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STATEMENT OF
WALTON H. SHELEY, JR., DIRECTOR
MISSION ANALYSIS AND SYSTEMS ACQUISITION DIVISION
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
COMMONALITY OF RADAR WARNING RECEIVERS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to testify concerning our review of the Department of Defense's efforts to have the Navy and Air Force achieve maximum commonality of radar warning receivers. We made this review because the Navy was developing its ALR-67 radar warning receiver concurrently with the Air Force efforts to upgrade its ALR-69 radar warning receiver now designated the ALR-74. We wanted to determine whether the two services were complying with congressional and Secretary of Defense instructions to achieve maximum commonality between the receivers to eliminate duplication of expenditures. A detailed discussion of our findings, conclusions and recommendations is in our report "Lack of Cooperation Precludes Navy and Air Force from Developing Common Radar Warning Receivers (GAO/MASAD-C-82-38) issued June 11, 1982.

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The Navy and Air Force plan to buy its receivers at a cost of over \$1.7 billion from the same contractor—Applied Technology, Division of Itek Corporation.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) recognized that the operational requirements for the receivers are virtually identical. Accordingly, it instructed the two services to achieve maximum commonality and set forth eight tasks it wanted implemented so that standard hardware could be built. It was believed 80 percent commonality could be achieved between the Navy ALR-67 and Air Force ALR-74.

We found that the services have essentially ignored the instructions given them. Instead they have pursued separate developments with virtually no emphasis on commonality. A recently completed study by Applied Technology shows that there is only 19 percent commonality between the Navy's ALR-67 and Air Force's ALR-74.

The Navy and Air Force programs have progressed to a point where it may be difficult to change or redirect them so that commonality can be achieved in the near term. This situation presents a dilemma to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If the programs are separately continued, OSD, the Navy and the Air Force will be justifiably open to criticism for wasting limited funding through duplication of program and contractor overhead, research and development, testing, production facilities and logistical support. Also, if OSD acquiesces to the continuation of separate programs

it may very well lose the opportunity for standardization efforts since the Navy has already stated that it does not intend to join the Air Force in efforts to develop a New Threat Warning System (NTWS).

On the other hand, program changes and, perhaps needed redesigns, to achieve commonality may require significant tradeoffs to be made, such as program delays and contract cost adjustments. The program delays can impact operational capabilities of the F-18 and F-16 aircraft beyond the respective dates that the Navy and Air Force radar warning receivers are scheduled to have initial operational capability on those aircraft. The impact of the delays can be reduced, however, because the Air Force is now equipping the F-16 with its existing ALR-69 receiver and the Navy has the option of using other radar warning receivers, such as the ALR-45F, on the F-18 if the need arises. Further, there are no assurances that the Air Force and Navy receivers will proceed according to schedule without further program delays. Thus, it appears that the tradeoffs may be feasible from an operational viewpoint and should be subjected to analysis.

Faced with this situation, OSD must acquiesce to the wishes of the Navy and Air Force with full understanding of the consequences or take decisive action to get the two services on track to commonality and standardization in the electronic warfare mission area. Under the circumstances, we believe that OSD should fully exert its authority and direct the Navy and Air Force to develop a common radar warning receiver for use by both services. If this is not done now, a precedent will be set and the services will always present arguments "demonstrating the absolute need" for their particular program.

Therefore, in our report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions:

- Stop further funding of and suspend work on the ALR-74 and ALR-67 programs until an acceptable option for developing a common radar warning receiver is agreed to by the Navy and Air Force.
- Direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to identify and make the tradeoffs needed for restructuring a joint commonality program with full Navy and Air Force participation. This should include a joint plan to develop a common radar warning receiver for the near term and also for full Navy participation in the NTWS program.
- Establish a science advisory group to resolve the technical and threat disputes between the Navy and Air Force.
- Release funding for the new joint program upon OSD's approval of the commonality plan.

We believe implementation of these recommendations will reduce costs and provide the foundation for standardization.

Mr. Chairman this concludes our prepared testimony and we will be happy to answer questions the Subcommittee may have.