This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-552R 
entitled 'Training Necessary to Address Data Reliability Issues in NASA 
Agreement Database and to Minimize Potential Competition with 
Commercial Sector' which was released on May 26, 2011. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

May 26, 2011: 

The Honorable Charles Bolden: 
Administrator: 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
300 E Street, SW: 
Washington, DC 20024-3210: 

Subject: Training Necessary to Address Data Reliability Issues in NASA 
Agreement Database and to Minimize Potential Competition with 
Commercial Sector: 

Dear Administrator Bolden: 

Today, GAO issued a correspondence identifying the internal controls 
that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has in 
place for reimbursable Space Act agreements and assessing to what 
extent the agency is adhering to those controls.[Footnote 1] 
Specifically, our review focused on NASA's internal controls related to 
(1) fair reimbursement from agreement partners; (2) interference 
between agreement partners' work and NASA's use of its facilities; and 
(3) alignment of agreement partners' work with NASA's mission. In that 
correspondence, we reported that NASA was generally adhering to its 
controls for entering into reimbursable Space Act agreements. In our 
review, however, we also found several instances in which agreements 
were not completely and accurately recorded in the Space Act Agreement 
Maker (SAAM) database. In addition, we identified one instance where 
NASA awarded a reimbursable agreement when similar services may have 
been available in the private sector. This action appears contrary to 
the National Space Policy and may have also been contrary to the 
Commercial Space Competitiveness Act. 

Federal government standards for internal controls state that control 
activities should help ensure that all transactions are completely and 
accurately recorded. NASA's SAAM database, managed by the Mission 
Support Directorate, is used to assist in writing and storing 
information relating to Space Act agreements.[Footnote 2] Although 
agreements are not required to be written using the system, Space Act 
agreements and related documentation, except for international 
agreements, are required to be stored there. According to NASA 
officials, the agency relies on SAAM-generated quarterly reports to 
help maintain the integrity of the system's data. For example, NASA 
officials stated that agreement managers use quarterly reports to 
identify (1) agreements that were begun, but not submitted (i.e. false 
starts); (2) agreements that have been submitted, but have not 
completed the review process; and (3) agreements that have been 
submitted and completed the review process, but have not been signed. 
Agreement managers at each NASA center also use monthly reports to 
track Space Act agreement-related work at the center.[Footnote 3] These 
reports are also sent to the Office of International and Interagency 
Relations at NASA headquarters for awareness and coordination purposes. 

The Commercial Space Competitiveness Act provides that federal 
agencies, including NASA, may allow nonfederal entities to use space- 
related facilities on a reimbursable basis if the Administrator 
determines that, among other things, equivalent commercial services are 
not available on "reasonable terms."[Footnote 4] The 2006 and 2010 
National Space Policies state that agencies should refrain from 
conducting United States government space activities that compete with 
U.S. commercial space activities, unless required by national security 
or public safety. NASA has developed internal controls related to this 
statutory provision and policy. For example, the agency has issued a 
Space Act Agreement Guide, an agency-level guidance document, and an 
interim directive on reimbursable agreements which reiterate the 
importance of avoiding competition by the federal government with the 
private sector. In addition, when drafting the agreement in the SAAM 
database, the responsible agency official (technical point of contact) 
is required to discuss how NASA goods, services, or facilities to be 
provided are unique and not available from the U.S. commercial market. 
Depending on the technical point of contact's response, the agreement 
could be flagged for additional review by the NASA center's Office of 
Chief Counsel. 

Inaccurate Data in Space Act Agreement Maker Database: 

As part of our assessment of NASA's internal controls regarding fair 
reimbursement, we utilized the Space Act Agreement Maker (SAAM) 
database to identify partially reimbursable Space Act agreements, or 
those agreements with waived costs, awarded in fiscal years 2009 and 
2010. In selecting agreements to review, we identified 20 agreements 
out of 58 whose agreement type had been incorrectly coded, resulting in 
inaccurate data within the SAAM database. This represented almost 34 
percent of agreements awarded in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that had 
been coded as partially reimbursable or fully reimbursable with dollar 
figures in the waived cost field. For example, some agreements that had 
been coded as partially reimbursable Space Act agreements were actually 
fully reimbursable or non-reimbursable Space Act agreements - both of 
which do not involve waived costs. For other agreements labeled as 
partially reimbursable, NASA actually paid the partner instead of 
receiving payment from the partner. NASA officials told us that these 
were interagency acquisitions rather than Space Act agreements. We also 
identified 12 Space Act agreements that were labeled as fully 
reimbursable or fully non-reimbursable[Footnote 5] in SAAM, but 
included dollar figures in the waived cost field. NASA officials 
subsequently reported that 8 of these agreements were partially 
reimbursable, 3 were non-reimbursable, and only one was a fully 
reimbursable agreement. We later determined only 6 of these agreements 
were partially reimbursable. See table 1 below for further details 
regarding the agreements that we identified as being incorrectly coded 
as partially reimbursable agreements within the SAAM database. See 
table 2 below for further details regarding the agreements we 
identified as being incorrectly coded as fully reimbursable or fully 
non-reimbursable agreements with waived costs. 

Table 1: Incorrectly Coded as Partially Reimbursable Space Act 
Agreements: 

SAAM Number: 7730; 
Center: Ames Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Interagency acquisition. 

SAAM Number: 8109; 
Center: Glenn Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Fully reimbursable[A]. 

SAAM Number: 6212; 
Center: Headquarters; 
Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Interagency acquisition. 

SAAM Number: 7372; 
Center: Johnson Space Center; 
Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Fully- reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 6689; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Non- reimbursable[B]. 

SAAM Number: 6206; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Fully reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 8160; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Interagency acquisition. 

SAAM Number: 4569; 
Center: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Partially reimbursable; 
Correct status: Non- reimbursable. 

[A] Fully reimbursable Space Act agreements are those under which NASA 
is fully reimbursed for costs associated with the undertaking of an 
agreement. 

[B] Non-reimbursable Space Act agreements involve NASA and one or more 
partners in a mutually beneficial activity that furthers NASA's 
mission, where each party bears the cost of its participation and there 
is no exchange of funds between the parties. 

[End of table] 

Table 2: Incorrectly Coded as Fully Reimbursable or Fully Non- 
Reimbursable Space Act Agreements with Waived Costs: 

SAAM Number: 7492; 
Center: Glenn Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 7507; 
Center: Glenn Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully non-reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Non-reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 5406; 
Center: Goddard Space Flight Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully non-reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Non-reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 5060; 
Center: Johnson Space Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 7793; 
Center: Kennedy Space Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 4646; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially Reimbursable[B]. 

SAAM Number: 5161; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 5896; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Non-reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 8263; 
Center: Langley Research Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 4528; 
Center: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 4987; 
Center: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Fully reimbursable. 

SAAM Number: 5592; 
Center: Marshall Space Flight Center; 
SAAM Coding Error: Fully reimbursable with waived cost; 
Correct status: Partially reimbursable amendment[A]. 

[A] NASA officials initially identified this transaction as a partially 
reimbursable agreement. However, upon reviewing the documentation, we 
determined that this transaction was actually an amendment to a 
partially reimbursable agreement awarded in 2004. We did not include 
this amendment in our review. 

[B] This agreement was not included in our review as it was originally 
identified by officials as an interagency acquisition. 

[End of table] 

NASA Awarded Partially Reimbursable Space Act Agreement when Similar 
Services May Have Been Available Commercially: 

During our review of partially reimbursable Space Act agreements, we 
identified one agreement from Glenn Research Center that may have been 
contrary to the Commercial Space Competitiveness Act and the National 
Space Policy. The agreement involved conducting small engine jet 
testing services for a commercial firm at a cost of $78,685. NASA's 
technical point of contact for the agreement, who was unaware of the 
limits on NASA competing with the private sector, told us that the 
commercial firm approached NASA in an attempt to receive small engine 
jet testing using Glenn Research Center's Propulsion Systems Laboratory 
at a cheaper rate than what was charged commercially. Officials from 
Glenn Research Center's Office of Chief Counsel stated they did not 
know that these services were available commercially because the 
technical point of contact had indicated in the SAAM database that NASA 
had unique capabilities to conduct this testing and that the services 
were not generally available commercially. As a result, NASA entered 
into the agreement to perform the work as it helped to sustain a core 
facility and competencies and even waived the center management and 
operations costs associated with performing the work. While we did not 
independently verify whether these services were available 
commercially, regardless, because of the technical point of contact's 
lack of understanding of restrictions on competition with the private 
sector, the controls NASA had in place to prevent competition with the 
private sector were ineffective. 

Conclusions: 

Inaccurate data in SAAM limit NASA's visibility over Space Act 
agreements and the agency's ability to make informed agreement 
management decisions. NASA's internal controls on avoiding competition 
between the agency and the private sector are only as effective as the 
people implementing them. When technical points of contact either lack 
a thorough understanding of the limits on competing with the private 
sector or do not provide complete and accurate information regarding 
proposed partner activities in the SAAM database, the controls can be 
ineffective. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the data integrity of the SAAM system, we recommend that the 
Administrator of NASA direct the Mission Support Directorate to: 

1. Rectify the data inaccuracies in the SAAM database that we have 
identified in this report. 

2. Assess why the coding errors we have identified in this report 
occurred and develop procedures for enhancing the accuracy of the data. 

To improve data integrity and ensure NASA does not violate statutory 
provisions or policy regarding competition with the private sector, we 
recommend that the Administrator direct the Mission Support Directorate 
to: 

1. Provide refresher training, as part of NASA's annual Space Act 
agreement community of practice, to SAAM users that explains the 
various agreement types, stresses the importance of accurately 
inputting data into the SAAM database, and clarifies NASA's policy 
regarding competition with the private sector. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a copy of the draft report to NASA for comment. In 
commenting on the report, the agency agreed with our overall findings 
and concurred with our recommendations. NASA indicated that the agency 
has already taken several actions and has planned additional action to 
address the issues we raised. For example, NASA stated that it has 
taken steps to identify and correct data inaccuracies that were 
reported herein. Further, the agency stated that the Mission Support 
Directorate has assessed why the coding errors occurred and identified 
two primary causes which they are working to address through additional 
training and changes to the SAAM database. Finally, the agency stated 
that it conducted training on proper agreement classification protocols 
and legal and policy requirements related to the competition with the 
private sector issue. NASA also provided technical comments that we 
have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. 

Scope and Methodology: 

The findings in this management letter were based on work completed as 
part of our review of NASA's internal controls for reimbursable Space 
Act agreements.[Footnote 6] As part of that review, we assessed the 
reliability of the SAAM data by (1) interviewing agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data, (2) reviewing existing information about 
the data and the system that produced them, and (3) performing 
electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness. In 
the course of our review, we identified some limitations in the data, 
such as some agreements being incorrectly coded within the database and 
NASA officials acknowledging that the database did not contain all 
agreements. We took additional steps to mitigate the impact of these 
data limitations through further examination of agreements that 
appeared to be coded incorrectly or were not originally listed in the 
dataset as partially reimbursable Space Act agreements. We provided a 
list of partially reimbursable Space Act agreements and 12 fully 
reimbursable or fully non-reimbursable Space Act agreements with waived 
costs to NASA and officials confirmed that several had been coded 
incorrectly in the SAAM database. Through these mitigation steps, we 
were able to build our own list of partially reimbursable Space Act 
agreements to include in our review. We determined that our list of 
partially reimbursable Space Act agreements was sufficiently reliable 
for the purpose of that report. We reviewed all 44 partially 
reimbursable Space Act Agreements awarded in fiscal years 2009 and 
2010, as identified in SAAM, at five NASA centers, including Glenn 
Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Langley 
Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. We also reviewed 
public laws, the 2006 and 2010 National Space Policy, and NASA policies 
and procedures for reimbursable Space Act agreements. We identified one 
agreement at Glenn Research Center where NASA potentially competed with 
the private sector, interviewed the technical point of contact and 
agreement manager responsible for managing and overseeing the 
development of the agreement, and obtained a written response from 
Glenn's Office of Chief Counsel. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to May 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any 
questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. 

Key contributors to this report were Shelby S. Oakley, Assistant 
Director; Jeffrey Hartnett; Morgan Delaney Ramaker; Laura Greifner; 
Jean McSween, Megan Porter; Andrew Redd; Swati Thomas; and Alyssa Weir. 

Sincerely Yours, 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration: 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 
Headquarters: 
Washington, DC 20546-0001:   

May 20, 2011  

Reply to Attn of:   

Office of the General Counsel:   

Ms. Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548:   

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) appreciates 
the opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
draft reports entitled "NASA  Reimbursable Space Act Agreements" (GAO-
11-553R; report number 120926) and -NASA Data Issues and Compliance" 
(GAO-11-552R; report number 120983). NASA values the continued open 
communications between NASA and the GAO team and appreciates the 
constructive comments arising as a result of this effort. 

NASA agrees with GAO's concern regarding managing programs and projects 
as efficiently and effectively as possible, especially within a budget 
that is likely to be constrained due to the fiscal limitations 
currently faced by all Federal Government agencies. NASA remains 
dedicated to continuous improvement of the Agency's Space
 Act Agreement's (SAA) internal controls and business practices. We are 
pleased that GAO recognized the policy requirements and other internal 
controls in place related to Agency SAA practices and found that NASA 
is generally adhering to those controls. 

We also appreciate GAO's constructive findings from the two reports 
regarding the need to clarify existing Agency guidance in regard to 
certain Reimbursable SAA pricing policies (i.e., waived costs), the 
need for improved training and internal controls to ensure the data 
integrity in NASA's Space Act Agreement Maker (SAAM) system, and the 
need for improved training and internal controls to ensure that NASA 
does not violate statutory provisions or policy regarding competition 
with the private sector. NASA is committed to promptly addressing these 
issues and, in fact, has already taken several actions and has planned 
additional action toward that end, as discussed below. 

In the two draft reports, GAO makes a total of four recommendations to 
the NASA Administrator to address the findings identified in the 
reports. Those recommendations, and NASA's responses, are as follows: 

GAO-11-553r: 

Recommendation 1: Direct the Offices of the Chief Financial Officer and 
General Counsel to refine the agency's policy to clearly define the 
type of information that is required to support the justification in 
the estimated price report. This type of information may include 
documenting that there is a clear and demonstrated benefit to NASA and 
quantifying the benefit to the extent practicable. 

NASA's Response: Concur. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
(OCFO) is already working with the Office of General Counsel (OGC) and 
other offices addressing this recommendation. We are in the process of 
reviewing these and other refinements to NASA Interim Directive 9090.1, 
as part of the transition to a NASA Procedural Requirement this year. 
Among the refinements being reviewed are reporting requirements 
including the additional types of information recommended above. 

GAO-11-552R: 

Recommendation 1: Direct the Office of Program and Institutional 
Integration to rectify the data inaccuracies in the SAAM database that 
we have identified in this report. NASA's Response: Concur. All of the 
data inaccuracies identified in the GAO report have been corrected in 
coordination with the respective Center and Headquarters Agreement 
Managers. 

Recommendation 2: Direct the Office of Program and Institutional 
Integration to assess why the coding errors identified in this report 
occurred and develop procedures for enhancing the accuracy of the data. 

NASA's Response: Concur. The Mission Support Directorate (MSD) has 
assessed each instance and found that there were two primary causes for 
the data entry errors: 

1) Initial misclassification by the Agreement initiator due to a lack 
of understanding of how to classify certain Agreements in the system. 
We also identified some problematic SAAM data entry protocols that 
confused users and allowed erroneous classification entries such as 
"Fully Nonreimbursable" or "Fully Reimbursable [with waived costs 
entered]," which contributed to this problem. 

2) Failure or inability of the Agreement Manager to update the initial 
classification of an Agreement if it changed during the course of 
discussions with the partner (e.g., from "Fully reimbursable" to 
"Partially reimbursable" or vice versa). We also found that system 
restrictions that prohibited the Agreement Managers from being able to 
directly make changes to the agreement classification after it had been 
initially established contributed to this problem. 

In order to enhance the accuracy of the system data, we conducted 
training on proper agreement classification protocols during the Space 
Act Agreement Community of Practice Meeting at Stennis Space Center on 
May 18-19, 2011. In addition, we implemented changes to the SAAM system 
to allow designated Center and Headquarters Agreement Managers to make 
changes to the classification of their Agreements as needed. Finally, 
are in the process of implementing additional changes to the SAAM 
system to automatically "flag" such errors and eliminate the 
possibility of confusing or contradictory agreement classification 
entries. 

Recommendation 3: Direct the Office of Program and Institutional 
Integration to provide refresher training, as part of NASA's annual 
Space Act agreement community of practice, to SAAM users to explain the 
various agreement types, stress the importance of accurately inputting 
data into the SAAM database, and clarifies NASA's policy regarding 
competition with the private sector. 

Management's Response: Concur. MSD will conduct training on proper 
agreement classification protocols during the upcoming Space Act 
Agreement Community of Practice Meeting referenced above. As part of 
that training, we discussed the findings from the GAO's audit and 
provided both policy and technical training regarding how to properly 
classify and enter SAAs in SAAM, emphasizing the importance of users 
accurately inputting data into the system. During the meeting, MSD and 
OGC also covered the legal and policy requirements relating to the 
"competition with the private sector" issue and the related policies 
and internal controls in place to prevent that. 

The GAO report finding regarding "competition with the private sector" 
in SAAM 7492 (GRC's SAA3-1112 w/Technical Directions Inc.), we have 
reviewed the circumstances surrounding that particular agreement. We 
agree with the facts as stated in the GAO report, and offer the 
following additional background information for further context. 

Under the agreement, GRC performed work on a small jet engine that the 
company was developing for the Department of Defense (DOD) using GRC's 
Propulsion Systems 4 Laboratory (PSL). The PSL is NASA's only ground-
based test facility that can provide true flight simulation for 
experimental research on air-breathing propulsion systems. When the 
Agreement was initiated, the GRC Agreements Manager relied on the 
written statement in SAAM by the PSL facility manager that there were 
no other vendors available who could do the work, After additional 
inquiry, however, it appears that there may have been another vendor 
capable of performing the testing conducted under the agreement. 

GRC indicated that, although the agreement was with a commercial entity 
(DTI), the work was known to be for the direct benefit of DOD. 
Accordingly, the testing was conducted within the context of a policy 
arrangement between NASA and DOD regarding aerospace research of mutual 
interest to both agencies. For example, GRC waived certain costs 
incurred under the agreement pursuant to its practice of waiving such 
costs for testing conducted in conjunction with the DOD. While we 
understand that these facts do not fully address the issue of avoiding 
competition with the private sector, we believe that the context of 
NASA and DOD mutual commitment to conduct joint aeronautics research at 
reduced costs and on appropriate terms and conditions is useful in 
providing an understanding of the circumstances surrounding this 
particular agreement. 

GRC is planning to conduct additional Center-level training in response 
to the GAO report finding. Specifically, GRC has taken the following 
three corrective actions: (1) Since January 2011, shortly after this 
issue became known, the GRC Agreement Managers make it a standard 
practice to more extensively question GRC staff to gain better 
understanding of the uniqueness of requested NASA facilities and the 
possible existence of other potential vendors; (2) The GRC Office of 
Chief Counsel and the GRC Chief Technologist convened a meeting with 
the Propulsion Systems Laboratory facility manager and his management 
on May 3, 2011, to re-emphasize and explain the NASA policy that NASA 
must not compete with the private sector in performing reimbursable 
work; and (3) The GRC Offices of Chief Counsel and Technology 
Partnerships and Planning have agreed to hold refresher training 
sessions for GRC staff on initiating and implementing Space Act 
Agreements. 

NASA is committed to continuous improvement of our SAA internal 
controls and practices, as with all Agency practices, in order to 
explore and utilize Space in an affordable way for the benefit of the 
Nation. Toward this end, we look forward to continuing to work with the 
GAO to measure and improve our performance and management practices.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the two draft reports. If 
you have any questions or require additional information, please 
contact Richard McCarthy at (202) 358-2031. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael C. Wholley: 
General Counsel: 

[End of section] 

(120983): 

Footnotes:  

[1] GAO, Reimbursable Space Act Agreements: NASA Generally Adhering to 
Fair Reimbursement Controls, but Guidance on Waived Cost Justifications 
Needs Refinement, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-553R] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2011). 

[2] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C., November 1999). 

[3] Monthly reports include information on (1) new agreements since the 
15th of last month; (2) new agreements since the beginning of the 
fiscal year; and (3) ongoing agreements that will expire within the 
next 60 days. 

[4] 51 U.S.C.  50504 

[5] The SAAM database provides two separate fields to identify 
agreement type. In the first field, the user selects fully or partially 
while in the second field the user chooses whether the agreement is 
reimbursable or non-reimbursable. 

[6] [[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-553R].

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAOs actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAOs Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: