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United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 27, 2008: 

The Honorable Bill Nelson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

Subject: Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy 
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts: 

The United States depends on space assets to support national security 
activities as well as civil and commercial activities. The Department 
of Defense (DOD) depends on space assets to support a wide range of 
military missions to include intelligence collection; battlefield 
surveillance and management; global command, control, and 
communications; and navigation assistance. This operational dependence 
on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems 
and organizations to meet Joint Force Commanders' needs. Moreover, 
concerns have increased regarding emerging threats that could affect 
the United States' and other countries' access to the free use of 
space. 

At your request, we are currently reviewing the acquisition and 
requirements processes of the DOD's Operationally Responsive Space 
[Footnote 1] (ORS) concept. In response to this request, we plan 
to issue a report regarding ORS acquisition issues by April 2008, and 
by July 2008 we will issue a report regarding how ORS is being 
developed to satisfy warfighter needs. However, we are providing you 
this letter because during the course of our work on how ORS is being 
developed to satisfy warfighter needs, we learned that the National 
Security Space Office developed a National Security Space Strategy in 
2004, but it has not been issued. We are bringing this matter to your 
attention because without a strategy in place to link the defense and 
intelligence communities, future space programs, plans, and new space 
concepts, such as ORS, will be developed without the overarching 
strategic guidance that a national strategy could provide. Moreover, in 
April 2003, GAO recommended and DOD agreed that space activities needed 
to include a national security space strategy tied to overall 
department-level space goals, timelines, and performance measures to 
assess space activities' progress in achieving national security space 
goals.[Footnote 2] 

A national security space strategy would address the national security 
space sector, which consists of all services and components of DOD and 
all agencies within the intelligence community[Footnote 3] that provide 
or use space capabilities. The use of commercial satellites to support 
military operations has grown substantially particularly for 
communications; however, the national security space sector consists of 
DOD and intelligence community space assets. For the military, the U.S. 
Strategic Command is responsible for establishing overall operational 
requirements while the services are responsible for meeting these 
requirements. The Air Force is DOD's primary procurer and operator of 
space systems. The Army controls a defense satellite communications 
system and operates ground mobile terminals. The Navy procures DOD 
narrowband satellite communications capability and operates several 
space systems that contribute to surveillance, meteorology and warning. 
The National Reconnaissance Office designs, procures, and operates 
space systems dedicated to intelligence activities. The National 
Security Space Office, working with the DOD Executive Agent for Space 
supporting Combatant Commanders, DOD services, and components, assists 
in facilitating the integration and coordination of National Security 
Space strategies, planning, and architectures that include defense and 
intelligence space activities and those civil, commercial, and allied 
space activities that contribute to National Security Space. The 
Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the 
intelligence community and acts as the principal advisor to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security 
Council for intelligence matters related to national security. 

For the purposes of this letter, our objective was to determine the 
extent to which DOD and the intelligence community have developed, 
agreed upon, and issued a National Security Space Strategy. To address 
this objective, we interviewed officials and reviewed relevant 
documentation in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Policy, the National Security Space Office, the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the U.S. Strategic Command. We 
conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD and the intelligence community have not developed, agreed upon, or 
issued a National Security Space Strategy. The National Security Space 
Office developed a draft strategy in 2004, but it was never issued. The 
Director of the National Security Space Office and the Director of 
Space Policy in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
provided examples of reasons why a strategy has never been issued. One 
reason was that the National Security Council requested that the 
strategy not be issued until the revised National Space Policy was 
released in October 2006.[Footnote 4] However, once the policy was 
released, changes in leadership in the National Reconnaissance Office 
and the Air Force delayed the issuance of the strategy. In addition, 
differences of opinion between the defense and intelligence communities 
over the implementation of the strategy and cultural differences 
between the two communities further delayed the issuance. ODNI 
officials told us they are uncertain as to what specific problems exist 
that caused the delay in the issuance of the national security space 
strategy, yet they have not been approached by the National Security 
Space Office to review any current drafts. Regardless of the reasons 
for not issuing the strategy, DOD officials agree a strategy should be 
issued and ODNI officials also see the benefit in having a strategy. We 
previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy 
that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing 
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and 
responsibilities, and integrates relevant parties.[Footnote 5] In the 
case of space, a national security space strategy would assist DOD and 
the intelligence community to establish national space goals and 
priorities and ensure effective strategic coordination between DOD and 
the intelligence community. A national strategy may help ensure that 
the 1999 DOD Space Policy, which is being updated, and the National 
Military Strategy for Space Operations, which is being developed, 
support national security space goals and priorities.[Footnote 6] Until 
a national security space strategy is issued, the defense and 
intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and 
use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, 
which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and 
redundancies in others. 

Because our previous recommendation regarding the need for a national 
security space strategy has not been implemented, we believe Congress 
should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
National Intelligence to identify and resolve any remaining differences 
of opinion and issue a National Security Space Strategy. In its 
comments, DOD agreed that a National Security Space Strategy, approved 
by both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, would assist DOD and the intelligence community in 
establishing national space goals and priorities and enabling strategic 
coordination. DOD also provided technical comments which we 
incorporated as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure 
I. ODNI provided technical comments on our draft report, but did not 
take a position on our Matter for Congressional Consideration. 

Background: 

In January 2001, the report of the Commission to Assess United States 
National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) 
suggested that explicit national security guidance and defense policy 
were needed to direct development of doctrine, concepts of operations, 
and capabilities for space.[Footnote 7] Higher policy generally sets 
the boundaries of a strategy, while a strategy provides guidance to a 
corresponding plan. According to the Director of Space Policy in the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in the case of 
space issues, a national security space strategy would originate from 
the National Space Policy and the National Security Strategy. The 
National Security Strategy, which covers both defense and intelligence 
activities, provides guidance to the National Defense Strategy and the 
National Intelligence Strategy. In addition, higher policy such as the 
National Space Policy guides the creation of more specific policies, 
such as the DOD Space Policy. According to the Director of the National 
Security Space Office, which coordinates the National Security Space 
Strategy, both the defense and intelligence communities must coordinate 
and agree on the content of this national strategy for it to be 
considered a legitimate and official document. Such coordination and 
agreement is important to avoid fragmentation in DOD and intelligence 
community efforts in space. 

Pursuant to a DOD directive, the Secretary of Defense designated the 
Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Space. The 
DOD Executive Agent for Space is responsible for the development, 
coordination, and integration of plans and programs for space systems 
and the acquisition of major DOD space defense programs. The Secretary 
of the Air Force is permitted to redelegate its executive agent 
responsibilities only to the Under Secretary of the Air Force.[Footnote 
8] At the time of this report, the position of the Under Secretary of 
the Air Force is vacant; therefore, the Secretary of the Air Force 
retains the duties of the Executive Agent for Space. 

The Director of National Intelligence, a position established in the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, serves as the 
head of the intelligence community. In this capacity, the Director 
oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence 
Program and acts as the principal advisor to the President, the 
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for 
intelligence matters related to national security. The Director must 
consult with the Secretary of Defense on the development and 
implementation of plans for the acquisition of a major system for a DOD 
element of the intelligence community. As previously mentioned, the 
national security space sector is composed of the defense and 
intelligence communities. 

DOD and the Intelligence Community Have Not Issued a National Security 
Space Strategy: 

DOD and the intelligence community have not issued a National Security 
Space Strategy. The draft National Security Space Strategy, developed 
in 2004, describes current national security challenges and America's 
decisive asymmetric advantage in space, while recognizing that our 
space superiority depends on unity of effort among the defense, 
intelligence, and civil government communities in collaboration with 
the U.S. private sector. The draft strategy presents four broad 
strategic objectives for space but also mentions that detailed 
implementation and specific planning objectives will be contained in 
the National Security Space Plan. According to the National Security 
Space Office Director, the National Security Council requested that the 
National Security Space Strategy not be issued until the revised 
National Space Policy (NSPD-49) was released in October 2006. However, 
once the policy was issued, changes in leadership in the National 
Reconnaissance Office and the Air Force delayed the issuance of the 
strategy. In addition, differences of opinion between the defense and 
intelligence communities along with cultural differences have further 
delayed the issuance. In addition to different organizational 
constructs, the defense and intelligence communities may also be faced 
with other impediments such as different and sometimes competing 
funding arrangements and requirements processes as it relates to 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, such as 
space activities. 

Reports have long recognized that the national security space community 
needed a strategy to guide its efforts in space and better integrate 
the space activities of DOD and the intelligence community. In its 
January 2001 report, the Space Commission stated that explicit national 
security guidance and defense policy were needed to direct development 
of doctrine, concepts of operations, and capabilities for space. In 
2003, we recommended that space activities should include a national 
security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals, 
timelines, and performance measures to assess space activities' 
progress in achieving national security space goals. Moreover, we 
reported that it is standard practice to lay out goals and objectives 
in a national strategy to define the objectives, suggest actions for 
addressing those objectives, allocate appropriate resources, identify 
roles and responsibilities, and integrate relevant parties. In 2004, we 
identified a set of six desirable characteristics to aid responsible 
parties in developing and implementing national strategies to enhance 
their usefulness as guidance for resource and policy decision makers 
and to better ensure accountability. These characteristics include: (1) 
a statement of purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition 
and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; 
(5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) 
integration and implementation.[Footnote 9] We reviewed the 2004 draft 
strategy and concluded that most of the desired characteristics had at 
least been partially addressed in that document. 

In the meantime, the National Security Space Office, in coordination 
with the defense and intelligence communities, developed and issued a 
National Security Space Plan to provide national security space 
planners and programmers with a common point of reference. 
Specifically, the plan's intent is to prioritize space capabilities 
through balancing top-down national strategic guidance in combination 
with a bottom-up assessment of agency and combatant command priorities. 
It is to be updated every 2 years. As previously mentioned, however, a 
strategy generally provides guidance to its implementation in the form 
of a plan. The National Security Space Plan is based on the overarching 
goals of the draft national security space strategy but this strategy 
has never been officially issued. We believe it is important to base 
detailed plans on an overarching strategy. Our 2003 report noted that 
without a plan that is linked to high-level strategies, the services 
would not have clearly defined space objectives and milestones to guide 
their initiatives, nor would DOD have a mechanism to ensure successful 
accomplishment of integrated efforts between the defense and 
intelligence communities without gaps and duplication. 

According to the National Security Space Office Director, a signed 
plan, such as the National Security Space Plan, that is not based on an 
official national security space strategy lacks legitimacy in the eyes 
of participants. The Director of Space Policy in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that current investment 
decisions regarding U.S. national security in space are being made 
based on guidance from a plan, without the analysis that higher 
strategic guidance could provide. Moreover, strategies force decisions 
to be made at a higher level to ensure overall strategic goals are met. 
Strategies also serve to guide investments that achieve goals and 
objectives and prevent investment in programs that are not consistent 
with higher level goals. For these reasons, both officials believe a 
strategy is needed. 

Congress found in the past that DOD and the national intelligence 
communities may not be well-positioned to coordinate certain 
intelligence activities and programs in order to ensure unity of effort 
and avoid duplication of effort. The 2001 Space Commission report 
stated that the relationship between the defense and intelligence 
communities is critical to the development and deployment of space 
capabilities. The commission advised the two communities to work in 
partnership to set and maintain the course for national security space 
programs and to resolve the differences between their respective 
bureaucracies. Moreover, according to ODNI, since the events of 
September 11, 2001, the traditional distinction between the 
intelligence missions of DOD and the national intelligence community 
have become blurred, with DOD increasingly engaging in more strategic 
missions and the national intelligence community engaging in more 
tactical missions. Because of this trend, government decision makers 
have recognized the increased importance of ensuring effective 
coordination and integration between DOD and the national intelligence 
community in order to successfully address today's security threats. 

According to its Director, the National Security Space Office continues 
to work on issuing the national security space strategy. However, the 
Director noted that a strategy is unlikely to be issued before the 
upcoming November 2008 presidential election, because it will be 
difficult to get all relevant parties to agree on a strategy before 
that time. ODNI officials told us they are uncertain as to what 
problems caused the delay in the issuance of the strategy and that the 
intelligence community has not been approached by the National Security 
Space Office to review any current drafts of a national security space 
strategy. However, ODNI officials see the benefit in having a strategy. 

In the absence of an official national security space strategy, the 
U.S. Strategic Command is drafting a National Military Strategy for 
Space Operations. The National Military Strategy for Space Operations 
is exclusively a military document that does not flow from a finalized 
national security space strategy between DOD and the intelligence 
community. The fact that a military strategy for space is currently 
being drafted demonstrates that the defense community recognizes a gap 
in higher strategic guidance in space that needs to be filled and 
revised to counter emerging threats. Moreover, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy is updating the July 1999 DOD Space Policy based on 
the 2006 release of the National Space Policy and recognition of 
changes in the operational environment. These activities demonstrate 
DOD's recognition of the need to move forward to implement the 2006 
National Space Policy, even in the absence of an agreed upon national 
security space strategy. 

If directed to work together on a national security space strategy, the 
defense and intelligence communities may have to overcome cultural 
differences that have hindered collaboration and development in the 
field of national security space. A national security space strategy 
would assist DOD and the intelligence community to establish national 
space goals and priorities, and ensure effective strategic coordination 
between DOD and the intelligence community. Moreover, a national 
strategy may help ensure that the DOD Space Policy and the National 
Military Strategy for Space Operations support national security space 
goals and priorities. Until a national strategy is issued, the defense 
and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions 
and use resources that are not necessarily based on national 
priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations 
and redundancies in others. This is particularly important in light of 
emerging threats to critical U.S. space assets. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Because our previous recommendation regarding the need for a national 
security space strategy was not implemented, Congress should consider 
requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence to identify and resolve remaining differences of opinion 
and issue a National Security Space Strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that a 
National Security Space Strategy, approved by both the Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, would assist DOD and 
the intelligence community in establishing national space goals and 
priorities, and enabling strategic coordination. DOD, however, 
disagreed with the report's assertion that in the absence of such a 
strategy, decisions with respect to space capabilities are not being 
made based on national priorities. Our report did not state that 
decisions with respect to space capabilities are not being made based 
on national priorities. Rather, our draft report stated that the 
defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent 
decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national 
priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations 
and redundancies in others. 

DOD also stated in its written comments that we incorrectly 
characterized DOD's efforts to update the 1999 DOD Space Policy. DOD 
stated that the efforts to update the 1999 policy were not due to a 
recognition of a gap in higher strategic guidance as we stated in our 
report. Rather, they stated their efforts were due to the issuance of 
the 2006 National Space Policy and the changes in the operational 
environment. We changed the report to reflect this statement. 

DOD also stated that our report characterized only one aspect of the 
ORS program--its quick launch and reconstitution aspect--and that our 
report should reflect the broader aspect of ORS, which includes a 3-
tiered concept to exploit existing capabilities, replenish and augment 
with existing technologies and capabilities, and develop and employ new 
technologies and capabilities. We changed the report to include these 
broader aspects. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure I. 

In addition to written comments, DOD provided technical comments which 
we incorporated as appropriate. 

ODNI provided technical comments on the draft report, but did not take 
a position on our Matter for Congressional Consideration. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. Copies will be made available to others upon 
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our 
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Major contributors to this report are Lorelei St James, Assistant 
Director; Grace Coleman; Amy Higgins; Enemencio Sanchez; Kimberly Seay; 
and Amy Ward-Meier. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at 202-512-5431 or DAgostinoD@gao.gov. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Enclosure: 

Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent 
Capabilities: 
2500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500: 

March 24, 2008: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This letter is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO 
draft report, GAO-08-431R "Defense Space Activities: National Security 
Space Strategy Needed to Guide Future DoD Space Efforts," dated March 
10, 2008 (GAO Code 351134). 

In general, DoD agrees that a National Security Space Strategy, 
approved by both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, would assist DoD and the intelligence community in 
establishing national space goals and priorities, and enabling 
strategic coordination. However, DoD disagrees with the report's 
assertion that in the absence of such a strategy, decisions with 
respect to space capabilities are not being made based on national 
priorities. 

The report identifies current efforts within DoD intended to provide 
goals and priorities for military space capabilities. In this regard, 
the Commander of United States Strategic Command is developing a 
National Military Strategy for Space Operations, which will provide 
strategic context for the development and employment of space 
capabilities. However, the current efforts to update the 1999 DoD Space 
Policy are incorrectly characterized as resulting from recognition of a 
gap in higher strategic guidance. The revision of DoD Space Policy is 
based on the 2006 release of National Space Policy and recognition of 
changes in the operational environment. 

Since the GAO report was initiated based upon an investigation related 
to Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), it is important to accurately 
characterize ORS. The report describes only one aspect of ORS, that is 
quick launch of small satellites to support warfighters' needs and, if 
lost, reconstitution of certain space capabilities. Implementation of 
ORS is actually based on a three-tier concept: tier-1 is the rapid 
exploitation of existing capabilities; tier-2 is the ability to 
replenish, augment or reconstitute with existing 
technologies/capabilities; and tier-3 is the ability to rapidly develop 
and employ new technologies/capabilities. Concepts such as ORS are 
captured in the National Military Strategy for Space Operations and DoD 
Space Policy documents. Enclosed are additional specific comments and 
corrections to the information contained in the report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. Questions should be directed to DoD's primary action officer, 
COL Patrick Frakes, Director, Space Policy & Information Operations, 
(703) 697-6364. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Brian Green: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
(Strategic Capabilities): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of correspondence] 

GAO Draft Report  Dated March 10, 2008:
GAO CODE 351134/GAO-08-431R: 

"Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to
Guide Future DoD Space Efforts" 

Technical Comments: 

p. 2, para. 2. Reword sentence: "The Navy procures DoD narrowband 
satellite communications capability and operates several space systems 
that contribute to surveillance, meteorology and warning." 

p. 2, para. 2. Reword sentence: "The National Security Space Office, 
working with the DOD EA for space supporting COCOMs, DOD services and 
components, assists in facilitating the integration and coordination of 
National Security Space strategies, planning and architectures that 
include defense and intelligence space activities and those civil, 
commercial, and allied space activities that contribute to National 
Security Space." 

p. 3. para. 3. Correction: The NSSO developed a draft strategy in 2004, 
(vice 2003). 

p. 3. para. 3. Recommended addition: after, "2003," add "and while the 
draft National Security Space Strategy has been used as a reference for 
the development of the National Security Space Plan," it was never 
issued. 

p. 4. line 2. Correction: changes in NSSO leadership did not cause 
delay in issuance of NSSS. 

p. 4. line 4. Recommended change: recommend changing "disagreements" to 
"differences between" 

p. 4. line 18. Correction throughout the report: correct title is 
"National Military Strategy for Space Operations" 

p. 6. footnote 8. Recommended addition: Note that DODD 5101.2 is 
currently under revision. 

p. 6. para. 3. Correction: a draft National Security Space Strategy was 
developed, but not issued on instructions of the National Security 
Council, as described earlier. 

p. 7. line 4. Correction: Change NSSO to DoD. 

p. 8. para. 3. Reword last sentence: "Strategies will serve to guide 
investments that achieve goals and objectives and prevent investment in 
programs that are not consistent with higher level goals." 

p. 10. para. 1. Recommended change: change "an agreed upon" to "a 
finalized" 

p. 10. para. 2. Recommended change: change "if required" to "if 
directed" 

[End of enclosure] 

Footnotes: 

[1] ORS is a DOD concept designed to satisfy Joint Force Commanders' 
needs for readily available information and intelligence during ongoing 
operations. The concept is based on three tiers: Tier 1 is the rapid 
exploitation of existing capabilities; Tier 2 is the ability to 
replenish, augment, or reconstitute with existing technologies/
capabilities; and Tier 3 is the ability to rapidly develop and employ 
new technologies/capabilities. 

[2] GAO, Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, 
but Further Management Actions Needed, GAO-03-379 (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 18, 2003). 

[3] The intelligence community includes organizations and offices from 
both DOD and the national intelligence community. In addition to the 
intelligence branches of the military services, there are four major 
intelligence agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the 
National Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; 
and the National Reconnaissance Office. The national intelligence 
community includes agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency as 
well as the intelligence-related components of other federal agencies. 

[4] As part of its advisory function, the National Security Council 
coordinates national security and foreign policies among various 
government agencies for the President. The National Space Policy 
establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of 
U.S. space activities. It was authorized by the President in August of 
2006. 

[5] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

[6] The National Space Policy establishes the framework within which 
DOD Space Policy is created. DOD Space Policy was issued in July 1999 
and is currently being revised. The National Military Strategy for 
Space is solely a military document, which does not require the 
approval of the intelligence community. The National Military Strategy 
for Space should be based on higher strategic guidance, such as the 
National Security Space Strategy, in order to guide investment 
priorities for space capabilities. 

[7] Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security 
Space Management and Organization (Washington, D.C., Jan. 11, 2001). 
The Space Commission was created pursuant to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to assess the organization and 
management of space activities that support U.S. national security 
interests. 

[8] Department of Defense Directive 5101.2, DOD Executive Agent for 
Space (June 3, 2003). This directive is currently under revision. 

[9] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

[End of section] 

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