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GAO-10-669R: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 28, 2010: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Warfighter Support: Observations on DOD's Ground Combat 
Uniforms: 

This report transmits the attached briefing (see enclosure I) in 
response to section 352 of Public Law 111-84, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The statute requires the 
Comptroller General to conduct an assessment of the ground combat 
uniforms and camouflage utility uniforms currently in use in the 
Department of Defense and provide the results to the congressional 
defense committees not later than 180 days after the date of enactment 
of the act. On April 26, 2010, we provided a briefing on the results 
of our assessment to your committees' staffs to satisfy this 
requirement. We also provided the Department of Defense an opportunity 
to comment on the briefing. The department provided us with technical 
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense; 
the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps. This report will also be available at no charge 
on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your 
staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report were Larry Junek, 
Assistant Director; Meghan Cameron, Susan Ditto, Elizabeth Morris, and 
Michael Shaughnessy. 

William M. Solis: 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Enclosure: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Support: Observations on DOD's Ground Combat Uniforms: 

May 28, 2010: 

Table of Contents: 
* Introduction to DOD's Ground Combat Uniforms; 
* Background; 
* Objectives; 
* Scope and Methodology; 
* Summary of Findings; 
* Appendix I: National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, 
Sec. 352; 
* Appendix II: Current and Planned Service Ground Combat Uniforms; 
* Appendix III: Ground Combat Uniform Costs (FY 2001-2010); 
* Appendix IV: Camouflage Uniform Wear Policies of the Combatant 
Commands; 
* Appendix V: Detailed Scope and Methodology. 

Introduction to DOD's Ground Combat Uniforms: 

Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
military services wore similar desert camouflage uniforms. 

The Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia 
(DSCP) currently manages eight uniforms for the services. Three 
additional ground combat uniforms are under development by the Army 
(1) and the Navy (2). 

Congress has expressed interest in the costs of managing service-
specific uniforms, the impact of proprietary[Footnote 1] information 
on the ability of the services or Special Operations Command to share 
uniform technology, and the potential risk to individuals—such as 
airmen or sailors assigned to Army or Marine Corps units, 
interpreters, and other support personnel—who may be wearing a 
different uniform than members of the unit they are supporting. 

Congress has also noted that the design and fielding of future ground 
combat and camouflage utility uniforms of the Armed Forces may 
uniquely reflect the identity of the individual military services, as 
long as the uniforms, to the extent practical, provide an equivalent 
level of performance, functionality, and protection commensurate with 
their respective assigned combat missions; minimize risk to the 
individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine operating in the joint 
battlespace; and provide interoperability with other components of 
individual war fighter systems, including body armor and other 
individual protective systems. 

Section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
Fiscal Year 2010[Footnote 2] requires GAO to review performance, 
interoperability, costs and logistics, and patents or other 
proprietary elements involved in the services' ground combat uniforms, 
[Footnote 3] as well as the risks associated with individuals wearing 
different ground combat uniforms. (See appendix I.) 

[End of section] 

Background: Ground Combat Uniform Production Standards and Patents: 

Each ground combat uniform has production specification requirements 
that follow manufacturing standards for the production of the uniform. 
These standards include color fastness (fading), fabric durability, 
consistent pattern printing, color matching to ensure camouflage shade 
consistency, and visible and near infrared wavelength ranges. 

Uniforms may also have capability requirements such as flame 
resistance or insect repellency. 

Camouflage patterns are characterized as environment-specific or 
universal. Environment-specific patterns, such as the Marine Corps 
woodland and desert patterns, are expected to perform best in the 
specific environment. 

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, the troop support center for 
clothing and textiles for the Defense Logistics Agency, maintains a 
central role in production, procurement, storage, and distribution of 
most ground combat uniforms used by the services. As a working capital 
fund, the supply center relies principally on sales revenue rather 
than direct appropriations to finance its operations. Customers 
primarily use operation and maintenance funds to finance orders. 

The services' ground combat uniforms were funded or plan to be funded 
through annual appropriations or Overseas Contingency Operations 
appropriations. 

Since 2002, the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps have held 
patents[Footnote 4] for elements of the Marine Corps Combat Utility 
Uniform (MCCUU)—color scheme, uniform design, and pattern (including 
the service logo). The Marine Corps holds the patent to prevent the 
uniform from being copied commercially and to ensure the Marine Corps' 
uniqueness. 

Background: DOD and the Services Oversee Ground Combat Uniforms: 

Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board: 

* Department of Defense Instruction 4140.63 directs the Director of 
the Defense Logistics Agency to establish and chair the board to 
ensure collaboration and integration of clothing and textile 
activities. 

* Section 352(d) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the 
secretaries of the military departments to establish joint criteria 
for future ground combat uniforms. According to Department of Defense 
officials, the board will be the venue used to accomplish this. 

Service Uniform Boards are responsible for overseeing aspects of 
uniform changes within each service. 

The Cross Service Warfighter Equipment Board provides a structure for 
sharing uniform technology. 

* U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center (NSRDEC) is the coordinating agency for the board. 

* The advisory board facilitates and provides guidance to establish, 
plan, and manage joint service technology advancements. 

[End of section] 

Objectives: 

To address the legislation (see appendix I), our specific objectives 
were to assess: 

1. the extent to which ground combat camouflage uniforms meet 
standards for performance in combat environments and interoperability 
with currently issued protective gear and body armor. 

2. the costs and logistics requirements associated with developing, 
fielding, and supporting service-specific ground combat uniforms 3. 
the extent to which patents and proprietary information preclude 
sharing of advanced uniform design technology across the services and 
Special Operations Command. 

4. challenges and risks, if any, including tactical risk, associated 
with individuals serving in combat assignments where different ground 
combat uniforms are used. 

[End of section] 

Scope and Methodology: 

Our review focused on the current Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 
Corps ground combat uniforms and the development of future ground 
combat uniforms. 

To determine the extent to which ground combat uniforms meet standards 
for performance in combat environments, we reviewed uniform 
specifications provided by the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia and 
the services. We analyzed uniform performance feedback provided by the 
Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. We discussed performance standards 
and feedback for combat environments with officials from all four 
services. To assess the extent to which ground combat uniforms are 
operable with protective gear and body armor, we discussed operability 
of uniforms and protective gear with service and Special Operations 
Command officials. We did not test uniforms and protective gear for 
interoperability. 

To assess costs and logistics support requirements with the design, 
development, production, procurement, and fielding of service-specific 
ground combat uniforms, we analyzed uniform budget and cost estimate 
data on current and planned ground combat uniforms from all four 
services, the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, and commercial 
entities. To determine the reliability and accuracy of the Army, Navy, 
and Marine Corps cost estimates, we used the GAO Cost Estimating and 
Assessment Guide. (See appendix V.) We found that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting costs and trends in 
costs. 

To determine the extent to which patents and proprietary information 
might preclude sharing of advanced uniform technology, we identified 
elements of the uniforms that are patented or proprietary and 
discussed the impact of this on sharing of technology with services 
and Special Operations Command. 

To assess the challenges and risks associated with individuals serving 
in combat assignments where different ground combat uniforms are worn; 
we analyzed the uniform policies of the combatant commands and service 
components of U.S. Central Command and discussed risks to augmentees, 
interpreters, and other support personnel with service and Special 
Operations Command officials. 

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). For further details on 
our scope and methodology, see the scope and methodology section and 
appendix V. 

We received technical comments from the services, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations 
Command, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Summary of Findings: 

Objective 1: 

Although the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps state that they have 
established requirements for combat clothing that include performance 
capabilities and characteristics, we found that performance standards 
are not related to specific combat environments. In addition, we found 
technical production standards guide the manufacturing of uniforms for 
all four services. Camouflage effectiveness is not an operational 
performance criteria. 

Service and Special Operations Command officials indicate that the 
ground combat uniforms and their protective gear and body armor are 
interoperable. However, service officials stated that they do not have 
a requirement to regularly test their uniform and other services' 
protective gear for interoperability, but rely on feedback from users. 

Objective 2: 

Production and procurement costs are increasing and account for about 
95 percent of ground combat uniform costs. Several factors, such as 
the introduction of flame resistant fabric and pace of operations, 
account for the increase in production costs. According to DOD 
officials, supporting a variety of uniforms in any combat theater of 
operations does not place additional logistics requirements on the 
distribution system; rather, the additional logistical requirements 
are primarily found in storage costs in the United States. 

Objective 3: 

The government-owned patents on elements of the Marine Corps' ground 
combat uniforms—the color scheme, the uniform design, and the pattern 
with the service logo—present no legal barrier to allowing other 
services to use these elements. According to officials from all four 
services, it is unlikely that the services would choose to wear the 
same camouflage uniform because it is a symbol of the individual 
service and its uniqueness. Apart from the patents issue, Marine Corps 
System Command officials indicated that they believe 10 U.S.C. § 771 
prohibits a member of one service from wearing the uniform or a 
distinctive part of the uniform belonging to another service. 

Objective 4: 

The services and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials do not 
collect data that would enable an assessment of the risks associated 
with wearing different uniforms in combat operations. Combatant 
commanders and service component commanders maintain flexibility to 
determine uniform wear based on operational needs. 

Objective 1: The Services Have Some Overall Requirements for Uniform 
Performance: 

The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps state that they have established 
requirements for combat clothing that include performance capabilities 
and characteristics. 

* The Army issued a capability production document for its Core 
Soldier System which includes its combat uniform—in 2007, which 
provides parameters for capabilities such as temperature endurance, 
durability, and protection against insect bites. 

* The Air Force's Independent Uniform Review team identified some 
uniform performance requirements, including one uniform for all 
climates, useful in brown and green environments, similar design with 
service-specific pocket placement and closures. 

* The Marine Corps issued an operational requirements document in 1994 
that specifies its priorities for weight, service life, infrared 
reflective quality, protective gear compatibility, woodland 
camouflage, and other clothing characteristics. 

* Navy officials told us that the Navy is determining performance 
standards to meet all environments for the Navy's Working Uniform 
(NWU) Type II and Type III uniforms. 

Objective 1: Uniform Performance Standards Do Not Relate to Specific 
Ground Combat Environments: 

We found that the services' performance standards for design and 
development of their uniforms are not related to specific combat 
environments. 

* The Army's document states that the Core Soldier System must operate 
in all environments including snow, ice, rain, sand, dust, and 
saltwater. 

* The Marine Corps' document proposes a uniform to meet a temperate 
climate on varied terrain that will meet unique conditions required of 
Marine combat forces. 

* The services develop production specifications based on military and 
commercial standards, such as from the American Society for Testing 
and Material, which include some technical standards. For example, the 
purchase description for the Air Force man's utility uniform 
camouflage pattern coat states that the lining shall meet initial 
minimum directional bond strength of 32 ounces per inch and a minimum 
24 ounces per inch after 20 launderings. 

Objective 1: Camouflage Effectiveness Is Not an Operational 
Performance Criteria for Uniforms: 

Camouflage effectiveness is not an operational performance criteria of 
the services' ground combat uniforms. 

Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center and most 
of the services tested the camouflage patterns in different 
environments during design and development testing phase during the 
selection of new ground combat uniforms. 

Based on available data, it is not possible to fully assess the 
camouflage effectiveness of each services' uniform in different combat 
environments because of limitations in studies and different concepts 
of camouflage performance. 

* Some limitations of these studies include: 

- Not all of the services' ground combat uniforms were included; 

- A limited number of environments were included; 

- Not all seasons were included in background photographs. 

Objective 1: Services Use Various Mechanisms to Gather Ground Combat 
Uniform Performance Feedback: 

The services utilize feedback mechanisms to obtain overall performance 
data to inform uniform improvements. 

* The Army utilizes a Program Executive Office Soldier Web site and 
U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence post deployment surveys. 
Generally, the feedback has included concerns about uniform fading, 
durability, and laundering. 

* The Marine Corps uses surveys, user evaluations, theater urgent 
needs statements, and in-theater town hall meetings. Generally, the 
feedback has included concerns about durability and laundering. 

* The Air Force uses a Uniform Board Web site, theater urgent needs 
statements, and user evaluations. Generally, the feedback has included 
concerns about the weight of the uniform fabric and durability. 

* The Navy utilizes their administrative chain of command to provide 
the Navy Uniform Board feedback. The Navy did not provide any feedback 
on the ground combat uniform worn by the sailors. 

Objective 1: Example of Army Utilization of Performance Feedback 
Mechanism: 

The Army responded to feedback by addressing uniform durability 
concerns. 

* In August 2005, the Army Program Manager for ground combat uniforms 
received soldier feedback on seam rips on the trousers of the Army 
Combat Uniform. 

* In September 2005, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia included seam 
improvements to the trouser to address feedback. 

* In April 2007, after testing, Army Combat Uniform trousers in 
inventory were retrofitted with material to improve the strength of 
the seams. 

* In June 2010, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia will begin delivery 
of an improved trouser seam design on the Army Combat Uniform in 
response to soldier feedback. 

Objective 1: Services Indicate That Ground Combat Uniforms and 
Protective Gear Are Interoperable: 

Service and Special Operations Command officials indicate that the 
ground combat uniforms and protective gear and body armor are 
interoperable.[Footnote 5] 

* Air Force officials told us that the Air Force uniform is 
interoperable with the Army's protective gear. The Air Force's ground 
combat uniform system requirements included interoperability with the 
Army's body armor. 

* Navy officials told us that the sailors' uniforms are interoperable 
with the Marine Corps, Army, and Special Operations Forces protective 
gear. 

However, service officials stated that they do not have a requirement 
to regularly test their uniform and other services' protective gear 
for interoperability, but rely on feedback from users. Natick Soldier 
Research, Development, and Engineering Center has the capability to 
conduct testing of uniforms and protective gear. 

There are differences of opinion about the interoperability of 
matching and nonmatching camouflage patterns. 

* An Army Natick study indicates that the matching camouflage patterns 
for uniforms and protective gear in the Afghanistan environments 
blended better than nonmatching uniforms and protective gear. 

Objective 2: Production and Procurement Costs Account for Most of the 
Uniform Costs: 

Data on the design, development, production, procurement, and fielding 
of ground combat uniforms include cost estimates from the Marine 
Corps, Army, and Navy, and budget data from the Air Force and Defense 
Supply Center Philadelphia. 

Comparing overall costs of uniforms, the production and procurement of 
uniforms account for most (95 percent) of the services' and Defense 
Supply Center Philadelphia's ground combat uniform costs, with about 4 
percent for storage and distribution costs, and about 1 percent design 
and development costs. (See appendix Ill, table 2.) 

Objective 2: Service-Specific Design and Development Costs Are about 1 
Percent of Overall Ground Combat Uniform Costs: 

Design and development costs generally include initial manufacturing 
of uniform prototypes, conducting user evaluations, and material 
testing. 

* The kind of testing and the length of time testing is performed 
contributes to the varying costs of the services. 

The design and development cost (figure 1) of the uniforms[Footnote 6] 
include: 

* Air Force's Airman Battle Uniform (ABU); 

* Army's Army Combat Uniform (ACU); 

* Army's MultiCam®; 

* Marine Corps' Combat Utility Uniform desert and woodland (MCCUU); 

* Navy's Navy Working Uniform (NWU) Type II and Type III . 

The costs incurred for the design and development of the uniforms 
occurred in different years from 2001 to 2010. 

Objective 2: Figure 1. Design and Development Costs for the Services' 
Current and New Ground Combat Uniforms: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Service uniform: Air Force ABU; 
Costs: $3.16 million.  

Service uniform: Army ACU; 
Costs: $3.23 million. 

Service uniform: Army MultiCam®; 
Costs: $3.41 million. 

Service uniform: Marine Corps MCCUU; 
Costs: $0.32 million.  

Service uniform: Navy Type II and Type III; 
Costs: $8.39 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of the military services' design and development 
costs. 

Note: Timeframe for design and development costs: Air Force's ABU 6 
years (FY 2003-FY 2008); Army's ACU 2 years; (FY 2004-FY 2005), 
MultiCam® 4 years (FY 2006-FY 2009); Marine Corps' MCCUU 1 year (FY 
2001); and Navy's Type II/Type III 6 years (FY 2005-FY 2010). The 
Navy's design and development testing was performed by Naval Special 
Warfare. 

[End of figure] 

Objective 2: Flame Resistant and Insect Repellant Treatments Are Among 
Factors Impacting the Increase in Uniform Production and Procurement 
Costs: 

According to officials, increased costs are affected by new uniform 
specifications, such as flame resistant material, permanent press 
material, and permethrin insect repellant treatment; the number of 
service personnel deploying; and the overall pace of combat 
operations, including wear and tear in the austere environment of 
Afghanistan. For additional information on the specifications and unit 
costs for each uniform, see table 1. 

* However, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia officials are unable to 
attribute increases in production and procurement costs directly to 
the increase in the number of new service-specific ground combat 
uniforms since fiscal year 2005. 

Objective 2: Table 1. Ground Combat Uniform Characteristics and Unit 
Cost: 

Uniform: Air Force ABU (Man's); 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: Permanent press; 
Unit costs: $76.20. 

Uniform: Air Force ABU (Woman's); 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: Permanent press; 
Unit costs: $75.40. 

Uniform: Air Force ABE (Man's); 
Flame resistant: [Check]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $203.34. 

Uniform: Air Force ABE (Woman's); 
Flame resistant: [Check]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $200.53. 

Uniform: Army ACU; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: Wrinkle free; 
Unit costs: $75.85. 

Uniform: Army ACU; 
Flame resistant: [Check]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: Wrinkle free; 
Unit costs: $129.61. 

Uniform: Army ACU; 
Flame resistant: [Check]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Check]; 
Cloth treatment: Wrinkle free; 
Unit costs: $152.34. 

Uniform: Army MultiCam®; 
Flame resistant: [Check]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Check]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $173.93. 

Uniform: Marine Desert; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Check]; 
Cloth treatment: Permanent press; 
Unit costs: $77.90. 

Uniform: Marine Woodland; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Check]; 
Cloth treatment: Permanent press; 
Unit costs: $77.65. 

Uniform: Navy DCU Desert; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $61.61. 

Uniform: Navy CUU Woodland; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $48.86. 

Uniform: Navy NWU Type II/Type III; 
Flame resistant: [Empty]; 
Insect repellant permethrin treatment: [Empty]; 
Cloth treatment: [Empty]; 
Unit costs: $83.00. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, Air Force, 
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy data. 

[End of table] 

Objective 2: Some Accessory Costs Exceed Uniform Costs: 

Costs of ground combat uniform accessories (such as body armor, load 
bearing equipment, and helmets) can be more expensive than the ground 
combat uniform.[Footnote 7] 

For example: 

* The Army's flame-retardant combat uniform costs about $130, while 
the Army's Modular Light-Weight Load-Carrying Equipment currently 
costs $464 per unit. 

* The Marine Corps' combat utility uniform currently costs about $78, 
while its body armor vests cost $1,071.[Footnote 8] 

Objective 2: Production and Procurement Costs Are Most of Uniform 
Costs and Have Increased Over Time: 

During fiscal years 2005-2009, production and procurement costs for 
ground combat uniforms represented approximately 95 percent of the 
overall costs spent by the services and Defense Supply Center 
Philadelphia on camouflage uniforms. (See appendix Ill, table 2.) 

Figure 2 shows that Defense Supply Center Philadelphia's cost to 
produce and procure the services' ground combat uniforms have 
increased from about $223 million in fiscal year 2005 to about $422 
million in fiscal year 2009. 

* An increase in the number of the Army's ACU sold and the 
introduction of the Air Force's ABU in fiscal year 2006, and an 
increase in the number of flame resistant uniforms sold during this 
period contributed to the increase in production and procurement costs. 

Objective 2: Figure 2. Total Production and Procurement Costs Have 
Increased From Fiscal Year 2005-2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Costs: $222.8 million. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Costs: $382.4 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Costs: $295.7 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Costs: $334.4 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Costs: $422.4 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCP ground combat uniform obligations. 

Note: Procurement and production costs are represented by Defense 
Supply Center Philadelphia's obligations for service ground combat 
uniforms from fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2009. These costs include 
the production cost and its administrative cost to manage the 
production contracts. 

[End of figure] 

Objective 2: Figure 3. Uniform Storage and Distribution Costs Have 
Increased From Fiscal Year 2005-2010: 

According to Defense Supply Center Philadelphia officials, an increase 
in the number of uniform sizes and in the variety of different 
uniforms stored in warehouse storage space has increased storage costs 
in the United States. (See figure 3.) 

The fiscal year 2005-2010 storage and distribution costs account for 
approximately 4 percent of the overall costs spent by services, 
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia and commercial entities on
camouflage uniforms. (See appendix III, table 2.) 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
DSCP storage costs: $3.18 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $6.0 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $0 million. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
DSCP storage costs: $3.86 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $8.3 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $0 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
DSCP storage costs: $3.67 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $7.0 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $0 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
DSCP storage costs: $2.43 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $8.8 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $0 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
DSCP storage costs: $2.66 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $3.91 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $10.34 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
DSCP storage costs: $1.3 million; 
DCSP distribution costs: $1.2 million; 
Commercial storage and distribution costs: $3.99 million. 

Source: GAO Analysis of DSCP and commercial costs for storing clothing 
and textiles and accessories. 

Note: FY10 costs include 4 months for DSCP and 5.5 months for the 
commercial entities. 

[End of figure] 

Note: Officials indicated that due to Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission (BRAC) decisions, commercial entities began incurring 
storage and distribution costs in 2009. Commercial and DSCP storage 
costs include other accessories and clothing aside from uniforms and 
are for storage in the continental U.S. (CONUS) only. Service specific 
storage costs are not included in the graph above. 

Objective 2: Managing Multiple Uniforms Involves Additional Logistical 
Requirements in the U.S., but Fielding Multiple Uniforms in Theater 
Does Not Clearly Require Additional Logistics Support: 

According to DOD officials, supporting a variety of uniforms in any 
combat theater of operations does not place additional logistics 
requirements on the distribution system in theater. Rather, the 
additional logistical requirements to support multiple uniforms are 
primarily found in storage costs in the United States. Additionally: 

* Military personnel deploying to Central Command are issued four to 
six sets of their ground combat uniform. 

* If all uniforms issued for deployment wear out, service members may 
order replacements through their services' theater supply system. 

Distribution of uniforms is difficult in the Afghanistan environment. 
Challenges to supplying uniforms in Afghanistan are the same as those 
for supplying other types of equipment. 

Objective 2: Services Incur Additional Cost for Their Own U.S. Storage 
Facilities for Uniforms and Equipment: 

In addition to DSCP and commercial storage costs, the Army and Air 
Force store uniforms and other equipment to support deployment. These 
costs include: 

* An annual cost of approximately $970,000 to store Army ground combat 
uniforms in the United States. 
- The Army uses its facilities to stage uniforms to support deployment 
preparation. 

* An annual cost of about $350,000 to store Army uniforms and other 
personal equipment in Afghanistan. 

* Approximately $5.7 million for fiscal year 2010, an increase of 
about $2.3 million from fiscal year 2009, to store additional Air 
Force ground combat uniforms, other equipment, and clothing 
accessories. 

Objective 2: Army and Navy are Developing New Ground Combat Uniforms: 

The Army and Navy are in the process of developing and fielding three 
new ground combat uniforms. 

The Army is preparing to field a MultiCam® camouflage uniform to 
Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan. 

* The most recent Army estimate to field MultiCam® uniforms and 
accessories to 34,000 Soldiers deploying to and in Afghanistan is 
approximately $86.7 million. 

The Navy is developing its Type II and Type III ground combat uniforms 
for Naval Special Warfare, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, and 
expeditionary Navy units. 

* The most recent Navy estimate to field the Type II and Type III 
uniforms to 61,000 Navy personnel is approximately $74 million. 
[Footnote 9] 

Objective 2: Army and Navy Cost Estimates Do Not Fully Account for the 
Risk of Increases Due to Changes in Assumptions or Cost Drivers: 

The Army's cost estimate for its MultiCam® and the Navy's cost 
estimates for its Type II and Type III ground combat uniforms are well-
documented, comprehensive, and accurate. However, the estimates do not 
fully account for risk of cost increases due to changes in assumptions 
or cost drivers. 

* The Army's estimate could change. Final contracting costs to print 
MultiCam® are uncertain due to the small initial contracts used to 
initiate production and current limited industry capabilities to print 
the pattern. According to Army officials, since there is only one 
company licensed to print MultiCam® the printing costs may be higher 
than expected. Program Executive Office Soldier officials stated that 
additional printers will be licensed by the private vendor. 

* The Navy's estimate is also at risk for change. The timing and 
amount of Overseas Contingency Operations funds or annual budget funds 
to produce the Type II and Type III uniforms are unknown, and Navy 
officials told us that if the Navy receives a limited amount of 
funding it may have to purchase fewer uniforms at a higher contract 
cost. 

GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies 12 steps to 
developing high quality cost estimates that are well-documented, 
comprehensive, accurate, and credible. For additional information, see 
appendix V. 

Objective 3: Government-Owned Patents Present No Legal Barrier to 
Allowing Use by Other Services: 

The government-owned patents on elements of the Marine Corps' ground 
combat uniforms—the color scheme, the uniform design, and the pattern 
with the service logo—present no legal barrier to allowing other 
services to use these elements. 

Service officials from all four services state that it is unlikely 
that the services would choose to wear the same camouflage uniform 
because the camouflage uniform is a symbol of the individual service 
and its uniqueness. However, the services were wearing similar desert 
camouflage and battle dress uniforms prior to Operation Enduring 
Freedom. 

* The Marine Corps and Department of the Navy hold patents for the 
Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform (MCCUU) color scheme, design, and 
pattern. 

* Navy officials stated that the Navy is considering obtaining a 
patent for the Type II and Type III uniform. The Navy will include an 
embedded anchor, the Constitution, and an eagle emblem on the uniforms. 

Apart from the patents issue, Marine Corps System Command officials 
indicated that they believe 10 U.S.C. § 771 prohibits a member of one 
service from wearing the uniform, or a distinctive part of the 
uniform, such as a service emblem, belonging to another service. 
However, Combatant Commanders and Service Component Commanders 
maintain flexibility to determine which uniform is worn based on 
operational needs. 

The Army is using a flame resistant rayon fabric blend, patented by a 
private company, for their flame resistant uniform. In addition, 
Marine Corps officials confirmed that they use the same material in 
their flame resistant clothing.[Footnote 10] 

Objective 3: Proprietary Issue Could Hamper the Army's Production of 
Its MultiCam® Uniform: 

The services have not used proprietary elements of another service's 
ground combat uniform. 

Licensing considerations have the potential to impact the use of 
patented technology or other proprietary information. 

* Special Operations Command officials indicated that the future 
sharing of MultiCam® technology could be affected if licensing is not 
granted by the vendor. 

* The Army indicated that there currently is only one printer licensed 
by the MultiCam® supplier, resulting in potentially higher printing 
costs than expected. An Army official stated that the MultiCam® 
supplier is in the process of increasing the number of manufacturers 
licensed to print the camouflage pattern. 

Objective 3: Cross Service Warfighter Equipment Board Provides a Forum 
to Share Technology: 

The Cross Service Warfighter Equipment Board provides a forum that 
gives the services an opportunity to present their uniform technology 
to other services. For example, in March 2009 the Army reported on 
improvements they made to their Army Combat Shirt, worn under body 
armor. 

Outside of the Cross Service Warfighter Equipment Board, camouflage 
patterns have been shared. 

* Special Operations Command provided camouflage patterns to the Navy 
for its new camouflage uniforms. 

* In July 2009, the Marine Corps provided its urban digital camouflage 
pattern to the Coast Guard. 

Objective 4: DOD Does Not Collect Risk Data on Individuals in 
Different Uniforms: 

The services and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials do not 
collect data that would enable an assessment of the risks associated 
with individuals[Footnote 11] wearing different uniforms in combat 
operations. 

However, in July 2009 a Multi-National Force-Iraq subordinate command 
memo acknowledges the potential risk to individuals in different 
clothing. The memo requested that interpreters be allowed to wear a 
military uniform to blend with forces and minimize the risk of being 
singled out for attack. 

Objective 4: CENTCOM Combatant Commander Can Determine Uniform Wear of 
Individuals: 

The Combatant Commander and Service Component Commanders maintain 
flexibility to determine which uniform is worn based on operational 
needs. 

DOD Instruction 3020.41 indicates that generally commanders are not to 
allow contractors to wear military uniforms. However, geographic 
combatant commanders may authorize the wearing of military uniforms 
for operational reasons.[Footnote 12] 

In CENTCOM's area of responsibility, the combatant command and each 
service have issued policies on ground combat uniform wear. (See 
appendix IV, table 3.) 

* In general, individual augmentees or other military support 
personnel wear the Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU). 

* In general, DOD civilians and contractors may wear civilian clothing 
or, when authorized, the DCU; interpreters wear civilian clothes and, 
when authorized, the DCU or the uniforms of the service they support. 

In other combatant commands, officials indicated that there is no 
specific policy on the dress of civilian support personnel. (See 
appendix IV, table 4.) 

[End of section] 

Appendices: 

Appendix I: 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Sec. 352. 

Appendix II: 
Current and Planned Service Ground Combat Uniforms. 

Appendix III: 
Ground Combat Uniform Costs (FY 2001-2010). 

Appendix IV: 
Camouflage Uniform Wear Policies of the Combatant Commands. 

Appendix V: 
Detailed Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix I: 
 
Section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2010[Footnote 13] requires GAO to assess the ground combat uniforms 
and camouflage utility uniforms currently in use by DOD, including: 

1. The overall performance of each uniform in various anticipated 
combat environments and theaters of operations. 

2. Whether the uniform design of each uniform conforms adequately and 
is interoperable with currently issued personal protective gear and 
body armor. 

3. Costs associated with the design, development, production, 
procurement, and fielding of existing service-specific ground combat 
and camouflage utility uniforms. 

4. Challenges and risks associated with fielding members of the Armed 
Forces into combat theaters in unique or service specific ground 
combat or camouflage utility uniforms, including the tactical risk to 
the individuals serving in individual augmentee, in-lieu of force, or 
joint duty assignments of use of different ground combat uniforms in a 
combat environment. 

5. Implications of the use of patents and other proprietary measures 
that may preclude sharing of technology, advanced uniform design, 
camouflage techniques, and fire retardence. 

6. Logistical requirements to field and support forces in varying 
combat or utility uniforms. 

[End of Appendix I] 

Appendix II: Air Force Airman's Battle Uniform (ABU) and Airman's 
Battle Ensemble (ABE): 

[Photograph of airman in uniform: Source: U.S. Air Force] 

ABU: 
* Specifications: Permanent press, non-flame resistant, non-permethrin 
treated; 
* Unit cost (Man's blouse/trouser): $76.20; 
* Unit cost (Woman's blouse/trouser): $75.40; 
* Number of sizes: 
- Woman's blouse sizes: 33; 
- Woman's trouser sizes: 35; 
- Man's blouse sizes: 44; 
- Man's trouser sizes: 43. 

ABE: 
* Specifications: Flame resistant, non-permethrin treated; 
* The flame resistant fabric for the ABE is proprietary; 
* Unit cost (Blouse/man's trouser): $203.34; 
* Unit cost (Blouse/woman's trouser): $200.53. 

Appendix II: Army Combat Uniform (ACU): 

[Photograph of soldier in uniform: Source: U.S. Army] 

ACU: 
* Specifications: ACU can be non-flame resistant, non-permethrin 
treated; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $75.85; 
* Number of sizes: 
- Blouse sizes: 37; 
- Trouser sizes: 36. 

Flame Resistant ACU: 
* Specifications: Flame resistant and permethrin treated or flame 
resistant and non-permethrin treated; 
* Rayon fabric blend for the flame resistant uniform is patented and 
trademarked by a private company; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $129.61; 
* Unit cost permethrin treated (blouse/trouser): $152.34. 

Appendix II: Army MultiCam® 

[Photograph of soldier in uniform: Source: U.S. Army] 

MultiCam®: 
* Specifications: Flame resistant and permethrin treated; 
* Estimated unit cost (blouse/trouser): $173.93[Footnote 14]; 
* Number of sizes: 
- Blouse sizes: 37; 
- Trouser sizes: 36. 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform Desert (MCCUU Desert): 

[Photograph of soldier in uniform: Source: U.S. Marine Corps] 

MCCUU Desert: 
* Specifications: Permethrin treated and permanent press, non-flame 
resistant; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $77.90; 
* Number of sizes:
- Blouse sizes: 37; 
- Trouser sizes: 37; 
* The Department of the Navy and Marine Corps hold the patent for the 
desert and woodland MCCUU pattern, fabric, and design, which includes 
the eagle, globe, and anchor; 
* Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG) is worn for combat 
missions. Source: U.S. Marine Corps. 

Appendix II: Marine Corps Combat Utility Uniform Woodland (MCCUU 
Woodland) 

[Photograph of soldier in uniform: Source: U.S. Marine Corps] 

MCCUU Woodland: 
* Specifications: Permethrin treated and permanent press, non-flame 
resistant; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $77.65; 
* Number of sizes; 
- Blouse sizes: 37; 
- Trouser sizes: 37; 
* The Department of the Navy and Marine Corps hold the patent for the 
desert and woodland MCCUU pattern, fabric, and design, which includes 
the eagle, globe, and anchor; 
* Flame Resistant Organizational Gear (FROG) is worn for combat 
missions. 

Appendix II: Navy DOD Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU): 

[Photograph of sailor in uniform: Source: U.S. Navy] 

DCU: 
* Specifications: Non-flame resistant, non-permethrin treated; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $61.60; 
* Number of sizes:
- Blouse sizes: 28; 
- Trouser sizes: 24. 

Appendix II: Navy DOD Woodland Camouflage Utility Uniform (CUU): 

[Photograph of sailor in uniform: Source: U.S. Navy] 

CUU Woodland: 

* Specifications: Non-flame resistant, non-permethrin treated; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $48.46; 
* Number of sizes:
- Blouse sizes: 31; 
- Trouser sizes: 24. 
 
Appendix II: Navy Working Uniform Type II Desert and Type III Woodland 
Uniforms (In Development): 

[2 Photographs of uniforms] 

Type II and Type III: 

* Specifications: Non-flame resistant, non-permethrin treated; 
* Estimated unit cost (blouse/trouser): $83.00; 
* Number of sizes:
- Blouse sizes: unknown; 
- Trouser sizes: unknown; 
* Navy officials indicated that they are considering patenting the 
Type II and Type III uniforms and embedding the anchor, the 
Constitution, and an eagle emblem on the uniforms.
 
Appendix II: Navy Working Uniform (NWU): 

[Photograph of sailor in uniform: Source: U.S. Navy] 

NWU: 
This uniform, which replaced six working uniform options, is not a 
ground combat uniform; 
* Specifications: Non-flame resistant, non-permethrin treated, 
permanent press and treated with soil release; 
* Unit cost (blouse/trouser): $76.50; 
* Number of sizes:
- Blouse sizes: 42; 
- Trouser sizes: 39. 

[End of Appendix II] 

Appendix III: Ground Combat Uniform Costs (FY 2001-FY 2010): 

Because ground combat uniforms were developed at different times and 
include different characteristics, the costs reported in table 2 
include different years and different uniforms. 

* Design and Development costs range from fiscal year 2001 through 
2010 and include the Air Force ABU, the Army's ACU, the MultiCam®, the 
Marine Corps' desert and woodland utility uniforms, and the Navy's 
Type II and Type III uniforms. 

* Production and Procurement and Storage and Distribution costs range 
from fiscal year 2005-2010 and include Air Force ABU, the Army's ACU, 
the Marine Corps' desert and woodland utility uniforms, the Desert 
Combat Uniform, and Combat Utility Uniform. 

Appendix III: Table 2. Ground Combat Uniform Costs (FY 2001-FY 2010): 

Air Force: 
Design and development Service data (FY 2001-2010): $3,164,000; 
Production and procurement DSCP Obligations (FY 2005-2010): 
$198,731,403; 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): 
$7,727,376. 

Army: 
Design and development Service data (FY 2001-2010): $6,640,000; 
Production and procurement DSCP Obligations (FY 2005-2010): 
$1,241,602,034; 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): 
$4,823,664. 

Marine Corps: 
Design and development Service data (FY 2001-2010): $319,000; 
Production and procurement DSCP Obligations (FY 2005-2010): 
$173,796,280; 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): 
$1,409,088. 

Navy: 
Design and development Service data (FY 2001-2010): $8,386,000; 
Production and procurement DSCP Obligations (FY 2005-2010): 
$105,623,784; 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): $369,456. 

DSCP: 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): 
$52,317,751. 

Totals by Phase: 
Design and development Service data (FY 2001-2010): $18,509,000; 
Production and procurement DSCP Obligations (FY 2005-2010): 
$1,719,753,501; 
Distribution and storage Commercial and DSCP (FY 2005-2010): 
$66,647,335. 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The distribution and storage costs are for uniforms as well as 
additional clothing and textiles. 

[End of table] 

[End of Appendix III} 

Appendix IV: Table 3. Ground Combat Uniform Policies and Practices 
Vary in CENTCOM by Service: 

CENTCOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Each service wears its own ground 
combat uniform. Air Force and Navy augmentees are generally issued the 
Desert Camouflage Uniforms (DCU); 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD contractors and civilians may wear 
DCU if Combined Joint Operating Area commander identifies an 
operational need. Interpreters wear civilian clothes or, when 
authorized, a government-issued uniform or the uniform of the service 
they support.
 
Air Force: 
Policy for military personnel: Airmen wear ABU or Desert Flight Duty 
Uniform (DFDU). Airmen performing ground combat operations are 
authorized to wear Airman Battle System-Ground; 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD civilians may wear the ABU, when 
authorized by the commander. DOD contractors may wear the ABU or DCU, 
when authorized by the combatant commander. 

Army: 
Policy for military personnel: Soldiers wear the Army Combat Uniform 
(ACU). Air Force and Navy augmentees and other assigned personnel may 
be issued the ACU. 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD civilians and contractors may be 
issued the DCU when authorized by the theater or Joint Operating Area 
commander. DOD civilians and contractors are not issued the ACU. 

Navy: 
Policy for military personnel: Sailors wear the DCU or uniforms of 
services they are assigned to support; 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD contractors generally have not worn 
the DCU unless they are supporting units in forward operations. 

Marine Corps: 
Policy for military personnel: Marines wear the Combat Utility Uniform 
(MCCUU) Desert and/or flame resistant ensemble. Navy augmentees and 
other assigned Navy personnel may wear the MCCUU and have worn the 
flame resistant ensemble; 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD civilians and interpreters are not 
authorized to wear the MCCUU. They may wear a DCU or flight suit, when 
authorized. 

Source: U.S. Central Command, U.S. Air Forces Central, U.S. Army 
Central, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and U.S. Marine Corps 
Forces Central Command. 

[End of table] 

Appendix IV: Table 4. Combatant Command Ground Combat Uniform Policies 
and Practices: 

Combatant Command officials confirmed that the following are the 
uniform policies for their region. 

AFRICOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Military personnel and augmentees wear 
their combat uniform: Air Force-BDU or ABU; Army-ACU; Navy-CUU; Marine 
Corps-MCCUU; 
Policy for civilian personnel: DOD civilians, contractors, and 
interpreters wear civilian clothes. Changes to the uniform policy are 
determined by the commander. 

CENTCOM: 
Policy for military personnel: See CENTCOM Table; 
Policy for civilian personnel: See CENTCOM Table. 

EUCOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Military personnel and augmentees wear 
their combat uniform: Air Force-BDU or ABU; Army-ACU; Navy-CUU; Marine 
Corps-MCCUU; 
Policy for civilian personnel: No specific policy for DOD civilians, 
contractors, and interpreters. Contractors are prohibited from wearing 
military uniforms unless authorized by the combatant commander. 

PACOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Military personnel and augmentees wear 
their combat uniform: Air Force-ABU or BDU; Army-ACU; Navy-BDU or NWU; 
Marine Corps-MCCUU; 
Policy for civilian personnel: No specific policy for DOD civilians, 
contractors and interpreters. Civilian clothes are worn unless a 
military uniform is authorized by the service component commanders. 

SOCOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Military personnel and augmentees wear 
their Service specific combat uniform: Air Force-ABU or BDU; Army-ACU 
or MultiCam®; Navy-DCU, CUU, AOR 1 or AOR 2; Marine Corps-MCCUU; 
Policy for civilian personnel: No specific policy for DOD civilians, 
contractors, and interpreters. The respective combatant commander 
decides uniform wear for civilian support personnel. 

SOUTHCOM: 
Policy for military personnel: Military personnel and augmentees wear 
their combat uniform: Air Force-ABU; Army—ACU; Navy-CUU; Marine Corps-
MCCUU; 
Policy for civilian personnel: No specific policy for DOD civilians, 
contractors and interpreters. The service component commander may 
determine changes to the uniform policy. 

[End of table] 

Source: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European 
Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and 
U.S. Southern Command. 

[End of Appendix IV] 

Appendix V: Detailed Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which ground combat uniforms meet standards 
for performance in combat environments, we reviewed uniform 
specifications provided by the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia and 
the services. We analyzed uniform performance feedback provided by the 
Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force. We discussed performance standards 
and feedback for combat environments with all four service's 
officials. To assess the extent to which ground combat uniforms and 
protective gear and body armor are interoperable, we collected data 
from each service about their protective gear and uniform operability 
standards. We discussed interoperability of uniforms and protective 
gear with service and Special Operations Command officials. We did not 
test uniforms and protective gear for interoperability. 

To assess costs and logistics support requirements with the design, 
development, production, procurement, and fielding of service-specific 
ground combat uniforms, we analyzed uniform budget and cost estimate 
data on current and planned ground combat uniforms from the services 
and the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia. We did not assess the 
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia uniform management costs. To 
determine the reliability and accuracy of the Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps cost estimates, we used the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment 
Guide. See slide 53. In addition, we collected ground combat uniform 
storage cost data incurred by the supply center, commercial entities, 
and the services. We discussed the cost and budget data, the systems 
used to maintain the data, and testing they conduct to ensure 
reliability of data with DOD officials. We found that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting costs and trends in 
costs. 

To determine the extent to which patents and proprietary information 
might preclude sharing of advanced uniform technology, we identified 
elements of the uniforms that are patented or proprietary. We 
collected data on how the services and Special Operations Command 
share uniform technology. We discussed the uniform elements and the 
impact of patents and proprietary elements on sharing uniform 
technology among service and Special Operations Command officials. 

To assess the challenges and risks associated with individuals serving 
in combat assignments where different ground combat uniforms are worn, 
we analyzed the uniform policies of the combatant commands and service 
components of U.S. Central Command. We reviewed the Army's contracting 
data on interpreter uniform requirements. We also discussed risks to 
augmentees, interpreters, and other support personnel with service and 
Special Operations Command officials. 

We assessed the cost estimate and budget data using the 12 steps in 
GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide to determine if the cost 
estimates and budget data were well-documented, comprehensive, 
accurate, and credible. 

* A well-documented estimate includes source data, clear and detailed 
calculations, a purpose, and an explanation of the methods and 
references used. 

* A comprehensive estimate is detailed, ensures that costs are neither 
omitted or double counted, and accounts for ground rules and 
assumptions. 

* An accurate estimate is unbiased, not overly conservative or 
optimistic, and is based on an assessment of the most likely costs. 

* A credible estimate ensures limitations, uncertainties, and biases 
are discussed and considered, varies major assumptions, and includes a 
sensitivity and risk analysis to determine the risk in the estimate. 

Our review focused on the current Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 
Corps ground combat uniforms and the development of future ground 
combat uniforms. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

* Office of the Secretary of Defense: 
- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics 
(Land Warfare & Munitions); 
- Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness (Supply Chain Integration); 
- Defense Logistics Agency; 
- Defense Supply Center Philadelphia. 

* Army:
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics and Technology); 
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (G-4), Personnel (G-
1), Operations (G-3/5/7); 
- Army Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier; 
- Army Materiel Command; 
- Natick Soldier, Research, Development, and Engineering Center; 
- Maneuver Center of Excellence; 
- Training & Doctrine Command, Accelerated Capabilities; 
- Intelligence and Security Command, Operations. 

* Air Force:
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations, Logistics and Mission Support, 
Materiel Support Division; 
- Deputy Chief of Staff Services, Personnel and Manpower, Uniform and 
Recognitions Branch; 
- Air Force Uniform Board; 
- Air Force Materiel Command; 
- 303rd Aeronautical Systems Wing; 
- 670th Aeronautical Systems Squadron; 
- 648th Aeronautical Systems Squadron; 
- Air Force Special Operations Command; 
- 2nd Air Force (Joint Expeditionary Tasking). 

* Navy: 
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development 
& Acquisition; 
- Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics Operations & Policy; 
- Naval Facilities Engineering Command • Navy Uniform Board; 
- Naval Supply Systems Command, Navy Clothing and Textile Research 
Facility; 
- Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Logistics Policy & Concepts 
Branch; 
- Naval Special Warfare Command; 
- Naval Exchange Command. 

* Marine Corps: 
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Research, Development 
& Acquisition; 
- Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs, Plans, & Operations (PP&O), 
Ground Combat Element Branch, Infantry Section; 
- Headquarter Marine Corps, Office of Counsel; 
- Office of Legislative Affairs, USMC Congressional Liaison; 
- System Command: 
-- Infantry Combat Equipment; 
-- Combat Equipment Support Systems; 
-- Marine Corps Uniform Board; 
- Combat Development Directorate Fires, Maneuver, Integration Division. 

* Combatant Commands: 
- U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command; 
- CENTCOM Service Component Commands for the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps; 
- U.S. Special Operations Command 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 through May 
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of Appendix V} 

Footnotes: 

[1] Proprietary generally refers to a distinct aspect or feature of an 
item, in which the owner has a protectable interest—-such as a trade 
secret. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(b) (2009). 

[3] For our purposes, we use the term ground combat uniform to include 
the services' camouflage utility uniforms. 

[4] Patents provide a property right granted by the U.S. government to 
the patent holder to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling the invention in the United States. 

[5] For the purposes of this report, interoperability is the 
compatibility of the uniform to protective gear and the compatibility 
of camouflage colors to support combat operations. 

[6] For photos and additional information about each uniform type, see 
appendix II. 

[7] While ground combat uniform accessories are costly, they are not 
included in the scope of this engagement. 

[8] Does not include all armor. 

[9] Navy officials recently indicated that an additional $5 million 
has been added to the estimate for the Navy insignia and helmet covers 
for the uniforms. 

[10] Air Force officials indicated that they use a material from a 
different manufacturer for their flame resistant uniform. 

[11] Including military individual augmentees, in-lieu of forces, 
joint duty assignees, civilians, and contractors. 

[12] Distinctive elements should be added to the uniform to 
distinguish military and nonmilitary personnel. 

[13] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 352(b) (2009). 

[14] Army officials indicated that they expect the price of the 
uniform to decrease when more manufacturers are licensed to print the 
camouflage pattern. 

[End of section] 

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