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Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities' which 
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March 28, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi 
Security Forces' Logistics and Command and Control Capabilities: 

From May 2003 through June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), led by the United States and the United Kingdom, was the United 
Nations-recognized authority responsible for the temporary governance 
of Iraq and for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the 
reconstruction effort. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military 
organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or 
reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and a 
new Iraqi military. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed 
responsibility for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and 
police forces in their areas of responsibility.[Footnote 1] In May 
2004, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive 
stating that after the transition of power to the Iraqi government is 
achieved, the Department of Defense (DOD) would continue to be 
responsible for U.S. activities relating to security and military 
operations. The Presidential Directive also stated that the U.S. 
Central Command would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, 
equip, and train Iraqi security forces. 

In the summer of 2004, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) developed and 
began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated on 
and refined the original strategy for transferring security 
responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In November 2005, the National 
Security Council issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 
which states that the Coalition will adjust its "posture and approaches 
as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow," and that Coalition 
troop levels in Iraq will decrease over time as the Iraqis take on more 
responsibilities for themselves. The national strategy implies a 
conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence in Iraq. 

In April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with 
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, issued a Joint Campaign Plan that states 
as a goal the transfer of security responsibilities from MNF-I to the 
ISF and the Iraqi government. Finally, in August 2006, DOD issued its 
fifth report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 
stating that even though 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, 85 
battalions, and 2 National Police battalions had assumed lead 
responsibility for security in their areas of operation, most of these 
units still require support from Coalition forces. This is because 
logistics, sustainment, and command and control capabilities of the ISF 
are not yet fully developed. The ISF comprises the forces of the 
Ministry of Defense (MOD)--that is, the Iraqi Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and several Strategic Infrastructure Battalions--and the forces of the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI)--which includes the police, border 
enforcement, and other Iraqi civilian security services. 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), which 
operates under MNF-I, leads the Coalition effort to train, equip, and 
organize the Iraqi Security Forces. Once ISF units are trained and 
equipped, operational responsibility for their employment is turned 
over to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a command that is 
subordinate to MNF-I and is responsible for command and control of 
operations in Iraq.[Footnote 2] 

According to DOD's August 2006 report to Congress, the seating of the 
new government of Iraq, which was not fully complete until the 
appointment in June 2006 of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and 
State for National Security Affairs, sets the conditions for continuing 
progress toward Iraqi security self-reliance. Senior Coalition 
officials in Iraq echoed this sentiment, stating that prior to the 
seating of the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior in 
particular, only limited progress could be made toward forging a self- 
reliant ISF. 

In light of the broad congressional interest in Iraq, we have 
undertaken this engagement under the authority of the Comptroller 
General to conduct evaluations at his own initiative[Footnote 3] to 
provide information on the status and challenges of developing ISF 
support capabilities. Specifically, our objectives were to determine 
(1) the current state of the logistical, command and control, and 
intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense; and (2) the 
current state of the logistical, command and control, and intelligence 
capabilities of the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, during the 
course of our work Coalition officials provided us with information on 
the status of coordination and communication between and within the 
ministries. 

On March 7, 2007, we issued a classified report to you containing our 
preliminary observations.[Footnote 4] This report is the unclassified 
version of that classified report. Certain specific information and 
data about the current state of ISF's logistical, command and control 
and intelligence capabilities was classified as secret. On March 9, 
2007, we testified before the House Armed Services Committee, 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, on the development of the 
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior's logistical capabilities 
for the Iraqi army and police.[Footnote 5] We expect to provide a 
follow-up report later that will examine in more detail the progress in 
the development of these capabilities, the level of U.S. support being 
provided to the ISF, and the linkage between the development of the 
ISF's support capabilities and the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. 
This report is one of a series of products that GAO has produced since 
June 2004 addressing the security situation in Iraq and Iraqi security 
forces. A list of related GAO products appears at the end of this 
report. 

To determine the current state of the logistical, command and control, 
and intelligence capabilities of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and 
Interior, we reviewed relevant documents, orders, policies, and data 
that we obtained from the Department of Defense, the Department of 
State, and contracting officials. We also met with and interviewed DOD 
officials and contractor representatives in the United States and made 
two trips to Iraq, in January and August 2006. In Iraq, we met with 
officials from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, 
and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. During our August 
2006 trip, we also met with Iraqi Army officials and made a site visit 
to an Iraqi Army training compound and Iraq's National Depot. During 
our visits, we talked with knowledgeable officials and determined that 
the data they provided us was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report. We conducted our review from January 2006 through August 
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Notwithstanding our repeated requests for DOD to expedite 
and complete its reviews, this report was under security review within 
the Department of Defense and MNF-I from October 2006 until February 
2007. In our March 9th testimony, we updated information on the ISF's 
logistical capabilities and, where appropriate, we have identified that 
information in footnotes throughout this report. 

Results in Brief: 

Progress has been made in developing the logistics and command and 
control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. For example, 
there is a logistical concept in place for the MOD, and MNSTC-I is 
fielding many of the units required by the concept. Furthermore, the 
Coalition and MOD have established a training base at Taji, where Iraqi 
logistical and communications specialists are being trained. However, 
significant challenges remain in order for the MOD to achieve self- 
sufficiency. For example, although the ministry has a logistical 
concept, implementing that concept is hampered by a lag in the 
development of national and regional logistics centers, impediments to 
training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics, and maintenance 
shortfalls. Similarly, the establishment of a command and control 
capability in the MOD faces training challenges as well as a shortage 
of military leadership; the lack of a communications doctrine; and the 
lack of clearly defined policies and procedures at the ministerial 
level have further undermined efforts to develop this capability. 

Progress has also been made toward developing the logistics and command 
and control capabilities of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. For 
example, a logistics concept for the MOI is being worked on, the 
ministry has fielded communications technology, and a National Command 
Center is in operation. However, the MOI also faces challenges, such as 
supplying its forces and maintaining its vehicles. Furthermore, the 
logistics concept may not fully include the forces that are based in 
the provinces. With regard to command and control, maintenance and 
procedural challenges limit the capabilities of the MOI's 
communications technology. 

Background: 

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to an interim sovereign 
Iraqi government. The CPA was officially dissolved, and Iraq's 
transitional period had begun. Under Iraq's transitional law,[Footnote 
6] the transitional period included the completion of a draft 
constitution in October 2005 and two subsequent elections--a referendum 
on the Iraqi constitution and an election for a permanent 
government.[Footnote 7] The Iraqi people approved the constitution on 
October 15, 2005, and voted for representatives to the Iraq Council of 
Representatives (COR) on December 15, 2005. The Independent Electoral 
Commission of Iraq certified the election results on February 10, 2006. 
On April 22, 2006, the COR elected senior members of the new 
government, including a president, two vice presidents, a speaker of 
the COR, and two deputy speakers. This Presidency Council subsequently 
nominated a prime minister-designate and two deputy prime minister- 
designates, signaling the start of a constitutionally-mandated 30-day 
period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to form his 
cabinet. On May 20, 2006, the Prime Minister-designate named his 
cabinet, which the COR approved the same day, with the Prime Minister 
and deputy prime ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of 
Defense, Interior, and State for National Security Affairs. On June 8, 
2006, the Prime Minister submitted his nominees and the COR approved by 
a majority vote the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and 
Minister of State for National Security Affairs. 

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, MNF-I has the 
authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and 
stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership with the 
Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy issues. 

Ministry of Defense is Developing Support Capabilities, but Faces 
Training, Procedural, Maintenance, and Staffing Issues: 

Iraq's Ministry of Defense has established a logistical concept and its 
development is ongoing; however, implementation of the concept is 
hampered by the failure to develop national and regional logistics 
centers, training problems, and maintenance challenges. Similarly, as 
of August 2006, the standing up of a command and control capability in 
the MOD is hampered by a shortage of leadership and a lack of policies 
and procedures at the ministerial level, the lack of a communications 
doctrine, and training challenges. 

Implementation of Logistical Concept is Challenged: 

In early 2005, the MOD and MNF-I approved a multilayered logistics 
concept for the Iraqi military. Inherent to the concept is the 
generation of a variety of units from the ministerial to the unit 
level. The provision of logistics support at the lowest levels is 
expected to be the purview of Headquarters and Services Companies 
(HSC), which provide limited health, maintenance, supply, and 
transportation support to Iraqi Army battalions, brigades, and 
divisions, and Motorized Transport Regiments (MTR), which provide 
additional transportation, maintenance, and vehicle recovery support to 
each of the Iraqi Army's infantry divisions. Mid-level logistics 
support is expected to come from a National Depot, five Regional 
Support Units (RSU), and numerous Garrison Support Units (GSU). The 
National Depot, located at Taji, provides facilities for the receipt, 
storage, accounting, and issue of the Iraqi Armed Forces' national 
stockholding of most classes of supply as well as the maintenance 
capability to overhaul vehicles and other equipment. The RSUs are to 
provide regionally focused supply, maintenance, and contract support 
for the Iraqi military while GSUs are to provide base support for each 
Iraqi military installation. A Support Command is to provide command 
and control of the National Depot and RSUs while the Iraqi Joint 
Headquarters logistics staff section (M-4) is to provide logistics 
input to plans and orders. Finally, atop the logistics structure is the 
Office of the Director General of Acquisitions, Logistics, and 
Infrastructure (DG AL&I), which is expected to direct the ministry's 
overall logistical capability and the acquisition of capital equipment, 
to develop ministerial policies and procedures, and to manage the 
budget. The envisioned end state is a comprehensive logistics system 
that will provide maintenance, supply, transportation, and garrison 
support to all elements of the Iraqi military.[Footnote 8] 

However, several challenges remain in the standing up of this logistics 
system. First, the establishment of the National Depot, RSUs, and GSUs 
has lagged behind the creation of HSCs and MTRs. Second, the training 
of Iraqi logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, 
personnel, and materiel support to the training academy. Finally, the 
maintenance of the Iraqi military's vehicles is complicated because of 
the heterogeneity of the MOD's vehicular fleet and the lack of trained 
mechanics. 

The Establishment of National and Regional Logistics Centers Has Lagged 
Behind: 

Although the MOD's logistics concept does not delineate any priority to 
the establishment of one type of logistics unit over another, according 
to an August 13, 2006, MNSTC-I briefing, the priority has been on 
generating lower echelon logistics formations, specifically HSCs and 
MTRs. As of August 2006, most of the authorized HSCs and MTRs had been 
formed. Meanwhile, the creation of national and regional logistics 
centers has lagged behind; a circumstance that Coalition officials 
contend makes the attainment of MOD self-sufficiency problematic. For 
example, the establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by 
manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor 
maintenance. In August 2006, Coalition officials assigned to the 
National Depot told us that since April 2006, the amount of fuel 
delivered to the National Depot has been below that required to support 
routine warehouse, maintenance, and transportation requirements. The 
maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support 
day-to-day operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare 
parts, a situation exacerbated by the variety of makes and models of 
the equipment with which the National Depot operates. In the words of 
one senior Coalition logistician, what presently exists at Taji is "a 
depot in name only."[Footnote 9] 

The establishment of the RSUs and GSUs faces similar challenges. As of 
August 2006, all five RSUs were still in the process of being formed 
and had significant shortfalls in personnel, leadership, training, and 
facilities. Furthermore, as of August 2006 the exact number of GSUs to 
be formed had not been determined, and only five were in the process of 
being formed.[Footnote 10] 

Coalition logisticians have emphasized that development of all echelons 
of the logistic concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable 
of independently sustaining its forces. 

Challenges Exist in the Training of Iraqi Logisticians: 

Another challenge that the Coalition and MOD face in developing a 
logistics system for the Iraqi military is a shortage of experienced 
officers and noncommissioned officers available to staff logistics 
units. Providing trained officers and noncommissioned officers to fill 
support and combat service support positions throughout the Iraqi Army 
is the mission of the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute 
(Institute). However, during our visit to the Institute, several 
problems that negatively affected its ability to fulfill its mission 
were evident. 

According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the Institute, one 
problem hampering the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military 
is illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who report for each 
course are turned away because they are illiterate in Arabic and 
therefore incapable of reading the required manuals.[Footnote 11] This 
includes students from Kurdish provinces who, though literate in 
Kurdish, cannot read, write, or speak Arabic. 

For those who are eventually accepted into one of the Institute's 
courses, training has been hampered by quality-of-life problems, an 
insufficient number of trained cadre members, and equipment shortages. 
The quality-of-life problems stem from insufficient fuel for the 
generators which provide the power to run air conditioners, water 
pumps, and other life-support equipment. In August 2006, ambient 
temperatures during the day ran as high as 120 degrees Fahrenheit. 

As of August 2006, the Institute was staffed with just over half of its 
authorized Iraqi officer instructors. Although the reasons for this 
shortage are unclear, it has resulted in the training of fewer 
logistics specialists for the Iraqi Army because without the needed 
cadre the Institute has had to operate at less than full capacity. 

Maintenance Is Challenged by a Heterogeneous Vehicle Fleet and 
Undermined by a Lack of Trained Mechanics and Funds: 

Vehicle maintenance is another challenge that the MOD faces, a 
challenge exacerbated by the heterogeneous mixture of the ministry's 
vehicular fleet, a circumstance that has several causes: MOD vehicle 
purchases, gifts of vehicles from donor countries, and vehicles left 
over from Saddam's army. According to an August 1, 2006, vehicle 
inventory, the Iraqi Army has 6 different types of fuel trucks, at 
least 4 of which come from different manufacturers: Nissan, Ford, KrAZ 
(Ukrainian), and MAZ (Belarusian); 21 different types of light utility 
vehicles, including vehicles manufactured by Chevrolet, Gazelle 
(Russian), Honker (Czech), Kia, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and UAZ 
(Russian); and 15 different types of medium cargo vehicles, including 
U.S. military 2.5-and 5-ton cargo trucks, as well as vehicles 
manufactured by AMC, Ashok Leyland (Indian), GAZ (Russian), Hyundai, 
Kamaz (Russian), Nissan, and Mercedes.[Footnote 12] According to 
Coalition officials, obtaining repair parts for such a heterogeneous 
vehicle fleet, especially parts for vehicles of non-U.S. manufacture 
that are in relatively short supply in the MOD's vehicle inventory, is 
so expensive that it results in the cannibalization of parts from 
similar vehicles awaiting repair. The result is that some vehicles 
never get repaired.[Footnote 13] 

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of this 
heterogeneous fleet, MNSTC-I committed to a national maintenance 
contract. According to the statement of work, MNSTC-I's intent, by way 
of a "focus sustainment" effort, was to contract for the services of a 
maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and 
equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi 
Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of 
organizational and intermediate maintenance tasks, the maintenance 
contractor was to be organized to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi 
personnel. However, Coalition officials stated that this training 
regimen has not produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi mechanics. 
As of August 11, 2006, only 26 of the 191 Iraqis that had been enrolled 
in the on-the-job training program had completed this training. 

The national maintenance contract's statement of work also requires the 
contractor to determine and maintain an adequate authorized stockage 
level (ASL) for all equipment repaired, with the intent of the ASL 
being to reduce the "wait time" for parts. According to Coalition 
officials, although an ASL has been completed, updated, and partially 
funded by the Coalition, the MOD has not yet budgeted for maintaining 
the ASL once the contract expires in March 2007. Coalition officials 
fear that a failure by the Iraqis to budget for and maintain the ASL 
will result in repair part shortfalls that will have a concomitant 
negative impact on equipment readiness levels.[Footnote 14] 

Coalition officials have remarked that the national maintenance 
contract is too expensive for the MOD to continue past its March 2007 
end date. Coalition officials have presented an alternative to the 
national maintenance contract based on foreign military sales and 
direct vendor contracts to the MOD. As of August 2006, the MOD had 
taken no action with regard to this alternative.[Footnote 15] 

Command and Control Capability Is Hampered by Lack of Ministerial 
Policies and Procedures, a Shortage of Leadership, Lack of a 
Communications Doctrine, and Training Challenges: 

Although the MOD's command and control structure is still under 
development, Coalition and Iraqi Army officials identified several 
challenges that need to be addressed before full capability is 
achieved. These include the development of ministerial policies and 
procedures, the growth of Iraq's military leadership, the development 
of an effective communications infrastructure, and the training of 
communications specialists. 

Leadership, Procedures, and Policies Need to be Developed: 

According to senior Coalition officials, one of their greatest 
challenges is getting their Iraqi counterparts on the ministerial and 
Joint Headquarters Staff to agree on their respective roles and 
responsibilities. This confusion stems in large part from an absence of 
accepted procedures and policies. Echoing this claim is an August 1, 
2006, Coalition assessment of the MOD's executive support measures of 
effectiveness. This assessment rates all of the following core 
competencies as "ineffective" the ministry's development and 
implementation of a decision-making process; a process for the overall 
professionalization of the ministry; a directive that establishes terms 
of reference for ministry officials, civilian and military; a process 
for oversight and periodic review of decisions; and development and 
establishment of policy and procedures for command and control under 
provisions of the Constitution. Coalition officials, working in concert 
with their Iraqi counterparts, are addressing each of these 
shortcomings. In August 2006, these officials stated that they believe 
that the June 2006 naming of a Minister of Defense will contribute much 
to the development and implementation of appropriate procedures and 
policies. They stress, however, that without effective procedures and 
policies, command and control of the Iraqi military will suffer from 
confusion, lack of coordination, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency. 

According to a July 2006 MNSTC-I report, although leadership 
development programs for the Iraqi military are under way and a senior 
officer selection committee has been established to identify Iraq's 
future leaders, these measures will take time to have an effect. 
However, the report stresses that it has become increasingly evident 
that the larger and more complex the Iraqi Army has become, the harder 
it is to find senior leaders at the rank of lieutenant colonel and 
above able to provide confident, competent commanders and senior staff. 

Communications Doctrine Needs to Be Developed: 

According to Coalition and Iraqi Army officials, as of August 2006, the 
MOD had not yet agreed on an Iraqi Army communications doctrine. 
According to these same officials, a communications doctrine is 
essential to the establishment of an effective communications system 
which, in turn, is an essential part of a command and control system. 

Training Challenges Remain: 

As of August 2006, several challenges exist in training Iraqi signal 
officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. The 28-day training 
program, which is conducted at the Iraqi Signal School at Taji, is the 
same for all students regardless of rank and includes basic computer 
skills, preventive maintenance checks and services, basic radio 
communications procedures, and hands-on training with antennae and the 
various radios employed by the Iraqi Army. The officials stated that 
what is needed are several more courses specifically designed to train 
Iraqi Army officers and noncommissioned officers in more advanced 
procedures. Five such courses are envisioned for the future (a signal 
officer basic and advanced course, a noncommissioned officer basic and 
advanced course, and a signal military occupational specialty course), 
but a lack of qualified instructors has undermined efforts to establish 
these courses. And finally, according to a senior Iraqi Army signal 
officer, there is a tendency throughout the Iraqi Army to improperly 
employ the Signal School's enlisted graduates. Despite having been 
trained in communications, once the students return to their units they 
are employed as infantrymen, while officers, who may not have graduated 
from the Signal School, run the radios. 

Ministry of Interior Is Developing Support Capabilities, but Has Not 
Resolved Logistical and Communications Challenges: 

Although the Ministry of Interior and its Coalition advisers are 
developing a logistics concept and the ministry has demonstrated 
accountability for some commodities, the ministry faces challenges in 
the supply of its forces and maintenance of its vehicles and the 
logistics concept may not fully address MOI forces based in the 
provinces. In the area of command and control, the MOI has fielded 
communications technologies, but maintenance and procedural challenges 
limit the capabilities of these systems. 

MOI and Coalition Are Developing a Logistics Concept and MOI Has 
Accountability for Some Commodities, but MOI Faces Supply and 
Maintenance Challenges: 

The Coalition and Ministry of Interior are currently developing a 
logistics concept for the ministry's forces, but the concept may not be 
ready for ministry approval until December 2006.[Footnote 16] The 
ministry is experiencing logistics challenges in several areas, 
including the repair of police vehicles and the maintenance of its 
radios. Also, it is unclear whether the draft logistics concept for the 
MOI will fully address forces located outside the capital. 

Logistics Concept May Not Be Ready for MOI Consideration until December 
2006: 

According to a Coalition document, the Coalition's goal is to develop a 
Ministry of Interior logistics system in which the central government 
procures and distributes commodities; supports both the MOI's federal 
forces (National Police and Border Forces) and those forces that are 
based in each of Iraq's 18 provinces (Iraqi Police Service, Facility 
Protection Service, and Fire/Civil Defense); and provides 
accountability of items such as vehicles, weapons, and durable 
equipment. In August 2006, this was the end state envisioned by the 
Coalition for the ministry's logistics system, and although the MOI has 
not yet approved the draft logistics concept being developed by the 
Coalition, Coalition officials stated that one of the ministry's 
organizations has implemented accountability of some commodities. 

The draft logistics concept calls for a system of five to seven 
warehouses that would perform maintenance on communications equipment 
and weapons and would include three distribution centers to dispense 
supplies. In addition, the concept is to include contracts that would 
provide maintenance of vehicles and communications equipment. Although 
we did not examine the proposed contracts, Coalition officials stated 
that the proposed contracts will include $130 million in Coalition 
funding for 12 months of vehicle maintenance and $4.5 million in MOI 
funding for 12 months of radio maintenance and training of Iraqi 
mechanics. A Coalition official also stated that these contracts are 
intended as temporary solutions to provide maintenance until the MOI is 
able to develop its own capabilities in these areas.[Footnote 17] An 
August 2006 Coalition document states that in February 2007, the MOI 
would assume operation of six warehouses that supply ministerial forces 
and were being run by a Coalition-funded contractor.[Footnote 18] 

MOI Has Exercised Accountability over Some Commodities, but Still Faces 
Maintenance Challenges: 

The end state envisioned by the Coalition for the MOI's logistics 
system calls for the logistics system to provide accountability over 
items including vehicles, weapons, and durable equipment. While the 
ministry has not approved the draft logistics concept, a Coalition 
official stated that one of the ministry's organizations, the National 
Police, has demonstrated accountability for certain commodities, for 
example, vehicles, weapons, and uniforms. 

However, the ministry is experiencing significant supply and 
maintenance challenges in several other areas. According to a July 2006 
Coalition assessment, the MOI's logistics capabilities are ineffective 
because the force being developed by the Coalition for the MOI is 
overwhelming the ministry's existing logistics capabilities and a lack 
of centralized contracting and budget authorities limit MOI oversight. 
Because of this ineffectiveness, the Coalition was procuring and 
distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the MOI, and a 
Coalition-funded contractor was running warehouses that supply 
ministerial forces and providing transportation of supplies from these 
warehouses to MOI facilities.[Footnote 19] 

Coalition officials also stated that the MOI faces maintenance 
challenges. In August 2006, approximately 1,600 police vehicles were 
inoperable in Baghdad alone. In addition, MOI personnel are unable to 
maintain a certain type of American truck delivered by Coalition forces 
because these personnel are unable to work with the vehicles' 
computerized systems. As of August 2006, the ministry had 1,179 trucks 
of this type on hand.[Footnote 20] Coalition officials also stated that 
there is little or no sustainment of certain types of police radio 
equipment. 

It is unclear how the logistics concept in development will address 
some of the challenges the MOI faces. For instance, the MOI does not 
currently have a program to perform vehicle maintenance, and although 
we did not examine it, Coalition officials explained that the vehicle 
maintenance contract under consideration will operate only in Baghdad. 
As of August 2006, the draft logistics concept did not include a means 
to transport MOI vehicles from other parts of the country to 
Baghdad.[Footnote 21] 

Logistics Concept May Not Fully Address Provincial Forces' Needs: 

Another related challenge is that the Coalition and ministry are 
unclear on how the concept will incorporate MOI forces in Iraq's 18 
provinces. One goal for the logistics system is to support ministerial 
forces in the provinces. However, in August 2006, a Coalition official 
explained that the future logistical relationship between the MOI's 
headquarters and its forces located in the provinces remained unclear. 
For instance, while Iraqi Police Service units located in the provinces 
are part of the ministry's forces, funding for these units is 
controlled by each provincial governor. In August 2006, a Coalition 
official stated that the then-current draft logistics concept 
incorporated some of the ministry's provincial forces. However, the 
extent to which the forces are included is unclear. Also, because the 
relationship between the ministry and its provincial forces is still 
being defined by Iraqi officials, the MOI's eventual draft logistics 
concept may not fully address provincial forces. 

Although the Coalition is currently focused on certain MOI forces that 
operate on a federal level (National Police, Border Forces, and the 
ministry's national headquarters in Baghdad), as the relationship 
between the ministry and its provincial forces becomes clearer and the 
concept evolves, Coalition officials explained that the logistical 
relationship between the ministry's headquarters and its provincial 
forces may be clarified in the concept. According to an August 2006 
Coalition document, the focus of the ministry's future logistics 
efforts were to shift to provincial forces. However, the timeline for 
this shift is unclear. 

MOI Has Fielded Command and Control Communications Technologies, but 
Maintenance and Procedural Challenges Limit Capability: 

While we did not examine the contracts ourselves, a Coalition official 
stated that Coalition-funded contractors have built two command and 
control networks for the Ministry of Interior: the Advanced First 
Responder Network, which is intended to provide communication between 
police forces, the ministerial headquarters, and Iraqi military forces 
in 15 Iraqi cities; and the Iraqi Command and Control Network, which is 
designed to link the MOI's national and provincial headquarters. The 
MOI's forces are also being equipped with short-and long-range radios 
that allow these forces to communicate among themselves and with Iraqi 
military units. 

As of August 2006, the MOI's progress in developing a national command 
and control network had been mixed. Installation of the Advanced First 
Responder Network was complete; work on the Iraqi Command and Control 
Network was ongoing, with 52 percent of funded sites installed; and 
most of the of short-and long-range radios have been deployed (about 91 
percent and 81 percent of authorized requirements, respectively). 

Although these technologies have been fielded, the MOI faces 
substantial challenges in the area of national command and control. For 
example, the capability of the Advanced First Responder Network is 
limited by infrastructure insufficiencies, the fragility of Iraq's 
electrical grid, and by the MOI's inability to replace critical 
components. 

Infrastructure, Maintenance, and Procedural Challenges Limit the 
Capabilities of Certain Communications Technologies: 

According to a Coalition document, the $218.5 million Advanced First 
Responder Network was installed through a Coalition-funded contract and 
is intended to provide a communications system for first responders by 
integrating MOI police with local, provincial, and national public 
safety headquarters and Iraqi military units through radio, secure 
voice, data, and global positioning system services. In its current 
form, the network was designed to provide communication for MOI forces 
operating in 15 Iraqi cities. Although, according to a Coalition 
document, 65 percent of the country's population lives in these cities, 
the network does not provide national coverage. Several of Iraq's 18 
provinces--including Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah in the northeast, al- 
Anbar in the west, and Maysan in the east--do not have a city covered 
by the network. 

According to a Coalition document, other infrastructure insufficiencies 
also limit the network's capability. For instance, certain switches 
operate in a way that is not compatible with communications systems in 
Iraq and a system of microwave relay towers used to transmit signals is 
poorly designed. 

Another challenge is maintaining consistent power for the network. 
According to a Coalition official who worked with the MOI's Directorate 
of Communications, the fragility of Iraq's electrical grid means that 
the network must be powered with generators. The relatively small 
number of backup generators presents an additional challenge because 
the loss of a generator can result in a substantial loss in network 
capability. 

Challenges faced by the MOI in replacing parts compound the loss of 
capability caused by infrastructure insufficiencies and inconsistent 
power. For three reasons, the ministry has difficulty replacing parts. 
First, while we did not examine the contract, a Coalition official 
stated that the original contract to build the network does not require 
the contractor to provide spare parts. For instance, according to a 
Coalition document, replacement of faulty switches falls outside the 
scope of the operations and maintenance contract. Second, according to 
another Coalition document, although the ministry's Directorate of 
Communications has agreed to assume responsibility for operations and 
maintenance in January 2007, it is unclear whether the Minister of 
Interior has agreed to that decision. Third, the ministry's Directorate 
of Finance has refused a request for additional funding for the network 
made by the Directorate of Communications. In August 2006, a Coalition 
official stated that without additional funding to address these 
challenges, the network would likely fail within 3 months.[Footnote 22] 

In addition, as of August 2006, the MOI had not yet begun to develop 
the standard operating procedures[Footnote 23] that govern how it will 
run its communications networks. However, according to Coalition 
officials, Iraqi staff in the National Command Center[Footnote 24] are 
implementing standard operating procedures provided by the Coalition 
and are making progress in their implementation. For instance, the 
outgoing shift now briefs the incoming shift, the center's work space 
is arranged for more effective communication, and the Center staff now 
has adequate technology. 

In a July 2006 assessment, the Coalition judged the MOI's communication 
capabilities as partly effective. A Coalition official who works with 
the ministry to develop its command and control capabilities explained 
that while the MOI has several communications technologies in place or 
in the process of being installed, as of August 2006, these had not 
been coordinated to form a functioning national command and control 
network. 

Concluding Observations: 

The Coalition has been working to transfer full security 
responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. With 
regard to the development of logistics capabilities, Coalition 
officials stated that the MOD has progressed further than the MOI. In 
regard to the development of command and control capabilities, we were 
unable to determine if one ministry had made significantly more 
progress than the other. This is because Coalition and Iraqi government 
efforts in this area are numerous and in various stages of development, 
making them difficult to compare. We plan to address this comparison in 
subsequent work on ISF support capabilities. Further, according to 
senior Coalition officials, the seating of the Ministers of Defense and 
Interior in June 2006 sets the conditions for even greater progress 
toward attaining ISF self-reliance. However, significant challenges 
must be overcome before the ISF achieves full capability. These include 
training Iraqi logisticians and communications specialists, maintaining 
Iraqi vehicles and equipment, and developing policies and procedures 
within the ministries. Without qualified logisticians and 
communications specialists, reliable vehicles and equipment, and 
accepted policies and procedures, the Iraqi forces cannot achieve the 
self-sufficiency upon which the drawdown of Coalition forces depends. 
Coalition officials recognize these challenges and state they work 
daily to rectify them. 

Agency Comments: 

DOD provided official oral comments on a draft of this correspondence 
and stated that it had no comments on our findings and observations. 
DOD also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the 
correspondence where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will also be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your 
staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key Contributors to this report included 
Marilyn Wasleski, Assistant Director; Katherine Lenane, Guy LoFaro, 
Christopher Turner, Cheryl Weissman, and Gerald Winterlin. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

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(350989): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and 
Jordan academies with support from the State Department and the Justice 
Department. The CPA's Coalition Military Assistance Training Team was 
responsible for training a new Iraqi Army. 

[2] MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army III Corps forward deployed 
to Camp Victory, Baghdad. 

[3] 31 U.S.C.  717(b)(1)(2000). 

[4] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi 
Security Forces' Support Capabilities, GAO-07-120C (Washington, D.C.: 
March 7, 2007). 

[5] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi 
Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities, GAO-07-582T (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 9, 2007). 

[6] Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period, March 2004. 

[7] See GAO, Iraq's Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R (Washington, D.C.: 
May 25, 2004) for more information on key events during Iraq's 
transitional period. 

[8] The areas of health and garrison support are not addressed in this 
report. 

[9] In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, 
DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop 
maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National 
Depot. According to DOD, if these funds are not procured, the National 
Depot's construction will be affected and the shortfall will 
necessitate the continued presence and support of Coalition forces 
further into the future. 

[10] According to updated information we obtained in December 2006, the 
MOD was still developing the RSUs and they would not be transitioned to 
full Iraqi control until June 2007. Moreover, the same update revealed 
that full transition of the GSUs to Iraqi control would not occur until 
late 2007. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund 
request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining 
facilities for GSUs and RSUs. Without this funding, DOD states that 
those facilities might go months or years without use while waiting for 
equipment to be delivered through Iraqi acquisitions systems. According 
to DOD, if that were to occur the Coalition would not be able to 
diminish its support. 

[11] As a result of the literacy problem within the country, MNSTC-I 
has developed a literacy course. 

[12] Coalition officials stated that the information they provided us 
about the MOD's vehicle inventory was fairly complete as of that point 
in time, but acknowledged that there may be some vehicles in the MOD's 
inventory over which they do not have visibility. 

[13] According to DOD's Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund request, 
a portion of the $1,043 million it has requested for equipment and 
transportation will be used to purchase common system vehicles for the 
MOD, with an eye toward reducing the fleet to just one or two systems. 

[14] In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, 
DOD has asked for $499.6 million to procure recommended levels of 
supplies initially required to meet Iraqi wholesale and retail 
authorized stockage levels for most major classes of supplies. If it 
does not receive this funding, DOD states that the Iraqis will require 
continued support from Coalition forces. 

[15] According to a DOD official, MNSTC-I has reprogrammed some of its 
funds to extend the national maintenance contract beyond its March 2007 
expiration date. 

[16] As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the 
draft logistics concept proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this 
is unclear. 

[17] It seems that MOI's dependence on Coalition support of its 
logistical facilities will continue into fiscal year 2008. DOD states 
that the MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental 
Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and 
sustainment of warehouse and maintenance depots. 

[18] According to an update we received from DOD in December 2006, only 
one of the six warehouses will transition to Iraqi control by February 
2007. The remaining five are to continue under Coalition control until 
July 2007. 

[19] These challenges have continued and the MOI remains dependent on 
the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. 

[20] According to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain 
unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most of the 
MOI's vehicles. Moreover, a significant component of the MOI's forces, 
the National Police, is unable to maintain its vehicles. 

[21] DOD is requesting $145 million to build 130 maintenance facilities 
for the MOI. DOD states that without this infrastructure the ministry 
will not be able to maintain its vehicle fleet. 

[22] DOD has requested $27 million in U.S. funding for MOI 
communications maintenance and has stated that without this money, 
MOI's radio networks will be severely jeopardized, its first responder 
network will degrade and become inoperable, and the MOI will be unable 
to assume responsibility for its national command and control network. 

[23] Standard operating procedures are a set of instructions covering 
those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or 
standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. 

[24] According to a document provided by Coalition officials, the 
National Command Center maintains nationwide strategic and operational 
situational awareness and exercises command and control in order to 
implement plans and policy and track the execution of all operations 
for the Ministry of Interior.

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