources for youth and identifying youth's needs and gaps in the resources for those needs. The agencies were the Colorado Office of Youth Development; the Advocacy for Children and Youth, Colorado Coalition; and the Colorado Commission on Children and Youth. The fourth agency, the Colorado Criminal Justice State Planning Agency, received and distributed Federal funds from LEAA.

HEW provided the three agencies with \$311,810 in 1973, as follows:

Office of Youth Development	\$225,000
Colorado Coalition	64,590
Commission on Children and Youth	<u>22,220</u>
Total	<u>\$311,810</u>

The Colorado Office of Youth Development was established as the organizational counterpart of HEW's Federal Office of Youth Development. Although the Office was to establish a State youth services system administrative mechanism and to support the development of a youth service system in Denver, the Federal Office directed it to concentrate its technical assistance effort in Denver. As a result, \$160,000 of the \$225,000 was allocated to Denver and about 80 percent of the Office staff's time was devoted to the Denver youth service system.

The Colorado Coalition was established in 1973 and, under a 1-year contract from the National Institute of Mental Health, was to develop a model child and youth advocacy system for monitoring and caring for the needs of children. The contract required the coalition to remain independent of State government, so it developed a statewide child and youth advocacy system by creating regional advocacy councils in 12 State regions. The director told us that, because the coalition is independent of State government, its activities are not coordinated with other State agencies which serve youth.

According to an official of the National Institute of Mental Health, the project will not be statewide as originally planned because, after work began, the coalition found that the job was too big to do on a State basis. However, the personnel training phase is expected to be conducted statewide, as originally planned.

Presently, the coalition reports to the Institute on one rural area, Delta County, and one urban area, the city and county of Denver. The reports contain basic social data, such as population by age group, educational data, community information on housing, and juvenile justice information. The coalition's reports also contain an inventory of needs and resources, including information on education, foster care, day care, homemaker services, runaways, drug abuse, vocational guidance, and the mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed.

A Governor's executive order in September 1971 created the Colorado Commission on Children and Youth as a result of the 1970 Colorado White House Conference on Children and Youth. It is to coordinate the efforts of Federal, State, and local agencies and private programs dealing with youth. Its major efforts have been in the mental health area. It has conducted mental health workshops at 21 localities to learn the needs of children and youth and has planned a statewide conference on teenage pregnancy and childbirth.

The Colorado Criminal Justice State Planning Agency is responsible for law enforcement planning throughout the State. It distributes LEAA funds to grantees according to a State plan. Under the 1974 State plan, the State planning agency will award \$5,748,000 in block funds for specific projects. Of this amount \$1,215,500, or approximately 21 percent, will be awarded to projects for combating juvenile delinquency. For fiscal year 1974, LEAA has allocated \$618,000 to the agency to plan for activities to be funded with block grant funds.

The State planning agency had one full-time delinquency specialist on its staff but did not have any specific goals or strategies for juvenile delinquency. Its policy was to cover all areas of crime control equally. This coverage included, but did not emphasize, juvenile delinquency.

Other State agencies, whose programs might have had an impact on youth and delinquency, had developed State strategies for their functional areas. However, because they were not mandated or instructed to do so, they did not plan their activities with the intent to address any specific aspect of the problem. Any favorable impact on the problem was concomitant to the benefits derived from their operations.

For example, the Division of Occupational Education of the State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education is the single agency responsible for vocational education in Colorado and for developing a State plan for vocational education. The division does not have a strategy for preventing or reducing juvenile delinquency. The director told us that, although the programs--identified in the Interdepartmental Council's directory--for which he received Federal funds could affect juvenile delinquency, generally the effect was not known, since the programs have not been evaluated in those terms. Division officials were not aware of and therefore did not coordinate programs with any of the above-mentioned agencies.

Coordination of planning among the three HEW-funded organizations and the State planning agency has been minimal or nonexistent. The Office of Youth Development had made no input into the State planning agency's comprehensive State plans for the last 4 years, although meetings had been held from 1970 to 1973. The number of meetings, however, had decreased from 40 in 1972 to 4 in 1973. The Office was represented on the LEAA-funded Impact City Youth Development Task Force in Denver. However, the Director of the Office stated that a significant contribution was neither asked for nor made.

The Office's regional program director said that officials of the Denver Anti-Crime Council (see p. 41) initially were interested in reserving about \$230,000 in planning funds to coordinate the Denver youth service system and the Impact Cities program. However, because of differing priorities, the Council withdrew the funds. The regional program director said that this was a good example of how Federal programs get locked into provincial postures to meet legislative or program guideline requirements.

He also said that, although the Office is to coordinate the activities of State youth-serving agencies, nothing tangible beyond the mutual attendance at meetings has occurred. The State agencies which he believes should be coordinated include the

- Department of Education,
- Department of Social Services,
- Department of Health,
- Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education,
- The Division of Mental Health and Mental Retardation of the Department of Institutions,
- Colorado Commission on Children and Youth, and
- Advocacy for Children and Youth.

The director said the following reasons account for the lack of coordination between the Office and State youth-serving agencies:

- HEW has directed the Colorado Office of Youth Development to concentrate its efforts on the Denver Youth Service System.
- No Colorado statute, executive order, or State mandate sets forth the requirement for coordination, and no sanctions are available to hold State agencies accountable for not coordinating their activities with the youth service systems.
- The State legislature was considering reorganizing the State government.

The director told us that Federal coordination of programs is needed, as well as a logical extension of the coordinated youth service system concept at the State and local levels. He said that Federal funding practices contribute to coordination problems at the State level because:

- Some funds go directly from Washington to the State and other funds go to the Federal agencies' regional offices.
- Federal categorical grant programs are administered by function, such as health, education, welfare, and

criminal justice, and each program has separate policies, guidelines, and regulations.

--Federal programs create competition for talent at the State and local levels because of salary differentials among programs and differences in the amount of program funds.

--Federal programs have conflicting strategies. For example, the youth service system concept is attempting to coordinate existing services, while Impact Cities projects are creating new services which may duplicate those already available.

The Commission on Children and Youth had not been very effective since its inception because of uncertainties about its role, confusion over responsibilities in relationship to such other agencies as the Office of Youth Development and the Colorado Coalition, and its lack of authority within the State government. The commission has not coordinated its activities with other Colorado State agencies. The commission's functions are duplicated by the Office of Youth Development and the Colorado Coalition but much more so by the coalition because it has been active in the same areas as the commission.

#### Massachusetts

The lack of planning across functional lines was also evident in Massachusetts. Of the 10 agencies which provide services to youth, we contacted the Criminal Justice State Planning Agency; the Departments of Youth Services, Mental Health, Public Welfare, and Education; and the Office of Children.

As in Colorado, the State planning agency's function was to advise the Governor on all phases of adult and juvenile law enforcement and administer LEAA-funded activities through a State plan. For fiscal year 1974, LEAA allocated \$1,277,000 to the agency to plan for activities to be funded with block grants. One of the agency's responsibilities was to prevent or reduce juvenile delinquency; it had two people responsible for planning in this area.

The State planning agency had developed juvenile delinquency goals which included support for the deinstitutionalization of services and the design of programs to provide youth with legitimate access to society. The agency's planning director stated that its local planning agencies are responsible for coordinating criminal justice planning,

including juvenile delinquency. Juvenile delinquency project proposals from local groups, if accepted at the State level, become part of the State plan. The agency's director stated the agency knows some of the needs of delinquent youth; however, additional research is needed. He said the agency has not received research funds to identify the causes of delinquency and the needs of delinquent youth.

The Department of Youth Services' mission was to prevent juvenile delinquency and provide rehabilitation in the form of supervised residential and nonresidential care to offenders between the ages of 7 and 17. Such youth were either referred or committed by the courts. The Department was also responsible for detaining youths awaiting court action.

The Department's recently appointed juvenile delinquency planner said he did not have sufficient time to plan because most of his time has been devoted to trying to secure LEAA grant money. The Department has, however, coordinated its planning and funding for some juvenile delinquency activities with the State planning agency and the Department of Mental Health. In fiscal year 1974 the State Planning Agency awarded \$891,000 to the Department to help it reorganize. It also assigned the Department a juvenile delinquency planner whose chief duty was to help develop juvenile delinquency plans for community-based services.

Since the Department's mission is to prevent juvenile delinquency and rehabilitate offenders, these activities are the first priority. The State planning agency, on the other hand, is responsible for many crime prevention activities. Its juvenile delinquency planning specialist said that juvenile delinquency was considered the lowest priority within nine categories of assistance.

The executive director of the State planning agency stated that the lack of coordination prevents the problem from being effectively addressed because each agency looks at the problem differently. In addition to the delinquency grants of his agency, similar grants were awarded by the Department of Youth Services, the Office for Children, the Department of Public Welfare, and the Department of Education. He said that Massachusetts had no interdepartmental coordination of juvenile delinquency efforts at the State level and no comprehensive plan to attack the problem. No one was taking an overall view of the juvenile delinquency problem to see what was needed.

The Office for Children was created to serve as an advocate for children and to coordinate and monitor children's

services throughout Massachusetts. It is trying to do this by working closely with line agencies to strengthen their capacities to carry out their legislative mandates, to develop their programs, to improve their management practices, and to more effectively coordinate with their sister agencies. Its activities are to also include the development of standards and the licensing of day care, foster care, group care, and adoption placement agencies.

The Office for Children is helping such agencies as the Departments of Public Welfare, Youth Services, Mental Health, and Public Health plan for activities. However, it is just getting started in its efforts. According to the Office's Director of Planning and Project Management, the State planning agency has asked the Office to become involved in planning and evaluating some of its programs locally. The Office has verbally agreed to help but has made no effort yet.

The Office for Children is set up to provide services through an interdepartmental approach. It has in each of its seven regional offices an interdepartmental team of professional staff members from the Departments of Youth Services, Public Health, Public Welfare, and Mental Health. The team is to receive referrals of cases that do not come under the specific jurisdiction of existing agencies. It prepares a service plan and first attempts to get an existing State agency to accept responsibility for providing the needed services. If this is not possible, the team authorizes the expenditure of direct service funds from the Office for Children.

In September 1973 a group of representatives--including doctors, probation officers, teachers, and various State personnel within a court clinic--informed the heads of the Department of Youth Services, the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Public Welfare, and the Office for Children that:

"\* \* \* the absence of appropriate planning on the part of the combined agencies sets a model of delinquent behavior on our part that is disastrous when amplified through the inner mechanisms of these severely delinquent prone and in our opinion, mentally ill people. Our buck passing is felt to constitute such a delinquency encouraging attitude that is reflected onto the delinquents."

### Lack of awareness

One of the reasons for the lack of planning for the prevention of juvenile delinquency was that the officials of the State agencies were not aware that their programs might impact on the problem. Except for the agencies and programs which specifically address juvenile delinquency, the officials generally were not aware that their programs could play a role in juvenile delinquency prevention and did not administer them with that intent.

In Colorado, officials of the Department of Education could not agree on whether the Elementary and Secondary Education Act programs were related to delinquency prevention. One official told us that the programs were not conceived, planned, administered, or evaluated with the intent of having an impact on juvenile delinquency, although the programs could tangentially affect the problem. Another official told us that the programs do affect delinquency to the extent that they reduce dropout rates. A division director of the Colorado State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education told us that, if a correlation exists between reducing dropouts or providing youth with a marketable vocational skill, then the programs would impact on the juvenile delinquency problem. However, generally the effect on delinquency is not known, since the programs are not evaluated in those terms.

The Colorado Department of Social Services received about \$87 million under five programs the Interdepartmental Council considered to be related to youth development and juvenile delinquency. Both the Director of Public Welfare and the Director of Rehabilitation told us that these programs could affect the juvenile delinquency problem; however, the programs were not administered with that intent. The Department did not consider delinquency problems when setting program priorities.

State officials in Massachusetts made similar remarks. Only officials of LEAA's State planning agency and the Department of Youth Services, both of which serve delinquent youth, regarded their programs as specifically related to juvenile delinquency. Officials from other agencies which deal with youth do not see themselves as being involved with juvenile delinquency. For example, an official of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health stated that the Department is concerned with the mental health of all youth, but it does not consider itself as being involved with juvenile delinquency. An official of the Department of Public Welfare said that, although the Department had some residential treatment

care programs which could be treating potential delinquents, it did not generally consider any of its programs to be related to juvenile delinquency. An official of the Department of Education said that the Department's programs were oriented primarily toward educating children and young adults and that any juvenile delinquency prevention or control efforts would be incidental to that.

### Little evaluation geared to juvenile delinquency

Few of the State agencies we visited evaluated their programs to learn how they affected the juvenile delinquency problem. The State planning agencies in Colorado and Massachusetts contracted for their program evaluations. The evaluations of the Colorado State Planning Agency's programs show the impact on juvenile delinquency mainly through changes in recidivism rates. In 1973 the Massachusetts State Planning Agency contracted with a private agency to evaluate 15 of its juvenile delinquency projects. According to the director of evaluations for the State planning agency, the evaluations were descriptive and not oriented to results. The director stated his agency had not determined whether its projects were successful in reducing or controlling juvenile delinquency. Projects continue to be funded solely because they appear cost effective and thus discontinuance cannot be justified.

The Department of Youth Services in Massachusetts has evaluated some of its juvenile delinquency programs. Since 1969 it has evaluated the effectiveness of programs sponsored by several agencies from which it purchased services. It has stopped purchasing services from two agencies as a result of the evaluations. The director of evaluations stated that results are usually disseminated only within the Department.

### LOCAL LEVEL

#### Denver

Approximately 175 agencies were serving youth in Denver in 1973. Before that, many of the agencies were not aware that others offered similar services. Many had not worked together. Officials of nearly every local agency we interviewed said the Federal Government contributed to the fragmented approach; most said the reason for this was its funding but not coordinating many small categorical programs. They overwhelmingly believed an overall Federal youth strategy was needed. Categorical grants often carry many restrictions as to how the funds must be spent. Nearly everyone said that

the availability of Federal funding, rather than need, often suggested local priorities.

LEAA had one and HEW had two federally funded efforts to coordinate the activities of the youth-serving agencies. One of the HEW-funded projects, a citywide youth services system, did not normally provide direct services to youth but was designed to coordinate activities to bring about greater efficiency and better services to youth. The other HEW-funded project and the LEAA-funded project were trying to coordinate the delivery of services to youth.

In July 1973 the Denver mayor created the Mayor's Commission on Youth to coordinate the youth activities in the city. The office of the mayor is the grantee and coordinator of the HEW-funded commission, which is the citywide youth service system in Denver. The commission's primary mission is to prevent juvenile delinquency through youth development by coordinating the city's existing youth-serving agencies to provide more efficient and effective services and to facilitate favorable institutional change at the administrative level. These actions are to increase youth access to socially acceptable and personally gratifying roles, reduce negative labeling of youth by social institutions, reduce youth alienation, and develop needed direct services for youth.

The other HEW-funded project, the Westside Youth Development Project, was established to coordinate the delivery of services to all youth and thereby prevent delinquency and divert known delinquents within a specific location in Denver.

The third major coordinating effort in Denver was operated by the Denver Anti-Crime Council. It has developed a network of nine youth-serving projects that received about \$1.7 million under LEAA's Impact Cities program. The program is an intensive planning and action effort to reduce the incidence of stranger-to-stranger crime (including homicides, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies) and burglary in eight cities by 5 percent in 2 years and 20 percent in 5 years.

The Council's projects differ from those funded by HEW in that they primarily serve youth who have already been apprehended. Three of these projects are youth service bureaus that receive delinquent youth, primarily from the police and juvenile court, and refer them to one or more of the remaining six agencies in the local LEAA network or to one or more of the other agencies serving youth in Denver. The youth are tested by the youth service bureau psychologists or test data is gathered from the schools, juvenile court,

police, or welfare office to assess their problems and needs. The bureaus become advocates for the delinquent youth and closely followup on all referrals made to other agencies.

### Problems in achieving coordination

The Mayor's Commission on Youth had difficulty achieving coordination in Denver. To prevent juvenile delinquency, the commission used a systems approach to institutional change in which agencies had to work together. Cooperation was not easily achieved, however, whenever the commission had to tell the agencies to change their approach in dealing with youth. The commission recognized this and spent much of fiscal year 1974 trying to bring agencies together and familiarize them with each other and with itself. The commission hoped that the agencies would eventually formally agree to work together.

The commission's task is compounded by its lack of legal authority over certain agencies. Many are nonprofit corporations that are not responsible to the mayor and thus do not have to work with the commission. It has to operate through persuasion, which often achieves results only after developing a solid trust relationship. In addition, the Colorado Constitution has separated the schools and courts from political control, and they too are not responsible to the mayor. Consequently, the commission must also use persuasion to achieve coordination with the schools and courts.

Aside from getting the agencies' assurances that they will work together, the commission's primary accomplishments in fiscal year 1974 were (1) completing surveys identifying youth needs and agencies that offer services to youth and (2) developing task forces dealing with some of the most pressing needs--employment, recreation, run-aways, and truancy. Although the survey of agencies has been completed, the commission has not published the results because it does not feel all of the information received is reliable. Although the recreation, runaway, and truancy task forces had each met several times during our survey, no problem-solving proposals or guidelines resulted because they had not been in existence long enough. The employment task force, however, had developed and was implementing a plan aimed at working with employers, job development agencies, schools, and youth referral agencies to try to provide summer jobs for 400 high school youths.

Planning for youth activities in the city was not centralized. The commission and the Denver Anti-Crime Council were two of the major agencies involved in citywide

planning for youth development and delinquency control. Each agency was aware of the other agency's activities, but coordination of their activities was limited. According to a commission official, each city executive agency had its own grant writer in addition to the grant writers for the numerous private and State agencies. The council's assistant director said that the council was limited in its freedom to cooperate with the commission because the council and its projects were concerned primarily with "impact" crimes and offenders, not all youth. He said he did not coordinate his activities with HEW, HUD, the Department of Labor, or the Office of Economic Opportunity.

The delivery of services for predelinquent and delinquent youth in Denver has had some systematic coordination. However, no significant coordination has occurred in the planning and funding of youth activities. The 175 agencies still individually plan activities and receive funds for them from whatever Federal, State, and local sources they can find.

### Boston

Boston had over 200 public and private agencies that could deal with youth and therefore affect juvenile delinquency. The two primary city agencies were the Youth Activities Commission and the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee. Others included the Boston Police Department, Boston School Department, Boston Juvenile Court, and Action for Boston Community Development.

The Massachusetts legislature established the Youth Activities Commission to prevent or reduce the incidence of delinquency in Boston. It operated five LEAA-funded Youth Resource Centers which tried to maximize referrals from the police, courts, and schools and reduce recidivism among juveniles and act as a focal point for community delinquency prevention efforts. According to the director of the Youth Activities Commission, 50 to 70 percent of the clients at the centers have been arrested previously. The Youth Activities Commission also conducted a number of special projects and summer programs aimed at delinquency prevention and acted as the conduit for funds from the State Department of Youth Services to various private social agencies for delinquency prevention programs. In this capacity, it was designated prime contractor and is responsible for the general administration of these programs, including monitoring, evaluation, and fiscal accountability.

The Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee is LEAA's planning agency for the city of Boston. Its strategy is to fund programs that provide services that existing institutions, such as courts, police, and schools should but are unable or unwilling to provide. The committee is designed to effect changes in these institutions' attitudes toward predelinquent and delinquent youth.

#### Programs and funding

Because of the number of programs that could affect the delinquency problem and the diversified sources of funding, we were not able to determine the total Federal, State, local, and private resources affecting delinquency prevention and control in Boston. However, the following are indicative of some of Boston's activities.

The Boston Youth Advocacy Program is the Mayor's Safe Streets Act Advisory Committee's juvenile delinquency program. Its main emphasis is to try to divert juveniles from the justice system. For fiscal year 1974 LEAA, through the State planning agency, granted the Advisory Committee a total of \$660,895. In addition, the State provided \$36,105. The Youth Advocacy Program provided overall funds for eight projects.

In addition to operating five Youth Resource Centers throughout Boston, the Youth Activities Commission conducted a number of special projects and summer programs aimed at delinquency prevention. We estimated its local funding for fiscal year 1974 at about \$1.9 million, including \$711,000 from the city, \$271,607 from the State, \$865,000 from Federal agencies, and \$22,000 from private sources. In addition, the National Institute of Mental Health in July 1973 conditionally awarded it a categorical grant of \$1,180,177 for developing and coordinating a juvenile drug program. It has yet to receive the money. (See p. 47.)

The State planning agency has awarded the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association a grant of \$37,895 for a recreation program. It consists of a summer camp where disadvantaged youth can meet police officers in a relaxed atmosphere. It also awarded the Boston Police Department, through the Youth Activities Commission, a grant of \$31,263 for a Police Liaison Project. The project is a joint effort of the department and the commission, and caseworkers and juvenile officers work together in helping youths obtain needed services.

A Boston School Department official advised us that, because most school programs could have an effect on delinquency, it is impossible to determine the amount of Boston school

system funds used to prevent juvenile delinquency. HEW, however--under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's title III--awarded the Department \$50,000 and \$60,000 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, respectively. The funds were for a crisis prevention program that was to include delinquency prevention.

Through its Model Cities program, HUD provided \$170,855 for two ongoing projects, a drug abuse project (\$71,698) and a youth development project (\$99,157).

The Office of Economic Opportunity has awarded the Action for Boston Community Development \$558,916 for youth programs. These programs, involving various services, operate in 11 neighborhoods throughout Boston.

Many private social agencies, such as the Boston Children's Service Association, work with children and youth. One program, Project Juvenile, deals specifically with delinquents. It offers such services as tutoring, medical and psychiatric help, counseling, and emergency placement for youth who have appeared before the Boston Juvenile Court. In fiscal year 1974 the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare gave the Association \$603,872 to conduct this project.

The United Community Services, in conjunction with the Massachusetts Bay United Fund, funds over 200 agencies offering various services, some of which can impact on the juvenile delinquency problem. The agency's total income for 1972 was about \$10 million.

The Tufts-New England Medical Center operates the Anchor Worker Project which offers intensive counseling to troubled youth. Each child is assigned a caseworker who counsels the child and refers him to needed services. For fiscal year 1974 the program received a total of \$255,000 as follows: \$90,000 from the Office of Youth Development in HEW, \$70,000 from LEAA, \$12,500 from the Department of Youth Services, \$12,500 from the Office for Children, and \$70,000 from the Tufts-New England Medical Center. Officials consider the program to be a long-term delinquency prevention effort.

#### Problems in achieving coordination

Boston had no comprehensive coordination in the planning, funding, monitoring, or evaluation of juvenile delinquency and youth-related projects. No single organization had identified available resources for youth, youth needs, and gaps in the resources and developed one or more strategies to prevent and control juvenile delinquency. Individual

agencies have, however, worked with others in jointly funding delinquency projects and in coordinating planning efforts.

Several agency officials believed that the Federal Government's fragmented approach to delinquency prevention and control contributed to the fragmented approach at the local level. For example, one said his office was not aware of all Federal funds available to combat juvenile delinquency because a number of Federal agencies are involved. Another said that diverse Federal funding sources tend to encourage local project directors to take a parochial view toward the delinquency problem.

No single city agency had formulated comprehensive plans to address Boston's juvenile delinquency problem. Most efforts were made on an individual or one-shot basis. For instance, the Youth Activities Commission did seek funds from and had submitted to the Advisory Committee juvenile delinquency prevention or control project proposals. They maintained contact to avoid duplicating projects.

According to the Advisory Committee's Juvenile Delinquency Grants Manager, Boston has a need for a concentrated attack on delinquency. He believes a central planning agency would (1) reduce the number of grant requests submitted to various Federal agencies, (2) reduce administrative expenses, and (3) make more funds available for direct services to juveniles.

The Advisory Committee coordinated to a limited degree with some city, State, and Federal agencies in planning and funding juvenile delinquency programs. Officials attempted to establish comprehensive planning with the State planning agency, but the effort, for reasons unknown to them, was subsequently terminated. The Advisory Committee has jointly funded juvenile delinquency projects with various city agencies and maintains contact with the Youth Activities Commission to insure that projects are not duplicative.

The Boston School Department has received HEW grant money for its Crisis Prevention program, but it does not formally coordinate with anyone in planning, funding, monitoring, or evaluating juvenile delinquency projects. Similarly, Boston Juvenile Court's chief probation officer stated that, despite the court's implementation of the Department of Public Welfare's Project Juvenile and its cooperation with the Citizens Training Group project personnel in referring youths, the court does not cooperate with anyone in planning, funding, monitoring, or coordinating juvenile delinquency projects.

No concerted effort was underway to identify all available youth resources, youth needs, gaps in serving youth needs, and possible duplication. However, individual agencies, including the Youth Activities Commission, the Advisory Committee, and private social agencies, have identified residential facilities, detention facilities, alternative education programs, job placement programs, family counseling, vocational training programs, and legal services as some of the more pressing needs of delinquent and predelinquent youth. According to Department of Youth Services and Advisory Committee officials, few of these needs are being adequately satisfied.

An Advisory Committee official acknowledged the need for additional research into the causes of delinquent behavior, the number of juveniles involved, and the services best suited to remedy the situation. Officials of the Youth Activities Commission also believe that research is needed, particularly at the neighborhood level, on the needs of youth and the causes of delinquency. Officials of several private social agencies also indicated a need for additional research.

Several city and private agency officials stated that city, State, and private agency activities duplicate and overlap each other; however, they did not consider it serious, since delinquent and predelinquent youth's needs are great and the resources limited.

#### Current plans for formal coordination

Two current attempts to formally coordinate juvenile delinquency activities in Boston are the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime-Juvenile program and the Fields Corner Delinquency Task Force Committee. Neither was operational at the time of our fieldwork.

In December 1972 representatives from the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, the Massachusetts Office of Human Services, and Boston's Coordinating Council on Drug Abuse met to discuss a Boston proposal for a juvenile drug abuse program. The discussion centered on whether money available under the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime program, an adult drug prevention program, could be used for a program to treat juveniles. As a result of the meeting, the Special Action Office instructed the Boston representatives to develop a national pilot program for juveniles titled Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime-Juvenile. The Youth Activities Commission was selected to manage the grant.

In developing the program, officials of the Youth Activities Commission found that many juvenile drug users were also delinquents; it then revised its proposal from a purely juvenile drug diversion program to a juvenile delinquency prevention program.

The Special Action Office informed the Youth Activities Commission that the project's source of funding was changed in May 1973 from LEAA to the National Institute of Mental Health. On June 4, 1973, the Youth Activities Commission submitted a \$1,180,177 proposal to the Special Action Office. On July 19, 1973, the Institute conditionally awarded the full amount.

Under the proposal, Boston has developed and proposed to implement a service delivery system for juveniles. Information on services and needs was solicited from over 200 public and private social organizations and interested individuals. The program is intended to fill a gap in the availability of services for Boston's youth. Another purpose is to take the best knowledge of youth service procedures and policies and use it in a valuable and cost-beneficial demonstration of youth services.

Specific goals of the program are to reduce entry and reentry into the juvenile justice system, coordinate and make best use of existing services, avoid duplication, and minimize the potential discrimination inherent in many services' need to define "target population" (which labels potential service recipients). As of May 31, 1974, the program had not been implemented.

Another planned effort which may have some impact on the juvenile delinquency problem is that of the Fields Corner Delinquency Task Force Committee. Dorchester is the single largest community in Boston, and it has a serious juvenile delinquency problem. The Fields Corner neighborhood area has had various delinquency prevention programs at different times. At the time of our fieldwork, an estimated 21 groups were providing services to youth, 13 of which united to form the Task Force Committee to better coordinate their efforts and to advance joint planning and decisionmaking. To do this, it has applied for a \$10,000 grant from the Advisory Committee to be used to hire an independent researcher to determine the extent to which existing services are meeting needs. The application was being processed at the time of our fieldwork. The Task Force Committee intends to identify each member's resources and, on the basis of the research data plans, to narrow existing service gaps by comprehensively coordinating their juvenile delinquency efforts.

The Federal and local juvenile delinquency efforts in Boston were summarized in a letter from the director of the Delinquency Prevention Program, Tufts-New England Medical Center Hospital, to a Senator in 1973. It reads, in part:

"Funding for programs to meet this problem [juvenile delinquency] has been fragmented through several federal agencies. There is no single agency with adequate funding to develop coordinated and integrated services for the children and youth who have developed anti-social modes of behavior, much less services that attempt to prevent and intervene early in delinquent behavior. The lack of such a commitment by the federal government is reflected at the local level.

"We believe that this situation holds true for all services to children. Health, welfare, education, rehabilitation and social services for children are scattered through many governmental agencies, often leading to fragmentation, duplication and poor coordination. Too often the children who need these services the most do not receive them or, at best, receive them in a hit or miss fashion. We have had the experience more than once of an agency informing us that certain parts of a proposal for funding integrated services to children belongs to another agency or that no funds are available. \* \* \* We would like to recommend a commitment on the part of our government to fund adequately comprehensive, integrated and coordinated services to children through a single agency."

### CONCLUSIONS

State agencies receive substantial amounts of Federal funds for programs which could affect juvenile delinquency. However, there was a general lack of goals, strategies, or priorities as to how to prevent or reduce juvenile delinquency.

There was very little evidence of a conscious, comprehensive, coordinated effort by State agencies to deal with delinquency. Much of the lack of coordination by State agencies is caused by the lack of coordination by the Federal agencies which administer these programs.

In Colorado the Federal Government contributed to the problem by providing funds to three agencies with similar objectives and activities.

The greatest impact on the juvenile delinquency problem is made at the local level where the community's resources are used to serve youth. In launching a coordinated attack to prevent and control juvenile delinquency, the basic areas for action, as suggested by the 1962 report of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, appear to be as valid today as they were 13 years ago. The committee believed that, among other things, planning and programing were inadequate and should be improved if a significant impact was to be made on the problem. The same factors still need to be addressed more effectively.

## CHAPTER 6

### NEW LEGISLATION PROVIDES FOR IMPROVEMENTS

The Federal Government has largely relied on a variety of antipoverty, social and welfare, education, and employment programs to help improve and upgrade the standard of living and, at the same time, hopefully attack the root causes of juvenile delinquency.

Specific efforts to address the juvenile delinquency problem have been limited to either planning and funding programs outside of the justice system or programs within the justice system. They have not been used in conjunction with each other because of the legislation of the Federal agencies involved. No effective mechanism has been developed for planning and funding programs and projects across functional lines.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5601), enacted on September 7, 1974, if properly implemented, should contribute significantly to the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency and improve the Federal Government's coordination of such efforts. The law provides increased visibility to the problem and a focal point for juvenile delinquency activities in the Federal Government by creating an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention within LEAA. This will be the first organizational unit that can identify existing and needed resources, identify and set priorities, and develop strategies to implement a comprehensive attack on juvenile delinquency. Also for the first time, specific efforts to both prevent and control juvenile delinquency will be one agency's responsibility. This should provide for innovative prevention programs.

The law also establishes within the Office a National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to provide ongoing research into new techniques for working with juveniles, to serve as a national clearinghouse for information on delinquency, and to offer training to personnel who will work with juveniles.

To make the executive agencies more accountable, the law provides for a series of requirements which should help focus Federal efforts more precisely and increase Federal, State, and local officials' awareness of their roles in the prevention and control of juvenile delinquency. The LEAA Administrator is required to submit two annual reports

to the President and the Congress--one analyzing and evaluating Federal juvenile delinquency programs and recommending modifications to any Federal agency's organization, management, personnel, standards, or budget requests to increase juvenile delinquency program effectiveness and the other containing a comprehensive plan for the programs. The President, within 90 days of receiving the report containing recommendations, must report to the Congress and the Coordinating Council detailing the action he has taken or anticipates taking.

In the reports to the President and the Congress, the LEAA Administrator is also required to submit information in each of the first 3 years which would, in each year,

- enumerate specific criteria to be used to identify specific Federal juvenile delinquency programs,
- identify specific Federal juvenile delinquency programs, and
- identify the procedures to be used in submitting juvenile delinquency development statements by Federal officials whose programs the Administrator has identified.

If Federal programs are to be coordinated, specific programs will have to be identified as significantly helping to prevent and control juvenile delinquency. If not, virtually every Government social and welfare, education, and employment program will need coordinating. Once relevant programs and agencies are identified, all appropriate officials should be notified that planning for youth development and juvenile delinquency prevention and control should be addressed.

Provisions have been made for improving the coordination of Federal juvenile delinquency programs, policy, and priorities. The law establishes a Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as an independent executive branch organization of persons who exercise significant decisionmaking authority in their respective Federal agencies. It authorizes staff and funds for adequately carrying out Council functions.

The law also establishes a National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention whose duties include making annual recommendations to the LEAA Administrator on planning, policy, priorities, operations, and management of all Federal juvenile delinquency programs. Membership will include both government and

public representation to help insure broad expertise as well as new views on methods to combat juvenile delinquency.

The law authorizes new programs of delinquency prevention, diversion from the juvenile justice system, and community-based alternatives to traditional incarceration. It also requires LEAA's State planning agencies and regional planning units to include representatives of citizen, professional, and community organizations related to delinquency prevention. This will help insure that not all programs will emphasize law enforcement and that prevention programs will be developed to prevent juveniles from entering the justice system rather than preventing recidivism.

## CHAPTER 7

### MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 was enacted a few months after we completed our review. Consequently, it was too early for us to determine how the executive branch was implementing the act and, on the basis of such an assessment, to recommend to the appropriate officials ways to improve implementation.

The Congress, however, clearly expressed its intent to exercise oversight over the implementation and administration of the act. Therefore, although we do not have any specific recommendations to make, we believe the Congress may wish to consider and discuss several interrelated issues with the executive branch.

### NATIONAL STRATEGY

The Congress may want to examine the way LEAA is developing a national juvenile delinquency strategy. Many factors should be considered in developing such a strategy, but perhaps the most basic is the emphasis that the Nation should give to delinquency prevention or rehabilitation programs. Should the emphasis be on preventing children from committing delinquent acts or on reducing recidivism?

Considerable effort, in past years, has been aimed at reducing recidivism for both adults and youth. Because recidivism among juveniles is extensive, past efforts at reducing it need to be assessed to shape future planning and programing.

Also important is the consideration of how and when Government should intervene to prevent delinquency. Should primary efforts be focused in the schools or in the home or should special institutions and organizations be established to address the problem? At what age group should programs be directed? How should resources be mobilized?

In examining LEAA's actions to develop a national strategy, the Congress may wish to discuss with LEAA questions similar to those noted above. It is probably unrealistic to expect that such a strategy could be developed to the point where other Federal agencies' and the States' fiscal year 1976 juvenile delinquency funding decisions could be based on such a strategy, especially since no such plan existed before the 1974 act was passed. Such a

strategy should be developed, however, during fiscal year 1976 and should affect fiscal year 1977 funding decisions.

The Congress may want to investigate the means used to develop the national strategy, including the methods developed to determine needs and priorities at various levels and the type of analyses and evaluations made of Federal agencies' programs. The Congress could appropriately study the criteria used to identify juvenile delinquency characteristics and prevention and those applied to Federal juvenile delinquency programs.

#### COMPREHENSIVE STATE PLANS

The State plans, which determine how most of LEAA funds will be spent on juvenile delinquency, will have to be closely related to the national strategy to achieve a coordinated effort to combat juvenile delinquency. Therefore, the extent to which the State plans reflect the national strategy will depend, in part, on the timeliness with which the national strategy is completed.

The State plans must be comprehensive to insure that all pertinent issues are addressed and that all available resources are used best and most effectively. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended, requires the State plans to include priorities and comprehensive programs for improving juvenile justice before they may be approved. However, LEAA has not given the States specific guidelines for developing this portion of the plans.

The guidelines the States do have are very limited and require the State plan to include a summary page giving a page reference to all pertinent text and data relevant to the State planning agency's and other State agencies' juvenile justice activities.

LEAA and the States are developing guidelines to improve juvenile delinquency planning; these should affect how fiscal year 1976 funds are spent. The Congress may want to examine the adequacy of the States' fiscal year 1976 juvenile delinquency plans in terms of meeting the requirements noted in section 223 of the 1974 act and the extent to which they reflect the national strategy at a time that would permit implementation of any needed improvements before fiscal year 1977 plans were developed.

## COORDINATION

The Congress also may want to examine the extent to which LEAA is able to effectively implement certain provisions of section 204 of the act, such as (b)(2), (4), and (f), which basically give LEAA authority to coordinate and direct certain juvenile delinquency-related efforts of other Federal agencies. LEAA's effective use of such authority and other agencies' acceptance of it is essential if Federal efforts are to be truly coordinated.

The State plans submitted to LEAA for approval must be comprehensive and address the need to coordinate State and local efforts. This should include providing for coordination of juvenile delinquency programs in such areas as education, health, and welfare. If not, most funds will probably continue to be spent in a relatively uncoordinated way, as in Colorado and Massachusetts during our review.

Such coordination should become a reality for fiscal year 1977, once LEAA has developed a national strategy and the States have made funding decisions based on comprehensive juvenile delinquency plans.

## FUNDING

A basic issue which could be addressed is the extent to which the executive branch will request and allocate funds to adequately implement the act. The Administration did not request any new funds to implement the act for either fiscal year 1975 or 1976. Limited funding would almost preclude adequate implementation.

For example, some State criminal justice planning agencies (which are responsible for developing other LEAA plans as well as plans under this act) apparently are not able to develop adequate, comprehensive plans for spending other LEAA funds. Yet these same agencies are also required to develop more plans since the 1974 act was passed. Plans may be noncomprehensive because of inadequate funding of planning efforts or because of the way LEAA and the States have worked together in terms of common purposes and agreed objectives. But the 1974 act gives specific, more extensive emphasis to juvenile issues which may well require additional funds for adequate accomplishment.

Accordingly, the Congress may want to examine the extent to which the executive branch is willing to request funds to implement the act. Since juveniles account for

almost half the arrests for serious crimes in the Nation, adequate funding of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 would appear to be essential in any strategy to reduce the Nation's crime.

Section 544 of the 1974 act amends the Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, to require at least the same level of financial assistance for juvenile delinquency programs from law enforcement appropriations as was expended during fiscal year 1972. Because of the Administration's proposed budget cuts to LEAA's program, the Congress may want to look for the fulfillment of this requirement during any hearings held on the funding issue.

## CHAPTER 8

### AGENCY COMMENTS

#### DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

By letter dated April 4, 1975, the Department stated that it generally agreed with our findings regarding the need to address the problem of coordinating the many Federal, State, and local programs which could affect juvenile delinquency prevention and control. (See app. I.)

While recognizing its responsibilities to improve coordination as a result of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the Department pointed out two conditions which may impede its efforts.

The Department has interpreted "New Federalism" to mean that it is "restrained from imposing substantial guidelines and definitions other than those implementing statutory requirements and statutory standards upon State and local law enforcement and criminal justice operating agencies." It did note, however, that it attempts to utilize more indirect means, such as funding incentives and training, to encourage movement in this direction.

The second condition relates to the aggressiveness with which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) actively encourages coordinated planning through its funding and oversight responsibilities. The Department stated that it looked forward to the assistance of OMB, in its role as an oversight body, to support its efforts in implementing any national strategy to resolve juvenile justice issues.

This observation is very important in terms of how effectively LEAA is able to implement certain provisions of section 204 of the act, which basically give LEAA authority to coordinate and direct certain juvenile delinquency-related efforts of other Federal agencies. This is an area that we suggested the Congress examine. (See p. 56.)

Regarding actions already taken to implement the act, the Department stated that LEAA had begun developing a national strategy for the effective coordination of juvenile delinquency activities and had established written objectives for implementing and administering the act. Because LEAA was faced with the complexities inherent in development of a new office without an appropriation, it created a Juvenile Delinquency Task Group and gave it responsibility for both on going LEAA juvenile justice activities under the

Crime Control Act of 1973 and planning and developing activities associated with the implementation and administration of the 1974 act. The Department spells out in some detail actions already taken by the task group on pages 63 to 65.

#### DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

On April 3, 1975, we discussed our findings and conclusions with HEW officials responsible for administering its juvenile delinquency prevention program. They generally agreed with our findings and conclusions.

They pointed out, however, that coordinating juvenile delinquency efforts is difficult and requires cooperation at all levels of government, particularly at the local level. They also expressed concern, based on HEW's previous experiences, about the ability of LEAA to effectively coordinate Federal juvenile delinquency programs unless there is a commitment at the highest levels of the Federal Government to develop specific goals in the area and agreement in the legislative and executive branches as to the emphasis the goals should take.

The officials also noted that since enactment of the 1972 amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, about \$35 million has been expended for developing a comprehensive network of youth services in the communities, linking together public and private agencies and organizations. At the same time, HEW has sought changes in the practices, policies, and procedures of these agencies and organizations to make them more responsive to youth's needs.

#### OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

On April 4, 1975, we discussed our findings and conclusions with an appropriate official of OMB. He stated that OMB generally agreed with our report. He also stated that, as indicated in his statement issued at the time he signed the 1974 act, the President supported the need for policy centralization and better coordination of the Federal Government's juvenile delinquency efforts.

#### STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

Colorado and Massachusetts State and local officials generally agreed with our findings and conclusions. In addition, Boston officials also noted that more attention could be directed to coordination at the local level, but that without more Federal interest in and support of this type of effort, real achievement will be difficult.

## CHAPTER 9

### SCOPE OF REVIEW

We reviewed the activities of the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Departments of Labor; Housing and Urban Development; Health, Education, and Welfare; and Justice to determine the type and extent of Federal efforts to prevent and control juvenile delinquency and the attempts made to coordinate these efforts. Also, we reviewed the impact of Federal activities in two States and cities. Work was done at the national level in Washington, D.C., and the regional, State, and local levels in Boston and Denver.

We interviewed officials and reviewed records at the 5 Federal agencies and interviewed officials at 2 Federal regional councils, 14 State agencies, 29 city agencies, and 17 Federal grantees. Our fieldwork generally was done between January and July 1974.



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the  
Division Indicated  
and Refer to Initials and Number

APR 4 1975

Mr. Victor L. Lowe  
Director  
General Government Division  
U.S. General Accounting Office  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Lowe:

This letter is in response to your request for comments on the draft report titled "Ineffectiveness of Federal Attempts to Coordinate Juvenile Delinquency Programs."

Generally, we agree with the report findings regarding the need to address the problem of coordinating the many Federal, State and local programs which could affect juvenile delinquency prevention and control. Furthermore, the brief historical overview of juvenile delinquency prevention and control progress presented in the report indicates that the Department will face a difficult challenge in its efforts to create a nationally coordinated approach.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 authorizes the establishment of mechanisms within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to attack the coordination problem; but the Department foresees two conditions which may impede efforts in carrying out the provisions of the Act. These are:

1. The limited role of the Federal Government in establishing uniformly-defined national criteria; and
2. The aggressiveness with which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) actively encourages coordinated planning through its funding and oversight responsibilities.

The first condition presents a serious policy problem. The Department has interpreted "New Federalism" to mean that it is restrained from imposing substantial guidelines and definitions other than those implementing statutory requirements and statutory standards upon State and local law enforcement and criminal justice operating agencies. For example, interpretation of exactly what constitutes a "juvenile" or a juvenile delinquency program varies among States and jurisdictions within States. An essential first step to coordinated planning is agreement regarding appropriate terminology. Although the Department is not authorized by law to establish such uniform definitions, it does attempt to utilize more indirect means such as funding incentives and training to encourage movement in this direction.

The second condition refers to a recurring theme throughout the report that fragmentation of effort on the State and local level is directly related to fragmentation of effort on the Federal level. The GAO report asserts that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Interdepartmental Council to Coordinate All Federal Juvenile Delinquency Programs "... has not met its mandate." The Council's efforts to bring about sustained inter-agency cooperation were impeded by the lack of adequate staff and funds and because the Council was not certain about the authority it had to coordinate Federal efforts in the juvenile delinquency area. We look forward to the assistance of OMB, in their role as an oversight body, to support our efforts in implementing any national strategy to resolve juvenile justice issues.

Through the authority vested in it by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5601), LEAA has initiated a concerted effort to resolve many of the problems that have traditionally limited Federal efforts to coordinate juvenile delinquency programs. LEAA has already begun developing a national strategy for the effective coordination of these activities.

Written objectives have been established for implementation and administration of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. These objectives provide for development of the capability within LEAA to organize, plan for, and coordinate LEAA and Federal efforts aimed at supporting programs that will foster improvement in the juvenile justice system

and aid in the prevention of juvenile delinquency. These objectives also provide for development of a plan to establish a National Institute of Juvenile Justice and implement all other provisions of the new juvenile delinquency prevention legislation. In addition, special emphasis will be placed on the development of standards for juvenile delinquency.

On August 8, 1974, a task force was established to develop plans for integrating the new office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention into LEAA. Task force membership included high level representatives from every division in LEAA.

Because LEAA is also faced with the complexities inherent in developing a new office without an appropriation, a Juvenile Delinquency Task Group has been established. The Task Group, under the leadership of a newly appointed Acting Assistant Administrator, consists of LEAA personnel who were working in the area of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention prior to the enactment of the new juvenile delinquency legislation. The Task Group has been delegated the authority and responsibility for both on-going LEAA Juvenile Justice activities under the Crime Control Act of 1973 and for the planning and development activities associated with initial implementation and administration of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. In addition, the Task Group has been delegated the responsibility for coordinating its functional activities with other LEAA offices and other Governmental agencies to avoid duplication of effort and ensure effective program delivery. Ten of the fifteen individuals on the Task Group are professionals, and the group has been allotted five additional temporary professional positions. To date, the operations of the Task Group have included such activities as:

1. Development of Guidelines. Guidelines are being developed in a variety of areas under the new legislation. The need for guidelines can generally be broken down into those which are required immediately and those that will be necessary for the proper implementation and administration of the new Act on a continuing and long-term basis. Among the guidelines required immediately are those (a) specifying the mechanism needed to meet the fiscal year 1972 level of funding as required by the new Juvenile Delinquency Act, and (b) assuring representation of individuals on the State advisory board who are knowledgeable of juvenile justice and youth programs.

2. Development of Fiscal Plans. Essentially, two fiscal plans have been developed to fund new juvenile justice programs. One involves \$20 million of LEAA fiscal year 1975 discretionary funds, and the other involves \$10 million of LEAA fiscal year 1974 reversionary funds.

Public Law 93-415 authorizes \$75 million to LEAA for implementing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974. No new funds have been sought by the Department as the President, when signing the Act into law, indicated he would not seek new monies due to his policy of fiscal constraint. However, preliminary discussions to reprogram \$10 million of reversionary funds for juvenile justice programs are currently underway among the Department, OMB and the Congress. The reversionary funds are intended to supplement the approximately \$20 million in discretionary grant monies budgeted by LEAA in the juvenile area during fiscal year 1975.

Actions are already underway to implement the plan involving LEAA discretionary funds. The primary thrust of this plan involves the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This effort is designed to have a significant and positive impact on the lives of thousands of youths who are detained and/or institutionalized each year for having committed offenses which would not be considered criminal if committed by an adult.

It is contemplated that the above plans will provide the necessary impetus to launch the juvenile justice program and enable the orderly and efficient use of funds under the new Act without requiring major amounts of current year funds or committing the Administration to substantial additional funding in future years. No effort can be made to begin a State formula grant funding activity under the new Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act until funds are provided under the new legislation.

3. Development of a Work Plan. One of the first objectives of the Task Group was to develop a work plan for fiscal year 1975. This objective entailed reviewing and integrating the existing

juvenile delinquency work plans of LEAA's Office of National Priority Programs and National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

4. Information Dissemination. As a means of disseminating information pertaining to provisions of the Act to affected and/or interested parties, a slide presentation has been developed. The slides have been used to orientate both central office and regional office personnel of LEAA, the Executive Committee of the State Planning Agency National Conference, and several public interest groups that have requested information about the new legislation.
5. Transfer of Functions from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to LEAA. There have been several formal meetings between the staffs of HEW and LEAA to facilitate the effective and orderly transfer of program responsibilities from HEW to LEAA in accordance with the new legislation and to lay the groundwork for further coordinating efforts.

In addition, the President has appointed 21 representatives to the National Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as mandated by the Act. The members of the Committee are scheduled to hold their first meeting April 24-25, 1975. The Interdepartmental Council established in the HEW Act and charged with the responsibility to coordinate all Federal juvenile delinquency programs has been replaced under LEAA's legislation with the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The first meeting of this council has been delayed due to the recent turnover in the President's cabinet. All relevant material has been sent to the Office of the Attorney General.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Should you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

  
Glen E. Pommerening  
Assistant Attorney General  
for Administration

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF  
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE  
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES  
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE</u>		
ATTORNEY GENERAL:		
Edward H. Levi	Feb. 1975	Present
William B. Saxbe	Jan. 1974	Feb. 1975
Robert H. Bork (acting)	Oct. 1973	Jan. 1974
Elliot L. Richardson	May 1973	Oct. 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst	June 1972	May 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)	Mar. 1972	June 1972
John N. Mitchell	Jan. 1969	Feb. 1972
ADMINISTRATOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT		
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION:		
Richard W. Velde	Sept. 1974	Present
Donald E. Santarelli	Apr. 1973	Aug. 1974
Jerris Leonard	May 1971	Mar. 1973
Vacant	June 1970	May 1971
Charles H. Rogovin	Mar. 1969	June 1970
<u>DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE</u>		
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE:		
Caspar W. Weinberger	Feb. 1973	Present
Frank C. Carlucci (acting)	Jan. 1973	Feb. 1973
Elliot L. Richardson	June 1970	Jan. 1973
Robert H. Finch	Jan. 1969	June 1970
Wilbur J. Cohen	Mar. 1968	Jan. 1969
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:		
Stanley B. Thomas, Jr.	Aug. 1973	Present
Stanley B. Thomas, Jr. (acting)	Apr. 1973	Aug. 1973

Tenure of officeFrom                      ToDEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE (cont'd)

## COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF

## YOUTH DEVELOPMENT:

James A. Hart

Sept. 1973      Present

Robert M. Foster (acting)

May 1973      Sept. 1973

Robert J. Gemignani

Jan. 1970      May 1973

Copies of GAO reports are available to the general public at a cost of \$1.00 a copy. There is no charge for reports furnished to Members of Congress and congressional committee staff members; officials of Federal, State, local, and foreign governments; members of the press; college libraries, faculty members, and students; and non-profit organizations.

Requesters entitled to reports without charge should address their requests to:

U.S. General Accounting Office  
Distribution Section, Room 4522  
441 G Street, NW.  
Washington, D.C. 20548

Requesters who are required to pay for reports should send their requests with checks or money orders to:

U.S. General Accounting Office  
Distribution Section  
P.O. Box 1020  
Washington, D.C. 20013

Checks or money orders should be made payable to the U.S. General Accounting Office. Stamps or Superintendent of Documents coupons will not be accepted. Please do not send cash.

To expedite filling your order, use the report number in the lower left corner of the front cover.

**AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER**

UNITED STATES  
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

OFFICIAL BUSINESS  
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID  
U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE



**SPECIAL FOURTH CLASS RATE  
BOOK**