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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Resources, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST: 

Wednesday, March 15, 2006: 

Corps of Engineers: 

Observations on Planning and Project Management Processes for the Civil 
Works Program: 

Statement of Anu Mittal, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-06-529T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-529T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Through the Civil Works Program, the Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
constructs, operates, and maintains thousands of civil works projects 
across the United States. The Corps uses a two-phase study process to 
help inform congressional decision makers about civil works projects 
and determine if they warrant federal investment. As part of the 
process for deciding to proceed with a project, the Corps analyzes and 
documents that the costs of constructing a project are outweighed by 
the benefits. To conduct activities within its civil works portfolio, 
the Corps received over $5 billion annually for fiscal years 2005 and 
2006. 

During the last 4 years, GAO has issued five reports relating to the 
Corpsí Civil Works Program. Four of these reports focused on the 
planning studies for specific Corpsí projects or actions, which 
included a review of the cost and benefit analyses used to support the 
project decisions. The fifth report focused on the Corps management of 
its civil works appropriation accounts. For this statement, GAO was 
asked to summarize the key themes from these five studies. 

GAO made recommendations in the five reports cited in this testimony. 
The Corps generally agreed with and has taken or is taking corrective 
action to respond to these recommendations. GAO is not making new 
recommendations in this testimony. 

What GAO Found: 

GAOís recent reviews of four Corps civil works projects and actions 
found that the planning studies conducted by the Corps to support these 
activities were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and 
used invalid assumptions and outdated data. Generally, GAO found that 
the Corpsí studies understated costs and overstated benefits, and 
therefore did not provide a reasonable basis for decision-making. For 
example: 

* For the Delaware Deepening Project, GAO found credible support for 
only about $13.3 million a year in project benefits compared with the 
$40.1 million a year claimed in the Corpsí analysis. 

* For the Oregon Inlet Jetty Project, GAOís analysis determined that if 
the Corps had incorporated more current data into its analysis, 
benefits would have been reduced by about 90 percent. 

* Similarly, for the Sacramento Flood Control Project, GAO determined 
that the Corps overstated the number of properties protected by about 
20 percent and used an inappropriate methodology to calculate the value 
of these protected properties. 

In addition, the Corpsí three-tiered internal review process did not 
detect the problems GAO uncovered during its reviews of these analyses, 
raising concerns about the adequacy of the Corpsí internal reviews. The 
agency agreed with GAOís findings in each of the four reviews. For 
three projects the Corps has completed a reanalysis to correct errors 
or is in the process of doing so; it decided not to proceed with the 
fourth project. 

GAOís review of how the Corps manages its appropriations for the civil 
works program found that instead of an effective and fiscally prudent 
financial planning, management, and priority-setting system, the Corps 
relies on reprogramming funds as needed. While this just-in-time 
reprogramming approach can provide funds rapidly to projects that have 
unexpected needs, it has also resulted in many unnecessary and 
uncoordinated movements of funds, sometimes for reasons that were 
inconsistent with the Corpsí own guidance. Because reprogramming has 
become the normal way of doing business at the Corps, it has increased 
the Corpsí administrative burden for processing and tracking such a 
large number of fund movements. For example, in fiscal years 2003 
through 2004 the Corps moved over $2.1 billion through over 7,000 
reprogramming actions. In response to GAOís findings, the Congress 
directed the Corps to revise its procedures for managing its civil 
works appropriations, starting in fiscal year 2006, to reduce the 
number of reprogramming actions and institute more rational financial 
discipline for the program. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-529T. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512-
3841or mittala@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers' (Corps) civil works planning and project management 
processes. My testimony is based on five reports issued by GAO over the 
last 4 years;[Footnote 1] it focuses on the economic, or cost benefit, 
analyses used to support decisions on specific civil works projects and 
actions and the Corps lack of effective planning and project management 
processes for its civil works appropriations. As you know, the Corps is 
the federal agency responsible for designing, constructing, operating, 
and maintaining thousands of civil works projects across the United 
States. These projects historically involved navigation and flood 
control activities but have more recently been expanded to include 
ecosystem restoration efforts. The Corps follows a two-phase study 
process to help inform congressional decision makers about civil works 
projects and determine if they warrant federal investment. As part of 
the process of deciding to proceed with a project, the Corps analyzes 
and documents that the costs of constructing a project are outweighed 
by the benefits provided by the project. Although there has been an 
overall decline in federal funding for water resource development 
projects during the last three decades, over $5 billion was 
appropriated for the Corps' civil works program in both fiscal years 
2005 and 2006. 

In summary we found that: 

* the cost and benefit analyses performed by the Corps to support 
decisions on Civil Works projects or actions were generally inadequate 
to provide a reasonable basis for deciding whether to proceed with the 
project or action, and: 

* the Corps' practice of conducting thousands of reprogrammings 
resulted in movements of project funds that were not necessary and that 
reflected poor planning and an absence of Corps-wide priorities for its 
Civil Works portfolio. 

Background: 

The Corps' Civil Works program is responsible for investigating, 
developing, and maintaining the nation's water and related 
environmental resources. In addition, the Civil Works program provides 
disaster response as well as engineering and technical services. The 
Corps' headquarters is located in Washington, D.C., with eight regional 
divisions and 38 districts that carry out its domestic civil works 
responsibilities. 

Each year, the Corps' Civil Works program receives funding through the 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The act normally 
specifies a total sum for several different appropriation accounts, 
including investigations, construction, and operation and maintenance, 
to fund projects related to the nation's water resources. The funds 
appropriated to the Corps are "no year" funds, which means that they 
remain available to the Corps until spent. The conference report 
accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act 
specifically lists individual investigations, construction, and 
operation and maintenance projects and the amount of funds designated 
for each project. In effect, the conference report provides the Corps 
with its priorities for accomplishing its water resource projects. 

Corps' Process for Developing Water Resource Projects: 

In general, the Corps becomes involved in water resource projects when 
a local community perceives a need and contacts the Corps for 
assistance. If the Corps does not have the statutory authority required 
for the project, the Congress must provide authorization. After 
receiving authorization, generally through a committee resolution or 
legislation and an appropriation, a Corps district office conducts a 
preliminary study on how the problem could be addressed and whether 
further study is warranted. 

When further study is warranted, the Corps typically seeks agreement 
from the local sponsor to share costs for a feasibility study. The 
Congress may appropriate funds for the feasibility study, which 
includes an economic analysis that examines the costs and benefits of 
the project or action. The local Corps district office conducts the 
feasibility study that is subject to review by the Corps' division and 
headquarters offices. The feasibility study makes recommendations on 
whether the project is worth pursuing and how the problem should be 
addressed. The Corps also conducts needed environmental studies and 
obtains public comment on them. After those are considered, the Chief 
of Engineers transmits the final feasibility and environmental studies 
to the Congress through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 
Works and the Office of Management and Budget. The Congress may 
authorize the project's construction in a Water Resources Development 
Act or other legislation. Once the project has been authorized and 
after the Congress appropriates funds, construction can begin. Figure 1 
shows the major steps in developing a civil works project. 

Figure 1: Major Steps in Developing a Civil Works Project: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Reprogramming Authority: 

Reprogramming is the shifting of funds from one project or program to 
another within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than 
those contemplated at the time of appropriation. A reprogramming 
transaction changes the amount of funds provided to at least two 
projects-the donor project and the recipient project. However, more 
than two projects are often involved in a single reprogramming action. 
For example, in an effort to make effective use of available funding, 
the Corps may move funds from a construction project that has slipped 
due to inclement weather and reprogram the funds to one or more 
construction projects that are ahead of schedule or experiencing cost 
overruns. 

The authority to reprogram funds is implicit in an agency's 
responsibility to manage its funds; no specific additional statutory 
authority is necessary. While there are no government-wide 
reprogramming guidelines, the Congress exercises control over an 
agency's spending flexibility by providing guidelines, or non-statutory 
instructions, on reprogramming in a variety of ways. For example, some 
reprogramming and reporting guidelines have evolved from informal 
agreements between various agencies and their congressional oversight 
committees. 

The Corps' Cost and Benefit Analyses Were Inadequate to Support 
Decision-Making: 

Our review of four Civil Works projects or actions found that the cost 
and benefit analyses the Corps used to support these actions were 
fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and used invalid 
assumptions and outdated data. The Corps' analyses often understated 
costs and overstated benefits. As such, we concluded that they did not 
provide a reasonable basis for decision-making. In two instances, we 
also found that the Corps' three-tiered review process, consisting of 
district, division, and headquarter reviews, did not detect the 
problems we uncovered. These instances raised concerns about the 
adequacy of the Corps' internal reviews. 

Delaware River Deepening Project: 

Our review of the Corps' cost and benefit analysis of the Delaware 
River channel-deepening project found that it contained a number of 
material errors. For example, the Corps misapplied commodity rate 
projections, miscalculated trade route distances, and included benefits 
for some import and export traffic that had seriously declined over the 
last decade. As a result, the Corps' estimate of project benefits was 
substantially overstated. We found that project benefits for which 
there was credible support were about $13.3 million a year compared 
with the $40.1 million a year claimed by the Corps' 1998 report. 
Specifically, we found that the Corps significantly overestimated the 
growth in oil import traffic for 1992 through 2005 because it used an 
incorrect commodity growth rate for part of the period. Use of this 
rate resulted in the Corps overestimating benefits by about $4.4 
million. Additionally, the Corps' estimate contained a computer error 
that overestimated this same benefit by another $4.7 million. Finally, 
the Corps' project benefits attributed to the import and export of 
commodities such as scrap metal, iron ore, and coal were overstated by 
about $2.7 million. 

Conversely, the Corps' cost estimate for the project contained a number 
of positive and negative errors that in aggregate would have reduced 
project costs slightly but not enough to make up for the significant 
decrease in project benefits. 

We found that the Corps' three-tiered quality control process of the 
Corps, consisting of district, division, and headquarters offices, was 
ineffective in detecting or correcting the significant miscalculations, 
invalid assumptions, and outdated information in the cost and benefit 
analysis that our review revealed. 

In response to our report, the Corps conducted a reanalysis of the 
project with updated, more complete information. This reanalysis 
asserted that the project could be built for $56 million less than the 
Corps had previously estimated. As we recommended, the Corps also had 
its reanalysis reviewed by an external party. 

Oregon Inlet Jetty Project: 

Our review of the Oregon Inlet Jetty project found that the Corps' most 
recent cost benefit analysis of the project, issued in 2001, had 
several limitations, and as a result did not provide a reliable basis 
for deciding whether to proceed with the project. The Corps' analysis 
did not consider all alternatives to the project, used outdated data to 
estimate benefits to fishing trawlers, did not account for the effects 
on smaller fishing vessels, and used some incorrect and outdated data 
to estimate damage and losses to fishing vessels. For example, the 
Corps did not evaluate alternatives to the jetty project and 20-foot 
deep channel that it proposed, although many vessels that currently use 
the inlet could have benefited from a shallower and less costly channel-
deepening project. Further, the Corps used outdated data to estimate 
benefits of the project to larger (75-foot long) fishing trawlers that 
resulted in a significant overestimate of benefits. 

We determined that if the Corps had incorporated more current data on 
the actual number of trawlers that used the inlet in its analysis, 
benefits would have been reduced by about 90 percent, from over $2 
million annually to less than $300,000. Conversely, the Corps did not 
estimate the benefit to the smaller fishing vessels that use the inlet. 
However, since these vessels could have a shallower draft than the 
large vessels they might not have benefited from the deeper channel and 
jetty that was proposed to benefit larger vessels. Additionally, the 
Corps miscalculated benefits due to a reduction in the damages that 
would occur to trawlers because of accidents that occur due to the 
conditions in the inlet. The Corps overestimated these benefits because 
it assumed, based on anecdotal evidence, that all of the 56 commercial 
fishing vessels regularly using the inlet would be damaged during the 
year and would incur about $7,000 each in damages. Our review of Coast 
Guard data showed that only about 10 commercial fishing vessels 
actually reported damages during the time frame the Corps considered, 
these damages averaged about $1,700 per year. Because of the concerns 
raised by our report, the Corps, the Council on Environmental Quality, 
and the Departments of Interior and Commerce mutually agreed not to 
proceed with this project. 

Sacramento Flood Protection Project: 

Our review of the Corps' Common Features project, which is intended to 
provide flood protection to the Sacramento area, found that the Corps 
did not fully analyze likely cost increases or report them to the 
Congress in a timely manner. The Corps also incorrectly calculated 
project benefits because it overstated the number of properties 
protected by about 20 percent and used an inappropriate methodology to 
calculate the value of protected properties. 

After a 1997 storm demonstrated vulnerabilities in the project, the 
Corps substantially changed the design of the project but did not 
analyze likely cost increases. Some of the design changes led to 
substantial cost increases. For example, in some areas the Corps 
tripled the depth from almost 20 to almost 60 feet of cutoff walls 
designed to prevent seepage beneath the levees. The Corps also decided 
to close gaps in the cutoff walls in areas where bridges or other 
factors caused gaps. These changes added $24 million and $52 million, 
respectively, to a project that was originally, in 1996, estimated to 
cost $44 million. By the time the Corps reported these cost increases 
to the Congress in 2002, it had already spent or planned to spend more 
than double its original estimated cost of the project. 

The Corps also made mistakes in estimating the benefits from this 
project because in 1996 it incorrectly counted the number of properties 
protected by the project by almost 20 percent and incorrectly valued 
these protected properties. Although the Corps updated its benefit 
estimate in 2002 to reflect new levee improvements authorized in 1999, 
we found that even this reanalysis contained mistakes in estimating the 
number of properties that would be protected and therefore continued to 
estimate higher benefits from the project than would be warranted. 

As with the Delaware River Deepening study, we found that all three 
organizational review levels within the Corps reviewed and approved the 
benefit analyses for this project, but these reviews did not identify 
the mistakes that we found. 

The Corps concurred with our report's recommendations and is working on 
a General Reevaluation Report for the uncompleted portions of the 
project that is due in the spring of 2007. 

Restrictions on the Corps' Hopper Dredges: 

In a 2000 report to the Congress, the Corps recommended that one of its 
dredges remain in a reserve status and that another be added to that 
status. However, we found that the Corps could not provide support for 
these conclusions and that its cost and benefit analyses supporting 
these conclusions had analytical shortcomings. 

We also found that the Corps did not perform a comprehensive analysis 
of the ready reserve program and in fact could not provide any 
documentation of what analysis, if any, it had done. In addition, the 
Corps' recommendation that the reserve program be continued because it 
was beneficial was contradicted by evidence in the report showing that 
the price the government paid for dredging was higher after a Corps 
dredge was placed in reserve than before. We also questioned whether it 
was prudent to add another dredge to the reserve fleet without a 
comprehensive analysis in light of the fact that the dredge needed 
significant repairs to remain in service, even in reserve. 

We also determined that the Corps had used outdated data and used an 
expired policy that could raise the government's cost estimate for 
hopper dredging work. This cost estimate is pivotal in determining the 
reasonableness of private contractor bids. If all bids exceed the 
government estimate by more than 25 percent, the Corps may elect to 
perform the work itself. Moreover, in making its estimate, the Corps 
had not obtained comprehensive industry data since 1988 although it had 
obtained some updated data for some cost items. In addition, the Corps 
used a policy on estimating transit costs that had expired in 1994. Use 
of this policy could significantly raise the estimate of transit costs 
for dredging contracts. For example, in one case, using the Corps' 
policy resulted in a transit cost estimate of about $480,000 as opposed 
to about $100,000 if the expired policy was not used. 

As a result of our review, a conference committee report directed the 
Corps to report to the Appropriations Committees a detailed plan of how 
it intended to rectify the issues raised in our report. On June 3, 
2005, the Corps issued a revised report to the Congress on its plans 
for the hopper dredge fleet. 

The Corps' Reprogramming Activities Resulted in Inefficient Management 
of Civil Works Program Funds: 

The Corps' reprogramming guidance states that only funds surplus to 
current year requirements should be a source for reprogramming and that 
temporary borrowing or loaning is inconsistent with sound project 
management practices and increases the Corps' administrative burden. 
However, we recently reported that, over a two year period (fiscal 
years 2003 through 2004), the Corps moved over $2.1 billion through 
over 7,000 reprogramming actions. This movement of funds occurred 
because during these two years the Corps managed its civil works 
project funds using a "just-in-time" reprogramming strategy. The 
purpose of this strategy was to allow for the movement of funds from 
projects that did not have urgent funding needs to projects that need 
funds immediately. While the just-in-time approach may have moved funds 
rapidly, its implementation sometimes resulted in uncoordinated and 
unnecessary movements of funds from project to project. 

In our review of projects from fiscal years 2003 and 2004, we found 
that funds were moved into projects, only to be subsequently revoked 
because they were excess to the project's funding needs. For example, 
in fiscal year 2004, 7 percent of the funds (totaling almost $154.6 
million) from every non-earmarked construction project were revoked in 
order to provide funding to projects designated as "national 
requirements" by the Corps. The national requirements projects were a 
group of projects for which Corps headquarters management had promised 
to restore funding that had been revoked in previous years. However, 
after the Corps moved funds into the national requirements projects, 
the Corps revoked over a quarter of the funds, $38.8 million, from 
these projects because they actually did not need the funds. For 
example, one national requirements construction project, New York and 
New Jersey Harbor, received $24.9 million. All of these funds, plus an 
additional $10.3 million, were excess to the needs of the project at 
the time and were subsequently reprogrammed to other projects. Corps 
officials in the New York District told us that, prior to receiving the 
national requirements funds they had informed Corps headquarters that 
they could not use these funds. 

We also found that the use of the just-in-time strategy resulted in 
funds being removed from projects without considering their near-term 
funding requirements, such as projects with impending studies. For 
example, on August 1, 2003, the Corps revoked $85,000 from the Saw Mill 
River and Tributaries investigation project in New York because the 
funds were excess to the project's needs in the current year. Six weeks 
later, however, on September 15, 2003, $60,000 of funding was 
reprogrammed into the project because they were needed to initiate a 
feasibility study. Corps documents explaining the revocation of funds 
from the Saw Mill River and Tributaries project indicate that the Corps 
was aware of the project's impending needs, and knew that the project 
would need funds again in September 2003 to execute a feasibility 
study. 

Further, under the just-in-time reprogramming strategy, funds were 
moved into and out of the same project on the same day as well as 
numerous times within a fiscal year. Overall, 3 percent of 
investigations and construction projects in fiscal year 2003 and 2 
percent of investigations and construction projects in fiscal year 2004 
moved funds into and out of the same project on the same day. For 
example, in fiscal year 2003, the Corps used 18 separate actions to 
reprogram approximately $25 million into, and about $10.5 million out 
of, the Central and Southern Florida construction project, including 
three separate occasions when funds were both moved into and out of the 
project on the same day. 

The just-in-time reprogramming strategy also moved money into and out 
of projects without regard to the relative priorities of the projects. 
During the period of our study, the Corps lacked a set of formal, Corps-
wide priorities for use when deciding to reprogram funds from one 
project to another. Instead, according to the Chief of the Civil Works 
Programs' Integration Division, during fiscal years 2003 and 2004, 
reprogramming decisions were left up to the intuition of program and 
project managers at the district level. While this decentralized system 
might have allowed for prioritized decision-making at the district 
level, when reprogramming actions occurred across districts or across 
divisions, the Corps lacked any formal system of evaluation as to 
whether funds were moving into or out of high-priority projects. The 
lack of a Corps-wide priority system limits the Corps ability to 
effectively manage its appropriations, especially in an era of scarce 
funding resources when choices have to be made between competing needs 
of donor and recipient projects. 

Finally, the Corps' practice of allocating all funds to projects as 
soon as the funds are allotted to the Corps, coupled with the 
reprogramming flexibility provided to the districts, may result in an 
elevated number of reprogramming actions. Typically, once the Corps 
receives appropriated funds from the Congress, the Corps disperses all 
of these funds directly into project accounts at the district level. 
Allocating funding in this manner could result in some projects 
receiving more money than they are able to spend. In some cases that we 
reviewed, the Corps dispersed an entire fiscal year's worth of funding 
to a project even though they knew that the project manager could not 
spend all of the funding. The flexibility provided to district managers 
once they receive their funding may also increase the number of 
reprogramming transactions. According to some Corps program managers, 
the relative ease of conducting reprogramming actions at the district 
level, without the need to obtain division or headquarters approval, 
creates incentives for project managers to transfer funds among 
projects within the district even if it creates a greater number of 
reprogramming actions. For example, when project managers have an 
immediate need for funds, they may be more likely to reprogram funds 
between projects within their own district, even if the donor project 
has a need for funds in a few weeks or months, because Corps guidance 
allows them to do so. 

The Corps' reprogramming practices place a large demand on the 
administrative resources of the agency. In fiscal year 2003, after 
receiving their appropriated funds from the Congress, the Corps 
conducted at least one reprogramming action every business day of the 
fiscal year except for 4 days; after receiving its funds in fiscal year 
2004, the Corps conducted at least one reprogramming action on every 
business day of the fiscal year except for 14 days. Each reprogramming 
action conducted requires the Corps to expend time and personnel 
resources to locate donor projects, file necessary paperwork, and in 
some cases obtain the approval of appropriate Corps staff and, 
possibly, the Congress. In particular, locating sources of donor 
funding is often a time-consuming process, as the project manager 
seeking funding must wait for other project managers to acknowledge 
excess funds and offer them for use on other projects. 

In response to the findings in our report, the Congress directed the 
Corps to revise its procedures for reprogramming of funds starting in 
fiscal year 2006 to reduce the amount of reprogramming actions that 
occur and would institute a more rationale financial discipline for the 
Corps Civil Works appropriations accounts. 

Corps' Response to GAO's Findings and Recommendations: 

In all five of the reports discussed here, the Army or the Department 
of Defense essentially agreed with our findings and conclusions and 
agreed to take actions to address our recommendations. In some cases, 
the Corps has completed the actions and in others they are underway or 
planned. Of note, in 2005, the Corps amended its policy on external 
review of its Civil Works decision-making documents, including cost and 
benefit analyses to allow for outside review in certain cases. 
Specifically, according to the Corps' revised policy, external peer 
review of such documents will take place where the "risk and magnitude 
of the proposed project are such that a critical examination by a 
qualified person or team outside of the Corps and not involved in the 
day-to-day production of a technical product is necessary." In 
addition, the Corps has reported that it has undertaken a number of 
other improvements, including (1) updating and clarifying its project 
study planning guidance, (2) establishing communities of practice to 
foster technical competence and share knowledge among individuals who 
have a common functional skill, and (3) reorganizing to foster 
integrated teamwork and streamline the project review and approval 
process. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have found that the Corps' track record 
for providing reliable information that can be used by decision makers 
to assess the merits of specific Civil Works projects and for managing 
its appropriations for approved projects is spotty, at best. The 
recurring themes throughout the five studies that are highlighted in 
our testimony clearly indicate that the Corps' planning and project 
management processes cannot ensure that national priorities are 
appropriately established across the hundreds of civil works projects 
that are competing for scarce federal resources. While we are 
encouraged that the Corps and/or the Congress have addressed or are in 
the process of addressing many of the issues we have identified 
relating to these individual projects, we remain concerned about the 
extent to which these problems are systemic in nature and therefore 
prevalent throughout the Corps' Civil Works portfolio. Effectively 
addressing these issues may therefore require a more global and 
comprehensive revamping of the Corps' planning and project management 
processes rather than a piecemeal approach. 

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to 
respond to any question that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 
have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at 
(202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to 
this testimony included Ed Zadjura, Assistant Director. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Delaware River Deepening Project: Comprehensive Reanalysis 
Needed, GAO-02-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002); GAO, Oregon Inlet 
Jetty Project: Environmental and Economic Concerns Still Need to Be 
Resolved, GAO-02-803 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002);, GAO, Corps of 
Engineers: Improved Analysis of Costs and Benefits Needed for 
Sacramento Flood Protection Project, GAO-04-30 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
27, 2003); GAO, Corps of Engineers: Effects of Restrictions on Corps' 
Hopper Dredges Should Be Comprehensively Analyzed, GAO-03-382 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003); and GAO Army Corps of Engineers: 
Improved Planning and Financial Management Should Replace Reliance on 
Reprogramming Actions to Manage Funds, GAO-05-946 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 16, 2005)