This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-221T 
entitled 'Chemical Weapons: Better Management Tools Needed to Guide 
DOD's Stockpile Destruction Program' which was released on October 30, 
2003.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 9 a.m. EST:

Thursday, October 30, 2003:

Chemical Weapons:

Better Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD's Stockpile Destruction 
Program:

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, Defense 
Capabilities and Management:

GAO-04-221T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-221T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Since its inception in 1985, the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-
Demil) Program has been charged with destroying the nation’s large 
chemical weapons stockpile. After years of planning and building new 
facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. As 
of October 2003, the program had destroyed 26 percent of the 31,500-
ton agent stockpile, and its total estimated cost to destroy the 
entire stockpile is more than $25 billion.

This testimony summarizes GAO’s September 2003 report and addresses 
the following issues: (1) the status of schedule milestones and cost 
estimates, (2) the impact of the current schedule on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated with 
managing the program, and (4) the status of the Chemical Stockpile 
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).

What GAO Found:

The Chem-Demil Program faces schedule delays and higher costs, but it 
has improved emergency preparedness in communities near the sites. In 
2001, the Chem-Demil Program extended its schedule milestones and 
increased its cost estimates from $15 billion to about $24 billion. 
Since then nearly all sites have experienced delays, stemming from 
problems such as: plant safety issues, environmental requirements, 
approving emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. The 
program needs a risk management plan to mitigate problems affecting 
program schedules, costs, and safety. Program officials say the delays 
have raised the cost estimates by an additional $1.4 billion, to more 
than $25 billion as of September 2003. Based on current schedule 
slippages, GAO believes that costs will grow higher and further delays 
will occur. (See figure.)

Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC’s 
April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile and it 
risks not meeting the original 2007 deadline to complete destruction 
of the entire stockpile. Unless the program fixes the problems causing 
delays, the United States also risks not meeting CWC’s deadline of 
2012, if extended.

The program has suffered from several long-standing management and 
organizational issues. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut 
decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program’s 
complex structure, with multiple lines of authority, has left roles 
and responsibilities unclear. It does not have an overarching, 
comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and 
monitor its performance.

The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have helped state 
and local communities become better prepared to respond to chemical 
emergencies. Despite these gains, CSEPP costs are rising because some 
states have expanded their preparedness requests beyond the approved 
budgets. These requests amount to $88 million for fiscal years 2004 
and 2005. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommended in its September 2003 report that the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Army develop an overall strategy and 
implementation plan for the program and implement a risk management 
approach, and DOD concurred. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-221T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Henry L. Hinton, Jr. 
at (202) 512-4300 or hintonh@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today on 
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-
Demil) Program. Since its inception in 1985, this program has been 
charged with destroying the nation's large chemical weapons stockpile, 
second only to Russia's in terms of its size. After years of planning 
and building new facilities, the program started destroying the 
stockpile in 1990.

As you requested, my statement focuses on the following issues: (1) the 
status of schedule milestones and costs at the sites, (2) the impact 
that the current schedule may have on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention[Footnote 1] (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated 
with managing the program, and (4) an update on the status of the 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).

As of October 2003, the Chem-Demil Program had destroyed an estimated 
8,210 tons (26 percent) of the total 31,500 tons of the original agent 
stockpile stored at nine sites in the United States and the Pacific 
Ocean at Johnston Atoll. Of the four sites that have begun agent 
destruction operations, Johnston Atoll has destroyed all of its 
stockpile; Tooele, Utah, has reduced its stockpile by about 44 percent; 
Anniston, Alabama, has destroyed about 2 percent of its stockpile; and 
Aberdeen, Maryland, has eliminated over 3 percent of its stockpile. 
Current schedule estimates show that the Army will not complete 
destruction of the entire stockpile until after the year 2012.

Since 1990, we have issued more than 25 reports on the Chem-Demil 
Program. Nearly half of the reviews have raised questions about the 
program's growing costs, its inability to meet its schedule milestones, 
and its management weaknesses.

My testimony today draws heavily from our most recent report, which was 
issued in September 2003.[Footnote 2] In summary, we found the 
following:

* While the Chem-Demil Program has revised its schedule milestones and 
increased its cost estimates several times, with the latest revision in 
2001, the program still cannot meet them. According to current Army 
schedules for destruction, five sites will miss their 2001 schedule 
milestones, less than 2 years after they were reset. The other four 
sites have not yet missed schedule milestones, but they too have 
experienced delays. Most of the substantial delays have stemmed 
from problems that DOD and the Army have been unable to anticipate 
or influence. These include plant safety issues, difficulties in 
meeting environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about 
emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. Neither DOD nor 
the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management approach that 
could help mitigate potential problems that affect program schedules, 
costs, and safety by anticipating problems and developing mitigation 
plans. Army officials told us they are now developing such an approach. 
According to program officials, the delays that have occurred since the 
2001 schedule revisions, along with the resolution of emergency 
preparedness issues, have raised the program's cost estimates by 
$1.4 billion, to a current total of more than $25 billion. We expect 
this amount will grow substantially before the destruction of the 
stockpile is complete if these delays continue.

* Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC's 
April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the chemical stockpile. 
The United States recently asked the governing body of the convention 
for an extension beyond the April 2004 deadline. If the delays that the 
program has experienced continue, the United States also risks not 
meeting the 2007 deadline to destroy 100 percent of the stockpile. 
Unless the Chem-Demil Program is able to fix the problems that have 
caused these delays, the United States also risks not meeting CWC's 
deadline, if extended to 2012, to destroy the entire stockpile. The CWC 
allows extensions of up to 5 years to the 2007 deadline.

* Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the 
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program has suffered from 
several long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational, and 
strategic planning issues. The program has lacked sustained leadership 
at both the upper levels of oversight and at the program-manager level, 
which undercuts decision-making authority and obscures 
accountability.[Footnote 3] In addition, the program's complex 
management structure, with multiple lines of authority within the Army 
and the separation of program components among the Army, DOD, and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), has left roles and 
responsibilities for the different parts of the program unclear. FEMA 
manages the emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) for communities near 
the storage sites. Finally, the absence of an overarching, 
comprehensive strategy has resulted in a program without a clear road 
map to closely guide and integrate all of its activities and monitor 
its performance.

* Since our 2001 report,[Footnote 4] the Army and FEMA have helped 
state and local communities become better prepared to respond to 
chemical emergencies. Based on the states' self-assessments and FEMA's 
reviews, all of the states with nearby chemical storage sites are 
considered close to being fully prepared for emergency issues. However, 
despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because 
some state and local communities have expanded their emergency 
preparedness requests beyond their approved budgets, exceeding them by 
$88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, especially as they move 
closer to agent operations phase. FEMA and the Army have implemented a 
number of recommendations we made to improve technical assistance and 
guidance, training, and compliance measures to assess preparedness.

Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Programís Inability to 
Anticipate and Influence Issues:

Despite several revisions to schedule milestones since the program's 
inception, the Chem-Demil Program still is unable to meet these 
milestones because of unanticipated delays. Most incineration sites 
have missed important milestones established in 2001. Delays at 
Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff have already resulted in their 
missing the 2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent 
destruction operations (operations phase).[Footnote 5] Johnston Atoll 
has missed its schedule milestone for shutting down the facility 
(closure phase).[Footnote 6] Although Tooele has not missed any 
milestones since the 2001 schedule was issued, the site has undergone 
substantial delays in destroying its stockpile primarily because of a 
safety-related incident in July 2002. If additional delays occur at the 
Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as well. Table 1 
shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss 2001 schedule 
milestones.

Table 1: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration 
Site:

Site: Anniston; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date 
to begin next milestone: July 2002; Date to begin next phase[A]: Aug. 
2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of months): 
+13.

Site: Umatilla; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date 
to begin next milestone: July 2003; Date to begin next phase[A]: Mar. 
2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of months): 
+8.

Site: Pine Bluff; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule 
date to begin next milestone: Oct. 2003; Date to begin next phase[A]: 
Apr. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of 
months): +6.

Site: Johnston Atoll; Next schedule milestone: End of closure; 2001 
schedule date to begin next milestone: Sept. 2003; Date to begin next 
phase[A]: Nov. 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. 
of months): +2.

Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army.

[A] Program manager's official estimates for Pine Bluff, Umatilla and 
Johnston Atoll.

[End of table]

Many of the recent delays at the incineration sites have resulted from 
operations incidents, from environmental permitting problems, 
community protection concerns, and funding issuesóa trend that we 
identified in previous reports on the program. Among the events that 
have caused delays at incineration sites since 2001 are the following:

* Incidents during operations. At Tooele, a chemical incident involving 
a plant worker who came into contact with a nerve agent while 
performing routine maintenance led to the suspension of agent 
destruction operations from July 2002 to March 2003. An investigation 
attributed the incident to inadequate or poorly followed worker safety 
procedures, and a corrective action plan, including an improved safety 
plan, was instituted before operations resumed. Since operations 
restarted in March 2003, Tooele has experienced several temporary 
shutdowns.

* Environmental permitting. Several environmental permitting issues 
have delayed the start of agent destruction operations at sites at 
Umatilla and Anniston.[Footnote 7] At Umatilla, the delays stemmed from 
several unanticipated engineering changes related to reprogramming 
software and design changes that required permit modifications and to a 
shutdown by state regulators because furnaces were producing an 
unanticipated high amount of heavy metals during surrogate agent 
testing. At Anniston, delays occurred because state environmental 
regulators did not accept test results for one of the furnaces because 
the subcontractor did not follow state permit-specified protocols.

* Community protection. Concerns about emergency preparedness for local 
communities have led to additional delays at Anniston. These concerns 
included the inadequacy of protection plans for area schools and for 
special needs residents (e.g., elderly and disabled individuals) who 
would have difficulty in an evacuation. Although we reported on this 
issue in July 1996[Footnote 8] and again in August 2001, and a senior 
DOD official identified it as a key concern in September 2001, the Army 
had difficulty satisfactorily resolving the issue with key state 
stakeholders. As a result, operations did not begin until August 2003.

* Funding. Delays at Pine Bluff and Johnston Atoll occurred because 
DOD redirected fiscal year 2002 destruction program funds to acquire 
$40.5 million worth of additional emergency protection equipment for 
Anniston. To cover this unfunded budget expense, the Army reduced 
Pine Bluffís budget by $14.9 million and Johnston Atollís budget by 
$25.1 million, leading to systemization and closure milestone 
slippages, respectively, at these sites. Program officials told us that 
the total cost of this schedule slip would ultimately be $116 million 
due to the extended period before closure. The program is likely to 
face unfunded requirements aprogramwide funding requests continue to 
exceed budgeted amounts. As of October 2003, according to preliminary 
estimates from FEMA, unfunded CSEPP requirements for all sites are 
expected to amount to $39.4 million and $49.0 million for fiscal years 
2004 and 2005, respectively.s:

Unlike the incineration sites, the two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen 
and Newport, have experienced delays but have not breeched their 
schedule milestones. In 2002, DOD approved using an alternative 
technology (neutralization), instead of incineration, at these two 
sites. This technology is expected to accelerate the rate of 
destruction at these two sites. The Army estimated that this process 
would reduce the scheduled end of operations at both sites by 5 years, 
from 2008 to 2003 at Aberdeen and from 2009 to 2004 at Newport. 
However, Aberdeen has encountered unanticipated problems with the 
removal of residual agent from bulk containers and has extended its 
planned completion date by 6 months, from October 2003 to March 2004. 
In addition, Newport has faced construction delays and community 
resistance to offsite treatment of waste byproducts. As a result of 
these delays, Newport has extended its planned start date for agent 
operations by 5 months, from October 2003 to February 2004.

At two sites, Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, no milestones 
were set in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not yet selected a 
destruction technology. DOD has now selected a destruction technology 
for these sites, but it made decisions several months later than 
estimated. More importantly, DOD has set initial schedule milestones 
for these two sites that go beyond the extended April 2012 CWC 
deadline. According to DOD officials, these milestones are preliminary 
and will be reevaluated once contractors finish initial 
facility designs.

The Chem-Demil Program has faced continued delays with the program 
largely because DOD and the Army have not yet developed a risk 
management approach to proactively anticipate and address potential 
problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and 
safety. Such an approach could also leverage knowledge of potential 
problems gained at other sites. Instead, according to a DOD official, 
the program has used a crisis management approach, which has forced it 
to react to, rather than control, issues. The program had drafted a 
plan in June 2000 that was intended to address these issues. However, 
according to a program official, this plan was never approved or 
implemented because of a change in management in 2001.

The delays and schedule extensions[Footnote 9] have contributed 
directly to program cost growth, according to program officials. As a 
result, DOD's total program cost estimate grew from $15 billion to 
$24 billion between 1998 and 2001. (See fig. 1.) Because of delays 
encountered since the 2001 revisions, the Army is now in the process of 
developing new milestones that will extend beyond those adopted in 
2001. According to an Army official, the program will use events that 
have occurred since 2001 in presenting new cost estimates to DOD for 
preparation of the fiscal year 2005 budget submission. Program 
officials told us that they estimate new costs had increased by 
$1.4 billion as of October 2003, and this estimate is likely to rise 
further as additional factors are considered.

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998, 2001, and 2003 Cumulative Program 
Cost Estimates:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Schedule Delays Jeopardize Ability of Program to Meet CWC Deadlines:

Although the United States met the first two chemical weapons treaty 
deadlines, the continuing delays jeopardize its ability to meet the 
final two deadlines. (See table 2.) Since reaching the 2002 deadline to 
destroy 20 percent of the stockpile in July 2001, the Chem-Demil 
Program has been able to destroy only an additional 3 percent of the 
stockpile. In order to meet the April 2004 CWC deadline to destroy 45 
percent of the stockpile, the program would have to eliminate an 
additional 22 percent of the stockpile within the next 6 months. 
Because the program will likely not be able to achieve this rate of 
destruction, the United States has asked for an extension of the 2004 
deadline.

According to current destruction schedules, the United States will not 
meet the 2007 deadline to eliminate 100 percent of the stockpile. As a 
result, the United States will likely have to ask for an extension of 
the 2007 deadline to complete the destruction of the entire stockpile. 
The CWC allows extensions of up to 5 years beyond the 2007 deadline. 
Unless the program fixes the problems that are causing schedule delays, 
the United States also risks not meeting this deadline, if extended to 
2012.

Table 2: CWC Deadlines:

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 1; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2000; Date United States met deadline: September 1997.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 20; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2002; Date United States met deadline: July 2001.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 45; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2004; Date United States met deadline: Will not meet.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 100; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2007; Date United States met deadline: Will not meet.

Sources: CWC and U.S. Army.

[End of table]

Long-standing Management and Organizational Weaknesses Hamper 
Program Progress:

Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the 
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter 
because several long-standing leadership, organizational, and 
strategic planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The lack of sustained 
leadership has undercut decision-making authority and obscured 
accountability. The program's complex structure, with many lines of 
authority, has left roles and responsibilities unclear. Finally, the 
program lacks an overarching, comprehensive strategy to guide and 
integrate its activities and monitor performance.

Leadership Shifts Affect Continuity in Decision Making:

The Chem-Demil Program's lack of sustained leadership above the program 
level is underscored by the multiple shifts in oversight 
responsibilities that have occurred three times between DOD and the 
Army during the past two decades. The most recent change took place in 
2001 when oversight responsibility for the program shifted back to 
DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 summarizes the 
changes.

Table 3: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and 
the Army, 1986-Present:

Year: 1986; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD designates the Army 
as the executive agent for the Chem-Demil Program.

Year: 1994; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD makes the program a 
major defense acquisition program and oversight is elevated to control 
cost and schedule increases and to raise program visibility.

Year: 1998; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD delegates decision-
making authority to the Army, primarily as part of its overall effort 
to reduce responsibilities and staffing of its offices.

Year: 2001; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD reinstates its 
position as the program's top decision maker. According to DOD, this 
was done to streamline decision making, which is consistent with the 
cost of the program and national and state interest in the safe and 
timely destruction of the stockpile.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of table]

These shifts in oversight responsibilities affected the continuity of 
program decision making and obscured accountability. As a different 
office assumed major decision authority, the program's emphasis 
shifted and initiatives that had been started were often not completed. 
For example, when the Army had oversight responsibility for the 
program, it established a memorandum of understanding with FEMA to 
clarify each of their roles and responsibilities related to 
CSEPP.[Footnote 10] However, after DOD assumed the program's oversight 
responsibilities in 2001, DOD did not follow the protocols for 
coordination that had been established in the memorandum, according to 
FEMA and DOD officials. As a result, DOD provided funds for emergency 
preparedness items without having adequate plans for distribution, 
which delayed the process. This shift in oversight responsibilities 
from the Army to DOD also left state and local community officials and 
other stakeholders uncertain as to the credibility of federal 
officials. According to FEMA and Army officials, coordination between 
the two agencies has improved in the last few months and efforts are 
being made to repair relationships with community and state 
stakeholders.

Similar problems have also occurred within the Army as program 
leadership has changed. Three different officials at the Assistant 
Secretary level have held senior leadership positions since December 
2001. In addition, five officials have served as the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Chem-Demil) during that time.[Footnote 11] From 
April 2002 to February 2003, the program manager's position remained 
vacant for nearly 1 year, before being filled. However, after only 4 
months, the program manager resigned and the Army named a replacement.

Frequent shifts in key leadership positions have led to several 
instances where the lack of continuity affected decision making and 
obscured accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official 
promised to support future funding requests for emergency preparedness 
equipment from one community, but his successor did not fulfill this 
promise. Other communities viewed the agreement with one community as 
an opportunity to substantially expand their own funding requests. The 
lack of sustained leadership makes it unclear who is accountable when 
program commitments are made and not fulfilled. Moreover, when key 
leaders do not remain in their positions to develop the needed long-
term perspective on program issues and effectively implement program 
initiatives, it is difficult to maintain program progress and ensure 
accountability for leadership actions.

Program Management Structure Remains Complex:

As our 2003 report documents, the Army recently reorganized the 
program. But this change in management structure has not streamlined 
the program's complex organization nor clarified roles and 
responsibilities. The establishment of the Chemical Materials Agency 
(CMA) in January 2003 has left the Director reporting to two different 
senior Army organizations, which is one more than under the previous 
structure. This divided reporting approach is still not fully 
developed, but has the potential to adversely affect program 
coordination and accountability. The reorganization has also divided 
the responsibility for various program phases between two offices 
within CMA. One organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination 
of Chemical Weapons, will manage the first three phases (design, 
construction, and systemization) for each site, and a newly created 
organization, the Director of Operations, will manage the final two 
phases (operations and closure). This reorganization changes the 
cradle-to-grave management approach that was used to manage sites 
in the past and has blurred responsibilities for officials who 
previously provided support in areas such as quality assurance and 
safety. Moreover, the reorganization did not address two program 
components--Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program and 
community-related CSEPP. DOD will continue to manage ACWA separately 
from the Army, as congressionally directed. In addition, the Army will 
continue to manage CSEPP jointly with FEMA.

Program Lacks Strategy and Implementation Plan:

While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance 
documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an 
overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide 
the program and monitor its progress. This is contrary to the 
principals that leading organizations embrace to effectively implement 
and manage programs. Some key aspects of an approach typically used to 
effectively manage programs include promulgating a comprehensive 
strategy that includes a clearly stated mission, long-term goals, and 
methods to accomplish these goals. An implementation plan that includes 
annual performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and 
evaluation and corrective action plans is also important. According to 
DOD and Army officials, the Chem-Demil Program has relied primarily on 
guidance and planning documents related to the acquisition 
process.[Footnote 12] However, in response to our recent recommendation 
that they prepare such a strategy and plan, DOD stated that it is in 
the initial stages of doing so and estimates completion in fiscal year 
2004.

Emergency Preparedness Program Is Improving, but Costs Are Rising:

Since our 2001 report, the Army and FEMA have assisted state and 
local communities to become better prepared to respond to chemical 
emergencies. Based on the states' self-assessments and FEMA's reviews, 
all 10 states with chemical storage sites located within them or nearby 
are now considered close to being fully prepared to respond to a 
chemical emergency. This is a marked improvement from the status we 
reported in 2001[Footnote 13] when 3 states reported that they were far 
from being prepared. Now, 6 of the 10 states are reporting that their 
status is fully prepared and the remaining 4 are close to being fully 
prepared. However, these statuses are subject to change because the 
states and communities themselves can revise or expand their agreed-
upon emergency preparedness needs. They can make these changes because 
the "maximum protection" concept that governs CSEPP is open to 
interpretation. As a result, they can appear to be less prepared than 
before. For example, Oregon certified that it was fully prepared, but 
now has requested additional emergency equipment. This request has 
changed Oregon's self-reported preparedness status from fully prepared 
to incomplete.

Despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because, 
according to Army and FEMA officials, state and local communities may 
add to their emergency requirements beyond approved requests. Army and 
FEMA officials explain that the states often identify and expand their 
requirements, especially as destruction facilities move closer to the 
start of the operations phase. For example, the states of Colorado, 
Alabama, and Oregon have all requested funds for infrastructure, 
including roads and bridges. In June 2002, Oregon certified that its 
community readiness was adequate and recommended permit approval to 
allow test burns at Umatilla. Since that time, Oregon has asked for 
additional emergency preparedness support that exceeds its CSEPP 
budget. This request follows a pattern of substantially increasing 
funding requests at the start of the operations phase, as occurred at 
Anniston in 2001 when it received $40.5 million for additional CSEPP 
items. Programwide, new requirements continue to exceed approved CSEPP 
funding levels. FEMA has little control over the additional funding 
requests made by the states. As of October 2003, FEMA had identified 
$39.4 and $49.0 million in unfunded requirements for fiscal years 2004 
and 2005, respectively. (See table 4.):

Table 4: CSEPP Unfunded Requirements (UFR) for Fiscal Years 2004 and 
2005, as of October 2003:

Dollars in millions.

Alabama; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 21.0; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 41.9; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 21.0; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 19.7; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 36.7; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 17.0.

Arkansas; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 16.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 24.7; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 7.8; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.6; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 13.1; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 9.6.

Colorado; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 3.1; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 2.8; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.3; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 2.5; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 4.5; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 1.9.

Confederated Tribes; FY2004 unfunded requirements: 
FY2004 funded: 0.2; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 
3.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 3.5; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 0.2; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 0.9; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 0.7.

Illinois; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 0.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 0.8; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.1; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 0.8; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 0.7; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 0.0.

Indiana; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 3.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 4.7; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.8; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 2.3; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 6.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 3.7.

Kentucky; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 4.3; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.3; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 1.0; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.7; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 4.4; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 0.7.

Maryland; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 2.3; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 1.5; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.8; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 1.8; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 2.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 0.2.

Oregon; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 5.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 12.4; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 6.7; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 4.5; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 13.9; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 9.4.

Utah; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 funded: 
5.6; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.6; FY2004 
unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.0; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 funded: 7.1; FY2005 unfunded requirements: FY2005 
requirements: 7.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements: FY2005 UFRs: -0.1.

Washington; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 5.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.8; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.1; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.1; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 5.3; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 2.2.

FEMA support; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 18.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 18.7; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.0; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 22.6; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 26.5; FY2005 unfunded requirements: 
FY2005 UFRs: 3.9.

Total; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 
funded: 88.5; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 127.9; 
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 39.4; FY2005 
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 72.0; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 120.9; FY2005 unfunded 
requirements: FY2005 UFRs: 49.0.

Source: FEMA data.

[End of table]

In our August 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA 
(1) provide technical assistance, guidance, and leadership to the three 
states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) with long-standing emergency 
preparedness issues to resolve their concerns; (2) provide all states 
and their communities with training and assistance in preparing budget 
and life-cycle cost estimates and provide guidance and plans on 
reentry; and (3) establish specific measures of compliance with the 
benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify 
requirements. The Army is continuing to provide assistance to CSEPP 
states and communities as requested by FEMA. FEMA now participates more 
often in local community CSEPP activities and sponsors an annual CSEPP 
conference in an effort to improve its working relationships. FEMA 
has also provided software to simplify development of CSEPP financial 
reporting documents and has published a Reentry and Recovery Workbook. 
The workbook fills a void in state and local guidance for emergency 
responders to follow in the event of a chemical emergency. Lastly, FEMA 
expanded its capability assessment readiness tool to assist local 
communities in quantifying benchmark scores.

Agencies' Actions to Implement Prior GAO Recommendations:

We recommended in our September 2003 report that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the 
Army, to (1) develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for 
the chemical demilitarization program and (2) implement a risk 
management approach that anticipates and influences internal and 
external factors that could adversely impact program performance. DOD 
concurred with our recommendations. It said that it was in the initial 
stages of developing an overall strategy and implementation plan and 
estimated that it would be completed in fiscal year 2004. It also said 
that CMA will review the progress of an evaluation of several 
components of its risk management approach within 120 days and then 
that DOD would evaluate the results and determine any appropriate 
action. In our 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA make 
improvements to the program, and they have implemented those 
recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 
respond to any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may 
have.

Contacts and Acknowledgments:

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at 
(202) 512-4300. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony 
include Donald Snyder, Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler, 
Nancy Benco, and Mike Zola.

FOOTNOTES

[1] In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, April 24, 1997. 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Sustained 
Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to 
Guide DOD's Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
5, 2003).

[3] Upper level refers to the offices of the assistant secretary or 
above in the Departments of the Army and Defense.

[4] Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing 
States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

[5] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these sites 
were in the systemization phase; thus, their next milestone was to 
begin agent destruction operations.

[6] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, agent destruction 
operations had been completed and its next milestone was to complete 
closure of the facility.

[7] We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And 
Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-
97-18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 1997).

[8] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: 
Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses, 
GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C: July 23, 1996).

[9] Schedule extensions are caused largely by actual destruction rates 
being lower than planned.

[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army 
Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

[11] This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Elimination of Chemical Weapons).

[12] Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule, 
and performance parameters over the program's life cycle.

[13] GAO-01-850.