This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-354R 
entitled 'Force Structure - Need for Greater Transparency for the 
Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan' which was released on 
January 22, 2008.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

January 18, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Force Structure - Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's 
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan: 

In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to 
expand the Army from a total of 1,037,000 to 1,112,000 active and 
reserve soldiers by fiscal year 2013--an increase of 74,200 military 
personnel--in order to meet increasing strategic demands and to help 
reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion includes building 
six additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional 
modular support units,[Footnote 1] which will require a substantial 
increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. 
Currently, the Army estimates this expansion may require about $70 
billion in increased funding through fiscal year 2013 and a significant 
amount in annual funding thereafter to sustain the expanded Army. The 
President's fiscal year 2008 budget request contained $7.7 billion for 
Department of the Army funding related to the Grow the Force 
initiative. 

During the course of our review of Army modularity as required by the 
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007,[Footnote 2] we analyzed the $70.2 billion Grow the Force 
initiative funding plan. We are submitting this letter to you at this 
time to provide the results of our analysis for your consideration as 
your committees evaluate DOD's fiscal year 2009 defense budget 
submission, which will request additional funding to grow the force. 
Specifically, we examined the supporting documentation and 
comprehensiveness of the $70.2 billion funding plan. We will issue a 
separate report in spring 2008 in response to the authorization act's 
requirement for GAO to report on the Army's transformation to the 
modular force in fiscal year 2008. We will also be reporting on the 
Army's planning and budgeting process for Grow the Force 
facilities.[Footnote 3] 

To assess the Army's supporting documentation for its funding plan to 
Grow the Force, we analyzed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) budget 
materials and discussed the key assumptions and cost estimating 
methodology used to develop the funding plan with relevant Department 
of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials. We also 
assessed the extent to which the Army documented its cost estimate by 
reviewing Army and best practices guidance on cost estimating and by 
analyzing the Army's documentation for its cost estimate. We conducted 
our work at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
Department of the Army Headquarters, U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. 
Army Reserve Command. We conducted this performance audit from April 
2007 to January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We determined that the Army budget data we used were 
sufficiently reliable for our review. 

Results in Brief: 

The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan 
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to 
understand the full magnitude of the funds needed and weigh competing 
defense priorities. First, the Army's Grow the Force funding plan lacks 
transparency because Army budget materials and other documentation do 
not indicate how the Army developed the cost estimates that served as 
the basis of its $70.2 billion funding plan to grow the force. Army 
budget officials told us that they had limited time to prepare the 
funding plan before the President submitted the budget in February 
2007. However, according to best practices, cost estimates should be 
transparent, comprehensive, and easily replicated and updated to help 
ensure the validity of the estimate. Second, the Army's funding plan is 
not comprehensive and may be somewhat understated because some costs 
were excluded and some factors are still evolving that could 
potentially affect the Grow the Force funding plan. For example, the 
$70.2 billion funding plan did not include over $2.5 billion for health 
care and educational support assistance associated with increasing 
personnel levels. In addition, 

in October 2007 the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to 
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active 
Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010, 
which could increase costs such as budgeting for the hiring of military 
and civilian personnel sooner than programmed. The Army has an 
opportunity to update its Grow the Force initiative funding plan to 
reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach. Without more 
complete information, decision makers could have difficulty 
understanding the basis for any future estimates the Army submits and 
weighing competing priorities. We are recommending that the Secretary 
of Defense require the Army to (1) develop and provide Congress with an 
updated Grow the Force funding plan to support congressional oversight 
of the fiscal year 2009 budget submission, and (2) document the steps 
and sources of information used to develop an updated funding plan. DOD 
generally agreed with these recommendations. 

Background: 

The Chief of Staff of the Army stated in September 2007 that increasing 
the size of the Army will allow the Army to revitalize and balance the 
force, reduce deployment periods, increase time soldiers spend at home 
station in between deployments, increase capability, and strengthen the 
systems that support the forces.[Footnote 4] The February 2007 force 
structure plan sought to increase by six the number of active brigade 
combat teams from 70 to 76 and the number of support brigades from 212 
to 225. The initiative proposes to permanently increase Army end 
strength by about 74,200 in the active Army, Army National Guard, and 
Army Reserve by fiscal year 2013, as identified in table 1. 

Table 1: Proposed Increases in Army End Strength by Component in Fiscal 
Years 2007--2013: 

Army Component: Active Army; 
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: 7,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: 7,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: 7,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: 7,000; 
Fiscal year 2012; 1,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: 0; 
Total: 65,000. 

Army Component: Army National Guard; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008: 1,319; 
Fiscal year 2009: 1,247; 
Fiscal year 2010: 1,335; 
Fiscal year 2011: 1,432; 
Fiscal year 2012; 1,487; 
Fiscal year 2013: 1,381; 
Total: 8,201. 

Army Component: Army Reserve; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0; 
Fiscal year 2009: 0; 
Fiscal year 2010: 0; 
Fiscal year 2011: 0; 
Fiscal year 2012; 0; 
Fiscal year 2013: 1,010; 
Total: 1,010. 

Army Component: Total; 
Fiscal year 2007: 36,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: 8,319; 
Fiscal year 2009: 8,247; 
Fiscal year 2010: 8,335; 
Fiscal year 2011: 8,432; 
Fiscal year 2012; 2,487; 
Fiscal year 2013: 2,391; 
Total: 74,211. 

Source: President's 2008 Budget Submission, February 2007. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

The Grow the Force initiative represents a shift in DOD's force 
structure plans outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
In fiscal year 2004, the Army's authorized active end strength was 
482,400 active military personnel. Since that time, the Army was 
granted authority to increase its active end strength by 30,000. The 
rationale for this increase was to provide flexibility to implement its 
transformation to a modular force while continuing to deploy forces to 
overseas operations. Rather than return the active Army end strength to 
the 482,400 level by fiscal year 2011, as decided in the 2006 QDR, 
DOD's 2007 proposal calls for increasing the active Army's permanent 
end strength by 65,000 to 547,400 by fiscal year 2013. 

Army budget materials identify the $70.2 billion funding plan by 
appropriation through fiscal year 2013 (see table 2). DOD budget 
officials told us that the $70.2 billion funding plan was included in 
DOD's 2008--2013 Future Years Defense Program but was not identified as 
a separate program. Rather, the funding was included within the total 
for each respective appropriation because the Army developed its 
program budget based on the total Army end strength. The Grow the Force 
funding plan includes onetime costs for procurement and military 
construction and recurring costs associated with military and civilian 
personnel and operation and maintenance. 

Table 2: Army Fiscal Year 2007--2013 Funding Plan for the Grow the 
Force Initiative as of January 2007 (Dollars in billions): 

Appropriations: Military Personnel; 
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.7; 
Fiscal year 2009: 3.9; 
Fiscal year 2010: 4.6; 
Fiscal year 2011: 5.2; 
Fiscal year 2012: 5.5; 
Fiscal year 2013: 5.6; 
Total: 25.4. 

Appropriations: Operation and Maintenance; 
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0.6; 
Fiscal year 2009: 2.6; 
Fiscal year 2010: 2.9; 
Fiscal year 2011: 3.1; 
Fiscal year 2012: 4.3; 
Fiscal year 2013: 2.6; 
Total: 16.1. 

Appropriations: Procurement; 
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.9; 
Fiscal year 2008: 4.1; 
Fiscal year 2009: 4.2; 
Fiscal year 2010: 5.1; 
Fiscal year 2011: 3.0; 
Fiscal year 2012: 0.6; 
Fiscal year 2013: 0.0; 
Total: 17.9. 

Appropriations: Military Construction; 
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 0.4; 
Fiscal year 2008: 2.4; 
Fiscal year 2009: 4.3; 
Fiscal year 2010: 2.4; 
Fiscal year 2011: 0.7; 
Fiscal year 2012: 0.5; 
Fiscal year 2013: 0.1; 
Total: 10.8. 

Appropriations: Total; 
Fiscal year 2007[A]: 1.3; 
Fiscal year 2008: 7.7; 
Fiscal year 2009: 15.0; 
Fiscal year 2010: 15.0; 
Fiscal year 2011: 12.0; 
Fiscal year 2012: 10.9; 
Fiscal year 2013: 8.3; 
Total: 70.2. 

Source: U.S. Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management 
and Comptroller, February 2007. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Funds for fiscal year 2007 were contained in the Department of 
Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global 
War on Terror. 

[End of table] 

The Army's Grow the Force Funding Plan Is Not Transparent or 
Comprehensive: 

The Army has not developed a transparent and comprehensive funding plan 
for its Grow the Force initiative that allows decision makers to 
understand the full magnitude of the costs and weigh competing 
priorities. There is a lack of transparency in how the Army developed 
the cost estimate that served as the basis for the $70.2 billion 
funding plan. The Army estimated the costs to implement the Grow the 
Force initiative at $70.2 billion, according to Army and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense budget officials. However, based on our review of 
Army budget materials and other documentation, it is not clear how the 
Army developed this estimate. For example, Army documents do not 
identify key assumptions, limitations, or the steps used to develop the 
estimates. Army budget officials told us that they had limited time to 
prepare the cost estimates and funding plan before the President 
submitted the budget in February 2007. However, according to best 
practices, high quality cost estimates use repeatable methods that will 
result in estimates that are comprehensive and can also be easily and 
clearly traced, replicated, and updated.[Footnote 5] The Army Cost 
Analysis Manual states that cost analysts must document all steps in 
the development of a cost estimate, including ground rules and 
assumptions. The analyst must also state the source of all data and the 
processes used to analyze the data.[Footnote 6] The Army has not 
demonstrated that it followed its guidance for developing its Grow the 
Force cost estimate. 

In addition to a lack of transparency, the Army's February 2007 Grow 
the Force funding plan is not comprehensive and may be understated 
because some costs were excluded and some factors are still evolving 
that could potentially affect this funding plan: 

* The $70.2 billion funding plan provided to Congress excluded 
operation and maintenance funds for health care and educational support 
assistance totaling over $2.5 billion. According to the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army's funding plan did 
not include about $2.3 billion in health care support assistance and 
about $217 million in educational assistance associated with increasing 
personnel levels. Army officials told us these costs were excluded from 
the Army's funding plan because the funds are provided respectively in 
the Defense Health Program appropriation and Defense-wide Department of 
Defense Education Activity appropriation. Nonetheless, Congress needs 
to understand the full magnitude of costs to DOD as it considers the 
Army's Grow the Force initiative. 

* The number of Army civilians to be hired is likely understated. A 
senior Army civilian personnel official said the Army's funding plan 
included only a small number of civilians needed to be hired because 
there was limited time to develop the estimate. Army major commands are 
conducting a detailed mission needs analysis to identify overall 
civilian personnel requirements. As a result, this official expects the 
number of civilians needed to be hired to increase, thereby further 
increasing costs. 

* The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 2007 a plan to 
accelerate the Grow the Force implementation timelines for the active 
Army and Army National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010. 
The Army initially identified the completion date of this initiative 
for all Army components as fiscal year 2013. However, in October 2007 
the Chief of Staff of the Army announced a plan to accelerate the Grow 
the Force implementation timelines for the active Army and Army 
National Guard from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010. An Army 
official in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated 
that the Army is currently reviewing the cost estimates for 
accelerating its planned force expansion. Accelerating the 
implementation timeline could incur additional costs for reasons such 
as the following: 
- The Army would have to budget for the hiring of military and civilian 
personnel sooner than programmed; 
- The Army may have to increase recruitment and retention incentives to 
meet end strength goals; 
- Procuring equipment sooner than planned could require renegotiating 
contracts, keeping production lines open longer, and paying overtime to 
workers to meet increased production goals. 

* The locations of the active and reserve units to be built were 
unknown when the funding plan was developed. Because the locations of 
the new units were unknown when the Army developed its cost estimate, 
the Army used standard cost calculations to determine its military 
construction estimate, which excluded environmental costs. Out of 
concern about the lack of an overall plan to station and accommodate 
permanent additional soldiers with the necessary facilities, Congress 
restricted the Army from spending certain military construction funds 
for the Grow the Force initiative until the Secretary of Defense 
submits a detailed stationing plan to support Army end-strength growth 
to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and 
Senate.[Footnote 7] In response to this reporting requirement, on 
December 18, 2007, the Army submitted to Congress a Grow the Force 
stationing plan that identifies facilities necessary for brigade combat 
teams, combat service and combat service support units, training, and 
quality of life support facilities such as barracks, unit operations 
facilities, maintenance facilities, and family housing.[Footnote 8] In 
particular, the Army plans to build facilities for six infantry brigade 
combat teams: two at Fort Carson, Colorado; two at Fort Stewart, 
Georgia; and two at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Army stated it will revise 
its initial $10.8 billion military construction cost estimate based on 
the announced stationing locations and will include a full cost 
determination and resource strategy as part of the fiscal year 2009 
President's budget request and the fiscal years 2009--2013 Future Years 
Defense Program. The Army noted that because the process of land 
acquisition for federal agencies requires multiple approvals, and a 
series of environmental and real estate planning studies, the December 
2007 Army Stationing Plan did not identify installation expansion 
actions. As a result, there could be additional land acquisition and 
environmental costs that may not be included in the updated estimates. 

* Changes to the force structure that served as the basis of the $70.2 
billion funding plan could affect overall costs. The Army's $70.2 
billion funding plan was based on a force structure plan of six 
infantry brigade combat teams and additional support brigades, but Army 
officials were still working on the specific force structure 
requirements of the expanded Army in February 2007 when they developed 
the funding plan. As a result, changes to the initial force structure 
plan could increase costs. For example, the costs to procure heavy or 
stryker brigade combat team--related equipment are more expensive than 
for infantry brigades. An Army procurement official provided us 
standard equipment estimates for brigade combat teams: Infantry ($590 
million); Stryker ($1.7 billion to 1.9 billion); and Heavy ($1.2 
billion to 2.5 billion). Army officials stated the force structure plan 
has been revised since February 2007 but the Department of the Army has 
not approved a final force structure document. 

Given the magnitude of the Army's funding plan and potential changes to 
the plan since DOD submitted its budget in February 2007, the Army 
should be prepared to fully explain and document the basis for its 
funding plan. The Army has an opportunity to update its Grow the Force 
funding plan to reflect a more transparent and comprehensive approach, 
given that the Army plans to request future funding. Without complete 
information on the Army's $70.2 billion funding plan, decision makers 
will have difficulty understanding the full magnitude of costs and 
weighing competing priorities. 

Conclusion: 

Because the Army's funding request lacks transparency, and is not well- 
documented and comprehensive, the Congress may not have the information 
needed to consider the long-term costs and benefits associated with 
increasing Army personnel levels or gauge the amount of funding that 
should be appropriated to implement the initiative each year. To help 
illuminate the basis for its request, the Army needs to describe its 
process for documenting and revising its Grow the Force cost estimate, 
the proposed force structure plan, implementation timelines, and how it 
plans to manage and implement this initiative given competing 
priorities for funding. The Army has an opportunity to address these 
issues and facilitate congressional oversight of DOD's fiscal year 2009 
budget request. Without more complete information on the Army's $70.2 
billion funding plan, decision makers will have difficulty 
understanding the full magnitude of costs and weighing competing 
priorities. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To support congressional oversight of the Army's Grow the Force 
initiative and DOD's upcoming fiscal year 2009 budget request, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army to take the following two actions: 

* Provide Congress with additional information on the Army's Grow the 
Force initiative at the earliest possible date, but not later than 
March 30, 2008. This information should include the following: 
- The force structure to be created by this initiative and associated 
implementation timelines; 
- A revised Grow the Force funding plan; 
- The cost estimating methodology used to develop the Grow the Force 
funding plan, including (1) key assumptions, (2) key factors that could 
affect the Grow the Force funding plan, and (3) a clear definition of 
costs that were excluded from the estimate. 

* Maintain a transparent audit trail including documentation of the 
steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding plan. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 
recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the 
recommendations. DOD comments are presented in their entirety in 
appendix I. 

Specifically, DOD agreed to (1) provide Congress with additional 
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative not later than 
March 30, 2008, and (2) maintain a transparent audit trail including 
documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force funding 
plan. In explaining how it planned to address our first recommendation, 
DOD stated that it would identify the Army's Grow the Force 
implementation timelines, force structure, and funding plan in the 
Army's December 2007 Grow the Army Stationing Plan, the Army's Fiscal 
Year 2008 Annual Report on Army Progress, the Army Campaign Plan, and 
its revised funding estimates. We believe these are positive steps. 
However, until DOD and the Army issue all of the stated documents, we 
cannot determine the extent to which these actions will improve the 
transparency of the Army's Grow the Force cost estimates and funding 
plan. Identifying the Army's cost estimating methodology as well as DOD-
wide Grow the Force requirements as part of an updated Grow the Force 
funding plan would provide a more transparent basis for understanding 
the full magnitude of related requirements and costs. 

In explaining how it planned to address our second recommendation, DOD 
stated that although the Army's year-to-year staffing, equipping, and 
facilities are not identified as a separate budget activity, the Army 
will identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the 
Force plan in the development of the fiscal year 2010/2011 defense 
budget and preparations for the fiscal year 2010--2015 Future Years 
Defense Program. While we recognize the Army will not develop a 
separate budget activity for the Army's Grow the Force funding plan, 
there is a need for transparency of the Army's Grow the Force funding 
plan given the significant amount of funding requested ($70.2 billion). 
In addition to identifying requirements and funding plans to complete 
this initiative, we believe the Army needs to maintain a transparent 
audit trail to demonstrate how its Grow the Force funding request is 
linked to Army requirements. 

We are providing this letter today to relevant congressional defense 
committees. If you or your have staff have any questions about this 
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at 
stlaurent@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were Wendy Jaffe, 
Assistant Director, Kelly Baumgartner, Grace Coleman, Barbara Gannon, 
Terry Richardson, Kathryn Smith, and Karen Thornton. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of correspondence] 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

January 18, 2008: 

Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report "Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force 
Initiative Funding Plan," dated December 18, 2007 (GAO Code 351128/GAO-
08-354R). The Department concurs with the two GAO recommendations and 
our comments are enclosed. 

The Army's Grow the Force initiative is not a discrete budget element 
of Army equipping, staffing, operations, and facilities. This 
initiative was framed in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 defense budget. The 
Department is increasing the Army end-strength by more than 74,000 and 
is addressing the manning, equipping, and facilities needs for the new 
and augmented combat and support brigades for those personnel. In 
December, the Department provided to Congress the Army's end-strength 
growth stationing plan. This, with the Army's FY2008 Annual Report on 
Army Progress and revised funding estimates provide the force 
structure, timelines, and funding plan for the Army's Grow the Force 
initiative. 

The Army's year to year equipping, staffing, and readiness plans are 
considered Department resourcing priorities and are based on: (1) 
deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army equipment and 
personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4) emerging needs. 
Oversight of equipping, manning, and readiness plans comes through 
existing Department requirements, readiness, acquisition, and 
resourcing entities including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 
Senior Readiness Oversight Council, Defense Acquisition Board, and the 
Comptroller. The Department continually seeks to improve these 
management and oversight processes for better overall efficiency. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern:
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report  Dated December 18, 2007: 
GAO Code 351128/GAO-08-354R: 

"Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force Initiative 
Funding Plan" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with additional 
information on the Army's Grow the Force initiative at the earliest 
possible date, but not later than March 30, 2008. This information 
should include: 

* The force structure to be created by this initiative and associated 
implementation timelines; 

* A revised Grow the Force funding plan and; 

* The cost estimating methodology used to develop the Grow the Force 
funding plan, including: (1) key assumptions, (2) key factors that 
could affect the Grow the Force funding plan; and (3) a clear 
definition of costs that were excluded from the estimate. 

DOD Response: Concur. In December the Department provided the Army's 
end-strength growth stationing plan to the Congress. This, in 
conjunction with the Army's Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report on Army 
Progress, submitted in accordance with section 323 of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Army 
Campaign Plan, and revised funding estimates will frame the Grow the 
Army force structure, implementation timelines, and funding plan. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to maintain a transparent audit trail 
including documentation of the steps used to develop the Grow the Force 
funding plan. 

DOD Response: Concur. Although the Army's year-to-year equipping, 
staffing, and facilities plans are not discretely segregated in the 
budget by initiatives such as the Army's Grow the Force, the Army will 
identify requirements and funding associated with the Grow the Army 
plan in the development of the Fiscal Year 2010/2011 Defense Budget and 
preparations of the Fiscal Year 2010-2015 Future Years Defense Program. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The modular support units are the following: two combat support 
brigades, one fires brigade, one air defense brigade, one engineer 
brigade, and two sustainment brigades. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364,  323 (2006). 

[3] H.R. Rep. No. 110-186, (2007) at 12. 

[4] Statement by General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. 
Army, before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of 
Representatives, September 26, 2007. 

[5] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and 
Managing Program Costs, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, DC.: July 2007). 

[6] Department of the Army, Cost Analysis Manual, U.S. Army Cost and 
Economic Analysis Center, May 2002. 

[7] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 
126 (2007). 

[8] The December 2008 Army Stationing Plan incorporates the 
acceleration of the implementation timelines for active and National 
Guard end strength from fiscal year 2013 to 2010. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "Subscribe to Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: