This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-803R 
entitled 'Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications 
of Cheyenne Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined' which was 
released on May 21, 2007. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

May 21, 2007: 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jo Ann Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Defense Infrastructure: Full Costs and Security Implications 
of Cheyenne Mountain Realignment Have Not Been Determined: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations 
Center[Footnote 1] located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, in the 
early 1960s to withstand a multimegaton-yield-weapon strike and to 
provide protection against chemical and biological warfare. The mission 
of the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate is to monitor, process, and 
interpret air, missile, and space events that could threaten North 
America or have operational effects on U.S. forces or capabilities. 
This mission is conducted at five major centers--the Command Center, 
Air Warning, Missile Correlation, Operations Intelligence Watch, and 
Space Control--all currently located within Cheyenne Mountain. Elements 
of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)[Footnote 2] and Air 
Force Space Command[Footnote 3] are also located in Cheyenne Mountain. 
The Air Force's modernization of the attack warning systems within 
Cheyenne Mountain will cost more than $700 million from fiscal years 
2000 through 2006.[Footnote 4] 

Peterson Air Force Base, also located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is 
the headquarters of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a binational 
U.S. and Canadian organization staffed by both U.S. and Canadian 
personnel. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also the Commander of NORAD 
and he currently has command of two fixed command centers.[Footnote 5] 
The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center is located at Peterson Air 
Force Base and conducts air, land, maritime, and homeland defense 
operations, as well as defense support of civil authorities. The 
command center in Cheyenne Mountain is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command 
center that provides air, missile, and space warning, characterization, 
and assessment for NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and USSTRATCOM as well as command 
and control for the ground-based mid-course missile defense program. 

DOD officials have stated that they no longer need to continue 
operating in this hardened facility considering that the threat of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile strike in today's environment is 
low. In July 2006, the former Commander of NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM[Footnote 6] announced plans to move certain functions from 
Cheyenne Mountain and create an integrated command center at Peterson 
Air Force Base, which he projected at that time would save between $150 
million and $200 million per year. Additionally, USSTRATCOM announced 
plans to relocate its missile warning mission from Cheyenne Mountain to 
Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Air Force Space Command is in 
the process of moving the Space Control Center from Cheyenne Mountain 
to Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. NORAD and USNORTHCOM 
officials told us that after these functions have been moved, Cheyenne 
Mountain will be used as an alternate command center, a continuity of 
operations relocation facility, and a training center. 

You asked us to determine (1) the estimated costs, savings, and 
benefits associated with moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to 
other locations; and (2) how DOD evaluated the security implications 
associated with moving the functions, and what these implications are. 
On March 13, 2007, we provided your office with a briefing on our 
preliminary observations regarding the proposed relocation. This report 
summarizes the results of that briefing and provides updated 
information as a result of additional work we have performed since that 
time. 

To determine the costs, savings, and benefits associated with the 
proposed relocation of functions from Cheyenne Mountain, we reviewed 
and analyzed reports and studies conducted by NORAD and USNORTHCOM, 
Sandia National Laboratorie[Footnote 7]s and Lockheed Mart[Footnote 
8]in on the costs and implications of relocating functions from 
Cheyenne Mountain, and we interviewed NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials to 
identify the expected benefits of the relocation. We also interviewed 
USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command officials to identify the costs, 
savings, and benefits associated with the relocation of their functions 
from Cheyenne Mountain. We also interviewed USNORTHCOM and Air Force 
budget analysts to determine how the cost estimates were developed and 
validated. Based on these interviews, we believe that the cost data are 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To determine the security 
implications of the relocation and how they were evaluated by DOD, we 
reviewed vulnerability assessments and risk assessments conducted by 
USNORTHCOM and a security analysis conducted by Sandia National 
Laboratories for the proposed relocation of NORAD and USNORTHCOM 
functions, and we discussed these assessments and others that are 
ongoing and their potential effect on operations with NORAD, 
USNORTHCOM, and Air Force Space Command officials, and the Joint Staff. 
We conducted our review from January 2007 through May 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the 
$150 million to $200 million savings projected by the former Commander 
from moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force 
Base. As of April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have identified 
at least $41.7 million in onetime costs and $5.5 million in recurring 
costs related to the move; however, the full costs will not be 
determined until the completion of ongoing security assessments. NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM officials stated that they expect increased unity of 
effort and operational efficiencies as a result of the integration. 
Although there is no requirement for it, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not 
done an analysis of the operational effects--both positive and 
negative--of the move. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM allocated $26.7 million for conducting studies, purchasing 
needed equipment related to the relocation, and renovating the command 
center at Peterson Air Force Base. Renovation of the command center is 
scheduled to begin in June 2007 and be completed in December 2007. 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials are planning to allocate $15 million in 
fiscal year 2008 to purchase the remaining equipment for the integrated 
command center and program management support. Additional costs will 
likely be incurred based on the results of ongoing studies related to 
security requirements. Moreover, Air Force Space Command officials 
estimate that it will cost about $13 million to move their functions to 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, but USSTRATCOM has not yet developed a cost 
estimate for relocating their functions from Cheyenne Mountain to 
Schriever Air Force Base. 

The Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM decided to accept the risk of 
integrating the command centers based on initial risk and vulnerability 
assessments, but the full security implications will not be known until 
ongoing security assessments are completed and a protection level is 
designated for the integrated command center.[Footnote 9] While initial 
security assessments provided information on vulnerabilities based on 
current and projected threats, further assessments were needed to 
evaluate the cost of hardening computer terminals against 
electromagnetic pulse and to evaluate the physical security 
requirements of protecting the integrated command center. Before the 
Air Force can designate a protection level for the new command center, 
the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM must decide whether key computer 
terminals will move to Peterson Air Force Base or remain in Cheyenne 
Mountain. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, this decision 
will be made after a study on electromagnetic pulse hardening 
requirements is completed in late May 2007. Moreover, a System 
Effectiveness Assessment, scheduled for completion in September 2007, 
will provide information on the physical security needed to protect the 
Cheyenne Mountain systems that may be replicated at Peterson Air Force 
Base. According to NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials, it could take up to 
24 months to obtain the resources needed to meet the designated 
protection level requirements. If requirements for the designated 
protection level cannot be met because of funding and resource 
constraints, waivers will be needed to begin operations or specific 
systems may remain in Cheyenne Mountain. 

We believe Congress should consider restricting DOD's authority to use 
funds to renovate all proposed locations to accept functions designated 
to move out of Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all security 
analyses are complete, the full costs of the move are determined, and 
DOD provides Congress with an analysis of the operational effects of 
the proposed realignments. 

Background: 

Currently, there is a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center located at 
Peterson Air Force Base and a NORAD and USNORTHCOM command center 
located inside Cheyenne Mountain. Command staff are presently located 
in each of the separate command centers. Cheyenne Mountain's mission is 
to monitor, process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that 
could threaten North America or have operational effects on U.S. forces 
or capabilities, using air, ground, and space-based sensors that link 
to the complex's computer systems located more than 2,000 feet under 
ground. This mission is conducted at five major centers within Cheyenne 
Mountain--the Command Center, Air Warning, Missile Correlation, 
Operations Intelligence Watch, and Space Control--by approximately 658 
people, including support personnel. These personnel belong to NORAD, 
USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, and Air Force Space Command, as shown in table 
1. 

Table 1: Realignment of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel in 
Cheyenne Mountain: 

Command: NORAD[A]; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 112; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: TBD; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: TBD; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: 0; 
Positions eliminated: 0. 

Command: Northern Command; (USNORTHCOM)[B]; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 42; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: 24; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: 18; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: 0; 
Positions eliminated: 0. 

Command: Strategic Command; (USSTRATCOM)[C]; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 81; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: TBD; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: 17; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: TBD; 
Positions eliminated: TBD. 

Command: Air Force Space Command; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 160; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: 0; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: 12; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: 138; 
Positions eliminated: 10. 

Command: Air Force Space Command support personnel; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 263; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: 263; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: 0; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: 0; 
Positions eliminated: 0. 

Total[D]; 
Number of personnel: Currently in mountain: 658; 
Number of personnel: Remaining in mountain: TBD; 
Number of personnel: Moving to Peterson Air Force Base: TBD; 
Number of personnel: Moving to other Air Force Bases: TBD; 
Positions eliminated: TBD. 

Source: USNORTHCOM, NORAD, USSTRATCOM, Air Force, and GAO calculation. 

Notes: TBD = to be determined. 

[A] NORAD has not yet determined the number of personnel that are 
remaining in the mountain and those moving to Peterson Air Force Base. 

[B] USNORTHCOM positions remaining in Cheyenne Mountain are for Nuclear 
Command and Control. 

[C] NORAD and USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM 
transfer 17 positions to Peterson to support NORAD's correlation of 
potential missile and space threats to North America. 

[D] Contractor personnel are not included in the table. There are also 
28 Canadian personnel currently working in Cheyenne Mountain. 

[End of table] 

No final decisions have been made as to how many personnel will remain 
in the mountain, move to Peterson Air Force Base, or move to other 
locations. There are also approximately 500 contractors in Cheyenne 
Mountain providing support to each of the major centers. It has not 
been determined how many of these contractors will be retained in the 
mountain after the relocation. 

During a series of major exercises conducted in 2005, the Commander of 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM attempted to direct planning, operations, and 
command and control from two separate command centers. In the course of 
the exercises, the Commander identified shortcomings in unity of effort 
due to the geographic separation of the command centers and negatively 
affecting critical, time-sensitive decisions. As a result, in late 
2005, the Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM directed a senior command 
official to analyze options for correcting these shortcomings and to 
determine the limitations and costs of duplicating Cheyenne Mountain 
capabilities within the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson 
Air Force Base. This analysis concluded that it would be cost- 
prohibitive to duplicate Cheyenne Mountain capabilities at Peterson Air 
Force Base. The Commander then tasked the official to analyze options 
to "replicate," rather than duplicate, capabilities of the two command 
centers in a single location.[Footnote 10] This analysis considered the 
following four options: a single command center at Peterson, a single 
command center at Cheyenne Mountain, a Net-centric battle cab, or two 
separate command centers. The analysis concluded that a single command 
center at Peterson Air Force Base was the only option that provided the 
physical space required and strengthened unity of effort between the 
commands. 

In February 2006, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander ordered a study to 
determine how best to establish a NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center 
at Peterson Air Force Base and place the Cheyenne Mountain Directorate 
in "warm standby" status. The completed study[Footnote 11] outlined a 
plan to move the air warning, missile correlation, and command center 
functions out of Cheyenne Mountain but to leave the core computer 
systems there, from which they would transmit their data to Peterson 
Air Force Base. The Air Force must designate a protection level for the 
functions moving into the integrated command center. The protection 
level system identifies specific requirements for each security level 
and recognizes that the users must accept varying degrees of risk. If 
resources are not available to meet the assigned protection level 
requirements, the Commander must request waivers from the security 
requirements until corrections can be made.[Footnote 12] Renovation of 
the integrated command center at Peterson is scheduled to begin in June 
2007 and be completed in December 2007. Full operational capability is 
planned for May 2008. 

Once the functions and their associated personnel are moved, NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM officials told us that they plan to use Cheyenne Mountain as 
an alternate command center that could become fully functional within 
approximately 1 hour, with adequate warning, if a threat situation so 
dictated. Additionally, the nuclear command and control function for 
USNORTHCOM will remain in the mountain and the computer systems 
remaining will be used to train and certify personnel. 

According to Joint Staff officials, the Commander of NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM has the authority under Title 10 of the United States Code 
to make decisions affecting his command--including changing the 
location of command and control--as long as he performs his mission as 
described in the Unified Command Plan. Our review of Title 10 confirms 
that a commander of a combatant command, unless otherwise directed by 
the President or the Secretary of Defense, has the authority to perform 
such command functions as organizing commands and forces within that 
command as he considers necessary to carry out the missions assigned to 
the command.[Footnote 13] According to USNORTHCOM officials, the 
Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM consulted with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Canadian Chief 
of Defence Staff about his plan to move certain functions out of 
Cheyenne Mountain, and he received their verbal concurrence. Moreover, 
the Secretary of Defense stated in a February 2006 memo to the 
Commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM that he liked the Commander's 
approach to place the mountain in "warm standby" and achieve a range of 
cost savings. 

USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command also have functions in Cheyenne 
Mountain that are moving to other locations. USSTRATCOM has about 81 
people in Cheyenne Mountain for its missile warning mission. Of these 
81 people, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have formally requested that USSTRATCOM 
transfer 17 positions to Peterson to provide some missile warning 
continuity, while an undetermined number of personnel will move to 
Schriever Air Force Base in early 2008. Likewise, Air Force Space 
Command officials told us that they are in the process of moving about 
138 people in the space control center and unified space vault to 
Vandenberg Air Force Base. This move is scheduled to be completed by 
October 2007. 

No Savings Result from Proposed Relocation and Estimated Costs Have Not 
Been Fully Determined: 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM could not provide documentation to support the 
$150 million to $200 million savings projected by the previous 
Commander by moving functions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air 
Force Base. As of April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials have 
identified $41.7 million in onetime and $5.5 million in recurring costs 
related to the move so far; however, the full costs will not be 
determined until the completion of ongoing security assessments. NORAD 
and USNORTHCOM officials stated that they expect the relocation to 
result in increased unity of effort and, consequently, improved 
operational efficiencies. Although there is no requirement for it, 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM have not done an analysis of the operational 
effects--both positive and negative--of the move. While Air Force Space 
Command has identified approximately $13 million in costs to move its 
mission to Vandenberg Air Force Base, USSTRATCOM has not yet determined 
the costs to move its mission to Schriever Air Force Base. 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM Relocation: 

NORAD and USNORTHCOM do not know the full costs of moving functions 
from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base because two security 
assessments that will determine the recommended security upgrades are 
still underway. As of April 2007, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have identified 
about $41.7 million in onetime costs needed to integrate the two 
command centers at Peterson Air Force Base, comprising: 

 $8.1 million in fiscal year 2006 for various studies related to the 
relocation and for purchasing equipment needed to replicate some 
computer systems; 

 $18.6 million in fiscal year 2007 for renovating the existing command 
center at Peterson Air Force Base to accommodate the functions being 
relocated from Cheyenne Mountain, for additional study costs, and for 
completing computer purchases; and: 

 $15 million for fiscal year 2008 to complete communications and 
systems equipment purchases and program management support. 

In addition, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials estimate that approximately 
$5.5 million will be needed annually to operate and maintain the 
computer systems and to provide help desk support once the integrated 
command center is operational. 

There are no short-term cost savings from relocating functions from 
Cheyenne Mountain. However, NORAD and USNORTHCOM officials stated that 
certain transformational benefits, such as increased unity of effort 
and improved operational efficiencies and effectiveness, are the main 
reasons for integrating the command centers. Specifically, officials 
stated that having one unified command center will increase the 
situational awareness across all NORAD and USNORTHCOM missions and will 
provide a single voice to decision makers. However, officials noted 
that they have not done an analysis of the operational effects--both 
positive and negative--of the move. Furthermore, the officials stated 
that they have not thus far effectively communicated and documented the 
anticipated benefits and plan to improve communications both within the 
command and with outside entities. 

Air Force Space Command Relocation: 

The projected cost for relocating the Space Control Center and the 
Unified Space Vault from Cheyenne Mountain to the Joint Space 
Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, is 
approximately $13 million. Of this amount, $4.5 million was allocated 
in fiscal year 2006 for studies, renovation of facilities, and 
relocation of equipment to Vandenberg, and $5.4 million was allocated 
in fiscal year 2007 for training, temporary duty to Vandenberg, and 
relocation of equipment. An additional $2.9 million has been requested 
to complete the move, but at the time of our review, Air Force Space 
Command officials did not know from which fiscal year these additional 
funds would be allocated. Moreover, costs for any needed security 
upgrades at Vandenberg have not yet been determined, pending a security 
assessment that is scheduled to be completed in August 2007. According 
to Air Force Space Command officials, the first phase of the equipment 
move has been completed, and the equipment is operating at Vandenberg. 
The remaining equipment is scheduled to be moved by October 2007. Air 
Force Space Command officials expect that the relocation will enable 
them to reduce future costs for systems modernization and maintenance 
and for contractor operations. Moreover, these officials stated that 
the space mission does not require "hardening" from nuclear attack and 
does not have to be located in Cheyenne Mountain. 

U.S. Strategic Command Relocation: 

The costs to relocate the missile warning mission from Cheyenne 
Mountain to Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, have not yet been 
developed. According to USSTRATCOM officials, an ongoing site survey 
scheduled for completion in late May 2007 will determine the security 
requirements, and a subsequent engineering study will develop the 
estimated costs of the planned relocation. USSTRATCOM decided to move 
its missile warning mission to get away from the mountain's legacy 
computer systems and acquire a more modern net-centric system using 
distributed nodes. 

Security Implications and Associated Risks of the Proposed Relocation 
Have Not Been Fully Determined: 

After reviewing initial risk and vulnerability assessments conducted by 
USNORTHCOM in early 2006, the Commander accepted the risk of 
integrating the two command centers, but the full security implications 
and the associated risks of the proposed relocation will not be known 
until at least September 2007, following the completion of ongoing 
security assessments and the designation of a protection level for the 
new command center. An electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, a 
physical security assessment of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters 
building, and the designation of a protection level for the new command 
center are in progress. If the protection level designation 
requirements cannot be met for replicating the desired systems due to 
resource or funding constraints, waivers will be needed to proceed with 
the planned integration or specific systems may remain in Cheyenne 
Mountain. 

Initial Security Assessments: 

In January 2006, USNORTHCOM conducted a classified risk 
assessment[Footnote 14] on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters 
building at Peterson Air Force Base. As a result of this risk analysis, 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM have taken some steps to mitigate known 
vulnerabilities to the headquarters building from potential threats, 
which exist regardless of the command center integration. For example, 
NORAD and USNORTHCOM have limited the access to backup generators and 
the garage of the headquarters building. Additionally, in March 2006, 
USNORTHCOM conducted a classified risk assessment[Footnote 15] that 
compared the vulnerability of the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center 
to the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters building. After seeing these 
initial security assessments based on current and projected threats, 
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander deemed that the risk incurred by 
integrating the two command centers was acceptable. 

USNORTHCOM also contracted with Sandia National Laboratories to 
determine the security implications of moving assigned missions to 
Peterson Air Force Base. Sandia's December 2006 classified 
report[Footnote 16] analyzed four different options for moving the 
missions. Sandia's report recommended replicating some of the computer 
systems in Cheyenne Mountain because this solution would require a 
lower protection level than moving all computer systems and would cost 
less. However, a USNORTHCOM official told us that the Commander is 
still considering other options and additional security assessments are 
ongoing. 

Ongoing Security Assessments: 

Two security assessments related to moving functions from Cheyenne 
Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base are underway. First, Sandia 
National Laboratories is assessing the cost associated with hardening 
computer terminals used to track air, missile, and space events, and 
examining the methods needed to protect those terminals against man- 
made and natural threats. The results of this assessment, which is 
scheduled to be completed in May 2007, will enable the NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM Commander to assess the feasibility of moving these 
terminals. Second, according to an Air Force Space Command official, 
the Air Force is conducting a Systems Effectiveness Assessment that 
will determine the effectiveness of the security system at NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM headquarters to detect, delay, deny, and neutralize a 
threat; however, the assessment will not specifically examine 
procedures for protecting against a chemical/biological attack. After 
the completion of this assessment, the leadership will be able to 
develop an actionable plan with cost estimates to build a system to 
protect the building at those levels through the conceptual design 
process. USNORTHCOM officials expect the results of this assessment in 
September 2007. 

According to a USNORTHCOM official, a complete protection level study 
has never been conducted on the NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters 
building. USNORTHCOM is in the process of completing a Protection Level 
Designation Matrix that includes information on the threat to the 
headquarters building and its significance to the United States' 
warfighting capability. This tool will help the Department of the Air 
Force determine a protection level for the building. An Air Force Space 
Command official said that if NORAD and USNORTHCOM cannot meet the 
protection level requirements for the integrated command center due to 
resource or funding constraints, they will have to request waivers and 
develop a mitigation strategy. He added that it could take up to 24 
months to get the completed security system in place if it was fully 
funded. 

According to the Deputy Director of Operations of the NORAD and 
USNORTHCOM Command Center, the renovation of the command center is not 
dependent upon the decision regarding the appropriate protection level. 
This official stated the protection level requirements are focused on 
external vulnerabilities and address issues such as cameras, bollards 
for stand-off distances, and additional security forces personnel. 
Nonetheless, one component of the renovation will depend on the results 
of the ongoing electromagnetic pulse hardening assessment, but this 
will affect only two of the many systems in the command centers. The 
Deputy Director of Operations stated that he does not anticipate having 
to delay the renovation to await any report results but will 
incorporate all accepted recommendations into the renovation of the 
integrated command center. He said that the contractor has been given 
the authority to proceed with renovation on June 11, 2007. It is 
scheduled for completion in December 2007. 

Conclusions: 

The proposed realignment of functions from Cheyenne Mountain represents 
a major transformation for NORAD and USNORTHCOM. Without benefit of an 
analysis of operational effects of the proposed moves, the completed 
security assessments, and final protection level designation to inform 
him, it is unclear what level of risk the Commander is accepting in 
integrating the two command centers. Furthermore, the costs associated 
with any needed security upgrades are not known and it is unclear 
whether resources and funding are available to meet the protection 
level requirements. Without knowing the complete security effects and 
cost to replicate the functions, neither DOD nor Congress has adequate 
information to assess the risks in relation to the costs of moving 
functions from Cheyenne Mountain. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

GAO is not making any recommendations for executive action. However, 
Congress should consider restricting DOD's authority to use funds to 
renovate new locations to accept functions designated to move out of 
Cheyenne Mountain until such time as all security analyses are 
complete, the full costs of the move are determined, and DOD provides 
Congress with an analysis of the operational effects of the proposed 
realignments. 

Agency Comments: 

We received technical comments from DOD, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. In their technical comments, NORAD and USNORTHCOM noted 
that the new commander clarified that the relocation was initiated by 
mission inefficiencies, not cost savings, and is required to increase 
unity of effort and operational effectiveness. Further, USNORTHCOM 
noted that the synergies gained through consolidation of missions into 
a single command center are essential for an effective response to the 
full spectrum of threats to the United States. Nevertheless, our review 
showed that NORAD and USNORTHCOM did not fully analyze the costs and 
operational effects of the proposed move, and, therefore, we are 
including a matter for congressional consideration. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of the Air Force; and 
the Commanders of NORAD and USNORTHCOM and USSTRATCOM. We will make 
copies available to others upon request. This report will be available 
at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 
Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director; Amy Higgins; Keith Rhodes; Enemencio 
Sanchez; Kimberly Seay; Brian Shiels; Karen Thornton; and Cheryl 
Weissman. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

(350965): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center is now known as the 
Cheyenne Mountain Directorate. It is one of several tenants that 
compose the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station near Colorado Springs, 
Colorado. 

[2] USSTRATCOM conducts the missile warning mission for North America. 

[3] Air Force Space Command conducts the space control mission for 
North America. 

[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Further Management and Oversight Changes 
Needed for Efforts to Modernize Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning 
Systems, GAO-06-666 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2006). 

[5] The Commander also has a mobile consolidated command center based 
at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. 

[6] The new NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander was sworn in on March 23, 
2007. 

[7] Sandia National Laboratories, a federally funded research center, 
was tasked to study the security implications of four options for 
moving missions from Cheyenne Mountain to Peterson Air Force Base. 

[8] Lockheed Martin conducted this study under contract with the 
Electronic Systems Center. The Electronic Systems Center, a component 
of Air Force Materiel Command, manages the development and acquisition 
of electronic command and control systems for the Air Force. 

[9] The Air Force must designate a protection level for the functions 
moving into the integrated command center pursuant to Air Force 
Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security Program (Mar. 
1, 2003). 

[10] USNORTHCOM officials told us that in this context, replicating 
capabilities means leaving computer servers, equipment, and 
infrastructure in the mountain and digitally sending the information to 
the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center at Peterson. Duplicating 
capabilities would involve moving the servers, equipment, and 
infrastructure. 

[11] U.S. Northern Command, The NORAD-USNORTHCOM Transformation 
Analysis Report (Colorado Springs, Colo.: July 2006). 

[12] Air Force Instruction 31-101, The Air Force Installation Security 
Program, 6.3.2 (Mar. 1, 2003). 

[13] 10 U.S.C. 164. 

[14] U.S. Northern Command, Risk Assessment Report (Peterson Air Force 
Base, Colo.: January 2006). 

[15] U.S. Northern Command, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center/ 
Building 2 Vulnerability Assessment against Terrorist Attacks (Peterson 
Air Force Base, Colo.: March 2006). 

[16] Sandia National Laboratories, Phase 2: Security Assessment Results 
and Conceptual Security Designs for North American Aerospace Defense 
Command and United States Northern Command, (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: 
December 2006). 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. 
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, 
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202) 
512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, D.C. 20548: