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September 7, 2005:

Report to Congressional Committees:

Subject: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 

Fostering a democratic and publicly elected government in Iraq is a 
U.S. foreign policy priority. According to the President, the United 
States intends to help Iraq achieve democracy and has a vital national 
interest in the success of free institutions in Iraq. Toward that end, 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred power to a 
sovereign Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. With assistance 
from the United Nations (UN) and international community,[Footnote 1] 
the interim government held a national election for a transitional 
National Assembly on January 30, 2005. To help Iraq prepare for this 
election, the United States obligated approximately $130 million to 
provide assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq 
(IECI),[Footnote 2] Iraqi nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and 
political entities. Much of this assistance is directed at not only the 
January 30 elections but also the two subsequent elections--a 
constitutional referendum and political election--scheduled before the 
end of 2005.

As part of our effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, we have gathered 
information on efforts to support Iraq's political transition. This 
report was initiated under the Comptroller General's statutory 
authority and is being addressed to the committees of jurisdiction. In 
particular, this report provides information on (1) U.S. assistance to 
Iraq for the elections and (2) improvements in the elections process 
that participating organizations identified for future elections.

To address these objectives, we interviewed staff and examined 
documents from U.S. agencies, grant recipients, and UN agencies; we 
also attended a UN conference on the January 2005 elections. Our 
description of elections assistance is limited to programs funded 
through U.S. appropriations for nonsecurity elections assistance, as 
reported in grant agreements and publicly available Department of State 
and other U.S. government reports to Congress.[Footnote 3] To describe 
U.S. assistance, we interviewed staff in Washington, D.C., on-site in 
Amman, Jordan, and by telephone in Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined 
documents such as grant agreements, work plans, performance monitoring 
plans, and periodic reporting from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Department of State, the National Endowment of 
Democracy, IFES,[Footnote 4] the International Republican Institute 
(IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and other grantees. We 
traveled to Amman, Jordan, to meet with officials from the U.S. 
government and implementing partners. Due to security conditions, we 
were unable to travel to Iraq. As feasible, we spoke to representatives 
from Iraqi NGOs to obtain information on their U.S.-funded programs. 
Program results and other data in this correspondence are based on 
reports and information from the organizations noted above and our 
review of U.S. government oversight of them. We believe the data are 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To describe 
improvements for future Iraqi elections, we attended a UN conference at 
which organizations that helped prepare for the elections identified 
problems and improvements; we also reviewed the UN's summary report of 
the conference. We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 
2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 


The United States obligated approximately $130 million for nonsecurity 
assistance to help Iraq undertake elections in 2005. The largest U.S.- 
funded area of nonsecurity election assistance was $41.1 million 
awarded by USAID to IFES to provide technical expertise directly to the 
IECI to help it conduct the elections and make key procurements. The 
Department of State provided $30 million to NDI and IRI to advise, 
train, and help organize democratically oriented political parties. 
Both USAID and the Department of State funded $25.2 million of voter 
education efforts in Iraq, with grants obligated to IRI, Voice for 
Humanity, and Iraqi NGOs to conduct voter outreach. USAID provided an 
additional grant of $14.2 million to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network 
to identify and monitor elections-related violence. USAID also 
obligated $14 million to NDI to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections 
monitor network. The United States sought the participation of Iraqi 
women in elections with $5.8 million from the Department of State and 
through USAID's integrated gender strategy. The United States, through 
the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), also helped the Iraqi 
government provide security to conduct the elections.

The UN, which coordinated assistance from the international community, 
convened a post-elections conference that included IECI, IFES, UN, and 
USAID officials to assess preparations for the January 30, 2005, 
elections and to identify areas needing improvement before the next 
elections. Conference participants identified overall elections 
management, media involvement in the elections process, and voter 
education as areas needing improvement. For example, regarding 
elections management, participants noted that reporting systems and 
communication practices among elections headquarters, governorate 
offices, and district offices need to be improved to avoid confusion 
about official policy guidance. In addition, participants suggested 
that the IECI develop a way to address regional differences in voter 
education. For example, the development of materials by the IECI in 
languages such as Assyrian and Turkmen would help avoid inconsistencies 
and inaccurate translations of official voter education materials.


On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi 
interim government. Under the Law of Administration for the State of 
Iraq for the Transitional Period, this interim government was 
responsible for holding an election for a 275-member transitional 
National Assembly. The election occurred on January 30, 2005, and as a 
result, 12 political entities won at least one seat in the National 
Assembly (see table 1). Out of approximately 14.3 million registered 
voters, almost 8.5 million voted, according to State Department 
reporting. The transitional National Assembly first met on March 16, 
2005, and subsequently elected the Presidency Council--a president and 
two deputies.

Table 1: Transitional National Assembly Results from the January 2005 

Political entity: Unified Iraq Coalition; 
Number of seats: 140.

Political entity: Kurdistan Alliance List; 
Number of seats: 75.

Political entity: Iraqi List; 
Number of seats: 40.

Political entity: Iraqis; 
Number of seats: 5.

Political entity: Turkman Iraq Front; 
Number of seats: 3.

Political entity: National Independent Cadres and Elites; 
Number of seats: 3.

Political entity: Islamic Action Organization in Iraq/Central 
Number of seats: 2.

Political entity: Islamic Group of Kurdistan/Iraq; 
Number of seats: 2.

Political entity: Nation Union; 
Number of seats: 2.

Political entity: Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering; 
Number of seats: 1.

Political entity: National Democratic Alliance; 
Number of seats: 1.

Political entity: Al Rafideen National List; 
Number of seats: 1.

Political entity: Total; 
Number of seats: 275.

Source: IFES.

[End of table]

A key function of the National Assembly is to write a draft 
constitution that the Iraqi people will then vote on in a general 
referendum to be held by October 15, 2005, (see fig. 1). If the 
permanent constitution is approved, elections for a permanent 
government would take place no later than December 15, 2005, and the 
permanent government would take office no later than December 31, 2005. 
However, if a majority of Iraqi voters do not approve the draft 
constitution or if two-thirds of the voters in three or more 
governorates reject it, the National Assembly will be dissolved. 
Elections for a new National Assembly would then take place by December 
15, 2005. The new government would continue to operate under the 
transitional law and would be responsible for drafting another 

Figure 1: Timeline for Iraqi Elections:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure] 

U.S. Programs Help Develop the Capacity of Iraqis to Undertake 2005 

The United States obligated about $130 million in nonsecurity 
assistance for the Iraqi 2005 elections in the areas of elections 
administration assistance, political party development, voter 
education, elections violence monitoring, domestic monitoring, and 
women's participation. Most of the major programs related to the 
elections are to continue through the end of 2005. Figure 2 illustrates 
the breakdown of U.S.-funded areas of nonsecurity elections assistance; 
enclosure 1 provides a list of the grants that fund U.S. electoral 
assistance to Iraq. In addition to nonsecurity assistance, the 
Department of Defense provided security and logistics support to the 
Iraqi government throughout the electoral process.

Figure 2: U.S.-funded Areas of Nonsecurity Elections Assistance: 
[Footnote 5]

[See PDF for image]

Note: Percentages do not add due to rounding. Total U.S. nonsecurity 
elections assistance is $130.3 million.

[End of figure] 

U.S. Programs Provide Iraq with Elections Administration Assistance:

Of the approximately $130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi 
elections, USAID obligated more than $41 million, approximately 32 
percent, for elections administration assistance. USAID provided 
initial funding for elections administration in September and November 
2003, with two grants totaling more than $1 million to IFES to conduct 
a pre-election assessment and develop a plan and budget to administer 
the elections. IFES identified Iraq's electoral needs, including an 
electoral institution, legal framework, voter education effort, and 
election security. USAID also provided two smaller grants to Iraqi 
authorities to test the reliability of the Public Distribution 
Information System database[Footnote 6] for use in voter registration. 
These assessments helped lay the foundation for future U.S. assistance 
and, according to one IFES official, for executing the January 2005 
elections. For example, the IECI used the database to develop the voter 

In September 2004, USAID obligated $40 million to IFES to develop the 
IECI as an elections administrative and regulatory body. This 
assistance included providing the IECI with a legal review of elections 
regulations, training staff, planning logistics, and procuring needed 
items for the January 30 elections. For example, IFES procured the 
printed voter registration forms because the IECI lacked appropriate 
contracting processes. IFES also paid to have the voter lists printed 
and distributed for a public challenge period. IFES is continuing such 
assistance activities to the IECI to support the upcoming elections.

U.S. Programs Assist the Nonpartisan Development of Iraqi Political 
Entities and Parties:

The United States obligated nearly $30 million of the approximately 
$130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections for political party 
development and assistance. These grants were provided by the National 
Endowment for Democracy and USAID and were implemented by NDI and IRI. 
The objective of the nonpartisan assistance was to build and strengthen 
movements and parties to build a broad democratic coalition that is 
supportive of a stable, democratic Iraq. Neither NDI nor IRI excluded 
political entities or candidates from their training programs based on 
their political leanings.

Both State and USAID provided funding to NDI and IRI to assess Iraqi 
political parties' needs and capacities. NDI and IRI conducted a joint 
assessment in early 2004 that provided an analysis of emerging 
political organizations and the political environment for party 
development in Iraq. The assessment described Iraqi political entities, 
including their staffing, membership, recruitment, finances, and 
platforms. The report made the recommendation that party assistance 
should never be in the form of direct cash assistance but could include 
access to meeting space, telecommunications and internet access, 
printing, and photocopying facilities.

NDI's and IRI's political party programs have operated since 2003 and 
include training Iraqi leaders and representatives from political 
entities in organizing a campaign, developing a constituency, and 
understanding IECI regulations. According to NDI and IRI sources, the 
nonpartisan political party assistance programs also helped political 
leaders and representatives develop communication skills such as public 
speaking and message development; the program also helped political 
parties produce commercials and other outreach materials. NDI and IRI 
conducted group workshops and consultations, created resource centers 
and media centers, and issued newsletters and other outreach materials 
as part of their programs. According to NDI reports, NDI provided 
training to 40 of the 111 political entities running in the national 
elections and to 35 of the 87 women elected to the transitional 
National Assembly.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Develop and Implement 
Voter Education Campaign:

The United States obligated more than $25 million, approximately 19 
percent of the total for Iraqi electoral assistance, to voter education 
activities. Some of these grants, including IRI's voter education 
program, are scheduled to continue through the end of 2005.[Footnote 7]

USAID obligated nearly $24 million to IRI to develop an NGO network, 
the Civic Coalition for Free Elections, to design and implement a 
national voter education campaign to inform and mobilize voters. 
According to IRI, this network, made up of 63 NGOs, developed public 
service announcements for television. For example, IRI reported that 
the coalition organized Iraq's first televised candidate debates that 
included airing IRI-developed announcements to viewers during station 
breaks. The coalition and other civic groups developed and disseminated 
thousands of election brochures, t-shirts, and posters. The coalition 
also assisted the Rafadin Women's Coalition with a voter education 
campaign to emphasize the message that women should vote according to 
their own beliefs. IRI further reported that it worked separately with 
eight Sunni organizations and five women's organizations to execute 
voter education activities targeting specific groups and geographic 
regions. For example, according to IRI, an Iraqi coalition member 
organized an elections conference for 130 women civic leaders from 
Kirkuk and Mosul.

USAID also provided $1 million to Voice for Humanity to implement a 
voter education campaign through the use of media players with pre- 
recorded messages and programming. These messages and programs 
emphasized elections as a path to security and peace. According to 
Voice for Humanity, it distributed 15,000 such devices throughout Iraq 
through social networks that included tribal sheiks, religious leaders, 
and political leaders in the latter half of January 2005. Further, 
Voice for Humanity estimated that 20 percent of the devices were 
provided to Sunnis.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Systematically Monitor 
Elections-related Violence:

USAID obligated $14.2 million, approximately 11 percent of the nearly 
$130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to IFES to build 
an Iraqi NGO network that would identify and monitor elections-related 
violence. According to IFES officials, 45 days before the January 2005 
elections, IFES-trained monitors were operating throughout Iraq 
gathering information on elections-related violence. Once the monitors 
verified the information, they aggregated these incidents into a Web- 
based database designed to track information about where, when, and who 
had been involved in elections-related violence. The program also 
reported having recruited and hired local staff for each governorate 
and opened regional offices in Baghdad, Erbil, and Basra. IFES conflict 
mitigation program is scheduled to continue through early 2006.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi Capacity to Monitor and Report on Electoral 

USAID obligated $14 million, approximately 11 percent of the total U.S. 
assistance for Iraqi elections, to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic 
elections monitor network and train party agent elections monitors. NDI 
reported having provided training and assistance to help form the Iraqi 
Election Information Network (EIN) comprised of over 150 NGOs. 
According to EIN, more than 8,000 domestic monitors were deployed on 
January 30 to approximately 80 percent of polling stations. In February 
2005, EIN issued and disseminated a final report that described polling 
center security, ballot box integrity, opening and closing of polling 
stations, voter finger inking, voter identity verification, and vote 

NDI and IRI also provided party agent monitor[Footnote 8] training 
through their political party assistance programs. IRI created an 
educational manual in cooperation with IECI to inform party officials 
about the rules surrounding party agent monitors. According to IRI, 
15,000 copies of the manual were distributed to political parties in 
the Baghdad area.

U.S. Programs Encourage Women's Participation in Elections through 
Multiple Programs:

The United States obligated more than $5.8 million in grants, primarily 
through the Department of State, for local nongovernmental 
organizations to encourage women's participation in the electoral 
process. Grantees reported having provided leadership training for 
women candidates--designed to, among other things, enhance candidates' 
public speaking and media skills--in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, and 
Sulaymaniya, as well as follow-up consultations with women elected to 
national and regional legislative bodies. The grants were also used to 
establish women's centers to organize trainings, provide resources, and 
build an advocacy network for women. Additional grant activities 
included voter education to increase awareness and public support for 
women's involvement in the political process. In addition to Department 
of State funding, the U.S. Institute of Peace provided funding to 
conduct conferences to train Iraqi women on candidacy and political 
participation. USAID has supported the participation of women by 
developing a strategy to incorporate gender considerations into each of 
its grants.[Footnote 9]

The Department of Defense (DOD) Helped Provide Security and Logistics:

In addition to U.S. nonsecurity assistance, DOD provided support to the 
Iraqi government for both security and logistics as part of MNF- 
I.[Footnote 10] At the time of Iraq's elections, more than 159,000 U.S. 
forces and 24,500 coalition forces were operating throughout Iraq as 
part of MNF-I. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior was responsible for 
providing a secure environment for all phases of elections, preventing 
threats and criminal activities, and facilitating full public 
participation in the elections. Iraqi Armed Forces and Iraqi Police 
were responsible for providing security at the polling sites. MNF-I 
forces provided support as needed to Iraqi forces.[Footnote 11] Figure 
3 depicts the security concept developed for the elections. In addition 
to its security support, DOD provided logistics assistance to the Iraqi 
government, including transporting election materials throughout the 
country to polling places and counting stations.

Figure 3: Iraqi Ministry of Interior's Security Concept for Polling 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: This is a notional concept diagram illustrating the Iraqi 
Ministry of Interior's general plan for polling center security. Each 
polling center was secured according to its configuration and 
individual security needs.

[End of figure] 

Participants in UN Conference Noted Improvements Needed before Upcoming 

In March 2005, the UN convened a conference to assess the electoral 
activities and preparations that led to the January 30 elections and to 
define areas requiring additional assistance before the next elections. 
Conference participants included IECI, IFES, the UN, USAID, and United 
Kingdom Department for International Development officials; 
representatives of the international monitoring effort; and experts 
from academia. Conference participants identified areas needing 
improvement, including overall elections management, access to media, 
and voter education. The following summarizes the key areas for 
improvement that were discussed at the conference.

IECI management: According to participants in the conference, aspects 
of IECI's management need to be formalized and strengthened. For 
example, it was rare that IECI headquarters' instructions were formally 
issued to the field as institutional guidance, resulting in confusion 
among field electoral administration personnel, who were unable to 
identify official policy guidance. Participants noted that reporting 
systems and communication practices among headquarters, governorate 
offices, and district offices need improvement. In addition, conference 
participants recommended that management and decision-making practices 
in the IECI Board of Commissioners and Electoral Administration ought 
to be formalized. These include clarifying and defining the roles and 
responsibilities of IECI staff and officials, documenting the 
decisions, and making the decisions accessible.

Media issues: According to conference participants, the Chairman of the 
Board of Commissioners should be the only official representative of 
the IECI to the media to convey public information on policy issues. At 
the time of the January elections, more than one board member held 
press conferences, creating confusion as to who could make official 
IECI statements. Participants also agreed that an independent 
monitoring entity was needed to observe and assess media involvement in 
the electoral process, as well as candidates' and political entities' 
electoral activities in the media. A monitoring entity would help the 
IECI understand the media's role in elections and ways to work 
effectively with the media to convey information.

Voter education: Participants noted that voter education efforts needed 
to be improved, particularly throughout diverse regions. Poor 
translations into other languages, such as Assyrian and Turkmen, 
resulted in inaccuracies and showed a lack of sensitivity to these 
populations. Participants suggested that these languages should be used 
in future elections. In addition, the IECI should develop a way to 
maintain a consistent message regarding the elections and electoral 
process throughout the country while addressing regional differences in 
perceptions and culture. Further, the IECI should work more closely 
with both governmental and nongovernmental groups to assist in 
conducting the voter education campaign to reach a larger number of 
voters, and in strengthening public outreach at governorate and 
district levels. In addition, because of limited access to electricity 
and television, conference participants noted that the use of radio and 
interactive face-to-face activities were needed.

In addition to these specific recommendations, participants identified 
the following areas that needed improvement.

Training: Conference participants believed that training for polling 
staff, security personnel, media officials, and reporters on their 
roles and responsibilities in electoral activities needed to be 
improved. For example, because of insufficient training of polling 
staff, an unknown number of ballots were excluded from the official 
vote count due to improper processing.

International assistance: Conference participants also called for the 
prompt deployment of more international experts to additional locations 
to assist in electoral events. Because of the limited training and 
experience of IECI personnel, international advisers are important in 
providing assistance and advice.

Legal framework: According to participants, establishing mechanisms to 
ensure equity among candidates, including provisions to limit spending 
and report finances, is another area where improvements are needed.

Candidate certification: Conference participants stated that the IECI 
needed more resources to verify candidates' compliance with 
certification requirements. The IECI currently has limited resources, 
which hampers it from investigating candidates' affiliation with 

Filing election complaints: According to conference participants, 
expanding the times and locations and better publicizing the procedures 
for filing complaints is also needed. Although there were media reports 
and allegations of voter fraud, the IECI did not investigate because it 
did not receive any complaints through the official process.

Agency Comments:

We requested comments from the USAID and the Departments of State and 
Defense. USAID provided written comments, which are reproduced in 
enclosure 2, and technical comments, which we have incorporated as 
appropriate. USAID found the report to be factually correct. The 
Department of State declined to provide written comments, but provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The 
Department of Defense declined to comment.

Concluding Remarks and Observations:

Elections are a critical goal for achieving the U.S. policy objective 
of a peaceful and stable Iraq. As of the issuance of this report, Iraq 
was on schedule for undertaking the referendum by October 15, 2005. The 
United States also continues to support the capacity of Iraqis 
(including the IECI, civil society groups, and political parties) to 
execute the next set of electoral events by funding IECI technical 
assistance, voter education, political party assistance, conflict 
mitigation, domestic monitoring, women's participation, and military 
support. Programs in these areas are scheduled to continue through 2005 
or the next parliamentary elections. The UN has continued its 
involvement in Iraqi elections, holding a conference in March 2005 
where participants noted areas requiring additional assistance before 
the next elections, including IECI management, media issues, and voter 
education. The UN also conducted a needs assessment mission in June 
2005 for the upcoming constitutional referendum and subsequent 
political elections.

We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at If 
you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for of our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs maybe found on the last page 
of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in 
enclosure 3.

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:

Enclosures - 3:

[End of section] 

List of Recipients:

The Honorable John Warner:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.: 
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Ted Stevens:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:

United States Senate:
The Honorable Mitch McConnell:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Jim Kolbe:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:

Enclosure I:

Table 2: U.S. Assistance for Iraqi Elections by Area of Assistance as 
of March 31, 2005:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of grant agreements from USAID, the Department of 
State, NED, and USIP.

[A] IRI's grant is for both party agent monitor training and for voter 
education activities. We do not have a breakdown between the two 
components of the grants. IRI's total amount obligated for this award 
is indicated under Voter Education in this table.

[End of table]

Enclosure 2:

Comments from the U.S. Agency International Development:



August 19, 2005:

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Christoff:

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response to the draft GAO report entitled Rebuilding 
Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Election [GAO-05-932R].

USAID has reviewed the report and finds it to be factually correct. We 
have a few minor technical corrections that will be transmitted to you 
shortly via separate e-mail, which do not materially alter the 
substance of your findings.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 


Signed by: 

Steven G. Wisecarver:
Acting Assistant Administrator Bureau for Management: 

[End of section] 

Enclosure 3:

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact: Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979:

Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the individual named above, 
Tetsuo Miyabara, Valérie Leman Nowak, Friendly Vang-Johnson, and 
Christina Werth made key contributions to this report. Lynn Cothern, 
Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos provided technical 



[1] In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, European 
Union, and Chile provided technical advisers to the IECI to assist in 
the administration of the January 2005 election. The UN also 
coordinated this technical assistance to prevent duplication of efforts 
and gaps in the assistance.

[2] The IECI is the Iraqi government body responsible for administering 
these three elections. The CPA established the IECI before the transfer 
of power to Iraqi authorities. 

[3] Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (P.L. 
108-106) required the Office of Management and Budget to submit a 
report to the Congress every 90 days that updates the use of the funds 
appropriated in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.

[4] IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for 
Election Systems.

[5] Obligation amounts are through March 31, 2005.

[6] The Public Distribution System established a database containing 
information on Iraqis for the purposes of distributing food rations 
under the Oil for Food Program.

[7] For more information on the duration of projects, refer to 
enclosure 1.

[8] Whereas EIN monitors are considered independent and nonpartisan, 
party agent monitors represent their respective parties while 
undertaking monitoring activities. 

[9] Due to the agency's integrated approach, we did not determine the 
amount of USAID's funding that contributes to women's participation.

[10] We did not determine the cost of DOD's support for the elections 
because it is embedded in DOD's overall operating costs in Iraq.

[11] In a statement to the Congress, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency said that attacks on Iraq's election day reached 
about 300, double the previous 1-day high of about 150 during Ramadan 
in 2004.